GRADUATION:
NPS Spring Quarter Graduates Embrace Change, Celebrate Teamwork
(NPS.edu 16 June 23) … MC2 Lenny Weston
With teamwork and the inevitability of change as central themes of the day, the Naval Postgraduate School (NPS) recognized its 2023 Spring Quarter graduates on June 16 during a ceremony at King Hall Auditorium.

EDUCATION:
Marine Corps Ph.D. Graduate Explores Uncertainty in Machine Learning
(NPS.edu 15 June 23) … Javier Chagoya
During his Ph.D. studies in Computer Science at the Naval Postgraduate School (NPS), U.S. Marine Corps Lt. Col. Pedro Ortiz worked with his faculty advisor, Assistant Professor Marko Orescanin, to focus his dissertation on helping to enable rapid, effective decision-making for commanders in an era of ever-increasing sensor data and uncertainty.

RESEARCH:
NUWC Division, Keyport Employee Develops Innovative Methods for Locating Underwater Objects
(DVIDS 8 June 23) … Frank Kaminski
The United States Government, as represented by the Secretary of the Navy, has received a patent for the invention of novel methods for locating underwater objects by sensing pressure waves…Paulus was the primary investigator in collaboration with Naval Postgraduate School on the HMV project and received the 2021 Dr. Delores M. Etter Top Scientists and Engineers of the Year Award in the Individual Engineer category for his contributions to it.

STUDENTS:
An Electrified POV: Leveraging BEVs for Military Travel Policy Reform
(Real Clear Defense 16 June 23) … Alfonso Sciaccitano & Marieme Gueye, Barada Moncravie Students at NPS
Electric vehicles are becoming more popular with Americans, and that includes service members. The 2022 Inflation Reduction Act (IRA) prioritized energy security and climate change and the Congressional Budget Office estimates $64 billion in funding within the IRA will be spent on lowering energy costs, increasing clean production methods, and reducing carbon emissions by 2030. Further advancing the Nation’s policy on energy security and carbon emission reduction, the Biden Administration announced steps towards the construction of 500,000 additional electric vehicle (EV) chargers across the United States and the goal of having EV sales account for 50% of all vehicle sales by 2030.
FACULTY:

**Learning the Lessons of Afghanistan**
*(The American Conservative 8 June 23)* … Daniel Strand

With the last military planes taking off from Kabul airport at 11:59 P.M. on August 30, 2021, the nearly twenty-two year American war in Afghanistan came to an end. The television scenes of Afghans falling off the wheels of C-17’s as they sought to escape the country symbolized the chaos and panic of this long and bloody chapter in Afghanistan’s history—and an ignominious end to the two decade long Global War on Terror that spanned four U.S. presidencies…Carter Malkasian, a professor at the Naval Postgraduate School and former civilian advisor to the then chairman of the Joint Chiefs, General Joseph Dunford, has written a well-researched and comprehensive account of the American war in Afghanistan that begins to help us make sense of this long conflict. Why were we there for two decades? How did the 9/11 attacks trigger this herculean and protracted effort on behalf of the American people? How did a once promising and popular invasion end up an unpopular failure?

David Henderson on Economists’ Nobels, Obitz, and More [Audio Interview]
*(Ricochet 16 June 23)* … Juliette Sellgren

David Henderson is a research fellow at Stanford University’s Hoover Institution and the editor of the Concise Encyclopedia of Economics. He is also an emeritus professor of economics with the Naval Postgraduate School. He is the Wall Street Journal’s go-to writer for pieces on Nobel prizes and deaths in economics, which we talk about today, exploring a list of favorites. He tells us of their contributions to the field and some stories.

**The Korea Model Why an Armistice Offers the Best Hope for Peace in Ukraine**
*(Foreign Affairs 20 June 23)* … Carter Malkasian

In the middle of August 1952, Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai traveled nearly 4,000 miles to Moscow to meet with the Soviet dictator Joseph Stalin. Zhou was acting as an emissary for the leader of China, Mao Zedong. The two Communist powers were allies at the time, but it was not a partnership of equals: the Soviet Union was a superpower, and China depended on it for economic assistance and military equipment. Two years earlier, Mao and Stalin had embarked on a joint venture of sorts, giving their blessing to the North Korean leader Kim Il Sung when he invaded South Korea. Their hopes had been high; even though the United States immediately rushed to South Korea’s aid, Stalin telegrammed Kim in the wake of the invasion to tell him that he had “no doubt that in the soonest time the interventionists will be driven out of Korea with ignominy.”… Carter Malkasian is Chair of the Department of Defense Analysis at the Naval Postgraduate School and author of The Korean War, 1950–1953. From 2015 to 2019, he served as Special Assistant for Strategy to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The views expressed here are his own.

ALUMNI:

**Lieutenant General Michael Groen Joins Academy Securities’ Advisory Board and Geopolitical Intelligence Group**
*(Business Wire 9 June 23)*
*(UCW News Wire 9 June 23)*

Academy Securities, a registered broker-dealer, certified Disabled Veteran Business Enterprise (DVBE), and Minority Business Enterprise (MBE), today announced the addition of Lieutenant General Michael Groen to its Advisory Board and Geopolitical Intelligence Group…Lieutenant General Groen earned his Master’s Degrees in Electrical Engineering and Applied Physics from the Naval Postgraduate School. He is the author of, With the First Marine Division in Iraq, No Greater Friend, No Worse Enemy.

**THS Grad in Command of Ship in Bahrain**
*(Tehachapi News 11 June 23)*

Lt. Commander Grant Mead Barrett, a 1999 graduate of Tehachapi High School, is now in command of the USS Dextrous, a United States Navy Avenger-class mine countermeasures ship homeported in Bahrain. He has been assigned to the ship as Executive Officer for the past 18 months…Ashore, he attended Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey, where he earned a master’s degree in financial management and completed joint professional military education, phase one. Following Naval post-graduate school, he was assigned to surface warfare officer school in Newport, Rhode Island, where he was a cruiser gas turbine lead Instructor.
**A Navy Diver Lived a Record-Breaking 100 Days Underwater**

*We are the Mighty 12 June 23* … Miguel Ortiz

On June 9, 2023, University of South Florida Associate Professor Dr. Joseph Dituri, Ph.D. resurfaced at Key Largo, Florida, after living underwater for 100 days. Dituri, a retired U.S. Navy Saturation Diving Officer, began his submerged stay in a 100-square-foot underwater room at Jules' Undersea Lodge on March 1, 2023. From 22 feet underwater, he continued to teach his students online, living up to his nickname, "Dr. Deep Sea."

Dituri enlisted in the Navy in 1985 and worked in saturation diving and ship repair. He attended the University of South Carolina where he earned a B.S. in Computer Science before commissioning through the Navy's Special Operations Officer pipeline. As a diving officer, he attended the Naval Postgraduate School and earned a Master's degree in Astronautical Engineering. After nearly 28 years of Naval service, Dituri retired at the rank of commander. He earned his Ph.D. in Biomedical Engineering at USF.

**USS Stethem (DDG 63) Change Of Command**

*DVIDS 14 June 23* … Saavan Patel

Family and friends gathered together for a change of command ceremony at Naval Base San Diego where Commander James Watts relieved Commander Bryan Hart as Commanding Officer of USS Stethem (DDG 63). In attendance at the ceremony was Robert Stethem’s Father, and retired Navy Senior Chief, Richard Stethem…His relief, CDR James “Nate” Watts is a native of Lawrenceville, Georgia. He attended The Citadel Military College of South Carolina, earning a Bachelor of Science in Business Administration and commissioned in 2005. He also attended the Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey, California, where he earned a Masters of Arts in National Security Affairs specializing in Middle East studies. He has served as Executive Officer of USS Stethem since October 2021 and is grateful to return to take command of Robbie’s destroyer.

**Former MAXAR Director selected to be President of Edgybees Inc.**

*Sat News 21 June 23*

Edgybees Inc., the newly formed U.S. division of Edgybees, LTD, announced the selection of Ken Campbell as its new President. A global leader in georegistration software, Edgybees provides advanced solutions to the U.S. government, states, and the commercial sector to enable faster, more accurate, and detailed analysis of imagery derived from aerial and satellite imaging sensors…He holds a Master of Arts in National Security Affairs from the Naval Postgraduate School and a Bachelor of Arts in Political Science from San Francisco State University.

**UPCOMING NEWS & EVENTS:**

- **July 4:** Independence Day (Federal Holiday)
- **July 7:** Foundations of Academic Writing
- **July 25:** SGL with CEO’s (ret) Lockheed and Raytheon
With teamwork and the inevitability of change as central themes of the day, the Naval Postgraduate School (NPS) recognized its 2023 Spring Quarter graduates on June 16 during a ceremony at King Hall Auditorium.

Keynote speaker Gary Wipfler, who served as vice president and treasurer for Apple Inc. from 1997 to 2021, lauded the achievements of the quarter’s 349 graduates, among them six recipients of doctoral degrees and 25 international students representing 16 countries.

