Program for Culture and Conflict Studies at NPS

Produced by the Program for Culture & Conflict Studies, The Culture & Conflict Review is an online peer review journal bringing you analysis of current events, policy, operations, and human terrain in South and Central Asia as well as updates on our research. Premised on the belief that the U.S. must understand the culture and human terrain of other nations and people, we offer monthly commentaries and academic analysis on issues of current interest to policy makers, military commanders, academics, and the general public. We are particularly interested in issues addressing culture, anthropology, regional and identity politics, and the contemporary role of U.S. forces in areas of conflict. New issues of Culture & Conflict Review are published on a monthly basis.

I am pleased to welcome you to our new e-journal The Culture and Conflict Review (TCCR). The purpose of this journal is to provide a constructive forum for the discussion of current events, policy perspectives, operational analysis, and opinions concerning South and Central Asia as well as other conflict regions. We are especially interested in publishing articles which challenge conventional wisdom and assessments – critical as well as supportive – of US and international policies.

This journal, as well as the website that hosts it, is dedicated to the proposition that an understanding of the ‘human terrain” and culture is critical for the United States. How can the United States win the trust and confidence of people if we don’t understand them and their desires? We believe that human terrain will continue to be critical in future conflicts. If the most recent Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) is correct, for example, the conflicts of today are the kind we will be fighting over the next generation. Hence, the TCCR is especially interested in publishing articles describing and discussing culture dynamics from the mundane to the esoteric. The understanding of such has and will continue to be a central variable in the relations amongst nations as well as non-state actors. Our primary goal is to recognize and understand cultural dynamics and educate the general public concerning them.

The Program for Culture and Conflict Studies (CCS) at the Naval Postgraduate School also desires to actively engage the academic community and general public for information, criticism, suggestions concerning our program. While we do not intend to start a new blog, we are interested in hearing and publishing opinions concerning our program’s interests, products, and positions.

In conclusion thank you for taking an interest in our journal and I encourage you to submit an article or opinion. To submit an article, please view our Author's Guide.

On November 29, a new missive from Osama bin Laden was released to the world. The message came first to the news outlet al Jeezera,[1] where most of his messages have been passed, and at the time of writing, it has not been confirmed by the intelligence community that it is in fact Bin Laden. Assuming it is, however, the message bears some very real implications for the ongoing conflict in Afghanistan.

In the message, among other things, bin Laden said that Europe would do well to withdraw from Afghanistan as “the American tide is receding.”[2] Afghanistan and other nations reacted quickly, saying that the mission in Afghanistan was a united one between the government of Afghanistan and international forces, and that a withdrawal of foreign forces was not an option and that security in that country was “…an international responsibility.”[3] President Karzai went further and called the idea of a European withdrawal “ridiculous.”[4] As Iraq (relatively) stabilizes, however, and even the staunchest of allies such as Australia pull out of that country, troop commitments in Afghanistan will be subjects of debate in a number of European capitals. Furthermore, as security deteriorates in Afghanistan, many at home and abroad are increasingly viewing the situation there as a quagmire.[5] Bin Laden’s words have no bearing among the international forces, but it does show that he has a certain understanding of the international politics at play in Afghanistan, and is desperate to exploit divisions among the allies.

Bin Laden also claimed full responsibility for the attacks of September 11, 2001, and said that the Taliban knew nothing of the plot beforehand, saying “I am the one responsible… The Afghan people and government knew nothing whatsoever about these events.”[6] This is the most important part of his transmission, meant not for European capitals so much as the Karzai government and its U.S. allies. The Taliban has been making overtures to the Afghan government, seeking a negotiated settlement.[7] There are elements within the Taliban that are not happy being grouped with extremists such as former commanders Mullah Dadullah and Jalaluddin Haqqani, and are seeking to join a new Afghan government. Former Taliban have already been incorporated into the government at the district and provincial levels; their further assimilation is entirely possible.

Why would bin Laden push for this? He owes the Taliban, and he knows it. Without their support, and that of their tribal brethren, he could easily have been captured or killed in the wilds of Afghanistan after 9/11. He ruined, almost single-handedly, their first government, although it is debatable how much they knew of it beforehand. What is clear is that no matter how much the Taliban knew of the 9/11 plot before it took place, they did not anticipate in any way the fierce reaction from the United States. Now bin Laden wants to remove the original stain on the Taliban reputation that led to their downfall.

