**Province: Kunduz**
**Governor:** Engineer Mohammad Omar  
**Deputy Governor:** Sayed M. Dawoud Hashmi  
**Provincial Police Chief:** Abdul Rahman Aqtash  
**PRT Leadership:** Germany

<table>
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<tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Area in Square Kilometers:</td>
<td>8,040 sq. km</td>
<td>Capital: Kunduz</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Names of Districts:</td>
<td>Ali Abad, Archi, Chahar Dara, Imam Saheb, Khan Abad, Kunduz, Qalay-i-Zal</td>
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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Composition of Population:</th>
<th>Ethnic Groups:</th>
<th>Religious Groups:</th>
<th>Tribal Groups:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Pashtun: 33%</td>
<td>Sunni: 94%</td>
<td>Gilzai Pashtun</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tajik: 22%</td>
<td>Shi'a: 6%</td>
<td>Pashai</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Uzbek: 27%</td>
<td>Turkmen: 11%</td>
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<tr>
<td>Hazara: 6%</td>
<td>Pashai: 1%</td>
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<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Household: Vegetables</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Literacy Rate Total:</th>
<th>22%</th>
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</thead>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Number of Educational Institutions:</th>
<th>Schools: Total: 276</th>
<th>Colleges/Universities: None</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total: 276</td>
<td>Primary: 135</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lower Secondary: 76</td>
<td>Higher Secondary: 50</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Islamic: 12</td>
<td>University: 0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tech/Vocational: 2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Number of Security Incidents, 2007:</th>
<th>January: 1</th>
<th>May: 0</th>
<th>September: 0</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>February: 1</td>
<td>June: 2</td>
<td>October: 0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March: 0</td>
<td>July: 0</td>
<td>November: 3</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>April: 3</td>
<td>August: 0</td>
<td>December: 1</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<th>Poppy (Opium) Cultivation:</th>
<th>2006: 102 ha</th>
<th>2007: 0 ha</th>
</tr>
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<thead>
<tr>
<th>NGOs Active in Province as of 2002</th>
<th>MSF: Clinic support</th>
<th>SCA: Clinic support, Pump Well installation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Organizations and International NGOs located in Kunduz City as of July 2007</td>
<td>CFA: School reconstruction, Literacy classes, Clinic support</td>
<td>Concern: Clinic support</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-------------------------------------</td>
<td>---------------------</td>
<td>---------------------------------------------</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>UNICEF: School Materials</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<th>PRT Activity:</th>
<th>Total PRT Projects:</th>
<th>Other Aid Projects:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total per capita: $8</td>
<td>Complete: 168/$4,268,612</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Ongoing: 33/$405,210</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Planned/Funded: 60/$1,728,528</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Planned/Unfunded: 21/$571,543</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total: 282/$6,973,893</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Transportation:**
- Roads passable by car year round: 68%
- Roads passable by car in winter: 42%
- No roads present: 4% of province

See Map Below

**Electricity:**
- Households with access: 18%
- Households with public electricity: 15%
- Access in urban areas: 64%
- Access in rural areas: 5%
- Public access in rural areas: 2%

Source: Tajikistan as of May 2003
- Reliability: Generally erratic
- Issues: Joint Cooperative Agreement signed by Afghan and Tajik governments.
- Balance of payment by Afghanistan for its power imports dominates current and future negotiations with extra-national suppliers.

**Future Growth:** Tajikistan possesses vast amounts of hydroelectric resources of which only 10% is exploited. The country also has considerable coal deposits. The electricity sector alone currently accounts for about 5% of GDP in Tajikistan.

**Health Facilities:**
- Hospitals: 1 equidistant between Kunduz City and Khan Abad
- Clinics, etc.: 36

**Drinking Water:**
- Statistics vary regarding the availability of safe drinking water with the UNHDR of 2007 reporting lower availability than the Afghan government for the same year.

Afghan Government Report:
- Availability of safe drinking water: 25%
- Availability in urban areas: 15%
- Availability in rural areas: 29%
- Travel required in rural areas:
  - In community: 88%
  - Less than 1 hour: 9%
  - 1-3 hours: 2%
  - 3-6 hours: 1%

UNHDR:
- Availability of Potable Water: 16%

Potable Water defined as: Piped water, public tap, public well, protected spring, well, or rain water.