"Today marks your graduation day from NPS, which has also prepared you to be lifelong learners," Wipfler said. "What better skill and capacity can you walk away from here today, than with the capacity, and the mind, to keep learning – especially in times of change?"

Retired Vice Adm. Ann E. Rondeau, president of NPS, opened the ceremony by acknowledging the graduates’ hard work and investment in themselves and the respective missions of their services and nations. She also reminded the graduates that they achieved their goals together.

“This has been a team sport,” said Rondeau. “You cannot do this alone. We cannot lead alone. We cannot learn everything that we need alone. We can do some solitary work, about gathering of knowledge and information; but problem solving, solutions creation, and truly coming to different ways and approaches to the challenge in front of us every day … That is a team sport.”

Rondeau highlighted a few key areas of research that the new alumni focused on through their degrees, including artificial intelligence, cyber warfare, and logistics. She also recognized three historic firsts, acknowledging the first female graduates from Pakistan (Army Maj. Rukhsana Zenab) and Trinidad and Tobago (Coast Guard Lt. Sherisse Moore) and the first NPS graduate from Belgium (Army Maj. Cedric Craninx).

“This is what we do in our military services, whether or not you’re from the U.S. or from one of our international partners,” said Rondeau. “This is about the team getting things done.”

A key figure in many of Apple’s achievements since he first joined the company in 1986, Wipfler shared several anecdotes from his 35-year tenure, citing specific examples of how Apple and co-founder Steve Jobs epitomized change in Silicon Valley. He encouraged the Spring Quarter graduates to likewise embrace change and innovation.

"Change is inevitable – don't get stuck and complacent in the status quo," he said. "Ask yourself: is there a better path forward?"

But Wipfler also advised the graduates to be on the lookout for opportunities throughout their careers. He used the metaphor of sliding doors – seemingly inconsequential moments that nonetheless alter the trajectory of future events.

"Each and every day will present opportunities and sliding doors for you," said Wipfler. "It is only later that you will recognize the profound impact of a decision that might seem ordinary."

Throughout his remarks, Wipfler referenced critical points in his life and career at Apple, including challenges which had a significant influence on his personal and professional journey.

"Times of difficulty and challenge will often yield the best learning and opportunities," said Wipfler. "If when things get easy, put those curious minds to work, look around the corners, seek the challenges, and you will be rewarded. … "

"You are all leaders – capable, smart, ready for what comes next," he continued. “And in times like these, where change is increasing in breadth and speed, the world needs good leaders. And the world needs you!"

For more information about the Spring Quarter class, visit the NPS Graduation website at https://nps.edu/graduation.
Marine Corps Ph.D. Graduate Explores Uncertainty in Machine Learning
(NPS.edu 15 June 23) … Javier Chagoya

During his Ph.D. studies in Computer Science at the Naval Postgraduate School (NPS), U.S. Marine Corps Lt. Col. Pedro Ortiz worked with his faculty advisor, Assistant Professor Marko Orescanin, to focus his dissertation on helping to enable rapid, effective decision-making for commanders in an era of ever-increasing sensor data and uncertainty.

As battlespace sensors proliferate and data increases, commanders can easily find themselves in an information paradox: drowning in data, but starving for knowledge.

U.S. Marine Corps Lt. Col. Pedro Ortiz, who will graduate from the Naval Postgraduate School (NPS) on June 16 with a Ph.D. in Computer Science, focused his dissertation on this challenge to help enable rapid, effective decision-making for commanders in an era of ever-increasing sensor data and uncertainty.

“I am very interested in applying artificial intelligence and machine learning to solve warfighter problems,” Ortiz said. “Ideally, I would like to be able to investigate a warfighting problem, posit some solutions, and lead the efforts to apply those solutions at operational units.”

Ortiz’ dissertation, entitled “Uncertainty Quantification and Decomposition through Bayesian Deep Learning for Big Data Satellite Remote Sensing Problems,” was something of an exercise in doing just that. Through the application of probabilistic models to massive satellite remote sensing data sets, Ortiz examined uncertainty quantification (UQ) methods that are pivotal in reducing the impact of uncertainty during optimization and decision-making processes.

Ortiz joins an elite group of graduates from the Marine Corps’ Ph.D. Program (PHDP). This very competitive program – only two candidates are selected each year – provides the service with a cohort of strategic and highly technical thinkers to support senior leader decision-making, assist in developing defense and service strategies, and help inform long-range concept and capability development areas.

In his next assignment, Ortiz will report to the DOD Chief Digital and Artificial Intelligence Office (CDAO) to apply his newfound knowledge and expertise. According to Ortiz, his research has the potential to positively affect the joint all-domain command and control (JADC2) in both present-day and future operations.

“My research involved using data sets from two different satellites, and two different sensors on each of those satellites,” he explained. “We used probabilistic deep learning to fill in the gaps in a microwave dataset using infrared from a different satellite. We were also able to quantify the uncertainty, and tell you how reliable the data we generated from that model was.”

UQ methods have been applied to solve a variety of real-world problems in science and engineering.

“With more data to fill in the gaps between different sensors, and an ability to understand the uncertainty in the data, the warfighter now has more information to make better decisions,” Ortiz said. “High uncertainty means the model output may not be trustworthy. Understanding the uncertainty makes the output of a model more interpretable. This applies to many military decisions,” such as target identification and other complex automated military systems.

Ultimately, Ortiz says modeling predictions will help with decision-making, as they address a critical component of trustworthiness in artificial intelligence and machine learning.

“It is my hope that my research will encourage other people to use the same models I did so that they can reap the benefits of being able to measure uncertainty,” he continued. “One of the main contributions I made was demystifying how to use this additional information for many scientific fields, essentially anywhere deep learning is being used today or might be used in the future.”

Ortiz began his Ph.D. journey at NPS just as the COVID-19 virus had gripped the world and NPS went to 100 percent online education.

“The Ph.D. program was rigorous, and really stretched my thinking,” said Ortiz. “Despite the pandemic, there were still a lot of advances in my field and figuring out how to make a unique contribution was difficult, as difficult as it would have been before the pandemic. Fortunately, I had a
great advisor, Professor Marko Orescanin. We were able to publish a journal article in my first year at NPS, which is not necessarily the norm.

“My thinking also changed over time. I wrote my dissertation proposal in my first nine months, and my dissertation turned out to be much different two years later. That’s not really surprising, as that is how science progress goes; come up with an idea, test it, make an adjustment, repeat,” he continued.

As a life-long learner, Ortiz’s professional approach – during both the peak of the pandemic and the school’s return to normalcy – committed him to a research regimen that was second nature. In fact, this is Ortiz’ second educational tour with NPS; he graduated in 2010 with a master’s degree in computer science, completing his studies three months early and earning an Outstanding Thesis distinction. Ortiz said he was pleased to see that there are several master’s students at NPS today who are already investigating follow-on lines of his Ph.D. research.

Regardless of the challenges at the outset, Ortiz reveled in the rigor of his program and found a unique problem that was directly relevant to a key operational naval issue. Ortiz will also graduate with the distinction of being the first Hispanic Marine to earn his Ph.D. through the Corps’ PHDP-Technical (PHDP-T) program.

Ortiz is one of 349 NPS warrior-scholars who will cross the stage at King Hall on June 16, marking the completion of their studies in the 2023 Spring Quarter Graduation Ceremony. The event is scheduled to begin at 10 a.m. Pacific (1 p.m. Eastern) and can be viewed live on the NPS website at https://www.nps.edu/watchlive.

Learn more about Ortiz’s research here: https://youtu.be/b-s_i3cGxjY

Marine Corps Ph.D. Graduate Explores Uncertainty in Machine Learning - Naval Postgraduate School (nps.edu)

RESEARCH:

NUWC Division, Keyport Employee Develops Innovative Methods for Locating Underwater Objects

(DVIDS 8 June 23) … Frank Kaminski

The United States Government, as represented by the Secretary of the Navy, has received a patent for the invention of novel methods for locating underwater objects by sensing pressure waves.

Inventor Mark Paulus, Ph.D.—who works as Department Technology Officer for Naval Undersea Warfare Center Division, Keyport’s Unmanned and Theater Undersea Warfare Systems Department—said the patent is the product of a Naval Innovative Science and Engineering-funded project that sought to develop a less expensive, more compact technology base for acoustic directional sensors.

“[The goal was to] use signal processing techniques with cheaper sensors to accomplish the same thing that was done with more expensive sensors,” said Paulus.

The new technique is an outgrowth of another technology Paulus was involved in developing called the Hybrid Mobile Vehicle for Undersea Tracking, which provided a new low-cost, portable undersea tracking capability deployable from many U.S. Navy surface vessels and capable of returning to launch point at the completion of the mission, said Paulus.

Paulus was the primary investigator in collaboration with Naval Postgraduate School on the HMV project and received the 2021 Dr. Delores M. Etter Top Scientists and Engineers of the Year Award in the Individual Engineer category for his contributions to it.

While working on the HMV project, Paulus pursued a NISE project aimed at improving on the HMV’s sensor, which eventually led him to develop the patented method.

