Central Asia Executive Summary Series

KYRGYZTAN COUNTRY PROFILE

The Program for Culture & Conflict Studies
Naval Postgraduate School
Monterey, CA

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This paper on Kyrgyzstan provides a broad reaching, but detailed analysis of human, structural and cultural issues affecting security and development in that country. Part of our Central Asia Executive Summary Series, the profile on Kyrgyzstan provides significant and needed context to the overall international strategy in South and Central Asia.

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Phone: 831-656-3190
REPUBLIC OF KYRGYZSTAN

(Kyrgyz Respublikasy in Kyrgyz)
Short Form: Kyrgyzstan

State Emblem: 

National Flag:

![State Emblem](image1)
![National Flag](image2)


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# KYRGYZSTAN

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LOCATION

A combination of the Turkic words "kyrg" (forty) and "-yz" (tribes) with the Persian suffix "-stan" (country) creating the meaning “Land of the forty tribes”; the name refers to the forty clans united by the legendary Kyrgyz hero, Manas.

Kyrgyzstan is a landlocked country located in Central Asia: north of Tajikistan, east of Uzbekistan, west of China, and south of Kazakhstan. Kyrgyzstan means a land of Kyrgyz (Stan – land). Fifteen years ago the country was actually referred as the “island of democracy” and “Switzerland of Asia.” This has all changed over the last decade or so.

CAPITAL

Capital city Bishkek (called Frunze during the Soviet era) is located in the north, in the Chuy valley near the Kyrgyz-Kazakh border, at an altitude of approximately 800 m (2624.67 feet), on the edge of the Ala-Too range, which is an extension of the Tien Shan mountain range. Bishkek is the largest city in the country with a population of 937,400.1 Manas International Airport in the outskirts of Bishkek was home to the U.S. air base established in December 2001 to support the Operation “Enduring Freedom” until June of 2014. Bishkek is also the administrative capital of Chuy Province.

Bishkek, before becoming a capital city, was a fortified Silk Road stop on the caravan route under the Uzbek khans of large Quqon Khanate. It was then turned into a Russian garrison when Tsarist troops occupied the region in 1862. A large influx of ethnic Russians and later Slavs during the Russian and Bolshevik occupations developed the city and named it Peshpek. With about 70 percent of the population represented by Russians and Slavs the city lacked indigenous historic attributes or traditional architecture making it more of a Russian and Soviet city.

The city was later given the name Frunze after Mikhail Frunze, the Bolshevik troop commander of the Eastern Front, who ordered the onslaught of thousands of local people who supported the resistance. Commander Frunze was born in Peshpek, the city that ironically was named in his honor in 1926.

Kyrgyz’s gratitude to the Russians, who gave pastoral nomadic Kyrgyz tribes and juz (traditional cast-based clans) independence from Uzbek Quqon Khanate and then statehood within the Soviet Union, is expressed by preserving Soviet period monuments: the Mikhail Frunze Museum, the Monument to the Martyrs of Revolution (in commemoration of Kyrgyz women who supported the Bolshevik regime and organized the local mobilization in support of Red Army) built during the Soviet period, the Lenin Statue on Ala-Too Square in downtown Bishkek, which was moved

1 As 2015, according to Government statistics, see http://stat.kg/en/statistics/download/operational/219/
recently to a less prominent place, still surprise tourists and please old residents of the capital. Many street names and locations also bear Soviet heritage.

INDEPENDENCE FROM THE USSR

August 31, 1991 is celebrated as Independence Day. Present day Kyrgyzstan was formed by the Bolsheviks in 1924, first as Kara-Kyrgyz (Kara means black) Autonomous province of the Russian Federative Socialist Republic after the area was conquered by the Red Army in 1918. In 1926 it became Kyrgyz Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic and only in late 1936 was given the status of a full-fledged republic.

Map of Kyrgyzstan

TERRITORY

Total: 198,500 sq km (slightly smaller than South Dakota) Water: 7,200 sq km
Land: 191,300 sq km
Border length with China: 858km
Border length with Uzbekistan: 1,099 km
Border length with Kazakhstan: 1,224 km
Border length with Tajikistan: 870km

SIGNIFICANT TOPOGRAPHIC FEATURES

Mountain ranges cover over 93% of the country. The Tian Shan (in Chinese means Heavenly Mountains), Pamir and Alay Mountain Ranges constitute most of Kyrgyzstan’s landscape. The country is rich in lakes, rivers, and glaciers which provide abundant water resources for the country. Lake Issyk Kul is a famous tourist place in Central Asia. Song Kyl and Chatyr Kul are other major lakes; Naryn (535 km, is longest river in Kyrgyzstan), Talas, Chuy, and Kara Darya, in ranking order, are the other longest rivers in the republic. In the southern part of the country is the fertile soil and warm climate of the Ferghana Valley ideal for producing agricultural products. The Chu and Talas Valleys are other areas of irrigated land. Nearly 5 percent of the country’s total geography is woodlands. Most of Kyrgyzstan’s area is above 1,000 m; average altitude is above 2,500 m; 40 percent is above 3,000 m; and the highest point is Peak Pobedy (7,439 m).  

WEATHER

The climate of the country varies from sub-tropical at lower altitudes in the warm valleys, cooler continental in the mountainous valley and cold in the high peaks of the Tian Shan Mountains. The country’s geographic partition between north and south also offers a difference in temperature. The warmest areas in winter are in Osh province in the south of the country. The area to the north is Issyk-Kyl (means Hot Lake in Kyrgyz) have moderate cold averaging -5°C in the peak of winter from late December - January.

The Ferghana Valley part of Kyrgyzstan is the warmest region with summer temperatures reaching up +35 °C in Osh and Jalal-Abad, and just a bit cooler in Batken. The Issyk-Kyl area never gets too hot attracting thousands of international and local tourists to its positive health effects and pleasant summer climate. The Highland mountain regions have short summers where the temperature does not exceed +13°C, the long winter season lasts from November - March

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2 In Russian pobeda means victory.
with lots of snowfall and temperatures down to -20°C.

PUBLIC HOLIDAYS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Event</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>January 1</td>
<td>New Year</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March 8</td>
<td>International Women’s Day</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March 21-23</td>
<td>Noorus (comes from ancient Zoroastrian</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>tradition which many Central Asians take for</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>an Islamic New Year)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May 1</td>
<td>International Solidarity Day</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May 5</td>
<td>Constitution Day</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May 9</td>
<td>Victory Day (until recently was celebrated as</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>the Victory Day over Nazi Germany in WWII)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>August 31</td>
<td>Independence Day (from the USSR)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The dates of two Islamic holidays Orozo Ait (*Eid al-Fitr* in Arabic, the feast of End of Ramadan) and Qurban Ait (*Eid al-Adha* in Arabic, the feast of the Sacrifice) change annually depending on the Islamic calendar.

LANGUAGES

- The official language is Kyrgyz, a Southern Turkic language which includes many Arabic and Persian words. There are two major dialects: one from the northern region and the other from the south.
- Russian is widely used in Bishkek, among intelligentsia, political and business elites. It serves as the common language of communication between various ethnic groups.
- Uzbek is spoken in Osh, Jalal-Abad and some areas of Batken provinces.
- English is in big demand, particularly among the youth for educational and professional opportunities, and to access information.

LITERACY

Kyrgyzstan has a legacy of high literacy achieved in Central Asia during 70 years of Moscow’s rule over the region. United Nations Children’s Fund, the total adult literacy rate (percentage of population over the age of 15 years older who can read and write) between 2008 and 2012 was
Due to a lack of funding in the education sector, and low pay wages and heavy workloads, for teachers there is a shortage of teachers in both regular and vocational schools throughout the country.

NUMBER OF HIGHER EDUCATIONAL INSTITUTIONS
From 1990 (a year before independence) to 2007 the number of academic institutes and universities had grown from 9 to 49, according to the National Statistics Committee. In 2011-2012, there were 54 higher education institutions in the republic (33 public, 21 private). The role of private institutions is slowly increasing, in 2011-2012, these institutions accounted for approximately 12.5 percent of total student enrollments in the country.

In the 2007-08 academic year 250,460 students were enrolled in 49 higher education schools throughout the country. The number of schools and students are high for such a small country. Students represent nearly 5 percent of total population (477 students per 10,000 citizens). Forms of study include full-time, evening and distance learning taught by 14,400 teachers. Female students constituted 56.3 percent of all students. About 55,000 applicants are accepted in universities and institutes every year. The number of college graduates from 2006 (7,700) increased considerably in 2011 (13,000).