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| Significant Topographic Features | 80% of Kunduz Province is classified as flat-land with the remaining 20% being mountainous or semi-mountainous. The Kunduz River system is classified as a "Complex River System" by the UN Food and Agriculture Organization. Of note, it originates both in the highlands of neighboring Badakhshan and Takhar provinces and flows through Taloqan, Takhar. It also rises in the highlands of Bamyan and Baghlan provinces and flows through Pul-i-Khumri, Baghlan. From here it flows to its confluence with the Amu Dariya River north of Kunduz city. Most settlements and agricultural activities exist within close proximity of the river and its tributaries within the province. |

| Political Landscape: |

| Governor: | An ethnic Andar Pashtun from Baharak District, Omar politically aligned with Dawat-e Islami of Prof. Sayyaf (probably Ustah Sayyaf, Dawlat-e Islami party leader), though he was recently affiliated with the Afghan Millat Party. He completed 2 years of study in engineering at Kabul Polytechnic Institute but did not obtain a diploma. He was the Mayor of Taloqan from 1991 to 1992, a commander for Sayyaf against the Taleban, and Governor of Baghlan Province from 2001 to 2003. |

| Deputy Governor: | Sayed M. Dawoud Hashmi |

| Chief of Police: | Abdul Rahman Aqtash |

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**Meshrano Jirga Members: 13**

**Haji Abdul Hameed:**
Sunni Amaiq, illiterate but well connected businessman.

**Safar Mohammad Kakar:**
Sunni Pashtun, BA in Education and Management. Tribal elder, former teacher and principal.

**Wolesi Jirga Members: 14**

**Haji Mohammad Omar:**
Sunni Pashtun, Former HIG, Jamiat and Taliban Commander. Brother of slain top commander (and former governor) of province.

**Haji Abdul Rawoof:**
Sunni Uzbek, Commander - linked first to Hezb-e Islami, then Junbesh, then Jamiat. Brother of former governor (Abdul Latif Ebrahimi). Commander of border forces in Kunduz past five years.

**Fazal Karim:**

**Ustad Shukria Paikan Ahmadi:**
Sunni Uzbek University of Balkh Professor. Married with 4 children.

**Haji Mohammad Amin Qaney:**
Sunni Tajik or Turkmen. Former Jamiat. Carpet dealer/farmer.

**Al-haj Pohanmal Moeen Mrastyal:**
Sunni Pashtun, Former Commander. Studied in Australia and India. Recently Minister Counselor for MOI. Former Deputy Minister of Education, Professor at Kabul Univ. Originally from Khanabad.

**Nazek Mir Sarfaraz:**
Sunni Pashtun, BA in Education. Trader. Extensive relations with Tajikistan, including financial support to Tajik muj and shareholder in cooking oil company in Tajikistan. Former teacher.

**Qari Rahmatullah:**
Sunni Tajik, Commander - linked first to Hezb-e Islami, then Junbesh, then Jamiat. Controls Ali Abad and Khan Abad districts, commanded 350 armed militia. Former Muj Kunduz governor.

**Doctor Fatima Aziz:**
Sunni Tajik, Brother head of Econ Min in Kunduz, husband engineer. Graduate of Kabul University Medical Faculty. Worked for Kabul Hospital for 13 years, then for international NGOs.

**Provincial Council Members: 15**

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Primary Political Parties:

**Jamiat-e Islami (Islamic Society of Afghanistan):**
Led by Burhanuddin Rabbani. It is predominately a Tajik political party which was active in the anti-Soviet jihad and a major political player in the Northern Alliance. Today Rabbani supports Karzai. Yunus Qanuni’s Hezb-e Afghanistan Naween broke away from Jamiat-e Islami. The vast majority of Kunduz's District Chiefs are affiliated with Jamiat.

**Shuria-e Nazar:**
The party was founded by Ahmed Shah Masood in an effort to offset the power of Pashtun ethnic majority in Afghanistan. The Shuria-e-Nezar group was a key player in the Afghan Civil war that followed the Anti-Soviet Jihad. After the Taliban were removed from power in 2001, this same group re-emerged in Afghan politics and has continued to seek power for their former Northern Alliance patrons. Many Afghan observers believe that groups like Shuria-e Nazar serve to alienate the Pashtun majority and inadvertently undermine U.S. anti-terror and counterinsurgency efforts in Afghanistan.\(^{16}\)

**Hezb-e Wahdat (Islamic Unity Party of Afghanistan):**
Hazara umbrella organization led by Mohammad Karim Khalili. Hezb-e Wahdat is an offshoot and successor to a party of the same name that was established in 1990 when several Iran-based, Shi'a jihadi parties merged. Khalili was chosen to lead the party after the Taliban killed Abdul Ali Mazari, the head of original Wahdat party, in 1995. Khalili's drift toward an alliance with the Taliban is generally blamed for his party's factional disintegration. Khalili has served as second vice president in President Karzai's government and wields particular influence among

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Hazaras in central Afghanistan. His party's success or failure might be viewed as an indicator of the degree to which Hazaras believe the current government reflects their aspirations.17