NUWC Division, Keyport electronics engineer Emily Saito laid out circuit boards for the experimental sensor array. Saito said this array was better at picking up information from its surroundings than the original array because it had more sensors positioned at many different angles.
While a commercial product has not yet resulted from the experimental sensor, NUWC Division, Keyport computer engineer Daniel Gentile, who provided critical engineering support on both the HMV project and this latest one, said he believes it’s feasible to realize the original goal of improving on the HMV’s sensor.

Gary Zook, a retired principal technologist for NUWC Division, Keyport’s Test and Evaluation Department and current Keyport contractor, was Paulus’ supervisor at the time of the HMV project. Zook said Paulus’ most recent work is “pretty significant” in its potential to make portable ranging systems cheaper and easier to deploy by reducing the number and cost of their components.

DVIDS - News - NUWC Division, Keyport employee develops innovative methods for locating underwater objects (dvidshub.net)

STUDENTS:

An Electrified POV: Leveraging BEVs for Military Travel Policy Reform
(Real Clear Defense 16 June 23) … Alfonso Sciachitano & Marieme Gueye, Barada Moncravie Students at NPS

Electric vehicles are becoming more popular with Americans, and that includes service members. The 2022 Inflation Reduction Act (IRA) prioritized energy security and climate change and the Congressional Budget Office estimates $64 billion in funding within the IRA will be spent on lowering energy costs, increasing clean production methods, and reducing carbon emissions by 2030. Further advancing the Nation’s policy on energy security and carbon emission reduction, the Biden Administration announced steps towards the construction of 500,000 additional electric vehicle (EV) chargers across the United States and the goal of having EV sales account for 50% of all vehicle sales by 2030.

State policies are also pushing the United States towards the federal clean air goals of 2030 and 2050. California put forth the Advanced Clean Cars II rule in November of 2022, requiring all vehicles sold after 2035 to be battery-electric or plug-in hybrid. Other states have already adopted the same policy or are in the process of ratifying it to further push for countrywide use of EVs. Adoption by these states alone will require 25% of all vehicles sold in the United States to be low or zero-emission.

According to the American Automobile Association, a quarter of Americans expect their next car to be an EV. Applying data to anecdote, the desire to adopt clean energy vehicles by Americans is also apparent based on light-duty (cars of various size, sport utility vehicles, and light-duty trucks) vehicle data collected by the Alternative Fuels Data Center. Recent years have seen an explosion in the adoption of EV infrastructure across the United States and the rate of development is still increasing. In 2022 alone, 6,300 fast charging stations were installed, pushing the total number of fast charging stations above 28,000. The recent adoption of Tesla chargers by Ford and GM now means more stations are available to EV owners than ever before. With this more robust infrastructure and increased number of battery-electric vehicles (BEV), service members are now more likely to own a BEV.

Focusing on the Military, Military One Source estimates more than 400,000 service members execute a primary change of station (PCS) each year. For moves within the continental United States, many members choose to drive their Personally Owned Vehicles (POV) due to the milage reimbursement policy provided for travel. The Department of Defense (DoD) needs to update the Joint Travel Regulation (JTR) PCS policy to address service members who elect to drive their BEV POV from one station to the next. The current JTR states, “A traveler who is authorized PCS travel by POV is allowed one day of travel for the first 400 miles between authorized points. For any distance greater than 400, the traveler is allowed another day of travel for every additional 350 miles.” Assuming an average speed of 50 miles per hour, the total daily travel time to cover the allotted distance is place at seven or eight hours. Most service members would consider this reasonable as it is the time equivalent to an average workday.

BEV route planning is complex as BEVs must consider their proximity to existing charging infrastructure to maximize their distance traveled between stops. The BEV route must account for the
availability of chargers. For example, a BEV with a range of 150 miles is on a long-distance trip. Two charging stations exist along its route with one eighty miles and the other 140 miles from the starting point. An appropriate route plan will schedule a charge at the closer station to ensure adequate reserve energy is available to the driver. This type of planning for a BEV is not always necessary for a gas-powered vehicle because there are a greater number of gas stations available along routes. This higher availability of gas stations allows for a reduction in stops, resulting in greater distance traveled between refueling.

A one-on-one comparison when executing PCS travel using a gas-powered vehicle versus a BEV is provided in a hypothetical PCS from Monterey, CA to Annapolis, MD. Google Maps was used to find a route for the gas-powered vehicle and the BEV route was found using “abetterrouteplanner.com,” which considers the BEV type, charging method, and desired battery usage. The routes are different due to the location of the current charging infrastructure available for BEVs, however the difference in route length is minor.

Several assumptions are used in this comparison to find the estimated total drive time for both vehicles. The maximum gas-powered vehicle range is used to determine the total number of stops needed for refuel. These rest stops are fifteen minutes each to allow the driver time to conduct other necessary tasks. The BEV route is planned so that the battery is charged to a maximum of 80% at a Type 3 fast charger and depleted to a level of 10% to maximize the range between stops. The 80% maximum is used as it is the typical charge cutoff for fast-charging stations. These calculations do not account for weather, terrain, or additional weight effects on the calculated travel range. Finally, the costs associated with refueling or charging are not considered.

Authors via Google Maps

Figure 1. Comparison of Electric Vehicle vs. Gasoline car routes across the United States. While the BEV route is negligibly longer, it takes 20% longer to transit, because of availability of charging stations. This time difference needs to be considered in future updates to the JTRs.

The comparison shows gas-powered vehicles take approximately 44.6 hours to cover 2,900 miles while a BEV takes approximately 53 hours to cover 2,937 miles. This indicates a BEV is expected to take 20% longer to PCS travel than a gas-powered vehicle. This trip’s extension is due to the frequent charging that BEVs require in order to get across the United States. The length of charges can vary between 20 minutes and 1 hour to ensure there is enough battery charge to comfortably make it to the next available charging stations. Additionally, the featured range of BEVs is not always achieved when driving due to recommended battery control settings or features.

To drive this point home, we compare four popular vehicles used by Service Members, two gas-powered vehicles (Toyota Camry and Ford F – 150) and two BEV (Chevy Bolt and Tesla Model 3 Standard Range). The gas-powered vehicles are expected to take 44.8 hours and 44.3 hours to make the trip, while the BEVs will take 60.2 and 51.0 hours. This limited analysis shows that this trip takes between 23 – 35% longer with a BEV than a gasoline powered car. Converting to eight-hour travel days, this means the Service Members driving their gas-powered vehicles along this route will finish their PCS in six days while the Service Members with BEVs will take an additional one to two days of travel.

While the route difference as measured by miles driven is negligible, the extra time required for charging makes for a considerable difference. Additionally, the BEV drivable range can vary drastically and lead to an increased number of charges required between two destinations. The data collected on all 2022 BEVs show the minimum and maximum number of charges required to get across the United States to be 11 (2022 Mercedes Benz EQS 450+) and 42 (2022 Mazda MX-30), respectively. This leads to BEVs spending significantly more time at a rest stop compared to gas-powered vehicles that would only require five to seven stops to complete the journey. This disparity in time spent charging also equates to more time on the road by some BEVs than other vehicles. Without changing the authorized number of travel days, this may lead to some Service Members with BEVs driving longer hours or faster speeds each day to make up for lost time.

This paper is written to highlight that the current JTR does not account for service members executing PCS moves using their BEVs. We recommend that the JTR adds BEV travel guidance to the current
regulations. The updated guidance would state that service members executing PCS travel via BEV should not be expected to cover the same mileage per day. While more analysis needs to be done than what is presented here, the initial estimate infers that BEVs can only cover 80% per day of what gas-powered vehicles can. Therefore, BEV’s should be allotted 320 miles for the first day and 280 miles for each subsequent day. The Service Member’s safety is of utmost priority and adding this section ensures that priority is communicated and enforced. DoD leaders update policies to reflect national trends affecting service members and the nationwide BEV trend is no different. As most of the country is transitioning to BEV, the DoD Defense Travel Management Office needs to adjust their policies by updating the JTR to account for the arising travel needs. It is recommended that revisions to the JTR should make use of the findings of this paper and add guidance on BEV travel time allotted per day to promote safe PCS travel.

LT Alfonso Sciacchitano, USN, is a former fast-attack submarine officer and tactics instructor. He is pursuing a doctorate in mechanical engineering for the engineering duty officer community at the Naval Postgraduate School.

LT Marieme Gueye, USN, is a former surface warfare officer having served on LHD-4 and ACU-1 officer tours in San Diego. She lateral transferred to the engineering duty officer community and is a system engineering student at the Naval Postgraduate School.

LT Barada Moncravie, USN, is a former nuclear surface warfare officer. He served on a DDG tour in Japan and CVN tour in Newport News, VA. He lateral transferred to the engineering duty officer (nuclear) community and is a system engineering student at the Naval Postgraduate School.