We expect the Taliban to continue a twin pronged offensive; militarily to prove they can still be effective and to point out the current government of Afghanistan’s weakness, and diplomatically as they pursue negotiations. They know violence alone will not bring them any closer to power; after their last period of rule, less than 5% of Afghanistan wants them back in power.[8]

It is now up to the Afghan government and the allies what they want to do with these Taliban overtures. Bin Laden’s pronouncement shows some seriousness missing from their previous attempts at negotiations, when they demanded all foreign forces withdraw, all Taliban prisoners be released, and power over ten southern key provinces.[9] Moderate elements of the Taliban do exist and should be incorporated into the government. Bin Laden is not one of them, however, and any claims he makes should be taken with a bucket of salt.

Negotiations are important, and as previous Afghan conflicts have shown, inevitable. On the one hand, the government and allies must beware of throwing out the baby with the bathwater; i.e. dismissing patriotic Pashtun tribal leaders for mistakes made long ago when the Taliban was the power in Southern Afghanistan. On the other hand, the government must be wary of Greeks bearing gifts; any recommendation from bin Laden certainly falls into this category.

Careful study and in-depth analysis of former Taliban leaders will give the best indication of who can be trusted. Bin Laden’s pronouncement should be ignored at the risk of making some too willing to negotiate, or others too hesitant. His moment of influence in Afghan politics ended long ago.

Recently it was announced that a consortium of Chinese mining companies, led by the China Metallurgical Group (MCC) had won the rights to mine at Anyak in Logar Province, just south of Kabul.[10] This could have large implications for Sino-Afghan and Sino-American relations. As the group is a state-run venture, this must be seen in the context of government policy; the question is why, and what will come of it?

The company beat out a number of international concerns, and as others have noted, it’s the first time Chinese interests in a nation’s stability and ours have coincided. The company itself is massive, but its true value is hard to discern. The two other corporations in consortium, Jiangxi Copper (the largest copper producer in China) and Zijin Mining Group (the largest gold miner) also bring the necessary gravitas to what could be the largest copper mine in the world with somewhere between 13 and 20 million metric tones of the stuff.[11] The company itself has international holdings valued at only a little over a billion dollars, but it has the resources of the Chinese state behind it, so its financial situation should not be underestimated.[12] MCC seems typical of many Chinese resource extraction companies, investing in countries that most Western nations would shun as amoral or too risky, such as Pakistan, Burma, and Papa New Guinea. Afghanistan, however, faces a unique set of challenges and will certainly not be easy to work in, which is why many were surprised the Chinese offered anything more than two billion for the mining rights there. Still, MCC expects up to $30 billion in copper reserves there, making the initial three billion investment seem like more than a favorable entry charge.

The deal sounds like a blessing for Afghanistan as well. It is said there will be over three billion dollars invested in developing the site over five years, before production gets underway.[13] The infrastructure would include the construction of a power plant (at US $500 million) and a railway.[14] Due to its proximity to Kabul, the power station would send its excess energy to that city. Additionally, once the mine is fully operational, it would allegedly provide some $400 million a year in tax revenue to the Afghan government, more than the Afghan government receives now in total. Finally, the mine is estimated to provide somewhere between 5,000 and 10,000 Afghans with meaningful employment.[15] It sounds too good to be true.

And it probably is. China has long invested in natural resource extraction in Central Asia and elsewhere,[16] and is not known as a generous customer. Wages paid to local hires tend to be less than those of Western mining companies, and their contributions to the local economy smaller in scale.[17] Safety standards have also been called into question.[18] Furthermore, depending on the sources proximity to China, many of the workers are not local hires at all but exported work gangs.[19] Just as USAID has specified that many of the materials used in its funded projects must be American made, so too has China specified Chinese projects use Chinese labor. Not only do many Chinese companies enjoy the output of resource extraction, but the Chinese government is eager to provide the inputs as well. I would be very surprised if more than a few Afghans ever find employment at the actual mine in anything more than a menial capacity.

There are, of course, also significant security issues in Eastern Afghanistan that will make such a large, foreign operation a very risky undertaking. There have been a dozen serious security incidents in Logar in the first seven months of 2007, increasing in both frequency and lethality. How the Chinese will maintain their operations at the mine is unclear; no mention has been made of Chinese fighting forces being introduced. If they hire or align themselves with local commanders it could easily exacerbate the warlord situation in that part of the country. If, however, MCC works with the government of Afghanistan to bolster the Afghan National Army (ANA) and Afghan National Police (ANP) in the area, it could indeed be a boon for Afghanistan. China, although it releases no records on the subject, is one of the largest if not the largest small arms exporters in the world. As a low-cost solution to equipping the ANA and the ANP, China may very well prove valuable. For Afghanistan, even if Chinese promises do not come to full fruition, the mine will undoubtedly bring good things in the short and medium terms. Over time, however, as Afghanistan stabilizes, the government may regret the relatively small tax rate afforded MCC.