Islamic Unity Party of the People of Afghanistan (Hizb-e Wahdat-e Islami-ye Mardum-e Afghanistan):
Led by Mohammad Mohaqeq, The Islamic Unity Party of the People of Afghanistan, like Khalili's party, is an offshoot of the original Wahdat entity formed with the merger of Iran-based, Shi'a Jihadi groups. Mohaqeq was Wahdat's main representative in northern Afghanistan once the Taliban gained control of Kabul in 1996, becoming an ally of the United Front for the Salvation of Afghanistan (aka the Northern Alliance). In the post-Bonn Interim Administration, Mohaqeq served as a Karzai deputy and minister of planning. Mohaqeq placed third in the presidential ballot with 11.7 percent of the vote. Mohaqeq's party is expected to participate in a powerful opposition bloc in the National Assembly.18

Hezb-e Islami Gulbuddin (HiG):
Mujahideen party active since the Soviet invasion; led by Gulbuddin Hekmatyar. HiG was famous for its shifting loyalties, and was the favorite party of Pakistan's ISI until the rise of the Taliban. Former members continue to wield considerable influence. Thus far, HiG has been actively opposed to US-led and Afghan national forces. Hekmatyar is a Khorat Ghilzai and, therefore, less influential than the much more respected and powerful Khugianis, such as Haji Din Mohammad and Anwarul Haq Mohammad.19

Human Terrain:

Pastun: Gilzhai Pashtuns comprise 33% of the population of Kunduz and are the majority ethnic group in the province. They are primarily found in Imam Sahib District. The largest single ethnicity of Afghanistan, the Pashtun, and in particular the largest tribe of Said, the Ghilzai, formed the backbone of the Taliban movement. Traditionally beholden to the moral code of Pashtunwali (“the way of the Pashtun”), they can easily be deeply offended by breaches of the code and carry the grudge for generations. Several Pashtun communities were grafted into Tajik and Uzbek dominated Northern Afghanistan in the Nineteenth Century as part of the king’s ‘pashtunization’ policy. In general, Pashtuns have been slow to adapt to post-Taliban Afghanistan. At the outset of OEF, the U.S. backed Northern Alliance advance towards Kabul resulted in reported atrocities against Pashtun communities throughout northern Afghanistan. Over the course of American involvement in Afghanistan, Pashtun enclaves in Kunduz have been more susceptible to infiltration by anti-government elements than Tajik and Uzbek dominated areas. Tajiks and Uzbeks in Kunduz most recently blamed Pashtun Taliban sympathizers for most of the burning of schools in the province. Finally, the continuous state of armed conflict which has characterized Afghanistan for the past three decades has resulted in frequent displacements and subsequent land disputes between the Tajik majority and Pashtun minority in the Northern provinces. These disputes have yet to be successfully resolved and serve to fuel longstanding animosity between the Pashtun and their neighbours within Kunduz.

Gilzhai Pashtun: The largest single tribe of the Pashtun ethnicity, the Ghalji or Ghilzai, and in particular the Hotaki clan, formed the backbone of the Taliban movement. Long resentful of the power the Duranni tribe (of which Karzai and Zahir Shah are members), the Ghilzai are fiercely independent and often view themselves as the largest grouping of Pashtuns in the country and the rightful leaders of Afghanistan. Ghilzai Tree (PDF) Kunduz's Pashtun majority is primarily Gilzhai.

Uzbek: The Uzbek people of Afghanistan are found north of the Hindu Kush in Afghan Turkistan. In Afghanistan, they number approximately 1.6 million and comprise around 27% of the population of Kunduz Province. The presence of the Uzbek people in this region was facilitated by the frequent invasion of Central Asian Turks throughout history. Uzbeks are the most populous Turkish group in Afghanistan and are recognizable by their broad, flat faces and lighter skin when compared to the Pashtuns. They are historically farmers and stockmen, breeding the karakul sheep and an excellent type of Turkman horse. Their kinsmen reside in the central Asian

18 Ibid.
19 Chris Mason, *Tora Bora Nizami Mahaz*. 
republic of Uzbekistan. Many Uzbeks fled into northern Afghanistan in the 1920s to escape the suppression when the Soviet government was trying to stamp out their customs and Moslem religion. Uzbek militias represent one piece of a perennially complicated security puzzle within Northern Afghanistan.

**Tajiks:** Tajiks are the second largest ethnic group in Afghanistan after the Pashtuns and comprise between 25-30% of the population. In Kunduz, Tajiks are a significant minority ethnic group and represent 22% of the population. The Tajiks in Afghanistan tend to live in settled communities as opposed to a nomadic lifestyle. Pashtuns refer to them as Farsiwan, or speakers of Farsi, the lingua franca of Afghanistan (50% of Afghanistan speaks Farsi, as opposed to only 35% for Pashtu). Between the Tajiks and Pashtuns there has been significant animosity in recent years. Forming the backbone of the Northern Alliance, they also have a base in the nation of Tajikistan. They held out fiercely against the Taliban. Most Tajik are Sunni Muslims, but a few are Shi’a. Tajiks made up the majority of the Northern Alliance, both in terms of membership and leadership. Tribal ties have largely broken down among the Tajiks; therefore, social organization is defined primarily by geography. Despite their lack of cohesiveness the Tajiks are often brought together due to the perceived common threat posed by the Pashtuns. Currently, Tajik warlords vie for control of illicit opium and arms transport with competing Uzbek, and Ismaili militias throughout the Northern provinces.