Learning the Lessons of Afghanistan - The American Conservative

FACULTY:

Learning the Lessons of Afghanistan
(The American Conservative 8 June 23) … Daniel Strand

With the last military planes taking off from Kabul airport at 11:59 P.M. on August 30, 2021, the nearly twenty-two year American war in Afghanistan came to an end. The television scenes of Afghans falling off the wheels of C-17’s as they sought to escape the country symbolized the chaos and panic of this long and bloody chapter in Afghanistan’s history—and an ignominious end to the two decade long Global War on Terror that spanned four U.S. presidencies.

American troops began withdrawing from the field of battle in May 2021, and the Taliban ramped up attacks on the American-trained and supported Afghan army. By August the army had completely crumbled, and the Afghan national government, including President Ashraf Ghani, had fled the country. The Taliban controlled the capital, Kabul, and the twenty years of American nation building were lost in a span of weeks.

With a little over 2,000 American soldiers killed and many thousands more maimed and permanently disabled by the conflict, much of the public would like to turn the page and forget the longest war in American history. The American people stopped paying attention to the war long ago and the defense establishment shifted to great power competition with China. No small portion of our political class would like to forget the war because it happened on their watch. Much like the colossal failures of our Covid policy, leaders are hoping that the American penchant for forgetting will allow them to escape accountability. But we should not let them.

Carter Malkasian, a professor at the Naval Postgraduate School and former civilian advisor to the then chairman of the Joint Chiefs, General Joseph Dunford, has written a well-researched and comprehensive account of the American war in Afghanistan that begins to help us make sense of this long conflict. Why were we there for two decades? How did the 9/11 attacks trigger this herculean and protracted effort on behalf of the American people? How did a once promising and popular invasion end
up an unpopular failure? The answers are not easy, but Malkasian provides a more than adequate first pass at a comprehensive interpretation of the history.

The question of how the war was won, and then lost, carries a deeper question within: Was it ever really winnable? Malkasian, pressing against an overly deterministic reading of the history, concludes that it was hard to see how, even with a pacified Taliban, the Western-backed government could have ever succeeded long term. Perhaps with American support in perpetuity—a position Gen. David Petraeus believed was necessary—the Kabul-based government could have survived with nominal control of the country, but barring a prolonged American military, diplomatic, and economic presence, the prospects for the new regime’s survival were always dim.

Americans grew tired of the war. With the end of the Iraq war, the nation was anxious to turn the page on the Global War on Terror that consumed our nation in the post-9/11 epoch. Politically this is one of the biggest errors that American and Western leaders made in planning and prosecuting the Afghan conflict. Unlike Korea, Japan, and Germany, where there was broad bipartisan support for open-military presence, the American people never wanted to stay in Afghanistan. Malkasian adeptly points out this mismatch between Western ambitions and the will of the Western nations to make the long-term commitments and sacrifices necessary to build a Western-style nation state where one had never existed.

One can appreciate President George W. Bush’s sense of duty to Afghanistan while still realizing it was this very sense of duty that caused Bush to “stay the course” when other policy options were available. Malkasian’s analysis of the early years of war brings to light the extent to which Bush’s refusal to negotiate with the Taliban after they were defeated, against the urgings of Hamid Karzai, scuttled any possibility of a lasting peace that would have allowed the U.S. to leave. The instincts of Donald Rumsfeld for a limited and short operation appear to have been the right ones in hindsight.

Blaming Bush, however, is too convenient. The roadmap laid out for Afghanistan at the Bonn Conference in December 2001 was a complete mismatch for Afghanistan. Turning a country that had been torn apart by civil war for forty years into a functioning democracy was never going to be easy. Perhaps nothing symbolized our hubris better than our commitment to women’s rights. That judgment may appear harsh, but it is the reality that Afghans did not welcome this American imposition upon their own way of life. A bipartisan group of women senators sponsored the Afghan Women and Children Relief Act of 2001 in the aftermath of the Taliban’s initial defeat. Both Republicans and Democrats were committed to the idea of transforming Afghan society to be more egalitarian. The Western conception of women’s rights were conceptually and culturally alien to an Afghan culture that was deeply patriarchal, traditional, and Islamic.

The most surprising, and important, contribution of Malkasian’s book is his sensitive and rich picture of the role Islam played in the conflict, especially in a sympathetic portrait of the Taliban. American policymakers and military leaders never quite appreciated how powerful an effect the peculiar Afghan identity—a mixture of fierce independence, tribal loyalty, deep sense of honor, and strict interpretation of Islam—would have on the outcome of the war. Despite the good that the U.S. did in Afghanistan, and there are real success stories, Americans would always be seen as an occupying force that had to be expelled. And a government with U.S.-backing, likewise, would always be viewed suspiciously by the majority of Afghans.

The real story, however, is not that of American defeat, but the resilience, resistance, and triumph of the Taliban. In 2014, then U.S. ambassador to Afghanistan, Michael McKinley, put his finger on the Taliban’s source of strength: “Maybe I have read too much Hannah Arendt,” he interjected during a closed group meeting at the State Department, “but I do not think this is about money or jobs. The Taliban are fighting for something larger.” What American politicians never fully grasped, though maybe the American public intuitively understood, was that the Taliban was fighting for intangible spiritual goals that were essential for Afghan self-understanding. Unpacking this basic thesis, Malkasian writes:

The Taliban exemplified something that inspired, something that made them powerful in battle, something closely tied to what it meant to be Afghan. In simple terms, they fought for Islam and resistance to occupation, values enshrined in Afghan identity. Aligned with foreign occupiers, the government mustered no similar inspiration. It could not get its supporters, even if they outnumbered the Taliban, to go to the same lengths. Its claim to Islam was fraught. The very presence of Americans in
Afghanistan trod on what it meant to be Afghan. It prodded at men and women to defend their honor, their religion, and their home. It dared young men to fight. It animated the Taliban. It sapped the will of Afghan soldiers and police. When they clashed, Taliban were more willing to kill and be killed than soldiers and police, or at least a good number of them.

American leaders remained painfully blind to this reality, though many veterans I have talked to experienced it palpably. In a discussion with one, his assessment was simple, “They did not want us there.”

It is hard to not be cynical about the Afghanistan war. The wounds are still fresh. Much blood, treasure, and resources were spilled for what appears to have been an unwinnable conflict. So what are the lessons we should learn? There are many. Nation building is very hard work, and we are not very good at it. Not every nation wants what we have. I know this is hard for Americans to believe, but some countries see America and decide, “No, thanks.” Perhaps most importantly, the U.S. must learn to accept the limitations of what it can and cannot do. It is a hard lesson to learn, and we do not seem to learn it well. What we must not do is bury our heads in the sand. If we are to honor the lives of those lost in this war and the trillions we poured into this failed endeavor, we must learn from these failures so that we do not repeat them again.

Learning the Lessons of Afghanistan - The American Conservative

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David Henderson on Economists’ Nobels, Obitz, and More [Audio Interview]

David Henderson is a research fellow at Stanford University’s Hoover Institution and the editor of the Concise Encyclopedia of Economics. He is also an emeritus professor of economics with the Naval Postgraduate School. He is the Wall Street Journal’s go-to writer for pieces on Nobel prizes and deaths in economics, which we talk about today, exploring a list of favorites. He tells us of their contributions to the field and some stories.

David Henderson on Economists’ Nobels, Obitz, and More | Ricochet

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The Korea Model Why an Armistice Offers the Best Hope for Peace in Ukraine

In the middle of August 1952, Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai traveled nearly 4,000 miles to Moscow to meet with the Soviet dictator Joseph Stalin. Zhou was acting as an emissary for the leader of China, Mao Zedong. The two Communist powers were allies at the time, but it was not a partnership of equals: the Soviet Union was a superpower, and China depended on it for economic assistance and military equipment. Two years earlier, Mao and Stalin had embarked on a joint venture of sorts, giving their blessing to the North Korean leader Kim II Sung when he invaded South Korea. Their hopes had been high; even though the United States immediately rushed to South Korea’s aid, Stalin telegraphed Kim in the wake of the invasion to tell him that he had “no doubt that in the soonest time the interventionists will be driven out of Korea with ignominy.”

Things had not gone according to plan. In the fall of 1950, as troops led by U.S. General Douglas MacArthur advanced through North Korea, China directly intervened. By the middle of 1951, a bloody stalemate had set in along the 38th parallel, the line that had delineated North from South Korea before the invasion. Negotiations between the opposing sides began in July of that year. Their purpose was to reach an armistice and set the stage for discussions about Korea’s future. The talks had deadlocked, however, over the details of exchanging prisoners of war.

When Zhou traveled to Moscow in the summer of 1952, the situation was looking grim for the Communists. Airstrikes had destroyed the North’s industrial facilities and heavily damaged every city. Food was short. In February, Kim told Mao that he had “no desire to continue the war.” Around five
months later, Kim pleaded with Stalin to bring about “the soonest conclusion of an armistice.” But Stalin did nothing. Like Stalin, Mao was determined to stand fast in the face of U.S. demands, and he was less worried than Kim was about the battlefield. Like Kim, however, Mao knew that his country was suffering.