There have been concerns about the quality of private universities and institutes in particular where bribes for exams are widely known. A few university teachers in Osh and Bishkek admitted to taking bribes to survive due to low wages. Presently, the position of rector (president) of a prestigious university is among the most lucrative jobs in the country as they control the hierarchy of the bribe taking chain.

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3 https://www.unicef.org/infobycountry/kyrgyzstan_statistics.html
4 See Table: 5.03.01.01 Chislo uchebnyx zavedeniy po vidam uchrishdenii (The number academic schools per level of education) available in Russian, National Statistics Committee of Kyrgyzstan at http://www.stat.kg/stat/files/din.files/education/5030101.pdf
7 See Table: 5.03.01.04 Chislo detei i uchashihsa po vidam uchrishdenii (Number of children and students per level of education) available in Russian, National Statistics Committee of Kyrgyzstan at http://www.stat.kg/stat/files/din.files/education/5030104.pdf
9 The list of all 55 institutions in Russian is available at http://www.minedu.kg/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=15&Itemid=34
10 CCS’ interviews in Bishkek and Osh in 2005 and phone interviews in May of 2009.
HEALTH FACILITIES

The Ministry of Healthcare provides official statistics on healthcare indicators which show decline in the number of services including hospital beds, medical personnel and healthcare facilities.\(^{11}\) Newer data for hospital beds and doctors is available from the Ministry of Health, but does not specify the numbers per 10,000 people.\(^{12}\) However, aggregate data from The World Bank suggests that the numbers provided below are likely to follow the decreasing trend. The number of hospital beds available per 10,000 people was in 2012 was 48,\(^{13}\) while the number of physicians available per 10,000 people in 2013 was 19.7.\(^{14}\)

### HOSPITAL BEDS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Province</th>
<th>2000</th>
<th>2001</th>
<th>2002</th>
<th>2003</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Kyrgyz Republic</strong></td>
<td>70.4</td>
<td>61.9</td>
<td>55.3</td>
<td>52.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Batken</td>
<td>64.3</td>
<td>61.3</td>
<td>56.0</td>
<td>49.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jalal-Abad</td>
<td>62.2</td>
<td>54.8</td>
<td>47.3</td>
<td>45.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Issyk-Kul</td>
<td>53.8</td>
<td>36.1</td>
<td>31.8</td>
<td>29.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Naryn</td>
<td>59.9</td>
<td>57.8</td>
<td>34.3</td>
<td>31.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Osh</td>
<td>60.2</td>
<td>56.2</td>
<td>52.2</td>
<td>53.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Talas</td>
<td>58.8</td>
<td>55.8</td>
<td>40.0</td>
<td>27.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chui</td>
<td>56.2</td>
<td>34.9</td>
<td>32.3</td>
<td>31.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bishkek City</td>
<td>29.5</td>
<td>28.8</td>
<td>27.1</td>
<td>26.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Osh City</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>36.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### DOCTORS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Province</th>
<th>1996</th>
<th>2001</th>
<th>2002</th>
<th>2003</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Kyrgyzstan</strong></td>
<td>32.9</td>
<td>27.2</td>
<td>26.0</td>
<td>25.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bishkek City</td>
<td>46.2</td>
<td>30.7</td>
<td>28.7</td>
<td>30.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Osh City</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>25.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chui Oblast</td>
<td>24.3</td>
<td>19.2</td>
<td>18.5</td>
<td>18.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Issyk-Kul</td>
<td>27.8</td>
<td>22.8</td>
<td>21.4</td>
<td>20.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Naryn</td>
<td>25.7</td>
<td>23.1</td>
<td>19.9</td>
<td>18.8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


\(^{15}\) Ibid, p. 14, Table 2-4. Total number of beds and number of beds per 10 000 population, by regions (indicator 1.2/3.2) at [http://eng.med.kg/Files/R2004Eng.pdf](http://eng.med.kg/Files/R2004Eng.pdf)

\(^{16}\) Ibid, Table 2-6. Health personnel (doctors) per 10000 population, by regions (indicator 1.4.1.).
Due to deficiency in state’s funding in the healthcare sector and widespread poverty, access to private healthcare facilities resulted in increase of problems related to people’s health and well being, weakening confidence in the country’s health facilities. The mortality rate increased from 675.3 per 100,000 in 1999 to 717.3 in 2003.\textsuperscript{17} The child and maternal mortality rates and other indicators are among highest in the former Soviet Union zone. Babies, children and women while in hospitals in southern cities of Osh and Nookat were infected with HIV via tainted blood and the reuse of needles.

As reported in U.S. press in April of 2008, 72 children and 16 mothers were infected with HIV due to professional negligence in the Osh and Nookat state hospitals. This illustrates the alarming state of affairs in the health sector. The government does not provide free treatment for mother victims and only pays $29.00 to parents of infected children for treatment.\textsuperscript{18}

According to the former healthcare minister Marat Mabetov, Kyrgyzstan lacks almost 50 percent of medical cadres particularly in rural areas.\textsuperscript{19}

**POPULATION/DEMOGRAPHIC DATA**

\textit{As of 2015}:
- Total Population: 5,930,000
- Urban population: 2,117,000
- Rural residents: 3,813,000\textsuperscript{20}

\begin{tabular}{|l|c|c|c|c|}
\hline
Region & Talas & Osh & Jalal-Abad & Batken \\
\hline
25.0 & 20.2 & 20.7 & -- & \\
20.8 & 17.8 & 16.6 & 16.3 & \\
19.4 & 17.3 & 15.8 & 15.7 & \\
18.7 & 14.5 & 15.4 & 15.4 & \\
\hline
\end{tabular}

\textsuperscript{17} Ibid, Table 1.6. Indicator 6: Leading causes of mortality, including mortality rate per 100000 population and percent of total mortality attributable to each cause. Available at: \url{http://eng.med.kg/Files/R2004Eng.pdf}

\textsuperscript{18} For instance read: Associated Press, April 9, 2008, ‘Kyrgyz mothers catching HIV from babies: After contracting virus in hospitals, infants pass disease by breast-feeding’ at \url{http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/24034536/}


\textsuperscript{20} The World Bank, \url{http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.POP.TOTL/countries/KG?display=graph}
### Ethnic Composition of Population (January 2008)\(^{21}\)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ethnic Group</th>
<th>Number of People (in thousands)</th>
<th>Percentage from Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Armenian</td>
<td>1,1</td>
<td>0.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Azerbaijani</td>
<td>16,4</td>
<td>0.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belarus</td>
<td>1,8</td>
<td>0.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chechen</td>
<td>2,5</td>
<td>0.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dungan (Muslims of Chinese Origin)</td>
<td>60,3</td>
<td>1.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Georgian</td>
<td>0,6</td>
<td>0.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>German</td>
<td>11,5</td>
<td>0.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jewish</td>
<td>0,6</td>
<td>0.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kazakh</td>
<td>38,9</td>
<td>0.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Korean</td>
<td>18,2</td>
<td>0.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kyrgyz</td>
<td>3,616,5</td>
<td>8.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tajik</td>
<td>48,0</td>
<td>0.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tatar</td>
<td>35,0</td>
<td>0.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkmen</td>
<td>0,5</td>
<td>0.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turk</td>
<td>36,4</td>
<td>0.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uighur</td>
<td>51,2</td>
<td>1.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ukrainian</td>
<td>25,3</td>
<td>0.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uzbek</td>
<td>754,5</td>
<td>14.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>32,6</td>
<td>0.9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*The total population estimates was 5,224,300 when these numbers were generated.*

**HUMAN TERRAIN**

Kyrgyz are the dominant ethnic group in the country estimated at 4,060,835 or 70.9 percent of population as of July 2016,\(^{22}\) The nation is predominantly Sunni Muslim of Hanafi School of Jurisprudence. There are traditional kin-based and regional cleavages beneath the modern structure of the Kyrgyz society which dominate the political culture and explain the trajectory of events.

**KYRGYZ CLAN NETWORKS**

Kyrgyz people received statehood only after the arrival of the Russian Bolshevik administration. It divided the territory ruled by Central Asian Khanates along ethnic lines resulting in creation of an autonomous republic in 1926. In 1936 it became a full-fledged member of the union of 15

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Soviet states. Disjoined nomadic tribal group identities were represented in the pre-Soviet period rather than one unified national identity.

The outcomes of the Tulip Revolution revealed the significance of clanship and political culture. A wished overthrow of the Akaev’s old corrupt and nepotistic network and the re-installment of another clan occurred when the more vicious group of Bakiev’s family members and friends came to power and redistributed resources.