**Turkmen:** 11% of the population of Kunduz is classified as ethnically Turkmen. Turkmen are another Sunni Turkic-speaking group whose language has close affinities with modern Turkish. They are of aquiline Mongolid stock. The Afghan Turkmen population in the 1990s was estimated at around 200,000. Turkmen also reside north of the Amu Darya in Turkmenistan. The original Turkmen groups came from east of the Caspian Sea into northwestern Afghanistan at various periods, particularly after the end of the nineteenth century when the Russians moved into their territory. They established settlements from Balkh Province to Herat Province, where they are now concentrated; smaller groups settled in the northwest portions of Kunduz Province. Others came in considerable numbers as a result of the failure of the Basmachi revolts against the Bolsheviks in the 1920s. Turkmen tribes, of which there are twelve major groups in Afghanistan, base their structure on genealogies traced through the male line. Senior members wield considerable authority. Formerly a nomadic and warlike people feared for their lightening raids on caravans, Turkmen in Afghanistan are farmer-herdsmen and important contributors to the economy. They brought karakul sheep to Afghanistan and are also renowned makers of carpets, which, with karakul pelts, are major hard currency export commodities. Turkmen jewelry is also highly prized.

**Hazara:** In Kunduz, the Hazara comprise approximately 6% of the population. As a distinct minority ethnic and religious group within the population of Afghanistan; they have often been the target of discriminatory and violent repression. Most likely descended from the Mongols of Genghis Khan, (there is also a strong argument that they are of Eastern Turkic origin), the Hazara are noticeably different in physical appearance when compared to the Pashtun majority. In terms of religion, the vast majority of the Hazara are of the Shia Muslim faith, again in contrast to the Pashtuns who are Sunni Muslim. Due to these differences, “the Hazara have experienced discrimination at the hands of the Pashtun-dominated government throughout the history of modern Afghanistan.” As the traditional underclass of Afghan society, Hazara were exploited and made to work as servants and laborers. As a result, there tends to be an anti-government and anti-Pashtun bias among the Hazara. In present day Afghanistan, the Hazara are divided geographically into two main groups: the Hazarajat Hazara and those who live outside the Hazarajat. The Hazarajat is located in the Hindu Kush Mountains in central Afghanistan and is “centered on Bamiyan province and include[s] areas of Ghor, Uruzgan, Wardak, and Ghazni province.” The Hazara living outside of the Hazarajat live in and around Kabul, Herat, Mazar-e Sharif and Samangan province. Due to atrocities committed against them by the Taliban, the Hazara by and large are opposed to the Taliban. In August 1998, the Taliban massacred approximately 4,000 Hazara in Mazar-e Sharif; this massacre was followed by another the next month when the Taliban killed another 500 Hazara in Bamiyan. The Hezb-e Wahdat (Islamic

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Unity Party of Afghanistan) is an umbrella political organization which commands the support of large numbers of Hazara. The Hazara are also often at odds with the Kuchi population within the Hazarajat.

Pashai: The Pashai represent only 1% of the population of Kunduz but are present in small numbers throughout the northeast corner of Afghanistan. The term "Pashai" refers to the language itself, the people who speak it, and the area they inhabit. Pashai is spoken only in Afghanistan and Pashai speakers live in the area north of the Kabul River, extending about 160 kilometers from Gulbahar on the Panjshir River in the northwest to Chaga Serai in the east. There are two conflicting theories on the origin of the Pashai. One theory suggests that the Pashai were members of the classic Gandhara culture and that they were pushed out of their original homeland in the lowlands into the valleys of the Hindu Kush by an invasion of Pashto-speaking Afghans from the Sulaiman Mountains. Another theory, based on ethnographic evidence and the cultural similarities of all mountain people in the area postulates that all these groups, including the Pashai, share common historical roots that predate the rise of the Gandharan civilization.

Their economy is based on herding in higher elevations and agriculture in low lying areas. The major crops are rice in the lower elevations and wheat and maize in the high valleys. Walnuts, mulberries, and poppies are also grown. Goats, sheep, and cattle are the primary herding stock. In most villages, men are responsible for whatever primary economic activity predominates with women tending to lower priority economic activities. In some groups, and economic caste system exists in which endogamy is the norm although not culturally mandatory. Kinship ties through the male blood-line dominate most social relationships. However, political affiliations may be based on either patriarchy or matrilineal descent within specific villages. Feuds may also organize themselves based on either branch of the family tree.

