

Province: Baghlan
Governor: Munshi Abdul Majid
Deputy Governor: Abdul Hadi Rafi
Provincial Police Chief: Abdul Rahman Rahimi
PRT Leadership: Hungary



Population Estimate: ¹	Urban: 146,000	Rural: 616,500
Area in Square Kilometers: 21,112 sq. km	Capital: Puli Khumri	
Names of Districts:	Baghlan-e-Jadid, Burka, Puli Khumri, Nahrain, Khwaja Hijran, Guzra-e-Noor, Dana-e-Ghoari, Deh Salah, Khost-Farang, Pul-e-Hisar, Andarab, Khinjan, Dushi, Tala-Barfak	
Composition of Population: ²	<u>Ethnic Groups:</u> Tajik: 52% Pashtun: 20% Hazara: 15% Uzbek: 12% Tatar: 1%	<u>Religious Groups:</u> Sunni 85% Shi'a 15%
Income Generation	<u>Major:</u> Agriculture Animal Husbandry (Throughout Province)	<u>Minor:</u> Factory Work Private Business Manual Labor (In Pul-i-Khomri District)
Crops/Farming/Livestock:	<u>Agriculture:</u> Major: Wheat, Rice Secondary: Cotton, Potato, Fodder Tertiary: Consumer Vegetables Household: Farm Forestry, Fruits	<u>Livestock:</u> Dairy and Beef Cows Sheep (wool production) Poultry (in high elevation areas)
Literacy Rate Total: ³ 20%		
Number of Educational Institutions: ⁴	<u>Schools:</u> Total: 330 Primary: 70 Lower Secondary: 161 Higher Secondary: 77 Islamic: 19 Tech/Vocational: 2 University: 1	<u>Colleges/Universities: 2</u> Baghlan University-Departments of Physics, Social Science and Literature in Pul-e-Khumri. Departments of Agriculture and Industry in Baghlan Teacher Training Center-located in Pul-e-Khumri
Poppy (Opium) Cultivation: ⁵	2006: 2,742 ha	2007: 671 ha
	2008:475 ha	2009: 0ha
NGOs Active in Province:	UNHCR, FAO, WHO, IOM, UNOPS, UNICEF, ANBP, ACTED, AKF/AFDN, CONCERN, HALO TRUST, ICARDA, SCA, BRAC, ABC, KRBP, CFA, AGEF, SWCRA, AACRP	
<u>PRT:</u> Hungary since 2006; previously the Netherlands	PRT Budget: 1,459,000,000 HUF. + + 400,000 EUR from	Focus of Aid Projects: Agriculture, education, and health projects. Two

¹ Central Statistics Office Afghanistan, 2005-2006 Population Statistics, available from <http://www.cso-af.net/cso/index.php?page=1&language=en> (accessed May 7, 2008).

² Afghan Information Management Services, Baghlan District Profiles, available from <http://www.aims.org.af/ssroots.aspx?seckeyt=378> (accessed July 30, 2008)

³ Afghanistan Human Development Report 2007, United Nations Development Program, 2007, 164.

⁴ Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, Ministry of Education: School Survey Summary Report, 2007, available from <http://www.moe.gov.af/> (accessed July 31, 2008)

⁵ United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime: Afghanistan Opium Winter Rapid Assessment Survey, February 2008.

(2004-2006)	European Commission (2009), + 300,000 EUR from Greece (2009), + 803,000 USD from Japan (2009), and 49,340 USD from various donors.	NGOs, the Hungarian Interchurch Aid and the Hungarian Baptist Aid, are implementing projects related to workplace creation (brick factory, carpet weaving and carpentry classes), public sector reform, health (midwife education training), and education. These two organizations were the main recipients of international (EC, Japan, and Greece) donor involvement. ⁶
Transportation: See Map Below	<u>All Weather Primary:</u> Route 2: Kabul - Pol-e-Khumri - Sher Khan Highway Route A76: Pol-e-Khumri - Kholm - Mazar-e-Sharif Highway <u>All Weather Secondary:</u> Route 104: Dushi - Khamard Highway <u>Track:</u> Khenjan - Andarab Road Pul-e-Khumri - Nahrin Road Baghlani Jadid - Burka - Khost-wa-Firing Road	
Electricity:	The province has one power generation station. The majority of residents rely on public electricity. Access to electricity is much greater in the urban area where 65% of households have access to electricity, however totals approximately 4% with only half of these (2%) have access to public electricity. ⁷	<u>Estimated Population w/access:</u> 17% ⁸
Health Facilities: ⁹	<u>Hospitals:</u> 1 in Pul-i-Khumri	<u>Clinics, etc.:</u> 46
Primary Sources of Drinking Water: ¹⁰	Rivers, Streams, Canals, Springs provide non-potable water for the majority of the population. Most residents must walk a considerable distance to access safe drinking water.	Availability of Potable Water: 7 % Defined as: Piped water, public tap, public well, protected spring, well, or rain water.
<u>Rivers:</u>	The Kunduz / Khanabad river passes through Kunduz, Baghlan and Takhar provinces and is the most important and vital source of water for the North East region of Afghanistan. It is fed primarily by snow-melt and is heavily utilized for agricultural irrigation. The river and its tributaries also serve as the primary source of drinking water for many communities and their livestock.	