Over the course of the Cold War, Zhou would earn a reputation as a cool diplomat. Yet arriving in Moscow as the bearer of bad news, he could not have been at ease. His task was to sound out Stalin’s openness to a truce. Stalin had been behind the war, and it seemed reasonable to assume that talk of shutting it down would displease him.

The meeting took place on August 20. Stalin wanted to know if the Chinese and North Koreans could increase the military pressure on the United States. Zhou expressed confidence that “both sides are about equal in strength” but noted that a Chinese “general offensive would be difficult to carry out.” In other words, there were no good military options for coercing the United States. To exude confidence, Zhou reassured Stalin that “Mao believes that the continuation of the war is advantageous to us, since it [distracts] America from preparing for a new world war.”

“Mao Zedong is right,” Stalin affirmed, according to Russian archival documents. “This war is getting on America’s nerves. The North Koreans have lost nothing, except for casualties. . . . [The] Americans understand that this war is not advantageous and they will have to end it. . . . Endurance and patience [are] needed here.” Zhou praised “the truth of comrade Stalin’s observations.” Then he tried again. The North Koreans are “wavering somewhat,” he said. “They are in a slightly unsteady state. Among certain elements of the Korean leadership one can detect a state of panic, even.” This seemed to annoy Stalin, who replied that he had been “already informed of these feelings.” Zhou backed off.

A month later, Zhou broached again with Stalin the possibility of accepting a cease-fire and putting off contentious details regarding prisoner exchanges. Stalin dismissed the idea as “one of [several] possible scenarios, but America is not likely to agree to it.” It was clear that Stalin wanted the Chinese and North Koreans to press on and forgo compromise. Zhou was left with little choice but to assent to Stalin’s counsel, which he praised as “valuable instructions.”

The fighting would rage for another ten months before the two sides would agree to an armistice, albeit on terms that were slightly worse for China and the Soviet Union than those that Zhou and Stalin had discussed. During that time, tens of thousands died, and tens of thousands more were wounded. Ultimately, 36,574 Americans were killed in the war and 103,284 were wounded. China lost an estimated one million people, and four million Koreans perished—ten percent of the peninsula’s population.

The armistice ended that bloodshed, establishing a demilitarized zone and mechanisms to supervise compliance and mediate violations. But the Korean War did not officially conclude. The major political issues could not be settled, and skirmishes, raids, artillery shelling, and occasional battles broke out. They never escalated to full-blown war, however. The armistice held—and 70 years later, it still holds.

Today, the Korean Peninsula remains a site of high geopolitical tension. North Korea is governed by a dictator who brutally represses his citizens and regularly threatens his neighbors with nuclear weapons. But the carnage of the Korean War is now a distant memory, and the peace produced by the armistice allowed South Korea to develop a robust economy and, eventually, a stable liberal democracy. For all its flaws, the armistice was a success.

The war ravaging Ukraine today bears more than a passing resemblance to the Korean War. And for anyone wondering about how it might end, the durability of the Korean armistice—and the high human cost of the delay in reaching it—deserves close study. The parallels are clear. In Ukraine, as in Korea seven decades ago, a static battlefront and intractable political differences call for a cease-fire that would pause the violence while putting off thorny political issues for another day. The Korean armistice “enabled South Korea to flourish under American security guarantees and protection,” the historian Stephen Kotkin has pointed out. “If a similar armistice allowed Ukraine—or even just 80 percent of the country—to flourish in a similar way,” he argues, “that would be a victory in the war.”

The negotiations that produced the Korean armistice were long and difficult and took place alongside heavy fighting, before the war’s costs were clear enough to persuade either side to compromise. The same would likely be true today. The Korean experience also suggests that the obstinacy of Russian President Vladimir Putin—who, like Stalin, seems averse to compromise of any kind—could be
especially obstructive. On top of that, domestic politics in the United States and the gap between Washington’s and Kyiv’s legitimate but distinct interests could trip up a cease-fire.

At the moment, debate in Washington often focuses on the question of when would be the right time to start pushing Ukraine to negotiate, and the consensus answer has generally been, “Not yet.” The Korean War shows that, in a military stalemate, it can take a very long time for both sides to clearly see that the costs of continuing to fight are outweighing the benefits. And by the time they do, a great deal of death and destruction can occur without producing any meaningful advantages.

If the United States, NATO, and other supporters of Ukraine do decide to work toward a cease-fire, the end of the Korean War offers three practical lessons. First, they must be willing to fight and talk simultaneously, using battlefield pressure to enforce demands at the negotiating table. Second, they should include the United Nations in any negotiations, since neutral arbiters are an asset. Finally, they should condition future security assistance and postconflict support for Ukraine on Kyiv’s willingness to make some concessions.

A complete victory for Ukraine and the West and a total defeat for the other side would be a welcome end to the Ukraine war, just as it would have been in Korea. And as in Korea, the risk of escalation confounds such an outcome. Kyiv, Washington, and their partners in opposing Moscow’s aggression should understand that an armistice that both Ukraine and Russia can accept—even if it fails to settle all the important questions—would still be a win.

FIGHTING AND TALKING

North Korea invaded South Korea on June 25, 1950. Two days later, the UN authorized the United States and 14 of its allies and partners (collectively known as the UN Command) to enter the war on South Korea’s side. For the first five months of the war, neither side sought negotiations.

The presence of American forces in combat so close to China concerned Mao. In August, he told the Politburo of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), “If the U.S. imperialists won the war, they would become more arrogant and would threaten us. We should not fail to assist the Koreans. We must lend them our hands in the form of sending our military volunteers there.” In October, Mao made the fateful decision to send some 300,000 soldiers across the Yalu River to meet the advancing Americans.

The Chinese offensive routed MacArthur’s forces. Suddenly, all of Korea was in danger of falling to the Communists. MacArthur called for direct military action against China, not excluding the use of atomic weapons. U.S. President Harry Truman feared MacArthur might trigger a general war with the Soviet Union, which was by then a nuclear power. His team pieced together an alternative. In a joint communiqué issued in December 1950, Truman and British Prime Minister Clement Attlee called for cease-fire negotiations and assured the world that the American side would not use atomic weapons. Meanwhile, U.S. General Matthew Ridgway applied military pressure to coerce the Communists into negotiations while refraining from actions that could cause escalation, such as bombing China, launching operations deep inside North Korean territory, or capturing the North Korean capital, Pyongyang. The United States adhered to the main points of this strategy for the rest of the war.

The Communist side rejected U.S. and UN proposals for negotiations, and heavy fighting marked the first six months of 1951. Eventually, Ridgway’s forces recaptured all of South Korea. Despite the Communists’ best efforts, they could not advance farther south. The severe defeat of China’s so-called Fifth Phase Offensive, the largest battle of the war, proved to Mao and Stalin that a decisive victory would be impossible. After behind-the-scenes discussions with the American diplomat George Kennan, Jakob Malik, the Soviet representative to the UN, publicly called for a cease-fire and an armistice on June 23.

The talks began on July 10. Three main issues were at hand: the location of a cease-fire line, measures to supervise compliance, and the exchange of prisoners of war. Negotiations on the first issue proceeded slowly. The Communists wanted the 38th parallel to serve as the cease-fire line. The United States, on the other hand, preferred the frontline (or “line of contact”), which was slightly north of the parallel, where the rugged terrain was easier to defend. On November 27, after four months of fighting and talking, the two sides agreed that the line of contact would become the cease-fire line.

By the following spring, they had also reached an agreement on mechanisms for supervising the cease-fire. But no headway had been made on the question of how to exchange prisoners of war. Truman
demanded voluntary repatriation, meaning that the roughly 170,000 Communist prisoners of war would be free to return to their home countries or seek residence in a different country. The United States claimed that if given such a choice, some 100,000 North Korean and Chinese prisoners would elect not to return home. For Mao and Stalin, such a mass defection would undermine the idea that communism would produce a utopia that no rational person would ever willingly leave. In October, after months of deadlock, U.S. General Mark Clark, Ridgway’s successor, recessed the negotiations indefinitely.

Dwight Eisenhower was elected U.S. president the following month. When he took office, he and his secretary of state, John Foster Dulles, publicly and privately signaled that they were willing to escalate into a more destructive war, seeking to convince the Communists that further fighting was not worthwhile.

The Korean War never officially ended—but the armistice has held for 70 years.

The pause in negotiations and the election of Eisenhower worried many UN members states and U.S. allies, including Canada and the United Kingdom, that feared the war might escalate. Debates at the UN led to a resolution written by the Indian diplomat V. K. Krishna Menon proposing a repatriation commission of neutral countries—Czechoslovakia, Poland, Sweden, and Switzerland—to facilitate the return of prisoners after an armistice. Hoping to avoid a rupture with its key allies, the United States grudgingly went along. The idea would soon become the basis of a compromise.