The mine will also be good for U.S. and Coalition forces, as commerce and development are precisely what Afghanistan needs in order to bring about stability in the country. The mine will take some of the pressure off Western nations to provide development works in the country, and ties another great power to the success of the government of Afghanistan. While one may bemoan the steady march of China in its near abroad energy and natural resource markets, this is one case where China should be lauded for its undertaking in a risky environment where success is not at all assured.

Contracts such as the deal at Anyak are too often viewed through a mercantilist perspective in that someone will lose; the Chinese may not follow through on all their promises, the U.S. and Coalition forces may be loath to provide security to such an operation, or cooperate with the mine’s security detail, or the Afghan government may find itself over-exploited in the future if the mine proves especially profitable. Our analysis, however, indicates that the mine, at least in the short and medium terms, will be a blessing for both the Afghan government and foreign forces. Development in that nation is almost always a good thing, and development news doesn’t get much better than this.

Alec E. Metz is a Research Fellow for the Program for Culture & Conflict Studies at the Naval Postgraduate School.

Persistent and tragic violence has threatened one of the most important aspects of development in Afghanistan. Education provides not only short term success in offering employment, training, and opportunity for the people of Afghanistan, but it also ensures long term success in the process of developing that nation's human potential and promoting a tolerant, democratic society. Since 2001, school enrollment in Afghanistan has increased from 900,000 to nearly 5.4 million.[20] However, exceptional gains in education have been met with rising violence from totalitarian insurgent groups seeking to undermine development and the legitimacy of the Afghan government. To ensure the success of long term development, education must be protected from the violence of insurgents.

Education is an essential component of human capital and security.[21] An educated youth will provide a new generation of moderate leaders and a skilled workforce – necessary components of a developed society. A noted economist, Gary S. Becker has written that: “Indeed, in a modern economy, human capital is by far the most important form of capital in creating wealth and growth.”[22] With limited or deprived education levels, long term economic development and stability will be jeopardized. Since the fall of the Taliban, the education component of human capital has been threatened by rising levels of violence throughout unprotected areas in Afghanistan.

Over the past few years, the growing insurgency in Afghanistan has evinced itself in repulsive violence on local schools throughout the country. The threats and narratives fashioned by the attacks give rise to ever more potent consequences as fear is spread throughout the country, thus limiting the ability and effectiveness of education in Afghanistan. To demonstrate the viciousness of attacks and their collateral results, in southern Afghanistan, more than 200,000 boys and girls were deprived of education after over 150 schools were set ablaze by insurgents in 2006, according to the Ministry of Education in Kabul.[23] The Ministry also reported this year that over 400 schools remain closed in the south, east, and central part of the country due to violence.[24]

More than 20 schools have been torched and 17 students killed in the past 15 months in Helmand Province from Taliban and other insurgent groups.25 In response to this violence, more than 30,000 students who attended last year have been absent.[26] Districts severely affected by the insurgency have closed all of their educational facilities to include Sangin, Greshk, and Musa Qala.[27] As a result, Lashkargah, the capital of Helmand Province and a safe city in relation to surrounding districts, has experienced a surge of students from the surrounding region. Lashkargah has only 27 schools to accommodate the 35,000 students (more than half the student population in the province) that come for learning. Shifts in student populations have created increasingly difficult demands on instructors, parents, and the resident of Lashkargah, as schools are now forced to hold classes outdoors.

The use of terror on soft targets is a cowardly yet strategic means to shock the local and regional population into submission and weaken citizen reliance on the government. Taliban insurgent groups and other criminal factions have committed coordinated terrorist attacks on educational leadership, students, and facilities in order to generate fear among the citizens of Afghanistan. In one case, in January 2005 in Zabul Province, a teacher was decapitated in front of students at Sheik Mathi Baba School.[28] Human Rights Watch correctly states that these attacks on institutions of human development are not only crimes against humanity, but in the context of on-going conflict in Afghanistan, war crimes.[29]