Leadership potential is based on honor, age, generosity, and mediation skills. Village headmen primarily serve as arbiters of disputes and village to government intermediaries as opposed to a westernized tribal chief. Rule is generally by consensus via a village council which limits its authority to agricultural issues such as water distribution. Some village councils also regulate bride-wealth, betrothal, weddings, funerals, and pay rates for laborers. Individual are responsible for enforcing their own rights and disputes that cannot be settled by village council or the mediation of a headman often result in bloody feuds between rival families.

Like the Pashtun, the prosecution of feuds is a cornerstone of Pashai culture. The key masculine values are honor, military skill, loyalty to kinship ties, ferocity towards ones enemies, and an instantaneous readiness for single combat especially in the realm of knife fighting, and proficiency with firearms. Men who fail in this regard are referred to as "Men without honor", belittled publicly, and traditionally have ashes poured on their heads as a form of public humiliation for failing to live up to their warrior credo.

Religiously, the Pashai do not revere saints and are Sunni Muslims like their Nuristani and Pashtun neighbors. Unlike the Pashtun, the Pashai do not seclude their women and females are allowed to interact freely with men.24

Security Landscape:

General Level of Security:

One of the most widespread and disturbing tactics employed by the Taliban throughout Afghanistan in 2007 has been the burning of schools. In total, 187 schools were destroyed in 2007 alone with schools in Imam Saheb and Cahardara districts being torched as late as August 2007. The most highly publicized recent security developments concern increasing Taliban and al Qaeda attacks on German military forces in the province. A German soldier was killed and three others injured by a roadside bomb in Chardara District August 27. Additionally, In May 2007, three German soldiers and eight civilians were killed in Kunduz. This October, the German Parliament will vote on whether or not to extend the mandate of German forces serving under ISAF by

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increasing the size of the German contingent from 3,000 to 4,500 troops.\textsuperscript{25} The rise in insurgent activity against German forces fits the pattern of politically timed Taliban and al Qaeda activity over the course of the conflict in Afghanistan. It is reasonable to assume that attacks against German troops will increase as the October vote approaches. The body of a kidnapped French aid worker was also recently found in Kunduz province. These actions represent an effort by insurgent forces to decrease international support for ISAF operations in Afghanistan and undermine government legitimacy among the Afghan populace. In the long term, the presence of a majority Gilzhai Pashtun populace, traditionally opposed to Duranni rule and previously aligned with the Taliban regime, serves as a potential avenue for continued resurgent Taliban infiltration in the province.

The UN sponsored Disarmament of Illegally Armed Groups program has been operated on a voluntary basis. Therefore, only a few commanders in the province have submitted small quantities of functional weapons. This reality amounts to a token gesture on the part of various warlords and should not be misinterpreted as evidence of anything other than business as usual in the Afghan hinterland. Efforts to target independent militias under the control of provincial commanders are ongoing but are likely to meet with limited success. Warlords continue to dominate public life and are involved in various criminal enterprises. Evidence exist that Kunduz and its associated highways serves as an area of safe transit for opium from Badakhshan, destined for Central Asia and weapons caches bound for insurgent held areas in southern Afghanistan. Uzbek, Tajik and Ismaili militias are locked in conflict for control of the strategic routes throughout Northern Afghanistan. This ongoing competition has led to widespread lawlessness in the Northern provinces.\textsuperscript{26} The alliances between the U.S. backed Karzai government and various northern warlords are a fundamental element which now serves to de-legitimize the Afghan government in provinces like Kunduz.

Poppy eradication has largely met with success as the province reported zero poppy growth in 2007. Unfortunately, the geographical location of the Kunduz Province and the existence of a major north-south highway (Route 2) make it a major drug route from southern Afghanistan to Central Asia and Europe.\textsuperscript{27}

**Major Security Incidents 2007:**

20 January: Hundreds of protestors took to the streets in Kunduz District against "illegal" anti-narcotic house searches by FF; Governor Omer said the searches were illegal while pointing out that 40 jerry cans of chemicals used to produce heroin and 15 light arms had been recovered.

16 April: Security Officials: a suicide bomber attacked a police center in Kunduz District while the troops were carrying out morning drill; 9 killed and 25 wounded; Taliban claimed responsibility.

22 April: Interior Ministry: insurgents attacked a checkpoint in Ali Ababd District; but caused no casualties; Taliban claimed that 5 police were killed and 11 wounded.

14 May: T-ban attacks police patrol in Chahar Dara District, wounds two cops. Taliban claims to have killed them.

28 May: Suicide bomber after a US convoy near hospital in Kunduz District killed 2 civilians. Taliban claims after attacking a PRT and killing 6 soldiers, the PRT killed a number of civilians.

4 September: Suicide bomber blew his vehicle up when police stopped him and tried to search the vehicle; 2 police killed and 4 wounded; Taliban claimed responsibility.