Although tribal or regional affiliations might not matter in relation to various issues of everyday life, they are important for politicians in Bishkek. Igor Chudinov believes his ethnicity (Russian) was an important factor when he was appointed as Prime Minister: “I’ll say openly: I am the least one in this country under the influence of local clans and regional groupings.” Most Kyrgyz are attached to certain regional and tribal groupings. Slavs, who migrated to the country during the Soviet period, have no local roots and are considered neutral in local rivalries and are regarded as good professionals.

Today, kin based clanship and regionalism, important elements of political culture of Kyrgyz, still exist and play a significant role in political life in the rivalry for access to economic assets. To residents of rural areas, the extended family is still an important part of self-identity, less so for urbanized Kyrgyz.

**Clanship**

Kyrgyz are divided into three major tribal confederations as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sol kanat</th>
<th>Ichkilik</th>
<th>Ong kanat</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><em>The Left Wing,</em></td>
<td><em>Internal</em></td>
<td><em>The Right Wing,</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>also called “Arkalyk”</em></td>
<td></td>
<td><em>also called “Otuz Uul”</em></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

According to the North, tribal groupings are informally associated with:
### Northerners

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>7 tribes in the north and west of the country:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Sary Bagysh</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Kushchu</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Solto</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Tynay</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Sayak</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Saru</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

This group includes several tribes, some of which were not of ethnic Kyrgyz origin (for instance Kypchaks) but have assimilated with ethnic Kyrgyz and now view themselves as Kyrgyz. They reside in Osh, Batken, and parts of Jalal–Abad provinces in the south.

### Southerners

Has fewer and smaller tribes than the north. Geographically based in Jalal-Abad and partially Osh provinces of southern part of the country.

### Southern Osh province had 5 governors from the northern part of the country appointed by Akaev. Former president’s frequent reshuffling of northern governors, who were perceived by southerners as rivals against the southerners coming to extract resources for personal enrichment, had increased frustration in the south.

### A group of Kypchaks, a Turkic sub-ethnic group within Kyrgyz, demanded a separate status of nationality as a sovereign ethnic group during the national census conducted in Kyrgyzstan in March – April of 2009. Kypchaks, once a powerful confederation of pastoral steppe tribes and brave warriors, migrated to Central Asia from the Irtysh River basin. They constitute a sub-ethnic group either within larger Kyrgyz or Kazakh ethnic groups. The Kypchak language is lost and they speak the language of the dominant ethnicity of the locality: Kyrgyz in Kyrgyzstan, Kazakh in Kazakhstan and Uzbek in Uzbekistan. Today most of Kypchaks reside in the Ferghana Valley.

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| Each of the seven has a dominant characteristic, and all have fought each other for influence. Majority of the country’s leaders, including Askar Akaev came from the Sarybagysh clan. |
| Southern Osh province had 5 governors from the northern part of the country appointed by Akaev. Former president’s frequent reshuffling of northern governors, who were perceived by southerners as rivals against the southerners coming to extract resources for personal enrichment, had increased frustration in the south. |

Sarybagysh clan in Akayev’s government was represented by many government officials, including: Temirbek Akmataliev, Minister of Finance, from Akayev’s village and clan; Tashtemir Aitbaev, Minister of the Interior; Cholpon Baekova, Chairperson of Constitutional Court; Osmanakun Ibraynov, Secretary of State; Bolot Dzhanuzakov, Chairman of National Security Service; Amanbek Karypkulov, Chief of Presidential Staff. During Akaev era prominent public figures and MPs Azimbek Bekenazarov, Adahan Madumarov, Omurbek Tekebaev, Dooronbek Sadyrbaev, Masaliev, Bektur Asanov and Alisher Abdimomjunov all have ties with Ichkilik clans based in Osh, Jalalabad or Batken regions in the south. Once Prime Minister, under Akaev, and current president Bakiev is also an Ichkilik southerner.
North-South Regional Divide
High mountainous landscapes divide the Chuy, Talass, Issyk-Kul and Naryn provinces in the north from Osh, Bakten and Jalal-Abad provinces in the south. The two regions of the country are linked by the Bishkek – Osh road. Costly flights run daily between the two major cities and less frequent flights between Bishkek to Batken and Jalal-Abad cities. Despite comparatively new unifying common ethnic identity, the differences in historical, political and economic developments impact relationships between regional and kinship affiliations. The Bolsheviks did not disrupt the internal political rivalry between local elites as long as they were loyal to Moscow. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, the political battle of the former nomadic horse shepherds in the north which undergone forceful urbanization and embraced Russification against the settled tribes of the agricultural south, where Islam and close interaction with Uzbek and Tajik cultures had a significant influence, reemerged and the appearance of little known Askar Akaev became a result of an inter-regional political settlement.

North and South have their regional dialects of Kyrgyz language.

MAJOR ETHNIC MINORITIES
Uzbeks
Ethnic Uzbeks represent 14.5 percent of the total population. Uzbeks constitute the majority of important southern cities such as Osh, Kar-Suu and Jalal – Abad. Uzbeks were the largest indigenous minority since the region was under the Uzbek Qoqon Khanate until the Bolsheviks divided the major local ethnic groups into separate republics but the borders were drawn with a high degree of planned arbitrariness.

Inter-ethnic clashes between Uzbeks and Kyrgyz which erupted in June of 1990 in the Osh province resulted in nearly 1,000 casualties, most of whom were Uzbeks. Sponsored by the KGB, which tried to instigate inter-ethnic conflicts to regain control of the colonies, Kyrgyz nationalists organized violent attacks on Uzbeks with the epicenter in Uzgen, an ancient Uzbek city. Violence was characterized by brutality towards women, children and the elderly. This event planted the seeds of mistrust between ethnic Uzbeks and Kyrgyz in the south. Although there is status quo in relationship between the two it is more fragile than it may appear on the surface.

Since Kurmabek Bakiev assumed the presidency, arrests and kidnapings of ethnic Uzbeks allegedly linked to Hizb-ut-Tahrir and IMU by the National Security of Uzbekistan with permission of the Kyrgyz authorities have increased and have led to at least two killings of prominent Uzbeks. These developments along with the underrepresentation of Uzbeks in the government and in law enforcement add to the level of tensions between two ethnic groups.

Russians
Currently, less than a half million ethnic Russians reside in Kyrgyzstan while in 1999 they
numbered 603, 201. During the years of independence every third Russian (or nearly 700,000) left the country. Most Russians (Slavs in general) reside in major cities, primarily Bishkek and Osh.

The first wave of emigration started in 1989 and in the early years of independence in the early 1990s. The inter-ethnic clashes in the Ferghana Valley during Gorbachov’s political relaxation period, although not anti-Russian, raised fear among Russian Diaspora which forced more than 100,000 Russians to leave Kyrgyzstan.

With independence, most government positions were transferred to ethnic Kyrgyz and many Russians realized their dominant status was lost. Anti-Russian statements by Kyrgyz nationalists on the community level made Russians feel threatened politically and sometimes physically, which contributed to departure of thousands of ethnic Russians and Slavs from the country. However, high unemployment and low wages became the major factor of the second wave of emigration which started in the late 1990s. Worsening socio-economic conditions, corruption, police abuse, and lack of employment opportunities continue to motivate many Russians to depart the Kyrgyz Republic.

Kyrgyz - Russian relations are usually stable and positive. Closer relations between the two states were solidified by the closure of the U.S. air base at Manas International Airport which was aimed at receiving economic compensation from Russia.

In comparison with Uzbekistan, the Kyrgyz government has tried to preserve Russian Diaspora which consisted of highly trained professionals the country lacked.

**RELIGION/SECTS**

Ethnic Kyrgyz constitute the majority of population and the second largest ethnic group Uzbeks are both Sunni Muslims of Hanafi School of Jurisprudence. Ethnic Russians belong to the Russian Orthodox Church.