In coordination of such attacks, the Taliban often post “shabnamah” or night letters to warn local residents of upcoming attacks. Night letters are “extremely important” within the traditional culture of Afghanistan.[30] The letters are often posted during the night nearby mosques, government buildings, or in this case, education facilities. Professor Thomas H. Johnson of the Naval Postgraduate School and the director of Culture and Conflict Studies has conducted rigorous study of the narratives of Taliban Night Letters; he found they “represent a strategic and effective instrument, crafting poetic diatribe which appeal to the moral reasoning of Afghan villagers.”[31] Posted letters will often warn of attacks and continued violence if schools are not shut down and women denied access to schools. When such attacks take place, the letters take on greater significance as propaganda. The illiterate unable to read the letters soon hear of the danger of dealing with the international community via education facilities or other development projects. After attacks on 400 schools and 40 teachers in the past year, there are some districts where Taliban intimidation has shut down girls' education altogether.[32] Thus, the Taliban have constructed an extremely efficient psychological operation that has yet to be effectively countered.

While Taliban propaganda tactics frighten the population, they do not break their resolve. Polls show that Afghans view the lack of education as one of the most important issues for Afghan women.[33] Even under current security levels, 43 per cent of Afghan girls are now in school. In Helmand Province, headmaster of Zokur High School Shadi Kan Ihan says, “We are happy to teach students even under worse circumstances, only if security is ensured.”[34] ISAF and the Afghan National Police must provide the necessary elements to ensure security.

A coordinated effort to establish security in Southern Afghanistan is possible. Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRT) must reinforce the trust and confidence of local leaders so that those leaders will bring information and concerns to the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) commanders. When a Night letter is posted, PRTs and ISAF must be notified and provide requisite security via the Afghan National Police (ANP). Each school should be outfitted with patrolling and stationary ANP in order to provide safety, security, and assurance to Afghan children, their parents, and their instructors. Most important, a deeper understanding of how to counter the misinformation campaign and threats posed by Taliban in the form of Night letters will help security forces and local leaders offset their impact on the perceptions of the local population. Counter-propaganda campaigns must be instituted to remind the local population of the costs and effects a return to Taliban rule would bring. Currently, the momentum of public opinion is in our favor; nationally, 89 percent of Afghans view the Taliban unfavorably and 93 percent believe the Taliban would not be able to provide security. Keeping public opinion on our side through an effective counter-propaganda campaign, and providing the essential tools local leaders need for development to be successful will ultimately invalidate the Taliban and their beliefs.

It would be a tragic mistake if the international community were to end their support of education and the broad array of development initiatives in Afghanistan; they are key to winning the hearts and minds of the population. Education is the foundation of any democratic nation and a necessary element of the human capital required to develop the economy into the future. Ensuring the youth are educated is vital to the future of Afghanistan. We must ensure we secure a safe and prosperous education.

Matthew Dearing is a Research Associate for the Program for Culture & Conflict Studies and a graduate student with the National Security Affairs Department at the Naval Postgraduate School.

Whenever I lecture on the history of Afghanistan to groups of Army officers, I always ask for a show of hands of how many are interested in history. The response is almost always about three-quarters of the audience. Unlike most Americans, who are, by-in- large, disinterested in history, Army officers generally like history. It is a required subject at West Point, and forms a significant part of the curriculum at the Command and General Staff College and the Army War College. Groups of officers often go on "staff rides" to battlefields to study the terrain with the trained eye of a military professional. Indeed, the Army has even created a center for "lessons learned" to try to draw from experience. Unfortunately, we should call them “lessons unlearned” instead.

After six years into the war in Afghanistan I am dismayed that the Army has made no discernable effort to learn from the history of warfare in Afghanistan. We are today committing the exact same mistakes, with the exact same operational plan, as the generals of the doomed interventions of Alexander the Great, the British Empire (twice), and the Soviet Union. Sometimes the similarities are so uncanny I wonder if I'm dreaming. Is it just a kind of American bravado - a sense that we're Americans, we're different - that blinds us to the lessons of the past?

A careful study of the campaigns of the four previous western invasions of Afghanistan show that war there always has two phases: In Phase One, a modern western army brings a Revolution in Military Affairs to bear against disorganized resistance, and after a few set-piece battles in which many are killed; the enemy melts away into the hills. Alexander, the British, and the Soviets all experienced this - so did we in Operation Enduring Freedom. Then the victorious army settles down for about two years of nation building, attempting to administer and govern the country from the provincial capitals (Alexander, Elphinstone, Sokolov, Barno, etc). Then comes Phase Two, in which the people who were chased up into the hills cook up an insurgency which takes root at the district level - where they are, and the western army is not - and begin to build the political and military capital necessary to eventually own the ground.