⁶ Péter Wagner, "The Background of the Hungarian Activities in Baghlan," *Magyar Külügyi Intézet*, March 2010, <http://www.kulugyiintezet.hu/index.php?menu=26&gyors=2037>

⁷ MRRD Provincial Development Plan, Baghlan: Provincial Profile, 2005. Available at <http://www.mrrd.gov.af/nabdp/Provincial%20Profiles/Baghlan%20PDP%20Provincial%20profile.pdf> (accessed August 4, 2008)

⁸ MRRD, NRVA Survey Results: Access to Electricity Report, 2005. Available at <http://www.mrrd.gov.af/aird/Access%20to%20Electricity%20report.pdf> (accessed July 21, 2008)

⁹ USAID, Aghanistan: Baghlan Health Facilities Map, June 2005. Available at <http://www.aims.org.af/services/sectoral/health/provincial/english/baghlan.pdf> (accessed July 31, 2008)

¹⁰ *Afghanistan Human Development Report 2007*, United Nations Development Program, 2007, 166. Available at <http://hdr.undp.org/en/reports/nationalreports/asiathepacific/afghanistan/nhdr2007.pdf> (accessed July 21, 2008)

Significant Topographic Features	60% of the province is considered mountainous or semi-mountainous while 40% is classified as flat or semi-flat.
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Political Landscape:

Governor:

	<p>Munshi Abul Majid</p>	<p>Governor Munshi Abdul Majid</p> <p>Governor Munshi Abul Majid replaced as the Haji Mohammad Akbar Barakzai Governor of Baghlan in 2010. Munshi is a Pashtun from Baghlan province who has longstanding ties to Hekmatyar's <i>Hezb-i-Islami</i> and is allegedly involved in consolidating the party and reviving its communications network across the country.¹¹ He previously served as the Governor of Badakhshan since 2005. In 2007, Majid spearheaded a successful opium eradication campaign in Badakhshan, leading to a meager 200 hectares of opium being cultivated in the province (in 2008) from a high of 15,607 hectares in 2004.¹² Munshi is believed to maintain strong relations with Haji Juma Khan Hamdard, a Pashtun warlord and rival of General Rashid Dostum. Hamdard formerly served as the Governor of Jawzjan Province (and Baghlan Province, 2005) and is</p>
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¹¹ Cole Hansen, Christian Dennys and Idrees Zaman, "Conflict analysis: Baharak district, Badakhshan province," CPAU, February 2009.


¹² Cole Hansen, Christian Dennys and Idrees Zaman, "Conflict analysis: Baharak district, Badakhshan province," CPAU, February 2009.

		<p>currently the Governor of Paktia Province. He is known to maintain relations with Hezb-i-Islami operatives. The Afghan Border Police stationed in Badakhshan is allegedly at odds with the Provincial police loyal to Munshi. He was removed from office in April, 2009 following protests alleging his abuse of power.¹³</p>
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Deputy Governor:

<p>Picture Forthcoming</p>	<p>Abdul Hadi Rafi</p>	<p>Information forthcoming.</p>
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Chief of Police:

	<p>Abdul Rahman Sayedkhili</p>	<p>Abdul Rahman Sayedkhili previously served as the Police Chief of Kabul and was re-assigned from Kabul to Baghlan in late 2006. He blames resurgent Taliban and local warlords for instability in province.</p> <p>Abdul Rahman Sayedkhili is credited with the arrest of one suspect in response to the November 2007 suicide bombing that killed 61 and wounded 95.</p> <p>Abdul Rahman Sayedkhili also led the operation resulting in the surrender of Bibi Aysha. Reportedly stated, “Because she surrendered, the government will forgive her for her rebellion. But if someone accuses her of any other crime, she will have to answer for it in court.”¹⁴</p>
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¹³ “Governor replaced in Afghanistan after protest,” *China View*, May 5, 2009.





