Summaries - Office of Research & Innovation
Back Game-Theoretic Approaches to Deterrence
|Division||Graduate School of Operational & Information Sciences|
McCormick, Gordon H.
|Sponsor||Air Force Office of Scientific Research (Air Force)|
|Summary||We propose to examine the problem of deterring state actors. We are interested in several sets of problems that have not been closely considered in the deterrence literature: 1) the ways in which the deterrence problem is complicated when one is facing three or more players, 2) the ways in which cultural and other player specific attributes can influence the expected success of a deterrence program, and 3) the role that bluffing plays in the strategies of players who wish to both implement and circumvent deterrent threats. Our approach has a theoretical, empirical, and experimental component. The resulting products will advance our understanding of deterrence in complex environments.|
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|Data||Publications, theses (not shown) and data repositories will be added to the portal record when information is available in FAIRS and brought back to the portal|