Operation Enduring Freedom is, in the immortal words of Yogi Berra, “like déjà vu all over again.” We are making exactly the same mistakes that all went before us made. We are attempting to administer, develop, and govern the country from the level of the provincial capitals. Twenty-one years ago, Anatoly Dobrynin described the situation in Afghanistan to the Soviet Politburo Congress of 1986 with these words:

Of course we are not the Soviets. The differences between our efforts to assist, develop and protect the legitimate, elected government of Afghanistan and the Soviet imposition of communism at the point of a gun are too obvious to belabor. We are not them. But the difference in legitimacy should not blind us to the commonality of our efforts at the operational level of war. And the outcomes are becoming eerily similar as well. Consider the words of Marshall Sokolov, the Commander-in-Chief of Soviet forces in Afghanistan, reporting in Moscow on the situation on the ground in 1986:

Sound familiar? Today, just as the Soviets and the British and the Greeks did, we are expending the majority of our energies doing precisely what the enemy wants us to do -- chasing an endless supply of illiterate teenage boys with weapons around the countryside and killing them, so that their male relatives all want revenge. AK-47's and M-4's have replaced laminated bows and spears, but everything else is the same. The after-action reports from Herodotus to the Soviet General Staff all report the same enemy tactics. We're like that team that plays the Harlem Globetrotters, going along with their game plan, and we think it's our plan - except this is not funny - men are dying out there. ABC News reported last week that Afghanistan is now more lethal than Iraq.

So what operational lessons can we draw from history? What are the commonalities of the Greek, British (twice) and Soviet defeats at the operational level of war, and how can we get off the track of repeating them and onto the track of victory? They can be summarized in two, simple, but related main points:

One: No one ever defeated an insurgency in Afghanistan by killing insurgents. The Soviets killed a million and a half people, and lost. The November 2007 Senlis Council report shows that 54 percent of the country now has a permanent Taliban presence.35 The current operational approach of squeezing the toothpaste from one side of the tube to the other and then leaving is not working. This is what the enemy wants us to do: chase them into villages, martyr them, cause collateral damage, and lose the village to the Taliban permanently.

Two: No one ever defeated an insurgency in Afghanistan operating from the provincial level. The enemy is at the district level. Instead of Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs), we need District Reconstruction Teams (DRTs). As we learned in Vietnam, we must have a permanent presence in every district. The current effort is one level too high. The troop-to-task ratio is mind-boggling: There is now roughly one PRT for every one million Pashtuns living in abject poverty. But if a DRT was located on unwanted land near every district center, with police trainers and a Quick Reaction Force (QRF) within minutes of any Taliban provocation, the local police would start to put up a fight instead of running away. (Who can blame them now? With 30 rounds of ammunition and help often three or four hours away, who wants to be a martyr for Karzai?) And by maintaining constant contact at the district level, civilian officials and specialists can work closely with local elders, getting to know and addressing local needs. It's the first rule of counterinsurgency: Own the ground.

M. Chris Mason is Senior Research Fellow for the Program for Culture & Conflict Studies at the Naval Postgraduate School.

Opium in Southern Afghanistan: The Program for Culture & Conflict Studies provides a central hub for analysts to understand the impact of poppy cultivation in Afghanistan. Our current focus is on Eastern and Southern Afghanistan, areas most affected by the influence of opium. We have updated our website with analysis of Southern Afghanistan, complete with provincial opium surveys, data, and graphs.

Provincial pages provide a great deal of information on other topics in individual provinces such as politics, development and reconstruction data, tribal maps, human terrain analysis and related maps.

We have added a detailed biography of Governor Hajji Din Mohammad (PDF) as provided by sources with State Department Provincial Reconstruction Teams and other open source information. A genealogy of the Arsala family is provided as well as background of the ethnology of the Ghilzai and Suleiman Khel tribes which Arsala clan derives its origins from.

Our program continues to develop tribal genealogies to provide insight to anlaysts of the complex tribal history and background of traditional Afghan society. Our tribal genealogies can be accessed HERE.