In March 1953, Stalin died, and Soviet and Chinese leaders immediately adopted a softer line on the talks. On April 26, negotiations resumed. In early May, the Soviets and the Chinese cribbed from India’s UN resolution and introduced the neutral nations repatriation commission on their own. Unfortunately, quibbling over minor details dragged things out, and the violence escalated. The United States intensified its air war on North Korea, and in May, Eisenhower approved a directive that outlined options for a further U.S. advance into North Korea, the bombing of Chinese air bases in Manchuria, and the use of atomic weapons if talks went nowhere.

On May 25, 1953, the U.S. delegation presented its final position, which accepted the establishment of a repatriation commission with some minor adjustments. If the Communists rejected the terms, Clark was authorized to ramp up military action. In a series of communications with officials in China, North Korea, and the Soviet Union, U.S. leaders including Dulles and Clark conveyed Washington’s willingness to escalate the war and possibly use atomic weapons.

The Communists agreed to the final position on June 4. Yet it was not over: South Korean President Syngman Rhee was not on board. About two weeks later, Rhee unilaterally released around 27,000 North Korean prisoners of war, upending the entire process. The Communists retaliated with their largest attack in two years. Some 30,000 South Korean soldiers were killed—a toll that, along with pressure and incentives from Washington, got Rhee to comply. At last, the armistice was signed on July 27.

As Washington and its partners weigh the prospect of negotiations to end the war in Ukraine, they ought to be mindful of the heavy toll that a delay in reaching an armistice produced in South Korea. An outcome that essentially ratified the territorial status quo when negotiations began required threats of nuclear escalation and two years of intense fighting that inflicted more than 150,000 casualties on the United States, its allies, and South Korea and over 250,000 casualties on the Chinese and North Korean side.

Perhaps the most important factor contributing to the delay was that the Communists simply took too long to appreciate the true costs of the war and to realize that they could not outlast the United States. Whereas the debacle near the Yalu River in November 1950 had convinced Truman and other Western leaders to pursue negotiations, it had convinced Mao and Stalin that they could win the war outright. As the historians Shen Zhihua and Yafeng Xia have written, Mao had originally wanted to “localize the war” and simply defend China. The rout of the U.S.-led Eighth Army emboldened him to raise his sights, and he decided that China’s military strength would allow him to drive the United States off the Korean Peninsula, end U.S. support for Taiwan, and secure China’s entry to the UN. It took six months of heavy attrition in which roughly 150,000 were killed, wounded, or taken prisoner on the Communist side for Mao to realize that such ambitions were unrealistic and to seek an armistice based on the prewar status quo. By mid-June of 1951, Stalin had concurred.
Even then, however, Mao and Stalin were intent on using continued military action to gain leverage at
the negotiating table before agreeing to a cease-fire. Given China’s massive advantage in manpower, they
reckoned that the United States could never defeat China in a war of attrition. “Only by adopting an
unyielding position can you win the initiative and force the enemy to yield,” Mao explained to one of his
negotiators. “To achieve these objectives, you should prepare for a test of strength against the enemy
through several more months of negotiations.”

The Communist side failed that test. First, a series of hard-hitting U.S., British, and Australian attacks
compelled Mao to accept the line of contact as the cease-fire line in the fall of 1951. Then, after Mao and
Stalin resisted concessions on prisoner exchanges, Clark subjected Communist forces to an intensified air
campaign in 1952, striking targets in Pyongyang and hydroelectric plants that provided power to North
Korea and much of Manchuria.

According to the historian Shu Guang Zhang, by the latter half of 1952, the war was absorbing
roughly 50 percent of China’s revenues. Mao had already raised taxes and had requested a loan from the
Soviet Union, to which China was heavily in debt. In August, Mao informed officials at a CCP meeting
that the Chinese economy would collapse unless they halved war expenditures. The drain on the state’s
coffers was delaying China’s full transition to a socialist economy, and Mao and the party fretted about
internal dissent.

Though less worried than Kim, Mao had to weigh these economic and political concerns in
considering a cease-fire. He did not want to break China, but he also did not want the CCP to appear weak
as it consolidated power internally just three years after winning the Chinese Civil War. Mao was in a
bind, which is why he sent Zhou to Moscow in August 1952.

Stalin wasn’t interested in helping Mao get out of a jam. He wanted only to preserve Soviet military
capabilities, use China and North Korea to degrade U.S. military and economic strength, and avoid
making any hasty concessions. From his viewpoint, North Korean and Chinese casualties were tolerable.
Only when Stalin died in March 1953 did the Soviet position soften. Stalin’s successor, Georgy
Malenkov, and other senior Soviet leaders (including Nikita Khrushchev) sought “peaceful coexistence”
with the United States—continued competition, but with less tension and a lower risk of direct conflict.
For them, the costs of continuing to fight over Korea seemed too high.

Yet to dwell on Stalin misses another reason that the war did not end earlier. The negotiations were
hung up for 18 months by the U.S. demand that prisoners of war get to choose whether to be repatriated—
a position driven by an ideological desire to show that communism held less appeal than democracy, and
by domestic political pressure to look tough. For Truman, voluntary repatriation was an inalienable
human right. In May 1952, he declared that forcible repatriation would be “repugnant to our most
fundamental moral and humanitarian principles.” The policy received robust bipartisan support, as fierce
anticommunism defined U.S. political culture at the time.

When the issue bogged down negotiations, Truman could not backtrack without facing accusations of
weakness against communism during an election year. Later on, Eisenhower also worried that right-wing
Republicans would cast any wavering on the issue as going soft. If Truman had never made the demand
in the first place, the Communists might have agreed to a cease-fire much earlier, possibly before Stalin’s
death. Put bluntly, two U.S. presidents ended up allowing thousands of U.S. soldiers to die not in service
of any particular territorial goal or tactical advantage but to avoid domestic political backlash.

The South Koreans had a hand in delaying the armistice, as well. The entire agreement nearly fell
apart after Rhee’s preemptive prisoner release. Rhee’s interests diverged from those of the United States.
He wanted Korea unified under his government and had conceded only grudgingly to negotiations in
1951. Rhee also wanted a mutual security treaty with the United States that he hoped would deter the
Communists from trying to overwhelm his forces at some future date. Washington had initially demurred;
its defense priority in the region was securing Japan. So rather than passively accept the armistice, Rhee
sought to undermine it. Even in the wake of China’s retaliation, Washington obtained Rhee’s cooperation
only by promising to expand South Korea’s military, grant the country long-term economic assistance,
and sign the mutual security treaty it had previously rejected. And Rhee never signed the armistice
agreement: Washington just had to accept his word that he would abide by its terms.
A HARD ROAD TO PEACE
Today, as during the Korean War, an independent state is bearing the brunt of an act of aggression, and the ruler on the other side is bent on winning. As during the Korean War, great powers are center stage and nuclear weapons lurk in the background. And as during the Korean War, neither side seems likely to deliver a knockout blow on the battlefield, and neither side seems interested in pursuing a comprehensive peace deal.

Given the similarities, some of the same pitfalls that delayed the Korean armistice could hamper efforts to forge one in Ukraine. As in Korea, it might take a prolonged period of fighting to convince the parties to start negotiating. Putin, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky, and Western leaders may wait to talk out of a belief that the battlefield situation will improve or that the other side may break. If negotiations began, that problem would persist. Either side might hope that an improvement in its battlefield fortunes could lead to a better deal, such as a slightly more advantageous cease-fire line or supervisory arrangement.

Another roadblock would emerge if Putin adopted a position similar to the one that Stalin held in 1952. Putin appears committed to dismantling an independent, democratic Ukraine and averse to losing any of the Ukrainian territory that his forces have seized since 2014. High battlefield costs may be insufficient to overcome his will. What is more, the possible domestic political costs of making any concessions might further steel his resolve, regardless of the economic and human costs. Even if Putin lets negotiations begin, he may refuse compromise and use stalling tactics to wring concessions out of Ukraine, the United States, and NATO.

U.S. domestic politics could also complicate negotiations, as they did during the Korean War. No matter what approach he takes, U.S. President Joe Biden will face an array of attacks on his Ukraine policy as the 2024 election approaches, especially if negotiations start in the coming months. Some “America first” Republicans will complain that continued support for Kyiv is wasteful and reckless. Other Republicans will decry any compromise with Russia as weakness—as will some Democrats. It is easy to see how an armistice could draw domestic criticism if, for example, the text does not recognize an independent and democratic Ukraine, restricts the freedom of navigation for Ukrainian exports through the Black Sea, or leaves Crimea or parts of the Donbas region under Russian occupation.

Meanwhile, Ukraine should not be expected to toe the Western line. As Eisenhower learned in dealing with Rhee—and as subsequent U.S. presidents discovered in dealing with leaders in South Vietnam and Afghanistan—a junior partner rarely does whatever Washington wants. Zelensky might resist pressure that the United States puts on him. His interests diverge in important ways from those of the United States and NATO, and so might his strategy. He has long refused to cede any of Ukraine’s territory under Russian occupation, including Crimea and the Donbas. Concessions on those areas could affect his future electoral prospects. Indeed, a cease-fire could leave Ukraine in a far worse strategic position, with lost territory, constricted access to the Black Sea, and an ambiguous security relationship with NATO. Under those circumstances, Zelensky may prove even harder to budge than Rhee was. Furthermore, the United States and its allies have less leverage over Ukraine than they did over South Korea. There are no U.S. military units on the ground; Ukrainians themselves are doing all the fighting and dying. And an alliance guarantee for Ukraine would be controversial. Whereas Eisenhower could easily offer an alliance to South Korea, a U.S. president today would face opposition from some NATO members.