¹⁴ Institute For War and Peace Reporting, *Afghan Recovery Report: Female Afghan Outlaw Comes In From The Cold*, 09July2008. Available at http://www.iwpr.net/?p=arr&s=f&o=345621&apc_state=henh (accessed August 7, 2008)









Baghlan Wolesi Jirga 2010¹⁵




	<p>Shukoria Isakhel 5,247 votes</p>
	<p>Dilawar Aimaq 3,856 votes Graduated from the Harbi Pohantun (Army College) and served as an Army officer in the 20th Division under the PDPA regime. He comes from the Nahrin district.</p>
	<p>Saeed Mansour Naderi 7,849 votes Leader of the Ismaili sect, and is a former militia commander affiliated with the PDPA. His daughter Farkhonada Zohra Naderi won a seat in Kabul, and his son Sayyed Daud Naderi won a seat in Kunduz. His family owns several successful businesses including the <i>Finest</i> Supermarket chain and some construction companies.¹⁶</p>
	<p>Al-Haj Ustad Najia Aimaq 1,373 votes Comes from the Dahana-e-Ghori district. Supports Dr. Abdullah Abdullah and served in the previous Parliament. Previously served as the head of the Baghlan teacher training institute.</p>
	<p>Mohammad Zahir Ghani Zadah (Qand Agha) 3,080 votes Tajik. He comes from the Jelga district and is the son of a deceased Hezb-i-Islami commander. He has spent time as a refugee in Iran during the Taliban regime. He ran unsuccessfully in the 2005 elections.</p>
	<p>Mohammad Azim Muhsini 4,551 votes Tajik. He comes from the Andarab district. His brother, Rassul Khan, is the provincial council leader for Baghlan, and his elder brother Mustafa Muhsini, is a former PDPA leader who defected to Jamiat-e-Islami and serves as the provincial police chief of Logar.</p>

¹⁵ Biographical information derived from, Gran Hewad, “2010 Election (38): Who is coming from Baghlan?” *Afghan Analysts Network*, December 1, 2010. <http://aan-afghanistan.com/index.asp?id=1360>

	<p>Ubaidullah Ramin 5,362 votes Tajik. He comes from the Khost-e-Farang district and former Minister of Agriculture. He ran instead of his incumbent brother, Habibullah. His family is a major shareholder in the AWCC mobile phone company.</p>
	<p>Dr. Mohiuddin Mehdi 5,154 votes Tajik. He comes from Panjshir, an is a close associate of Dr. Abdullah Abdullah. Although initially affiliated with the Maoist group SAFZA in the 1970s, Mehdi later joined Jamiat-e-Islami in the 1980s and fought in the Andarab district (where his mother hails from). He is viewed as a critical component to the anti-Karzai political bloc in Parliament.</p>

2009 Provincial Council Results for Baghlan Province	
 <p>Mohammad Rasoul</p>	<p>5,278 votes (3% overall).</p>
 <p>Qari Qudrathullah Wafa</p>	<p>3,317 votes (1.9% overall).</p>
 <p>Fazaludin Muradi</p>	<p>3,164 votes (1.8% overall)</p>
 <p>Abdul Satar Efat</p>	<p>3,027 votes (1.7% overall)</p>

	<p>Ustad Zabiullah Rustami</p>	<p>2,807 votes (1.6% overall)</p>
	<p>Assadullah</p>	<p>2,678 votes (1.5% overall).</p>
	<p>Elam Jan</p>	<p>2,612 votes (1.5% overall).</p>
	<p>Mawlavi Abdul Wali Raji</p>	<p>2,604 votes (1.5% overall).</p>
	<p>Dr. Mohammad Faisal Sami</p>	<p>2,521 votes (1.4% overall).</p>
	<p>Abdul Khalil Anwari</p>	<p>2,469 votes (1.4% overall).</p>
	<p>Mawlavi Zainulabdin Ulavi</p>	<p>2,437 votes (1.4% overall)</p>
	<p>Nooria Hameedi</p>	<p>2,944 votes (1.7% overall) female candidate.</p>

 Neda Kayani	1,283 votes (0.7% overall) female candidate. Ms. Neda Kayani was seriously wounded during an ambush against her convoy as she traveled to her office in Pul-i-Khumri in early April, 2010. ¹⁷
 Ustad Gulshan Nawabi	943 votes (0.5% overall) female candidate.
 Zarghona Stanakzai	581 votes (0.3% overall) female candidate.