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Reference:
1. “Halt US aid, bin Laden urges Europe,” Al Jazeera, 29 November 2007 <Link> (29 November 2007), and “Messages From Bin Laden Since 9-11,” Associated Press, 30 November 2007 <Link> (30 November 2007).
2.’Bin Laden message’ to Europeans,” BBC News, 29 November 2007 <Link> (29 November 2007).
3. “Osama call will not affect war on terror,” Daily Times, 1 December 2007 <Link> (1 December 2007).
4. “Bin Laden’s call ‘ridiculous’: Afghan president,” Agence France-Presse, 30 November 2007 <Link> (30 November 2007).
5. Jonathan Karl and Luis Martinez, “Afghanistan Now Most Dangerous for U.S. Troops,” American Broadcast Company, 30 November 2007 <Link> (30 November 2007).
6. Firouz Sedarat, “Bin Laden urges Europe to quit Afghanistan,” Reuters, 29 November 2007 <Link> (29 November 2007).
7. “Karzai says Taliban make contact for Afghan peace,” Times of India, 23 November 2007 <Link> (24 November 2007).
8. “Afghans ‘still hopeful on future,’” BBC News, 3 December 2007 <Link> (3 December 2007).
9. Declan Walsh and Sami Yousafzai, “Taliban sets out demands to Afghan president,” The Guardian, 15 October 2007 <Link> (3 December 2007).
10. Jon Boone and Geoff Dyer, “China group wins Afghan copper rights,” Financial Times, 20 November 2007 <Link> (22 November 2007).
11. Hamid Shalizi, “China Metallurgical Group wins Afghan copper mine bid,” Reuters UK, 20 November 2007 <Link> (23 November 2007).
12. China Metallurgical Group Corp., 2007 <Link> (23 November 2007).
13. “Chinese Copper Cos. Get Afghan Rights,” Associated Press, 22 November 2007 <Link> (23 November 2007).
14. Ron Synovitz, “Afghanistan: China’s Winning Bid for Copper Rights Includes Power Plant, Railway,” RFE/RL, 24 November 2007 <Link> (24 November 2007).
15. Ian MacWilliam, “China wins major Afghan project,” BBC News, 20 November 2007, <Link> (21 November 2007).
16. Sébastien Peyrouse, Silk Road Paper: The Economic Aspects of the Chinese-Central Asia Rapprochement, Central Asia- Caucasus Institute, September 2007 <PDF> (24 November 2007), and “Chinese President calls for faster regional integration in Central Asia,” Xinhua News Agency, 16 August 2007 <Link> (12 September 2007).
17. Deborah Brautugam and Adama Gaye, “Is Chinese Investment Good for Africa?” Council on Foreign Relations, 20 February 2007 <Link> (27 November 2007), and Michael Bristow, “China in Africa: Developing ties,” BBC News, 29 November 2007 <Link> (29 November 2007).
18. “China Mine Safety,” International Federation of Chemical, Energy, Mine and General Workers’ Unions, 2007 <Link> (29 November 2007).
19. Alec E. Metz, At Home on the Steppe: Asian Migration to Mongolia, December 2006 <PDF> (22 November 2007).
20. Afghanistan National Human Development Report 2007.< Link> (27 Nov. 2007).
21.I am grateful for Jarad Van Wagoner’s comments on human capital, as well as his thesis publication: The Demise of Russian Health Capital: The Continuity of Ineffective Government Policy. Naval Postgraduate School. Monterey, 2007. <PDF>
22. As quoted by Wheelan, Charles, Naked Economics: Undressing the Dismal Science (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, Inc., 2002): 106.
23. Integrated Regional Information Networks (IRIN). Afghanistan: "Tribal Elders Reopening Southern Schools," UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, 7 Nov. 2006 <Link> (27 November 2007).
24. IRIN. Afghanistan: "Boy’s Education Slides in Helmand," UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, 8 Oct. 2007. < Link> (27 November 2007).
25. Ibid
26. Ibid
27. Ibid
28. Human Rights Watch, "Taliban Night Letter from Zabul Province," Lessons in Terror.<Link> (27 November 2007).
29. Human Rights Watch, "Attacks on Education in Afghanistan" Lessons in Terror. (Summary) Vol 18. No. 6<PDF.> (27 November 2007).
30. Johnson, Thomas H. “The Taliban Insurgency and an Analysis of Shabnamah (Night Letters)”. Small Wars and Insurgencies. Vol 18. No. 3, 317-44. Sept. 2007. <PDF> (27 November 2007).
31. Ibid.
32. Charney, Graig and Isobel Coleman. "There are grounds for hope in Afghanistan," Globeandmail.com 18 June 2007 <Link> (27 November 2007).
33. Ibid.
34. IRIN. Afghanistan: "Boy’s Education Slides in Helmand," UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, 8 Oct. 2007 < Link> (27 November 2007).
35. Senlis. "Stumbling into Chaos: Afghanistan on the Brink," November 2007. Senlis Council.net <PDF> (3 December 2007).

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