Nominally Muslim nomadic tribes of Kyrgyz, more in the past than at present, also practiced their ancient local religious traditions, including shamanism, which were at odds with Islam. Kyrgyz in the south are generally more religious than in the north due to the influence of the Uzbeks and Tajiks of the Ferghana valley. Although Quqon Khanate ruled from 1710 to 1876 over all Kyrgyz tribes the modern southern Kyrgyzstan is geographically closer to the capital of the Khanate in the Ferghana Valley city of Quqon. In recent years the north has seen an increase in the percentage of Kyrgyz who have strong religious sentiments towards Islam in comparison

23 Table 5.01.00.03 ‘Natsionalnyi sostav naseleniya’ (Ethnic composition of population), available at: http://www.stat.kg/stat.files/din.files/census/5010003.pdf
with previous years. The Central Mosque in capital Bishkek is overcrowded at Friday prayers and now donations are being collected for construction of a new mosque for 10,000 worshipers in the capital. Many mosques have been built in other cities in the north during the independence. Uzbeks, residing in the south, have traditionally been religious and are viewed by Kyrgyz nationalists and the secular government with suspicion. The southern Kyrgyzstan with its center city of Osh was an epicenter of anti-Bolshevik resistance in 1920s. After the collapse of the Soviet Union Western Evangelist Christian missionaries, mostly from America, descended on the Kyrgyz soil in an effort to recruit converts from among formerly atheist Soviet populations.

**ADMINISTRATIVE SETUP**

The country is divided into 7 provinces, which are subdivided into rayons. Rayons are districts similar to counties in the United States; each rayon has its own administrative center.

Rural areas consist of town type villages (in Russian: posolok gorodskogo tipa) and ayil keneshi (union of several rural settlements) which are administered by ayil ökmötu (village administration).

Each province has a capital. Capital Bishkek and Osh City represent separate administrative units also being capital cities of provinces giving them special status. Osh city is also often called “the southern capital.”

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24 Province in Kyrgyz is called oblast, a loanword from Russian.
25 In Russian: selskiy naselonyi punkt.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Administrative Unit</th>
<th>Area (sq. km.)</th>
<th>Capital City</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Bishkek City</td>
<td>115,700 heactares (0.1 sq. km.)</td>
<td>---</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Batken Province(^{27})</td>
<td>17,000 (8.5% of total territory)</td>
<td>Batken</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Chuy Province</td>
<td>20,200</td>
<td>Bishkek</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Jalal-Abad Province(^{28})</td>
<td>37,700 (16.9% of total territory)</td>
<td>Jalal-Abad</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Naryn Province</td>
<td>45,200 (25% of total territory)</td>
<td>Naryn</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Osh Province</td>
<td>29,200</td>
<td>Osh(^{29})</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Talas Province</td>
<td>11,400 (5.7% of total territory)</td>
<td>Talas</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Issyk Kul Province</td>
<td>43,100 (21.6% of total territory)</td>
<td>Karakol</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Map of Provinces and District of Kyrgyzstan\(^{30}\)**

**Corresponding Districts within Each Province on the Map:**

\(^{27}\) Until 1999 Batken province was a part of Osh oblast until IMU incursions into Kyrgyzstan prompted more attention of the central government and more resources to Batken district of Osh province.

\(^{28}\) From 1959 to 1990 was part of Osh province.

\(^{29}\) As of June 2003 Osh city is a separate administrative unit; at the same time it is also a capital of Osh province.

\(^{30}\) [http://enrin.grida.no/htmls/kyrghiz/soe2/english/map/map3.htm](http://enrin.grida.no/htmls/kyrghiz/soe2/english/map/map3.htm)
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Province</th>
<th>Centre</th>
<th>District and Centres</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ysyk-Köl</td>
<td>Karakol</td>
<td>1. Ak-Suu (Karakol), 2. Ieti-Ögüz (Kyzyl-Suu), 3. Tong (Bököńbaev), 4. Tüp (Tüp), 5. Ysyk-Köl (Cholpon-Ata)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Batken</td>
<td>Batken</td>
<td>1. Batken (Batken), 2. Kadamjav(Pülgün), 3. Leilek (Isfana)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
POLITICAL LANDSCAPE
THE GOVERNMENT

Almazbek Atambayev
President of Republic of Kyrgyzstan

LIST OF MEMBERS OF CABINET OF MINISTERS AND CHAIRPERSONS
AS OF March 2017

Sooronbay Jeenbekov
Prime Minister

Abulgazi Muhammetkaly Dyushekeevich
First Deputy Prime Minister
Oleg Pankratov
Deputy Prime Minister

Sultanbekova Cholpon Aalyevna
Deputy Prime Minister

Razakov Zhenish Parpievich
Deputy Prime Minister

Osmonaly Akylbek Sharipovich
Chief of Staff/Head of Office
Erlan Abdyldaev Bekeshovich
Foreign Minister

Dzhunushaliyev Kashkar Astanovich
Interior Minister

Akhmetov Tulondievich
Minister of Justice

Kasymaliev Adylbek Aleshovich
Minister of Finance
Kozhoshev Arzybek Orozbekovich
Minister of Economy

Murasheva Murpaziljanovıç
Minister of Agriculture, Food, and Reclamation

Kalilov Žamšitbek
Minister of Transport and Road

Kubatbek Harrow Ayylchievich
Minister of Emergency Situations
Kudaiberdieva Gulmira Karimovna
Minister of Education and Science

Batyraliev Talantbek Abdullaevich
Minister of Health

Kazakov Tugelbay Reno
Minister of Culture, Information and Tourism

Isakunova Taalaykul Bazarkulov
Minister of Labor and Social Development
OFFICIAL POLITICAL PARTIES
Kyrgyzstan, which in the recent past was called an “island of democracy”, had more than 100 registered political parties and movements before last parliamentary elections in December of 2007. Easy party registration laws allowed people to organize political groups of various orientations. Many parties had small membership while others were even unknown by the general public. Many parties critical of the executive branch had representation in the legislation.

The recent amendment to the Constitution states that parliament members are elected on the party lists basis for 5 year terms.

- **Ak-Jol Eldik Partiyasi**: Ak-Jol (literally translates as white road or bright path) and Eldik Partiyasi means people’s party. Short form used: *Ak-Jol*. The party was created in 2007 by the merger of Ata –Jurt (Fatherland), El Kelechegi (Great Future), Menin Olok (My Country), Republican Party of Labor and Unity, and a few smaller parties informally headed by President Bakiev. Bakiev resigned from his official chairmanship of the party because officially the head of the executive branch cannot be a member of a political party. President Bakiev was involved in establishing a new party which would be loyal to the leader of the country who faced growing disagreement with the legislative branch.

The Jogorku Kenesh (means Great Council; the name of Kyrgyz parliament), which was
dissolved in 2007 by the president and his party, received 71 seats out of 90 at the last parliamentary elections in December of 2007. These elections were criticized by international and local observers for breaching the international elections norms.

Many local and international experts viewed former President Bakiev’s efforts in creating a party based parliament with a strong pro-president presence in the legislation as a way to politically weaken traditionally independent Jogorku Kenesh and minimize the presence of influential parties critical of the government. The victory of Ak- Jol Party at the 2007 elections was a successful step in strengthening the power of the executive branch.

Former President Bakiev’s justification for creation of a new party was announced at the Ak-Jol party founding ceremony speech in October of 2007: “In the best cases, they simply criticize the authorities for their mistakes. But who will, who should, take care of affairs? Which political forces [or] political parties have done real work, have made progress toward those goals that stand before the country? Up until today, there haven't been any.”

In reality, considering the development of political events in the country, it is obvious that the example of the Russian president Putin’s domination in the Duma through “Unified Russia” Party is a motivation for legal changes in the election of parliamentarians. As of 2015 the Social Democratic Party of Kyrgyzstan holds 38 seats in Parliament, or 27.4 percent of the vote. Almazbek Atambayev became won elections in December 2011 to become the new Prime Minister.

Jany Kyrgyzstan (New Kyrgyzstan) Party faces a split among those who call for support of President Bakiev and those who are inclined to support opposition.

BANNED RELIGIOUS MOVEMENTS AND PARTIES
According to the constitution, Kyrgyzstan is a secular state and no parties based on religious platform may function legally, regardless whether they use violent or peaceful means.

*Hizb-ut-Tahrir (Party of Liberation)*
The party’s goal is rebuilding the single Islamic Khilafah State (Caliphate) through propagation and peaceful transformation of Muslim society and finally establishing ‘Islamic household.’ The radical party which is predominantly Sunni, with Islam as an ideology, does not employ violent means but Central Asian governments have accused HT of using terrorism.

HT is anti-Western, anti-Semitic, anti-secular, considers democracy a Kufr system, and calls for

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the overthrow of Muslim governments which do not obey the party’s vision of the Islamic governance and according to them, the country is currently a ‘Kufr household.’

Hizb-ut-Tahrir members first appeared in Central Asia in mid-1990s in Uzbekistan. The massive arrest campaign launched by the government after the Tashkent February 1999 bombings brought the party into the spotlight, which has been unknown for Central Asians. The government blamed IMU and Hizb-ut-Tahrir but arrested not only alleged members of these organizations but anybody who regularly attended prayers and was known for religious piety. Hizb-ut-Tahrir’s regular members openly criticized the unpopular government of Karimov and did not accept the offer from former President Karimov for pardon. This gesture won the respect of many people who might not have shared the ideology of the organization but agreed with critical statements towards the ruling regime.