21 September: TB rocket attack on police checkpoint in Khan Abad, 2 police killed and 3 wounded; Taliban claim they killed 4 police and wounded 3.


05 October: An explosive device detonated and damaged a German vehicle, 3 German soldiers and 1 Afghan civilian wounded.

10 October: Suicide blast in Kunduz City killed a man and wounded three people, including a police officer; the suicide bomber was targeting an ISAF convoy but his explosive belt detonated before he could reach the soldiers.

**Kunduz Province- Personalities**

**Engineer Mohammad Omar:** Kunduz Governor; several media reports accuse Engineer Omar of being highly corrupt and that he routinely passes sensitive information to known Taliban fighters working in the province, although the reports remain unverified. The reports further speculate that Omar is also linked to the drug trade citing the same sources. These reports are largely unsubstantiated however. German officials are lobbying for his removal and have gained some support from the current Interior Minister Mohammad Atmar. Omar has been Kunduz governor since March 2004. Political: Association: *Hizb-i Tanzim Dawat-i Islami-I Afghanistan (Sayyaf).*

**Mahbobullah Syedi:** the spokesperson of provincial governor.

**General Abdul Razaq:** Brigadier-General Razaq is a Tajik from Paghman district in Kabul, and is a former officer in the Communist forces.

**Col. (identified as Brigadier General last year) Abdul Rahman Aaqtash (Haqtash):** deputy provincial police chief.

**Col. Noor Khan:** The brother of Mohammad Omar and district police chief for Dashti Archi. Survived an ambush on May 20th in the Wazir Khan village area. One police escort was wounded and a police truck destroyed. The counterattack allegedly left two attackers dead while the Taliban claim to have killed 8 policemen in the clash. He was killed August 12 after Taliban forces raided the Dashti-Archi district headquarters.

**Sheikh Saduddin:** Dashti-Archi district governor.

**Abdul Majid Azimi:** NDS provincial chief for Kunduz and works closely with the German military contingent.

**Maulavi Abdullah:** Provincial council chief of Kunduz.

**Preme Qull:** Uzbek, former mujahedeen commander with a “ruthless reputation” who fought the Taliban during the 1990’s and is now a Member of Parliament. He lives in a massive compound in Kunduz and is protected by soldiers. He told reporters in August: “We all know that opposition to this government is all over Afghanistan. It is not simply the old Taliban, but also former mujahedeen who have switched sides and decided to fight the government. Our old mujahedeen fighters found themselves without jobs or influence. They are fighting with the Taliban now.”

**Dr. Humayun Khamoosh:** Head of Kunduz Central Hospital.

**Abdul Wahid Omarkhil (Abdul Wahid Omarkhel):** Current district chief of Chahar Darreh district, an area 15 km northeast of Kunduz City plagued by Taliban activity.
Malim Nazir: Former administrative head of Charhar Darreh district (July 2008).

Lt. Col. Baryali: Chahar Darreh district police chief.

Malim Juma Din: Current district chief form Imam Sahib district.

Mohammad Najeb Jamil: The director of Oil and Gas Department of Shir Khan port bordering Tajikistan, who was killed near Kunduz city around June 18.

Mehmoodul Hassan: Deputy investigative officer of Takhar; nearly assassinated in Kunduz on June 10. Taliban claimed credit for the attack.

Ziaudin Mahmoudi: Provincial security chief for Takhar Province.

Dr. Abdul Hakim Aziz: Provincial health director of Takhar Province.

Qaiz Azimy and Hamdedullah Shah: Two al Jazeera producers arrested by NDS after meeting and filming Taliban fighters and their leader in Kunduz in mid-June. The pair was later released after 3 days of questioning.

**Taliban and Insurgents**

Habibullah: Young Taliban commander in Kunduz interviewed by al Jazeera in June 2009. During the interview, Habibullah claimed to have 12 suicide bombers at the ready for attacks across the province. One of fighters (Mohammed Hamesh---see below) claims to have constructed a new IED that “explodes when a tank gets within 20 meters of it. It only costs $40 dollars to make.” Taliban check-points have been established a few kilometers north of the city. Photo (left) shows Habibullah during a spring 2009 interview with Al Jazeera.

Khalid Salim: One of ten most wanted Taliban and insurgent leaders operating in Kunduz. He operates in the Aqtash area and may run the “task force” in charge of attacking schools in Kunduz. He refers to Kunduz as the Islamic Emirate of Northern Afghanistan.

Abdul Razzeq: Taliban commander in Badakhshan responsible for several high profile attacks and IEDs. He was apprehended recently during a KSK commando raid on the outskirts of Faizabad and flown directly to Kabul. He was one the 10 most wanted list for RC-North. He was the Mullah of the Tirgaran maddrassah in upper Badakhshan district of Warduj.