2005 Meshrano Jirga Members:¹⁸



Mohammad Yonus Shirin Agha Permanent Meshrano Jirga Member



Abdul Satar Transitional Meshrano Jirga Member

2005 Wolesi Jirga Members:¹⁹



Qazi Habibullah Ramin



Wakill Sayyad Agha



Mawlawi Abdul Haq



Ustad Najia Aimaq



Helaluddeen



Shukria Eisakhail



Mohammad Asim

¹⁷ As referenced in, Mirwais Himmat, “Ghazni provincial council member escapes life bid,” *Pajhwok Afghan News*, April 5, 2010.

¹⁸ Wolesi Jirga & Provincial Council Elections Afghanistan 2005, available from <http://www.results.jemb.org/resultsMJ.asp?list=mj&offset=30> (accessed August 6, 2008)

¹⁹ Wolesi Jirga & Provincial Council Elections Afghanistan 2005, available from <http://www.results.jemb.org/leadingCandidates.asp?ElectionID=1&ProvinceID=16> (accessed August 8, 2008)

Provincial Council Members: ²⁰



Mawlawi Naqibullah Sajad

Mawlawi Sirajudin Seerat

Shukrullah

Abdul Ghayas

Fazlulhaq Andarabi

Mohammad Hussain Khoshbeen

Abdul Shakoor Hasanzada

Doctor Muhaiuddin Paikan Haidari



Mawlawi Zainul Abidin Alawi

Nooria Hameedi

Habib Rahman Jahid

Makhdoom Khalil Ahmad

Shukria Aseel

Habiba Ahmadi

Zarghona Stanakzai

Primary Political Parties:

Jamiat-e Islami (Islamic Society of Afghanistan):

Led by Burhanuddin Rabbani. It is predominately a Tajik political party which was active in the anti-Soviet jihad and a major political player in the Northern Alliance. Today Rabbani supports Karzai. Yunus Qanuni's Hezb-e Afghanistan Naween broke away from Jamiat-e Islami. The vast majority of Baghlan's District Chiefs are affiliated with Jamiat. Following the ouster of the Taliban in 2001, many Pashtun communities in northern Baghlan were punished for their role during the Taliban era, and Jamiat and Shura-e Nazar commanders dominated the provincial government and security apparatuses. The Tajik dominated government structure reclaimed Puli Khumri as the provincial capital in 2002.

Shura-e Nazar:

The party was founded by Ahmed Shah Masood in an effort to offset the power of Pashtun ethnic majority in Afghanistan. The Shuria-e-Nezar group was a key player in the Afghan Civil war that followed the Anti-Soviet Jihad. After the Taliban were removed from power in 2001, this same group re-emerged in Afghan politics and has continued to seek power for their former Northern Alliance patrons. Many Afghan observers believe that groups like Shura-e Nazar serve to alienate the Pashtun majority and inadvertently undermine U.S. anti-terror and counterinsurgency efforts in Afghanistan.²¹

Hezb-e Wahdat (Islamic Unity Party of Afghanistan):

²⁰ Wolesi Jirga & Provincial Council Elections Afghanistan 2005, available from <http://www.results.jemb.org/leadingCandidates.asp?ElectionID=2&pcv=2&ProvinceID=16&offset=0> (accessed August 8, 2008)

²¹ Afghan Meli Tolena: US and the Warlords in Afghanistan. Available at: <http://afghanmelitolena.com/html/warlords.html> (accessed July 28, 2008)

Hazara umbrella organization led by Mohammad Karim Khalili. Hezb-e Wahdat is an offshoot and successor to a party of the same name that was established in 1990 when several Iran-based, Shi'a jihadi parties merged. Khalili was chosen to lead the party after the Taliban killed Abdul Ali Mazari, the head of original Wahdat party, in 1995. Khalili's drift toward an alliance with the Taliban is generally blamed for his party's factional disintegration. Khalili has served as second vice president in President Karzai's government and wields particular influence among Hazaras in central Afghanistan. His party's success or failure might be viewed as an indicator of the degree to which Hazaras believe the current government reflects their aspirations.²²

Islamic Unity Party of the People of Afghanistan (Hizb-e Wahdat-e Islami-ye Mardum-e Afghanistan):

Led by Mohammad Mohaqeq, The Islamic Unity Party of the People of Afghanistan, like Khalili's party, is an offshoot of the original Wahdat entity formed with the merger of Iran-based, Shi'a Jihadi groups. Mohaqeq was Wahdat's main representative in northern Afghanistan once the Taliban gained control of Kabul in 1996, becoming an ally of the United Front for the Salvation of Afghanistan (aka the Northern Alliance). In the post-Bonn Interim Administration, Mohaqeq served as a Karzai deputy and minister of planning. Mohaqeq placed third in the presidential ballot with 11.7 percent of the vote. Mohaqeq's party is expected to participate in a powerful opposition bloc in the National Assembly.²³