Although the party claims to be peaceful, some members left the party and either joined the militant movements or created their separate cells (not associated with HT) which use violence. The organization is banned in all Central Asian states.

Hizb-ut-Tahrir, despite its popularity in early stages of its appearance in Central Asia, failed to become a popular movement due to highly secretive recruitment, heavy repressions, little interest among populace in political Islam and theological discrepancies with mainstream Islamic doctrine called Aqidah in Arabic. Differences in doctrine of Ahl as-Sunna wal-Jama’ah (majority of Muslims) and of HT is a significant obstacle for broad public support and recruitment of new members, particularly among religiously educated Muslims. Regular members are more preoccupied with political work, despite religious rhetoric, that makes some believe they are a purely religious organization. The frequency and quantity of leaflet distribution among the populace in the region has been decreasing and the number of arrests of alleged members of HT has decreased, which indicates the party has lost ground in Central Asia.

Traditionally, HT was popular among ethnic Uzbeks; besides Uzbekistan the organization was also active in the border areas of neighboring counties populated by ethnic Uzbeks. Currently, the group is most active in Kyrgyz and Tajik sections of the Ferghana Valley and the southern regions of Kazakhstan.

**HT in Kyrgyzstan: An Aggressive Public Diplomacy**

A significant conflict between the authorities and HT occurred in the city of Nookat in southern Kyrgyzstan on October 1, 2008 when locals celebrated Islamic religious holiday Orozo Ait but the government suddenly refused to provide the center of the city for festivities and charity which traditionally have been held every year. The government’s refusal to allow public celebration led to a peaceful rally to the district administration building and then turned into mass riots. The security forces launched mass arrests: 32 individuals (25 ethnic Uzbeks and 7

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33 Ibid.
ethnic Kyrgyz) had been arrested and 90 more people are on the government wanted list. Surprisingly the authorities included children of 10 and even 4 years old and elderly who are 71, 74 and even 81 years old. Human rights organizations claim the police used torture during investigation and demanded money for release among many other violations of human rights.\textsuperscript{34}

The reason behind government’s ban on publicly celebrating Orozo Ait was fear that HT would exploit this holiday for its public relations campaign when the party members provide free meal to poor and agitate masses to join the organization and change the government. In Kyrgyzstan’s more liberal conditions than in other states of the region, HT utilized the opportunity to propagate its ideas more ambitiously. HT’s materials in Kyrgyz provided by ethnic Kyrgyz were able to reach the audience in northern regions of the country, including, Chuy, Bishkek and Naryn. In February 2007, law enforcement arrested 11 members of HT who came from the south to Naryn to help rebuild the area hit by an earthquake. Despite the fact that the party had been banned, the leadership of the outlawed group shifted from closed, secretive tactics to open mass agitation via words and deeds to gain support.

The government of former President Bakiev was less tolerant of dissent and more even so towards Islamists of any kind. The government banned headscarves in public schools, prevented school children from attending Friday prayers, and extradited refugees from Uzbekistan. Bakiev’s policies reflected his own authoritarian style and attempted to please the regime of Uzbekistan, which demanded from Bishkek to destroy Uzbek president’s critics residing in Kyrgyzstan when discussing the natural gas export.

According to a leading expert on Islamist organizations in Kyrgyzstan, Ikbaljan Mirsaitov, there are currently about 2,000 members of HT which is much less than the number cited by authorities.\textsuperscript{35} Some experts on HT in Kyrgyzstan, including official estimates, claim the party has 15,000 members in Kyrgyzstan and 20 percent of them are representatives of various ethnic groups besides Uzbeks and Kyrgyz: Tatars, Russians, Chechens, Meskhetian Turks and others.\textsuperscript{36} The party has been banned since 2003.

According to Country Reports on Terrorism 2008 by the U.S. State Department, “Kyrgyz officials reported growing support for and bolder public outreach by HT. Supporters of terrorist groups the Islamic Jihad Group (IJG) and the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) were also believed to maintain a presence in Kyrgyzstan, and Kyrgyz authorities alleged that both groups

\textsuperscript{34} For more details on the conflict read the report of Human Right Center “Memorial” at http://www.memo.ru/2009/03/02/0203091.htm
received material support from HT.”37

**Other Islamist Organizations Banned in Kyrgyzstan**

The Kyrgyz Government and other Central Asian states, members of Shanghai Cooperation Organization, all include the following ethnic Uyghur separatist groups in the list of Central Asian terrorist organizations:

- **Sharqiy Turkestan Islamiy Harakati**
  *Eastern Turkistan Islamic Movement (a.k.a Eastern Turkistan Islamic Party; ETIM; ETIP)*

- **Sharqiy Turkestan Azatliq Teshkilati**
  *East Turkistan Liberation Organization (ETLO)*

China uses its economic and military power to curtail support for any Uyghur separatist group and ethnic Uyghurs from the local governments. The region has comparatively large economic influential Uyghur diasporas, particularly in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan which share borders with China.

Most Uyghurs in Central Asia are disillusioned over the Chinese government’s policy towards approximately 18 million Turkic Muslims of the Xinjiang-Uighur Autonomous Region (XUAR), historically known as Eastern Turkistan. Muslim ethnic groups of Kyrgyzstan and from neighboring states are sympathetic with Uyghurs as they share a common religion, culture and history of viewing China’s presence as illegitimate. Meanwhile, Central Asian leaders extradite “the enemies of Chinese State” without much investigation as to whether the person was actually involved in separatist, terrorist or extremist activities. In 2006, Huseyin Celil, a naturalized Canadian citizen of Uyghur origin who fled China in mid-1990s, was sent back to the People’s Republic of China by the Uzbek authorities despite protests by human rights organizations and the Canadian authorities. The extradition of Uyghurs to China is a matter of tension between Uyghur diaspora and the local governments.

**FOREIGN MILITARY BASES**

**RUSSIAN MILITARY BASE IN KANT**

Located only 20 km from the capital Bishkek is the military base originally established in 1941 (after the invasion of German Nazi forces into the USSR) as a Soviet air force base. It also served as a military pilot training school for military air crews for the Soviet Air Force.

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The Russian-Kyrgyz agreement of 2003 authorized Russian military to rent the base for 15 years with a 5-year extension term. The Russian Federation spent US $2.6 million in upgrading the base in 2003 and intends to invest even more to reconstruct the runways which should be able to accept heavy TU-160 and TU-95 ("Bear") bombers.

The airbase, under command of the Russian 5th Air Army based in Uralsk Military District, is also used by the Collective Security Treaty Organization [CSTO], a security alliance of some post-Soviet states

The Kant base hosts about 400 permanently deployed Russian troops, four L-39 combat training jets, two MI-8 combat transport helicopters, eight SU-25 attack aircrafts and five SU-27 fighters and six IL-76 transport aircrafts. The base is also “capable of receiving heavy-load An-22 and IL-76 transport aircraft, as well as passenger Tu-154, Yak-42, An-12 and other commercial aircraft.”

In late April of 2009 Nikolai Bordyuzha, Secretary-General of CSTO, during a visit to Kyrgyzstan said that Russia’s leadership plans to increase the number of military aircraft at Kant. He explained the decision is dictated by the situation in the region, including Afghanistan.

In late May of 2009 the Russian Government proposed 49 years long lease contract with 25 years of automatic prolongation if neither side decides to end the deal. The Kyrgyz side expressed its readiness to accept the offer. In 2012, a 15-year lease extension was agreed upon by both sides. However, Kyrgyz President Atambaev, has recently expressed his view on Russia’s presence in his country by saying that the “Russian military will have to leave its base in Kyrgyzstan in the future.”

Kyrgyzstan currently receives US$ 4.5 million and military and technical aid from Russia as a compensation for rent of the Kant base.

US AIR BASE AT MANAS INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT

The US base was established in support of Operation “Enduring freedom” in December of 2001

38 Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, Uzbekistan and Tajikistan are members of this organization.

39 There are rumors that Uzbekistan is considering to leave CSTO.


42 http://24.kg/english/46179_Russia_is_ready_to_withdraw_military_base_from_Kant_on_first_demand/

on the territory of the Manas International Airport in the outskirts of capital Bishkek. Kyrgyzstan, threatened by Taliban’s expansion close to the borders of the former Soviet Central Asian states and in expectation of financial compensation, expressed its willingness to host the American and NATO forces targeting Al-Qaida and Taliban in Afghanistan. The base was closed in 2014. President Atambaev has said that the decision to close the U.S. military transition hub was the “right decision.”