Mullah Salam (Shaykh Mulla Abdulsalam [Biryali]): Salam is the son of Muhammad Sarwar Bin Mulla Muhammad Khan, and is 35 years old. His family (Pashtun, Tokhi tribe) is known for their religious and educational background and they originally hail from the Dasht-e Archi District of Kunduz province. Salam is currently number one on ISAF’s 10-most wanted list for Kunduz. He takes direct orders from the Quetta Shura, in particular, from Mullah Berader. To avoid being tracked he rarely makes calls and he travels in various disguises. “Even in Kunduz, he never sleeps in the same house for two nights in a row.” Following the arrest of Abdul Razzeq and several offensives launched by German soldiers in the spring of 2009, Salam is believed to have
fled for Kandahar. He is responsible for facilitating and orchestrating nearly every attack directed against German troops in Kunduz. He has vowed to continue his attacks until all Germans and foreign invaders are ousted from Kunduz. *Photo (above) shows Salam being interviewed by Al-Samud, a militant magazine from Afghanistan published in Arabic.*

**Mohammad Hashem:** Taliban fighter based in Kunduz operating alongside commander Habibullah. Both Hashem and Habibullah appeared in a controversial al Jazeera news segment in the spring of 2009. Afghan intelligence officials arrested the three al Jazeera producers responsible for the segment shortly after they met with Taliban fighters outside of Kunduz City and held them for 3 days. Hashem claims the Taliban have deployed ‘new IEDs’ capable of destroying NATO vehicles at the cost of $40 a bomb. Shortly after his interview, two separate roadside bombs in Kunduz left 3 Germans and 4 US soldiers dead. *Photo (left) is taken from the al Jazeera news segment.*

**Mullah Shamsullah:** Deputy to Mullah Salam, Mullah Shamsullah is still active and physically present in Kunduz. He is the overall commander for the Chahar Darreh district, the most unstable district in Kunduz now that Mullah Salam is allegedly on the run. He claims to switch his location everyday and stays in a variety of different houses. He always has two bodyguards with him. He allegedly does not allow cell phones to be used anywhere near him nor does he use one himself.

**Shaikh Abdul:** Lead Taliban leader in Kunduz and the target of a combined operation in the Gul Tiapa area on June 16. He was reportedly killed by German and Afghan soldiers along with four of his men.

**Mufti Selim:** Uzbek commander for Uzbek nationals fighting in Kunduz. He is tightly linked with Kunduz Taliban commander Mawlawi Abdul Rahman. “This war shows the hypocrisy of the world,” Mufti Selim told reporters in August. “During the Russian jihad everyone gave weapons to us, now they are all against us.” He spoke in a very eloquent classical Arabic that he said had learned in madrasas in Afghanistan and Pakistan.  

**Mawlawi Abdul Rahman:** A younger Taliban leader for Kunduz and member of the *Qomissyon,* or Committee. He is allied with a Turkomen insurgent commander and the Uzbek commander for Kunduz, Mufti Selim.

**Qari Abdul Wadoud:** He is the senior Taliban commander in the Imam Sahib district of northern Kunduz. He is suspected of commanding up to 100 insurgent fighters. "German troops with the cooperation of national security forces arrested Taliban key commander Qari Abdul Wadoud from Qarakator village of Imam Sahib district Friday," Juma Khan, the governor of Imam Sahib, told Xinhua on August 1, 2009.

**Mullah Khairullah:** Suspected Taliban suicide bomb and IED facilitator for Kunduz (Chara darah district). Police authorities allegedly arrested Khairullah and several of his men (‘trained’ suicide bombers) on July 9, 2008. The Taliban denied being linked to a Kunduz insurgent commander by this name.

**Maulavi Ahmad:** Identified himself as the Taliban’s “shadow” governor for Kunduz during a media interview published on September 7. He claims to have over 700 fighters under his command. There is

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29 Ibid.
reason to suspect the interview was fake, since Mullah Abdul Salaam has been verified as the Taliban’s shadow governor for Kunduz. One interesting note is Kunduz Governor Engineer Omar has claimed Mullah Abdul Salaam was killed in an Afghan security operation in September, an incident that occurred before Maulavi Ahmad’s declaration of his shadow governor position. However, a man claiming to be Abdul Salaam phoned reporters following Omar’s claim of his death, vowing to continue his attacks against the government.

**Qari Sidiqullah**: Designated Taliban district chief for Imam Sahib District. He was reportedly killed alongside a companion in the area around May 30-31 during a security operation.