NOTHING VENTURED, NOTHING GAINED

Given all the potential obstacles to an armistice in Ukraine, some might argue that the more realistic option would be to wait for the conflict to freeze, as did the fighting in eastern Ukraine after Russia’s 2014 invasion. A stalemate along the frontline could settle in, and violence could descend to a bearable, steady state. The problem is that a frozen conflict would buy Russia time to eventually return to full-scale war. Putin could wait for his position to improve and then launch another offensive. For that reason, an armistice featuring a signed document, international mediation, an agreed-on cease-fire line, supervisory mechanisms, and enforcement measures remains the least bad option.

There are a number of things that Washington and its partners can do to improve the odds of an armistice. First, diplomats should tightly integrate their bargaining with the use of military force: the idea is to fight and talk, not wish for Russian goodwill. A cease-fire in Ukraine would depend on sustaining
military and economic pressure on Russia. The United States, NATO, and Ukraine should offer to start negotiations but keep up pressure on the battlefield and other fronts—for example, sanctions—until the Kremlin comes around. That is what Truman did when faced with Communist intransigence in Korea in late 1950 and early 1951. If Russia continues to reject negotiations, Washington and NATO could make the costs of stalling clear to Putin by giving Ukraine more equipment (such as ATACM missiles, tanks, fighter aircraft, and air defense systems) and by deploying special operations forces to Ukraine in a noncombat role. Once negotiations did begin, limited Ukrainian attacks could be coordinated with demands at the bargaining table. At the same time, security and economic assistance to Ukraine could be increased. In 2022, the United States contributed roughly $77 billion and the rest of NATO, $63 billion. They should expect to have to contribute at least the same amounts per year until a cease-fire occurs.

In setting up and carrying out negotiations, the United States and NATO should include the UN. Conventional wisdom in Washington today is that the UN is an ineffective diplomatic tool. Dulles mistakenly thought the same thing in 1953, but the organization’s mediation wound up playing a crucial role in the Korean armistice. Today, Russia may find it easier to accept ideas for compromise that come from neutral or friendly countries at the UN than proposals that come from the United States, NATO, or Ukraine. The fact that important members such as India have stood on the sidelines enhances the organization’s credibility in supervising and inspecting cease-fire arrangements.

To coax Zelensky toward a compromise, Washington and European governments should closely consult with him in designing the negotiations and ensure that his representatives play a central role in any talks. More important, they should condition postconflict security and economic assistance on Ukraine’s willingness to make concessions. Kyiv is certain to want security guarantees as part of any deal. Although NATO membership is unlikely anytime soon, U.S. and NATO diplomats would be wise to start exploring other kinds of assurances, such as long-term commitments to advise and train Ukrainian forces.

Biden will face an array of attacks on his Ukraine policy. There are fewer options to address the single biggest obstacle to talks: Putin. His obstinacy may be insurmountable. The United States and NATO have no good levers to pull if Putin is truly insensitive to the costs of war. Targeting Russian elites with sanctions and supporting Russian opposition movements are superficially appealing. But Washington and its allies have too little access to Russia and too poor an understanding of the country’s political dynamics to bet on success. Hopes that Putin might be deposed seem even more far-fetched. It is worth remembering that Stalin’s intransigence ceased to impede talks in Korea only when he died. Since Putin probably cannot be ousted and probably will not die soon, pursuing negotiations is a gamble that he will cave at some point to military and economic pressure.

Thus, there is no guarantee that talks will occur or result in an armistice. Russia may be resolved to outlast the United States and NATO. Washington should bear in mind that its stakes in Ukraine are lower than its stakes were in Korea. It is hard to imagine that any American president would commit U.S. forces to fight alongside Ukrainian ones. Nor would Washington enable Ukraine to levy the degree of destruction on Russia that the United States visited on North Korea: breaking dams, knocking out power stations, bombing the capital. Just because negotiations were successful in Korea does not mean history will repeat itself.

Yet if pursuing negotiations is a gamble, it is one with low risks and high potential rewards. Failure would merely yield the same result as doing nothing. Success, however, could preserve Ukraine, allay wider fears for democracy, deter further Russian aggression, and put fears of escalation to rest. The kind of stable, durable peace the Korean armistice produced would be a victory not just for Ukraine and its supporters but for the entire world, as well.

Carter Malkasian is Chair of the Department of Defense Analysis at the Naval Postgraduate School and author of The Korean War, 1950–1953. From 2015 to 2019, he served as Special Assistant for Strategy to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The views expressed here are his own.

The Korea Model: Why an Armistice Offers the Best Hope for Peace in Ukraine (foreignaffairs.com)

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ALUMNI:

**Lieutenant General Michael Groen Joins Academy Securities’ Advisory Board and Geopolitical Intelligence Group**

*(Business Wire 9 June 23)*
*(UCW News Wire 9 June 23)*

Academy Securities, a registered broker-dealer, certified Disabled Veteran Business Enterprise (DVBE), and Minority Business Enterprise (MBE), today announced the addition of Lieutenant General Michael Groen to its Advisory Board and Geopolitical Intelligence Group.

“Lieutenant General Groen is a skilled advisor, and we are honored to add him to the Academy team”

Lieutenant General Groen served for over 36 years in the U.S. Marine Corps, culminating his career as the Director of the Joint Artificial Intelligence Center, and the senior executive for AI in the Department of Defense. He previously served at the National Security Agency, overseeing Computer Network Operations, and as the Director of Joint Staff Intelligence (JSJ2), working closely with the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, Secretary of Defense, and Senior Leaders across the Department. Lieutenant General Groen is an experienced Marine commander and multi-tour combat veteran. His expertise centers on transformative technology and its application in Defense, the Intelligence Community, and the commercial marketplace.

“Lieutenant General Groen is a skilled advisor, and we are honored to add him to the Academy team,” stated Academy’s Chairman and CEO Chance Mims, “His expertise surrounding cybersecurity and artificial intelligence will be particularly pertinent to our clients.”

Lieutenant General Groen commented on joining Academy Securities: "I'm thrilled to be part of a team like Academy Securities. The people, the talent, and the connectedness are all inspiring. Support to veterans, win-win perspective, and a core professionalism are all part of a superior ethic, both as a company and as a team."

Lieutenant General Groen earned his Master’s Degrees in Electrical Engineering and Applied Physics from the Naval Postgraduate School. He is the author of, With the First Marine Division in Iraq, No Greater Friend, No Worse Enemy.

“Lieutenant General Groen’s impressive history of working with military technology and intelligence will be a big value add to our Geopolitical Intelligence Group,” stated Academy’s President Phil McConkey.

**Lieutenant General Michael Groen Joins Academy Securities’ Advisory Board and Geopolitical Intelligence Group | Business Wire**

**Academy Securities Adds Lieutenant General Michael Groen to Advisory Board and Geopolitical Intelligence Group - The UCW Newswire (ucwe.com)**

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**THS Grad in Command of Ship in Bahrain**

*(Tehachapi News 11 June 23)*

Lt. Commander Grant Mead Barrett, a 1999 graduate of Tehachapi High School, is now in command of the USS Dextrous, a United States Navy Avenger-class mine countermeasures ship homeported in Bahrain. He has been assigned to the ship as Executive Officer for the past 18 months.

Barrett is the son of James and Carol Mead Barrett, formerly of Tehachapi and currently living in Lillian, Alabama. He is the grandson of the late Joe and Alice Barrett, Tehachapi residents, and the late Bill and Betty Mead, who were publishers of the Tehachapi News from 1980 to 1998.

He is married to the former Sheri Lautherborn of Kaneohe, Hawaii. He and Sheri have two daughters: Brooklyn, 15 and Peyton, 12.

A number of his family members were present in Bahrain recently for a change of command ceremony.
Barrett enlisted in the Navy in July 1999 as an electronics technician serving on the USS Pasadena. He graduated from the University of Nevada, Las Vegas, with a degree in mathematics in 2010. In 2011 he received his commission from Officer Candidate School in Newport, Rhode Island.

Barrett’s shipboard assignments include USS Paul Hamilton as Strike Officer, USS Chosin as Damage Control Officer and USS Chafee as Chief Engineer.

Ashore, he attended Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey, where he earned a master’s degree in financial management and completed joint professional military education, phase one. Following Naval post-graduate school, he was assigned to surface warfare officer school in Newport, Rhode Island, where he was a cruiser gas turbine lead Instructor.