American Manas Air Base was the home to the 376th Air Expeditionary Wing and approximately 1,000 military personnel from the United States, Spain and France were assigned to the wing, along with 650 U.S. and host-nation contractor personnel. Coalition aircrafts supporting the mission includes U.S. KC-135s, Spanish C-130s and French C135FRs.

On February 20, 2009 the Foreign Ministry of Kyrgyzstan delivered an official letter to the U.S. Embassy in Bishkek demanding the base to be closed within 6 months. Although Russian and Kyrgyz authorities deny the closure of the American base was the result of Russia’s financial assistance package promised to an impoverished country. Since the region depends heavily on foreign aid, many observers believe Russians promised to provide US $2,150 million in loans to cement Moscow’s diplomatic efforts to oust the U.S. bases from the region.

There were long negotiations between the United States and Kyrgyzstan interceded by former Afghan President Karzai who asked Kyrgyz president to allow Americans to continue renting the base. The American side offered to pay a higher rent if the Kyrgyz government reconsiders its decision to evict US and NATO troops.

The extensive talks between the two sides resulted in an agreement: the military base was turned into a cargo transit center of non-military items into Afghanistan. The Kyrgyz government agreed to use the Manas airport in exchange for higher rent in the amount of US$ 60 million and aid to Kyrgyzstan in the amount of US $41.5 million. The base as suggested was closed in 2014.

During the meeting between former Russian President Medvedev and former President Obama in Moscow in early July Moscow the deal was signed that will allow U.S. military cargo aircrafts to overfly Russian airspace and transit overland necessary military and non-military deliveries to Afghanistan which most probably will lead to Kyrgyzstan’s permission to transport military shipments despite “non-military items only” agreement.

45 More information on the US Manas Air base can be obtained from its official web site: http://www.manas.afcent.af.mil/
SECURITY SITUATION

There are currently several important internal and external developments which will influence the security situation in the country:

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<th>Internal Developments</th>
<th>External Developments</th>
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<td>1. Political/security situation in Afghanistan</td>
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<tr>
<td>2. Criminalization of Politics</td>
<td>2. Kyrgyz—Uzbek relations</td>
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<tr>
<td>3. Sharpened tensions between powerful political and business elites</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Return of a large army of labor migrants to put additional pressure on poor socio-economic conditions</td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

INTERNAL DEVELOPMENTS

Criminalization of Politics

Employing criminal groups by the new leadership that needed broader public support and access to economic resources in early stages of Bakiev’s realm led to legitimization of some powerful criminal figures attempting to dominate politics and state assets. While Kurmanbek Bakiev was president, the killings and unresolved mysterious deaths of politicians and journalists became a part of political life in the country. In the first two years after the Tulip Revolution contract killings took the lives of 25 famous public figures, including businessmen, politicians, a famous actor and a well-known athlete.47

On April 4, 2009 the murder of a fifth parliamentarian within last four years sparked intense debate and claims within the Kyrgyz society about former President Bakiev’s close ties with the criminal world. Tashbolot Baltabaev, a leading member of the opposition party ‘Ata Meken’ and a parliamentarian, suspects that “The criminal world and [political] power go hand in hand, and that is regarded as being in the order of things.” He further warns that “… the shootouts and contract killings will continue.”48

List of individuals involved in politics killed/dead/disappeared since 2005:

1. Parliamentarian Sanjarbek Kadyraliev, was killed outside his home on April 14, 2009 by an unidentified lone gunman who shot him once in the back of the head. Politician and businessman Kadyraliev was close to the president and belonged to pro-presidential political party Ak Zhol (White Path). Kadyraliev is known for his criminal past when he

confronted another gang group leader in the south Bayaman Erkinbayev who was also a MP. Many believe Kadyraliev is responsible for the assassination of his major mafia rival, Erkinbayev.

2. Former head of the president’s administration, Medet Sadyrkulov, was killed in a car incident on March 13, 2009. Some opposition figures accused the government in organizing the car crash to eliminate an influential politician who joined President Bakiev’s opposition and a former presidential aide who knew “too much” about his former boss. The investigation implicated Omurbek Osmonov, who was found dead with “multiple knife wounds in a village outside of Bishkek.” After accusations by opposition leaders that Osmonov was framed, the Prosecutor General’s Office said that it would restart the investigation, but fires in the building “destroyed numerous files relevant to the case.”

3. The political observer of ‘Reporter – Bishkek’ independent newspaper Syrgak Abdyldaev was knifed on March 3, 2009 by unidentified individuals. The journalist produced critical reports about the government’s policies which many observers believe became the reason for the authorities’ vendetta against Abdyldaev. He survived the attack.


5. A well-known journalist for Voice of America Alisher Saipov (an ethnic Uzbek) was shot outside of his office in Osh in late October 2007. He is believed to have been killed by Uzbek National Security Service on the territory of Kyrgyzstan for critical reporting about Uzbek president with illicit approval of former President Bakiev. This was in exchange for a better natural gas supply deal from Uzbekistan for natural gas hungry Kyrgyzstan.

6. In August of 2006 the Kyrgyz security service officers shot a famous Imam Rafiq Qori Kamoluddin, an ethnic Uzbek preacher whose mosque attracted up to 10,000 people at a Friday prayer in the border city of Kara-Suu. Imam was well known for his criticism of Karimov’s foreign and internal policies. Qori Kamoluddin’s supporters believe he was killed by the Kyrgyz troops but on the request from an Uzbek counterpart.

7. Chairman of the Kyrgyz parliament's committee for legal affairs, defense and law and order Tynychbek Akmatbaev was shot dead in Moldavanovka prison near the capital on October 22, 2005 when he tried to pacify prisoners’ protest against bad conditions in Kyrgyz jail. Experts on Kyrgyz politics believe the newly appointed president relied on support of Tynychbek Akmatbaev’s brother Rysbek who was allegedly a mafia baron in the north of the country where southerner President Bakiev had little support. Prime Minister Kulov had an alliance with the rival underworld gang leader Azizbek Batukaev,

50 https://www.state.gov/documents/organization/160059.pdf
51 https://www.state.gov/documents/organization/160059.pdf
an ethnic Chechen accused in killing MP Akmatbaev who also had ties with the criminal world in the past. The conflict between two powerful criminal groups led to conflict between President Bakiev and then Prime Minister Kulov which indicates the ability of influential criminal figures to project power on the government. Following the death of Tynychbek, his brother, a mafia baron Rysbek, became MP after being cleared of triple homicide. During Akaev’s presidency Rysbek Akmatbaev was wanted on a list of charges at home but former President Bakiev’s alleged support for Rysbek set the notorious criminal and his six accomplices free of all charges. In May of 2006 mafia boss and newly elected MP Rysbek Akmatbaev was shot dead in outskirts of capital Bishkek, however there were rumors that he is alive but faked his assassination.

8. Bayaman Erkinbayev, a member of the Kyrgyz parliament since 1995 and a supporter of President Akaev who was also known as a leader of a powerful criminal group in the south, did not survive the third assassination attempt. Bishkek died on September 21 and various explanations were rumored about who killed Erkinbayev but the law enforcement offered no credible conclusions of the official investigation. Some experts believe Erkinbayev was killed by a rival criminal group that tried to seize the strategic economic asset - Kara-Suu bazaar on the Kyrgyz-Uzbek border which brought lucrative profits to the owner of this market. Others suspect the new political leadership got rid of a pro-Akaev politician and a powerful gang leader to control the rich resources of the southern region. By installing new criminal leaders loyal to a new government the president ensures political support in the south and access to wealth for his family.

9. Parliamentarian Jyrgalbek Surabaldiev, who was known for his sympathy with former president Akaev, was killed by unidentified gunmen on June 10, 2005 in the centre of Bishkek. The assailants have not been found. MP Surabaldiev head of the “Union of Entrepreneurs –New Step” and a powerful businessman was also suspected in having ties with criminal groups that caused suspicion that criminal groups behind then Acting President Bakiev were redistributing resources and eliminating competitors. This is the first case of an MP murder in Kyrgyzstan.

A well-recognized expert on Kyrgyzstan Erica Marat says new hybrids of power relations developed within the state after the Tulip Revolution, “Common economic interests between criminal and political actors merged within the state apparatus. Both groups could operate in sync in maintaining licit and illicit businesses while simultaneously representing the state and enjoying legal status.”