Hezb-e Islami Gulbuddin (HiG):

Mujahideen party active since the Soviet invasion; led by Gulbuddin Hekmatyar. HiG was famous for its shifting loyalties, and was the favorite party of Pakistan's ISI until the rise of the Taliban. Former members continue to wield considerable influence. Thus far, HiG has been actively opposed to US-led and Afghan national forces. Hekmatyar is a Kharoti Ghilzai and, therefore, less influential than the much more respected and powerful Khugianis, such as Haji Din Mohammad and Anwarul Haq Mohammad.²⁴ The HiG has been frequently accused of fomenting instability and lawlessness in Baghlan by its political and military rivals. During the Soviet Afghan war, Hezb-i-Islami dominated Baghlan-e-Jadid, Dahan-e Ghorri and Burqa districts, but in 1997, these areas were seized by the Taliban and Baghlan-e-Jadid was made the defacto provincial capital.

Human Terrain:

Tajiks: Tajiks are the second largest ethnic group in Afghanistan after the Pashtuns and comprise between 25-30% of the population. In Baghlan, Tajiks are the majority ethnic group and represent over 50% of the population. The Tajiks in Afghanistan tend to live in settled communities as opposed to a nomadic lifestyle. Pashtuns refer to them as *Farsiwan*, or speakers of Farsi, the lingua franca of Afghanistan (50% of Afghanistan speaks Farsi, as opposed to only 35% for Pashtu). Between the Tajiks and Pashtuns there has been significant animosity in recent years. Forming the backbone of the Northern Alliance, they also have a base in the nation of Tajikistan. They held out fiercely against the Taliban. Most Tajik are Sunni Muslims, but a few are Shi'a. Tajiks made up the majority of the Northern Alliance, both in terms of membership and leadership. Tribal ties have largely broken down among the Tajiks; therefore, social organization is defined primarily by geography. Despite their lack of cohesiveness the Tajiks are often brought together due to the perceived common threat posed by the Pashtuns.²⁵ Currently, Tajik warlords vie for control of illicit opium and arms transport with competing Uzbek, and Ismaili militias throughout Baghlan Province.

Pasthun: Pashtuns are located in a small pocket extending from north of Doshi through Pul-e Khumri and north through the City of Baghlan in Baghlan province. They are the majority group in Baghlan Jadid district in the northwestern corner of the province and comprise roughly 20% of the population of Baghlan as a whole. The largest single ethnicity of Afghanistan, the Pashtun, and in particular the largest tribe of Said, the Ghilzai, formed the backbone of the Taliban movement. Traditionally beholden to the moral code of *Pashtunwali* ("the way of the

²² Afghanistan Votes: Political Parties, Major Parties. Available at: <http://www.azadiradio.org/en/specials/elections/parties.asp> (accessed July 24, 2008)

²³ Ibid.

²⁴ Chris Mason, *Tora Bora Nizami Mahaz*.

²⁵ 2007 CIA World Factbook, Central Intelligence Agency, <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/af.html> (accessed June 28, 2007).

Pashtun”), they can easily be deeply offended by breaches of the code and carry the grudge for generations. Several Pashtun communities were grafted into Tajik-dominated Baghlan in the Nineteenth Century as part of the king’s ‘pashtunization’ policy. In general, Pashtuns have been slow to adapt to post-Taliban Afghanistan. Jadid district, north of Pul-i-Khumri, is dominated by Pashtuns and was a Taliban stronghold as late as 2001. At the outset of OEF, the U.S. backed Northern Alliance advance towards Kabul resulted in reported atrocities against Pashtun communities in Jadid district. Additionally, Jadid District is still dominated by former Prime Minister Hekmatyar’s fundamentalist Hizb-i-Islami party, which has resisted the Karzai government. Over the course of American involvement in Afghanistan, Pashtun enclaves in Baghlan have been more susceptible to infiltration by anti-government elements than Tajik and Uzbek dominated areas. Tajiks and Uzbeks in Baghlan blame Pashtun elements or members of the HIG for most of the security incidents which have taken place in the province since 2001. Finally, the continuous state of armed conflict which has characterized Afghanistan for the past three decades has resulted in frequent displacements and subsequent land disputes between the Tajik majority and Pashtun minority in Baghlan province. These disputes have yet to be successfully resolved and serve to fuel longstanding animosity between the Pashtun and their neighbors within Baghlan.²⁶

Gilzhai Pashtun: The largest single tribe of the Pashtun ethnicity, the Ghalji or Ghilzai, and in particular the Hotaki clan, formed the backbone of the Taliban movement. Long resentful of the power the Duranni tribe (of which Karzai and Zahir Shah are members), the Ghilzai are fiercely independent and often view themselves, as the largest grouping of Pashtuns in the country and the rightful leaders of Afghanistan. [Ghilzai Tree \(PDF\)](#) Baghlan's Pashtun minority is primarily Gilzhai.