A Navy Diver Lived a Record-Breaking 100 Days Underwater
(We are the Mighty 12 June 23) … Miguel Ortiz

On June 9, 2023, University of South Florida Associate Professor Dr. Joseph Dituri, Ph.D. resurfaced at Key Largo, Florida, after living underwater for 100 days. Dituri, a retired U.S. Navy Saturation Diving Officer, began his submerged stay in a 100-square-foot underwater room at Jules' Undersea Lodge on March 1, 2023. From 22 feet underwater, he continued to teach his students online, living up to his nickname, "Dr. Deep Sea."

Dituri enlisted in the Navy in 1985 and worked in saturation diving and ship repair. He attended the University of South Carolina where he earned a B.S. in Computer Science before commissioning through the Navy's Special Operations Officer pipeline. As a diving officer, he attended the Naval Postgraduate School and earned a Master's degree in Astronautical Engineering. After nearly 28 years of Naval service, Dituri retired at the rank of commander. He earned his Ph.D. in Biomedical Engineering at USF.

The 100 days that Dituri lived underwater was part of the Neptune 100 Day Undersea Mission. This scientific program aims to further medical research, ocean conservation and technical development. "It’s really not about the record," Dituri said in a USF article. "If we can get people excited about science, that would be a great success to me!"

After Dituri resurfaced, he was examined by doctors. With his medical team, Dituri will analyze the data collected before, during and after his underwater stay. His research focuses on increased pressure's effects on the human body and its potential to treat illnesses, including traumatic brain injuries. However, Dituri already discovered that the increased pressure of his 100 days underwater resulted in him shrinking half an inch.

The Neptune 100 Project also contributed to space research. "It takes 200 days to travel to Mars," Dituri said. "This research could help us better prepare our astronauts to ensure they arrive healthy and strong enough to explore the planet." Dituri himself plans to undergo zero-gravity training in mid-September 2023 in pursuit of his goal of becoming a civilian astronaut. He hopes to travel to space by 2026.

A Navy diver lived a record-breaking 100 days underwater | We Are The Mighty

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USS Stethem (DDG 63) Change Of Command
(DVIDS 14 June 23) … Saavan Patel

Family and friends gathered together for a change of command ceremony at Naval Base San Diego where Commander James Watts relieved Commander Bryan Hart as Commanding Officer of USS Stethem (DDG 63). In attendance at the ceremony was Robert Stethem’s Father, and retired Navy Senior Chief, Richard Stethem.
CDR Hart has served as Stethem’s Commanding Officer since January 2022, he previously served as the ship’s Executive Officer from May 2020 to October 2021. He commented on his time onboard Stethem and how inspired he was by the tireless dedication of every Sailor under his command. He touched on how special the ship is and talked about the unique privilege of being a Steelworker. Commander Hart spoke about how Robbie’s spirit is alive and well within our warship and its Sailors. His follow-on assignment is staff at the Navy Office of Legislative Affairs in Washington, D.C.

In his final remarks, CDR Hart reflected on his last 16 months as Commanding Officer, stating, “I will remain forever grateful and indebted to our Steelworkers, and those who came before you, for your loyalty, strength and steadfast and courageous character. I will miss this ship, each and every one of you tremendously. Thank you for your unfailing service, and I wish each and every one of you and your families, fair winds and following seas. Thank you.”

During CDR Hart’s tenure as Captain, USS Stethem successfully completed its basic phase trials and assessments and graduated to its strenuous Advanced and Integrated phases. Under his command the ship confidently executed Surface Warfare Advance Tactical Training (SWATT), Composite Training Unit Exercise (COMTUEX), and Group Sail.

His relief, CDR James “Nate” Watts is a native of Lawrenceville, Georgia. He attended The Citadel Military College of South Carolina, earning a Bachelor of Science in Business Administration and commissioned in 2005. He also attended the Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey, California, where he earned a Masters of Arts in National Security Affairs specializing in Middle East studies. He has served as Executive Officer of USS Stethem since October 2021 and is grateful to return to take command of Robbie’s destroyer.

“To my fellow Steelworkers, thank you. The dedication of this stellar crew is on display here today. This ship would not be where it is, ready to deploy, without your continued hard work.” said CDR. Watts upon assuming command.

RADM ret. David Hart the father of CDR Hart served as the ceremony’s guest speaker. RADM Hart provided the guests of the ceremony insight into how special the time honored tradition of a Navy change of command is. He spoke on his experience being in command of multiple units and platforms and how no matter what the “size or firepower” of a ship was, being in command was a unique responsibility with unique challenges.

Richard Stethem left the crew with inspiring words to send them on their way to deployment with Robbie’s spirit and mentality reinvigorated in their minds. “The Navy’s highest honor is in naming a ship after someone or something. Aircraft carriers are usually named after presidents, battleships for states. But the destroyers are named for heroes, and so the name Robert Dean Stethem.” Mr. Stethem described the characteristics of Robbie that he was most proud of and reminded the guests that “He was an American, this in itself stands for something great, for America is a symbol of freedom.”

USS Stethem is named after Steelworker 2nd Class Petty Officer Robert Dean Stethem, and was commissioned on October 21, 1995, in Port Hueneme, California, as the thirteenth Arleigh Burke-class guided-missile destroyer. Stethem was returning home from overseas duty when the plane he was on was hijacked by terrorists. Stethem was singled out as a U.S. Sailor and was beaten and tortured by terrorists to have their demands met. Throughout the ordeal, Stethem refused to aid the terrorists, and as a result of his heroism, Robert Stethem was shot and his body was thrown onto the tarmac.

Robert Stethem was posthumously promoted to Steelworker Second Class (SW2) and ultimately to Master Chief Constructionman (CUCM) for making the ultimate sacrifice in the defense of freedom as he laid down his life for the United States and his fellow Americans. USS Stethem continuously honors Robert’s sacrifice, proudly adopting the motto “Steadfast and Courageous” to highlight the exceptional heroism he demonstrated in June of 1985.

The Sailors USS Stethem maintain a close relationship with both the Stethem family and Seabee community. Steelworkers past and present are firmly committed to preserving the Stethem legacy of steadfast devotion to duty and courageous service. His spirit lives on and can be observed daily in the Steelworkers and in the ship that is Robbie’s destroyer.

USS Stethem is currently homeported in San Diego, California at Naval Base San Diego and will depart shortly for her deployment as a proud member of Destroyer Squadron Nine.
**Former MAXAR Director selected to be President of Edgybees Inc.**  
(*Sat News 21 June 23*)

Edgybees Inc., the newly formed U.S. division of Edgybees, LTD, announced the selection of Ken Campbell as its new President. A global leader in georegistration software, Edgybees provides advanced solutions to the U.S. government, states, and the commercial sector to enable faster, more accurate, and detailed analysis of imagery derived from aerial and satellite imaging sensors.

Campbell brings over forty years of experience in building, developing, and leading high-performing teams across private, civil service, and military sectors. His work has consistently supported U.S. government National Security missions, particularly those involving advanced geospatial technology and AI-enabled predictive analytic solutions.

He previously served as the Director of Strategic Growth – National Security Engagements at MAXAR Corporation, a leading space infrastructure and earth intelligence company. His selection comes at a crucial time as the newly established Edgybees Inc. expands its services to provide advanced georegistration solutions to the U.S. government, states, and the commercial sector.

“Edgybees is on the leading edge of georegistration and is revolutionizing the industry bringing clarity, accuracy, and speed to mission-critical operations,” explained Campbell. “I’m thrilled to have been chosen to lead the new U.S. entity as we continue leveraging advanced technology to provide clients with the most precise and timely geospatial information possible.”

Ken Campbell

In addition to his new role at Edgybees Inc., Campbell has held leadership positions as a senior executive with the Department of the Army, including tours in Iraq as the Deputy Director-Intelligence, Multi-National Forces Iraq (MNF-I) and Director of the Counter-Corruption/Counter Threat Finance Intelligence Support Group, Resolute Support mission, U.S. Forces Afghanistan (RS/USFOR-A). He has also served as the Vice President of U.S. Government Intelligence Solutions at DigitalGlobe, Senior Director at GeoEye Analytics, and Senior Vice President, Intelligence Operations at Spatial Data Analytics (SPADAC). Lastly, Campbell served in uniform as a career Navy Special Operations Officer, Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD).

He holds a Master of Arts in National Security Affairs from the Naval Postgraduate School and a Bachelor of Arts in Political Science from San Francisco State University.

Campbell has been recognized numerous times for his exceptional service and contributions to the defense and intelligence sectors. His accolades include the Joint Meritorious Civilian Service Award, the NATO Service Medal for his role in the Resolute Support Mission in Afghanistan, and the National Intelligence Exceptional Achievement Medal. He was also designated an Intelligence Community Senior Leadership Corps member and received the Army Meritorious Civilian Service Medal. Earlier in his career, Campbell was awarded the Combat Action Ribbon, the Defense Superior Service Medal, and the National Intelligence Certificate of Distinction.

He has also authored several publications, including “Weapons of Mass Destruction Terrorism,” “Geospatial Analytics in Support of Military Collaborative Environment,” and “Predictive Analytics for Intelligence Advantage.”

*Former MAXAR Director selected to be President of Edgybees Inc. – SatNews*