Many observers claim Bakiev’s family members are involved in illegal business activities occupying important positions in the government while formally engaging in the private sector. Many Kyrgyzstanis say that Bakiev’s family is much larger than of the former

president (Askar Akaev has no brothers; Bakiev has seven brothers) and therefore the current
president and his family has significantly higher financial and political appetite.53

Local and foreign journalists cite that businessman Maxim Bakiev, President’s younger son
whose nickname is “prince”, is connected to the criminal world and engaged in extortion and
other illegal economic crimes.54 The famous case of Maxim’s efforts to seize a profitable TV
Radio company ‘Pyramida’ in December of 2005 symbolized the aims and tactics of
President Bakiev’s family clan. These were more dangerous than of the family of former
President Akaev.

Despite that, Maxim denies his involvement in politics and claims he’s only a businessman
there are allegations of Maxim’s political pressure on his father’s opponents. Former head of
the Central Election Commission (CEC) Klara Kabilova in a video address to citizens of
Kyrgyzstan55 accused Maksim Bakiev of threatening her in front of employees. This threat
was made in front of employees of the CEC one week before the elections for 491 city and
town council positions.56

There were rumors that Bakiev’s brother Janybek (more often called Janysh) is controlling
drug trafficking in the south. In 2006, Janysh was fired as deputy head of the National
Security Service after the parliament learned he was helping his brother to get rid of powerful
critics. Janysh allegedly ordered the deputy head of Manas International Airport to plant
drugs in the luggage of highly respected Parliamentarian Tekebaev who was travelling to
Poland in 2006.57 Since his brother became president, Major General Janybek Bakiev has
installed many corrupt police officers into key positions in law enforcement in the south to
arrange the smooth delivery of drugs.58

In general, crimes of various types are on the rise. According to statistics from the Ministry

53 CCS’s phone interviews with several residents in Bishkek and Osh, April 2009.
54 For instance read articles: “Kyrgyz TV Station alleges takeover attempt,” Eurasianet.org Daily Digest, December
9, 2005. Available at: http://www.eurasianet.org/resource/kyrgyzstan/hypermail/200512/0006.shtml or read in
Russian “Delo Poroskuna-Sirotinoy nesot risk dla kirgizkix elit: Vsesilnyi mladshiy syn prezidenta Kirgizii ‘prins’
Maksim Bakiev otobral u zakonnyx vladeltsev pansionat ‘Utos’ na beregu Issyk-Kyla” ( The case of Poroskun-
Sirotina bears a serious risk for the Kyrgyz elites: almighty younger son of Kyrgyz president ‘prince’ Maxim Bakiev
forcefully took over ‘Utos’ resort on the beach of Issyk-Kul Lake) by Viktor nesinov, December 13, 2007. Available
at http://compromat.ru/page_24966.htm
55 Video address of Klara Kabilova in Russian is available at http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=aQbC1VhzI50
56 Read “Local Kyrgyz elections spark national uproar, amid fraud allegations and threats” The ISCI Analyst
Volume XV Number 2 (9 October 2008), Section: Central Asia, at
http://www.bu.edu/iscip/digest/vol15/ed1502.html
57 For details on this case read “Kyrgyzstan Rocked by Smear Scandal,” Institute for War & Peace Reporting, RCA
58 “Narkotiki vygodnee amerikanskoy bazy” (Drugs are more profitable than American base), Positsiya.ru Internet
news agency, April 24, 2009. Available at: http://www.posit.kz/?lan=ru&id=105&pub=23920
of Internal Affairs, as of February of 2009, 2,600 crimes were reported which is 5.1 percent higher than in February of 2008 and 18.6 percent higher than the previous month. Murder rate increased to 14.8 percent from February 2008 to February of 2009; an increase is also cited for other type of offenses: rape up 3.8 percent, hooliganism up 1.7 percent; burglary up 3.9 percent and economic crimes up 1.4 percent.\(^5^9\)

Figure below shows the updated numbers for crime in the country.

Anara Tabyshalieva, a well-established specialist on Kyrgyz politics, claimed that there were 24 known organized criminal groups and four criminal networks in the country in 2006.\(^6^1\)

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\(^6^0\) http://www.stat.kg/media/publicationarchive/e240e5ae-ffec-4acf-ad2f-ae3c66f8ae0f.pdf

\(^6^1\) See “Political violence on the rise in Kyrgyzstan,” Anara Tabyshalieva, 01/25/2006 issue of the CACI Analyst, at
Former President Bakiev’s attempts to strengthen his grip on power and secure his re-election in July of 2009 were managed by his family members and friends occupying lucrative positions in the government and seizing maximum assets from the private sector. More than his predecessor, President Akaev, Bakiev relied on services of the criminal authorities in pacifying resistance to his political and financial advancement throughout the country. Although the nexus between the political elite and the criminal groups existed before the 2005 Tulip Revolution, the mafia barons have never been as influential as they are now. This threatens the country by shifting the balance towards further criminalization of state institutions and monopolizing the economic policies which ultimately lead to turning the republic into a criminal state. Interim government formed and in 2011 Almazbek Atambayev was elected President; Atambayev won the 2011 Presidential elections and has been in power since.

**Sharpened Tensions between Powerful Political and Business Elites**

The 2005 Tulip Revolution disrupted the inter-clan equilibrium established during the Akaev era and triggered the attention of political and business elites whose well-being depends on new parity between the players. Surprisingly, even for opposition leaders to Akaev, their bet on Kurmanbek Bakiev brought disillusionment when the new president dismantled the old king and now tries to become a new one.

The emergence of new people in the political and business arena associated with the new president and their gains at the expense of the old powerful figures is still an ongoing process and needs careful attention. Resources are scarce and the country cannot satisfy economic demands of all interested parties while general socio-economic conditions of the common people do not improve. The traditional thirst for political power in Kyrgyz society is explained by the centralized distribution of resources by the executive branch with the private sector largely dependent on ties with powerful politicians. Therefore, access to political power gives access to economic resources and exemption from the law.

**Issue of Returning Labor Migrants**

Almost one third of Kyrgyzstan’s population works abroad as migrant workers; majority (92%) in Russia and remaining majority in Kazakhstan.62 With the global economic slowdown, especially impacting Russia’s economy, a substantial portion of the more than one million migrant workers are expected to return to Kyrgyzstan. This has been a gradual change. For example, remittances fell to US $1.367 billion in the first 11 months of 2014, compared to US


http://www.cacianalyst.org/?q=node/3691
$1.447 billion during the same time period the year before. The influx of a large number of unemployed who will need jobs or welfare is a serious concern for national and local authorities. The population heavily suffering from unemployment and low wages now will face even further social problems and economic hardships. The influx of this new group, combined with the fact that along with then remittances to Kyrgyzstan will also decrease, people are likely to see increase in food and housing prices.

EXTERNAL DEVELOPMENTS
Kyrgyzstan’s security and economic conditions are subject to a significant influence from external relations with next door neighbors, regional and global players. Poor in natural resources and technologically disadvantaged, the nation is isolated from seaports and dependent on neighbors for communication and energy and totally reliant on larger players like Russia and China for security. At this moment in its history, Kyrgyz Republic faces challenges in relations with Uzbekistan and has growing concerns over the situation in Afghanistan.

Political/security situation in Afghanistan
Starting 1999 the Kyrgyz Republic has been affected by the instability in Afghanistan. During the conflict between the Northern Alliance and Taliban, Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, in an attempt to overthrow the regime of President Karimov in Uzbekistan, tried to infiltrate southern Batken province on their way to Uzbekistan. Uzbek Islamists also crossed Kyrgyz border and clashed with the law enforcement in 2000 and 2006. Kyrgyz military is underequipped and poorly trained which makes it incapable defending the republic from external threats. Kyrgyzstan heavily relies on security and military aid from Russia, China and the U.S. The Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan views southern Kyrgyzstan, which is a part of the Ferghana Valley, as a recruiting ground for support and an integral part of the Islamic state they aim to build in Central Asia.

Incursions of Central Asian Islamist groups linked with Taliban and Al-Qaida into Kyrgyzstan and other states of the region might intensify due to military operations against Taliban and Al-Qaida in Pakistan and Afghanistan. Authorities of Kyrgyzstan claimed on June 23, 2009 the units of Kyrgyz National Security Committee clashed with and killed 5 well trained and equipped fighters of Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan in a private house full of explosives and ammunition in Tashbulak settlement of Suzak District of Jalal-Abad province neighboring with Uzbekistan – the prime target of IMU and IJU. The Kyrgyz officials identified the militants but refused to announce the names but admitted they are not citizens of Uzbekistan and belong to IMU. Although the Kyrgyz officials believe the Islamist group linked with Taliban was IMU it

is possible that the five member group identified in Ferghana Valley was a cell of Islamic Jihad Union fighters which launched attack on law-enforcement in Andijan province of Uzbekistan on May 26, 2009.