Hazara: In Baghlan, the Hazara comprise approximately 15% of the population. As a distinct minority ethnic and religious group within the population of Afghanistan; they have often been the target of discriminatory and violent repression. Most likely descended from the Mongols of Genghis Khan, (there is also a strong argument that they are of Eastern Turkic origin), the Hazara are noticeably different in physical appearance when compared to the Pashtun majority. In terms of religion, the vast majority of the Hazara are of the Shia Muslim faith, again in contrast to the Pashtuns who are Sunni Muslim. Due to these differences, “the Hazara have experienced discrimination at the hands of the Pashtun-dominated government throughout the history of modern Afghanistan.”²⁷ As the traditional underclass of Afghan society, Hazara were exploited and made to work as servants and laborers. As a result, there tends to be an anti-government and anti-Pashtun bias among the Hazara. In present day Afghanistan, the Hazara are divided geographically into two main groups: the Hazarajat Hazara and those who live outside the Hazarajat. The Hazarajat is located in the Hindu Kush Mountains in central Afghanistan and is “centered on Bamiyan province and include[s] areas of Ghor, Uruzgan, Wardak, and Ghazni province.”²⁸ The Hazara living outside of the Hazarajat live in and around Kabul, Herat, Mazar-e Sharif and Samangan province. Due to atrocities committed against them by the Taliban, the Hazara by and large are opposed to the Taliban. In August 1998, the Taliban massacred approximately 4,000 Hazara in Mazara-e Sharif; this massacre was followed by another the next month when the Taliban killed another 500 Hazara in Bamiyan. The Hezb-e Wahdat (Islamic Unity Party of Afghanistan) is an umbrella political organization which commands the support of large numbers of Hazara. The Hazara are also often at odds with the Kuchi population within the Hazarajat.

Uzbek: The Uzbek people of Afghanistan are found north of the Hindu Kush in Afghan Turkistan. In Afghanistan, they number approximately 1.6 million and comprise around 12% of the population of Baghlan Province. The presence of the Uzbek people in this region was facilitated by the frequent invasion of Central Asian Turks throughout history. Uzbeks are the most populous Turkish group in Afghanistan and are recognizable by their broad, flat faces and lighter skin when compared to the Pashtuns. They are historically farmers and stockmen, breeding the karakul sheep and an excellent type of Turkman horse. Their kinsmen reside in the central Asian republic of Uzbekistan. Many Uzbeks fled into northern Afghanistan in the 1920s to escape the suppression when

²⁶ Royal United Services Institute for Defense and Security Studies: Baghlan Commentary, November 2007. Available at <http://www.rusi.org/research/militarysciences/defence/commentary/rss/ref:C47334FB2B6F7F/> (accessed August 7, 2008)

²⁷ US State Department Afghanistan Culture and Ethnic Studies, 2004.

²⁸ US State Department Afghanistan Culture and Ethnic Studies, 2004.

the Soviet government was trying to stamp out their customs and Moslem religion.²⁹ Uzbek militias represent one piece of a perennially complicated security puzzle within the province.

Tatar: The Tatar people comprise roughly 1% of the population of Baghlan. They are classified as Turkic in origin and exist in significant concentrations in many former Soviet Republics. Their native tongue is Kazan Tatar (meaning archer). The physical appearance of the Tatar varies from blue-eyed blondes to that of typical Central Asian peoples. Generally, they have oval faces with little facial hair. Historically, the Tatar people have existed as an identifiable group since the tenth century. They have weathered the Mongol conquest of the thirteenth century and domination by the Russian empire and subsequent Soviet Union beginning in the sixteenth century. Today, the Tatar people are settled (as opposed to nomadic) and are generally peasants and merchants with no traditional tribal structure. The father is the legal head of the household in Tatar families and holds sole decision making authority within the family, which frequently includes up to three generations in one household. Most Tatar people are Sunni Hanafite Muslim. However, many pre-Islamic practices persist such as; Celebration of the "Rites of Spring", honoring of saints and holy places, belief in the power of "the evil eye", eating of pork, and not observing Islamic fasts.³⁰

Security Landscape:

General Level of Security:

Insecurity and political violence in Baghlan is attributed to a multitude of armed actors, including militiamen and criminals, Hezb-i-Islami (Gulbuddin, HIG), the Taliban, and al Qaeda affiliates (mostly Uzbek, Chechen, and some Arab fighters). In 2009, the al Qaeda affiliates were led by Qari Rahmatullah, who is also known as Mullah Mohammad, and his main area of operations included the northeastern areas of Baghlan and portions of neighboring Kunduz province. Anti-government and al Qaeda affiliated groups were particularly active in the mountainous areas of Koh-e Fulool, Burka district, Barfak, Karker, Wara Batoor, Baghlan-e-Markazi district, Ali Khwaja, Moghul-ha, Coke-Chenar, Nowroz-ak, Ab-Qul, Aikmar, Tala Wa Barfak, Dahana-e Ghoari, Dara-e Lar-Khwab and the Khastahn mountains of Baghlan-e Qadeem city. The defacto headquarters of the Taliban and Hezb-i-Islami in Baghlan were Baghlan-e-Makazi and Dahana-e Ghoari respectively. Despite security operations launched by Afghan and coalition forces against these positions, insurgent cadres slipped into neighboring Kunduz and have returned periodically ever since.

The Disarmament of Illegally Armed Groups (DIAG) process is operated on a voluntary basis. Therefore, only a few commanders in the province have submitted small quantities of functional weapons. This reality amounts to a token gesture on the part of various warlords and should not be misinterpreted as evidence of anything other than business as usual in the Afghan hinterland. Efforts to target independent militias under the control of provincial commanders are ongoing but are likely to meet with limited success. Warlords continue to dominate public life and are involved in various criminal enterprises. Evidence exist that Baghlan and its associated highways serves as an area of safe transit for opium is from Badakhshan, destined for Central Asia weapons caches bound for insurgent held areas in southern Afghanistan. Uzbek, Tajik and Ismaili militias are locked in conflict for control of the strategic routes from Baghlan Province to Kabul, Herat and beyond. This ongoing competition has led to widespread lawlessness in the province. In 2007, Baghlan's provincial governor was replaced three times as a result of their inability or unwillingness to reign in warring factions within the province. Baghlan's local administration suffers from division, corruption, and factional infiltration, further complicating efforts to promote stability and security.³¹ The customary alliances between the U.S. backed Karzai government and various northern warlords is a fundamental element which now serves to de-legitimize the Afghan government in provinces like Baghlan.

²⁹ The Afghan Network: Ethnic Group Profiles, The Turkish Groups of Afghanistan. Available at <http://www.afghan-network.net/Ethnic-Groups/uzbeks-turkmen.html> (accessed July 24, 2008)

³⁰ The Joshua Project, People-in-Country Profile: Afghanistan, Tatar. Available at <http://www.joshuaproject.net/peopctry.php?rog3=AF&rop3=109874> (accessed August 7, 2008)

³¹ Royal United Services Institute for Defense and Security Studies: Baghlan Commentary, November 2007. Available at <http://www.rusi.org/research/militarysciences/defence/commentary/rss/ref:C47334FB2B6F7F/> (accessed August 7, 2008)

Poppy eradication efforts have met with few problems in many districts. Opium crops in Burka, Nahrein and Khonjan districts have been successfully eradicated. There are ongoing campaigns in Tale Va Barfak district. Andarab district remains un-engaged by the eradication program. Unfortunately, the geographical location of the Baghlan Province and the existence of a major north-south highway (Route 2) make it a major drug route from southern Afghanistan to Central Asia and Europe.³² Sources have indicated that Bibi Aysha (aka The Kaftar) was allied with a recently escaped local Taliban commander, Mullah Dad-e Khuda, and another local warlord, Imam-e Sabz (the Green Imam) in the control of the drug trafficking routes within Baghlan Province as late as July 2008.

The presence of and minority Gilzhai Pashtun enclave, traditionally opposed to Duranni rule and previously aligned with the Taliban regime, serves as a potential avenue for resurgent Taliban infiltration in the province.

Taliban/Insurgent/Warlord Commanders in Baghlan:

Bibi Aysha (The Kaftar, ie The Pigeon): Female warlord surrendered to Baghlan authorities in July 2008 has since remained a cautionary figure who periodically engages in criminal activity along with her subcommanders; most of which are her sons.

Mullah Dad-e Khuda: Local Taliban commander noted for his escape from a prison in Bagram in the Summer of 2008. He is linked with the control of drug trafficking routes within Baghlan and elsewhere. He is suspected of leading a band of seven groups, and operates in Jelga, and in Deh-Salah and Pul-e Hisar districts.