**Kyrgyz—Uzbek Relations**
The relations between the two have a significant impact on Kyrgyzstan’s economic development and security. Several important issues impede healthy relations between the neighbors: water distribution, hydro-electric stations, border demarcation, and water supply.

**Water Distribution**
Water sharing between upstream countries Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan on one side and downstream states Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan on the other side becomes a cornerstone issue for regional stability. Decreasing water levels, mainly coming from Syr Darya and Amy Darya and continuous growth of water consumption due to increasing population in the region, Kyrgyzstan’s (Kambarata -1 and Kambarata -2) and Tajikistan’s (Rogun) plans to build giant hydro-electric stations are of great concern for downstream countries. These issues along with the Aral Sea disaster are serious problems the leaders from five states have enormous difficulties to resolve.

The Kyrgyz authorities seem to be very determined to build the gigantic Kambarata hydroelectric stations despite strong resentment from Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan. Addressing the meeting with NGOs in Bishkek on May 5, former President Bakiev announced: "We will build the Kambarata hydroelectric power stations in Kyrgyzstan whether one likes it or not."66

Kyrgyzstan tries to establish the new terms for water, which should be treated as commodity with a price set by upstream countries. Uzbekistan strongly objects to this notion and demands that water be treated as a common good for the entire region.

Uzbekistan, for lack of payment, cuts supply of natural gas to Kyrgyzstan during the winter season. The Kyrgyz hydro-energy sector has to let water run through the Toktogul Dam to generate power but this causes flooding in Uzbekistan, which experiences shortage of water during the summer season. The Kyrgyz side is frustrated that Uzbekistan sells natural gas to Kyrgyzstan at almost world price (US $240 per 1,000 cubic meters) without any discount. Also not allowing Bishkek to use its internal hydro energy capacity, the Kyrgyz authorities have to maintain water reservoirs to hold water until summer for downstream states.

Tashkent’s view is that natural gas is a commodity and requires investment into production,

http://www.rferl.org/content/Kyrgyzstan_Says_Slain_Militants_Were_Uzbek_Nationals_/1762715.html

transportation and maintenance of pipelines while water is a God given resource running from the Mother Earth’s mountains to all and upstream countries should not take control of this common good.

**Border Demarcation**

On April 19, 2009 approximately 40 police and border patrol troops of Uzbekistan illegally entered Kyrgyz territory and searched homes of residents in the village of Chek of Jalal-Abad province. The Uzbek officers behaved rudely claiming they were conducting anti-terrorism operations.

Then-Kyrgyz Prime Minister Chudinov informed the parliament that 80 percent of Uzbek-Kyrgyz border is agreed to. The remaining 20 percent is a difficult portion of areas in Kugart, Shahimardan, Sokh enclave and few other places. The Prime Minister explained that the border agreement is complicated due to conflicting documents and maps that mark the border of Central Asian states first in 1924 and then in 1956.67

This border incident highlighted the importance and urgency of resolving the border demarcation issue. The unfinished demarcation of the border often sparks local conflicts between Uzbek law enforcement and Kyrgyz residents.

Amid the attacks of Islamic Jihad Union fighters on law enforcement facilities and 2 suicide attacks on police officers in Andijan and Khanabad cities on May 26, 2009 near Uzbek –Kyrgyz border in volatile Ferghana Valley, the Uzbek government ordered digging 3 meters wide and 3 meters (in some areas, such as Madaniyat, Bekabad - up to 5 meters) deep trenches along the border. Along some border areas such as Chek-2 the Uzbek authorities remove the houses of locals in order to create a buffer zone to protect the border - the Uzbek authorities fear new incursions of Islamic militants into Uzbekistan from Kyrgyz territory. One sided security measure of the Uzbek side triggered frustration in Bishkek which view the unfriendly action of neighbor as illegal since the both sided have not completed the delimitation process.

The Inflexible and unfriendly border policy of the Uzbek government has caused obstacles for trade, water supply, travel, and has even led to a death of a local trader. On June 7, 2009, Ulug Usmanov, an ethnic Uzbek from Kyrgyzstan was shot by Uzbek border guards when he tried to cross the border into Uzbekistan in the point not designated for trespassing near the commercial town of Karasuu. The Uzbek authorities seized the body of the killed 29 years old resident of the border town and had not returned it to relatives for several days. Ulug Usmanov and many other local traders used to cross the Uzbek border to buy fruits and vegetables and other food stuffs and return to Kyrgyzstan after paying bribes to Uzbek border guards but this time he became a

victim of Tashkent’s barbaric treatment of local residents living in the valley that linked three republics of Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. Even when the Soviets formally introduced borders between these brotherly nations, locals would travel without restrictions.

**Gas Supply**

Power cuts for many hours during winter season threaten the government’s ability to provide energy. Energy is critical and a matter of survival for any regime in power in Bishkek. Every year the Kyrgyz authorities face uncertainty about Tashkent’s willingness to sell the volume needed for Kyrgyzstan and annual increase of price for this strategic commodity.

In 2009 the price of natural gas from Uzbekistan to Kyrgyzstan was set at US $ 240 per 1,000 cubic meters while Uzbekistan was demanding US$ 300 and the 2009 price is US$ 95 higher than in 2008. Irregularities with timely payment have been another problem with energy trade relations between the two states.
APPENDIX I

LINKS TO NEWS AND RESOURCES ON KYRGZSTAN/CENTRAL ASIA

Official Sources
Official Web site of the President
www.president.kg

State Portal
www.government.gov.kg

Ministry of the Foreign Affairs
www.mfa.kg

Ministry of Finance
www.minfin.kg

State Customs Committee
www.customs.gov.kg

State Committee for taxes and fees
www.sti.gov.kg

State National News Agency “Kabar
www.kabar.kg

Kyrgyz Diplomatic Services
http://www.kds.kg/main_en.html

State Committee on State Property
www.spf.gov.kg

News Agency “Gazeta.kg”
www.gazeta.kg

News Agency “24.kg”
www.24.kg

News on Kyrgyzstan/Central Asia in English, Russian and Uzbek:
Information Agency Ferghana.ru:
http://www.ferghana.ru/

News on Kyrgyzstan/Central Asia in English and Russian:
EurasiaNet:  
http://www.eurasianet.org/index.shtml

CentralAsiaNews:  
http://en.ca-news.org/

News on Kyrgyzstan/Central Asia in Russian:
Russian news web site Centrasia.ru:  
http://www.centrasia.ru/

FreeDoilnanet, radio news in Russian, Uzbek and Kyrgyz:  
http://www.freedolina.net/

News of Kyrgyzstan/Central Asia in English
RFE/RL in English:  
http://www.rferl.org/section/Kyrgyzstan/159.html

BBC Asia:  
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/default.stm

Institute for War & Peace Reporting:  
http://www.iwpr.net/?p=rca&s=f&o=346738&apc_state=henprca

The Times of Central Asia:  
http://www.timesca.com/

CentralasiaNews.net:  
http://www.centralasianews.net/

Transitions On Line News:  
http://www.tol.cz/look/TOL/section.tpl?IdLanguage=1&IdPublication=4&tpid=16

Turkish Weekly:  
http://www.turkishweekly.net/category/5/central-asia.html

Central Asia – Caucasus Institute Analyst:  
http://www.cacianalyst.org/

News on Kyrgyzstan in Kyrgyz only
RFE/RL in Kyrgyz:  
http://www.azattyk.kg/

BBC in Kyrgyz:  
http://www.bbc.co.uk/kyrgyz/

Zaman:  
http://kg.zaman.com.tr/kg/
**Analytical Reports**
International Crisis Group:  
http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?id=1251&l=1

Russian and Eurasian Security Network:  

National Bureau of Asian Research:  
http://www nbr.org/

RAND Center for Asia Pacific Policy:  
http://www.rand.org/international_programs/capp/pubs/central.html

**OFFICIAL WEBSITES OF MINISTRIES AND INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS**

**Regional International Organizations**
Shanghai Cooperation Organization:  
http://www.sectsco.org/

Eurasian Economic Community:  
http://www.evrazes.com/

Collective Security Treaty Organization:  
http://www.dkb.gov.ru/