Imam-e Sabz (The Green Imam): Reputed to be heavily involved in control of drug and arms trafficking routes in Baghlan. His main areas of operation include Saka and the Nahrain district.

Mullah Mir Muhammad- He served as the Taliban's Shadow Governor for Baghlan province until his arrest during a clandestine operation in January, 2010. He was a known associate of top Kunduz Taliban leader Mullah Abdul Salaam Baryali who was also arrested during the same raid. Mir Muhammad was replaced by Mullah Rouhullah.

Mullah Rouhullah- He briefly served as the Taliban's new Shadow Governor for Baghlan province before he was killed during a combat operation along with his deputy, Mullah Mukhtar, and three other Taliban military commanders on May 29, 2010.³³

Commander Mubarez- Appointed spokesman for the Taliban in Baghlan and likely to be the assistant to the Taliban Shadow Government in Baghlan province.

Hezb-i-Islami Commanders in Baghlan: Commander Baba (known as Baba Aabuddin) from Andarab district. He is now active in Pul-i-Hesar District (20110109).³⁴ Previous prominent HIG leaders in

³² MRRD Provincial Development Plan, Baghlan: Provincial Profile, 2005. Available at <http://www.mrrd.gov.af/nabdp/Provincial%20Profiles/Baghlan%20PDP%20Provincial%20profile.pdf> (accessed August 4, 2008)

³³ Two other commanders killed in the strike or around the same time in northern Baghlan were Mullah Haji Muhamood and Mullah Kajoor.

³⁴ Baba Abedin (Commander Baba) Aabedin hails from Andarab District, Baghlan Province. The last time Baba Aabuddin and 49 of his fighters surrendered to join the Peace Process was in November 2009, they fled again after six months, taking with them two police ranger vehicles. Now, Baba Aabuddin is again fighting the government in Pul i Hesar Pul e Hesar district and is blamed for highway robbery and other crimes. (20110103) .“Baba Aabuddin has more than 40 group members,” said a resident of Gan village in Pul-e- Hesar. “Whatever he wants to do in this place, nobody can stop him.” Baba Aabuddin said that he was sincere when he joined the peace process. “But the government did not fulfill the promises it made during the months when we were there. I gave food to all my group members, and then I saw that I can’t be part of the government. I returned to my first place and now I am staying there.” According to a police source in Baghlan, Baba Aabuddin joined the peace process three times, each time returning back to the insurgency. *Who’s Who in Afghanistan database*, Abedin, Baba Aabuddin, last modified 3-13-2011. http://afghan-bios.info/index.php?option=com_afghanbios&id=18&task=view&total=1995&start=9&Itemid=2

Baghlan Province were Mamor Malang, who was the second biggest Commander in Baghlan Province, before he and his front was defeated by Taliban fighters. Others include Abdullah [killed in a fight with police in the Karkar mine area of Pul-i- Khumri] (known as Kalakof) from Central Baghlan District, Commander Mohammadullah, Noor Agha, Sher³⁵, Mirwais³⁶, Noorullah (20100309), Gul Rahman from Andarab District, Rahmat Shah from Broka Nahrain District. Koh Chinar, Qaisekhel and Qashq-i-Ghulam areas are under control of the Taliban now. Taliban disarmed 20 HIA men in the Dehna Ghor District Dahana-I-Ghor District. Background: In severe fights between 20100306-20100309 Taliban defeated several HIG Commanders in their traditional HIG-Strongholds in the northern Baghlan-i-Markazi District of Baghlan Province. 120 Hizb-i-Islami Gulbuddin (HIG) fighters handed in their weapons and surrendered to the government in northern Baghlan province and asked for protection.³⁷



Commander Mirwais, HIG, seen in video interview, 2010



Commander Kalaqub, HIG northern zone commander, seen in video interview, 2010

³⁵ Commander Sher was killed in combat against Taliban fighters in September, 2010.


³⁶ Commander Mirwais is an influential commander who rose to prominence by 2010.

³⁷ Excerpt taken from *Who's Who in Afghanistan database*, "HIA Leaders/Baghlan Insurgents," last modified January 9, 2011. http://www.afghan-bios.info/index.php?option=com_afghanbios&id=591&task=view&total=80&start=33&Itemid=2

BAGHLAN DISTRICT MAP³⁸



REGIONAL INFRASTRUCTURE MAP



³⁸ Péter Wagner, "The Background of the Hungarian Activities in Baghlan," *Magyar Külügyi Intézet*, March 2010, <http://www.kulugyiintezet.hu/index.php?menu=26&gyors=2037>