**Mullah Bashir (Qari Bashir Haqqani): (Information likely inconsistent, possibly falsified or mixed identities)** Top Taliban leader operating in northeastern Afghanistan including Baghlan and Kunduz. Serves as a semi-official spokesman for the north and has issued several threats against the German government and its military forces in the north. He is a subcommander of Mullah Abdul Salaam. He made headlines in the summer of 2007 when he was granted temporary amnesty to conduct negotiations in Ghazni over the fate of the 21 abducted South Korean hostages. *Photo (left) shows Bashir in August 2007 as he and Mullah Nasrullah engaged in negotiations with the South Korean and Afghan governments over the fate of the 21 SK hostages seized in a Taliban ambush.*

**RC-North Taliban personalities**

**Mullah Usman**: Former top Taliban leader in northeastern Afghansitan (Badakshan, Takhar, Kunduz). He was killed during a police operation along with several insurgents and police after the militant group attacked a security check post in Takhar’s Kalafan district on July 26-27, 2008.

**Shaykh Mawlawi Muhammad Hasan Hashimi**: Taliban commander in Takhar. He is the son of Muhammad Hashim, who was born “in a famous well-educated and jihadist family in the village of Ardishan in Farkhar Subdistrict in the Takhar Province 38 years ago.” He is a top commander in Takhar. *Photo (left) allegedly shows Hashimi during an interview with Al-Sumud Magazine, a militant magazine from Afghanistan published in Arabic*.

**ANP**: Local units are notoriously corrupt. Many are sympathetic to the Taliban and/or actively participate in the narcotics industry, most likely providing protection for drug convoys and money laundering.

**Islamic Jihad Union (IJU)** – Two IJU operatives were arrested in Kunduz on May 12. The lead individual was described as a “known IJU militant” while the second person arrested was described as an associate. The IJU is a Turkish based militant group with strong ties to the Haqqani Network, who are active in western Pakistan (North Waziristan) and RC-East

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The IMU, which the IJU initially splintered from, is believed to be responsible for the trafficking of nearly 70 percent of all heroin trafficked through Central Asia and are also active in Badghis province.

**Insecure Locations**

**Chahar Darreh district**: 15km southwest of Kunduz city where the German contingent is based. Aqtash is completely overrun by Taliban. Locals refer to them as “the only government functioning here.” Qosh Tappeh, a village also close to Kunduz, has resisted Taliban infiltration by countering their threats from former Mujahedeen commanders who now support the government and work at the schools. This is also the area where a June 8th ambush left two German soldiers shot and injured as well as the late June attack that killed three German troops when their armored personnel carrier crashed into a ditch and they drowned following a Taliban ambush.

**Qasabha village (Chahar Darah district)**: The area where 2 German soldiers would injured during an IED on their vehicle on June 8.

**Dobandi (Charhar Darah district)**: The scene of a suicide bombing attack against a German convoy that left three school children (female) wounded on July 6, 2008. This was the third suicide bombing in Kunduz in 2008. The blast destroyed a German vehicle and a roadside electrical transmission pole, severing electricity to most of the district.

**Imam Sahib district**: Area in northern Kunduz that had an appointed Taliban district administrator. It is also a known smuggling transit route. Police confiscated over 1,000 bottles of alcohol here (smuggled in from Tajikistan) in July 2008.

**Sharawan (Imam Sahib district)**: Shah Rawan is the name of a canal carrying water from the river in Taloqan to water the large plain of Dashti Archi (dasht means plain / steppe); along that canal Pashtun settler were brought in since the 1930s. It is also near a village in Imam Sahib district that saw a fierce clash between police and Taliban on May 30 which left 3 insurgents dead and their motorcycle, RPG and machine gun confiscated.

**Gunbad (Imam Sahib district)**: Area where the Taliban claim to be active in.

**Hasqalan**: Is the area near Kunduz City where four engineers were injured in a roadside bombing on June 18.

**Aqtash village (Khanabad district)**: Northeast of Kunduz city, Aqtash is an insurgent stronghold. Taliban fighters are muscling in and shutting schools down in and near the village.

**Durahi Archi district**: Durahi means road fork; it’s the junction on the road where the road to Archi goes off the main tarmac road. This is the area where Mohammad Najeb Jamil, director of Oil and Gas Department, was shot dead by Taliban assassins on June 17.

**Wazir Khan village (Durahi Archi district)**: Scene of late night ambush that nearly killed district police chief (and brother to the governor) Col. Noor Khan on May 20.

**Gul Tiapa**: Located northwest of Kunduz City, GT was the area where German and Afghan soldiers killed Sheikh Abdul and his four men on June 16. Previously, insurgents blew a critical bridgehead in GT on August 17, 2008. The blast severed the connection between several villages on Kunduz City.
Angor Bagh (area of Kunduz City): Location of June 10 attack that nearly killed Deputy investigative officer of Takhar Mehmoodul Hassan.

Kabul Bandar (Bandar means “port of entry”): Scene of the September 23rd, 2008 suicide car bombing that rammed a German convoy and injured several people.

Aliabad and Chardara district corridor: Area where a German convoy was struck by an IED on August 27, 2008. Chardara was rocked by two suicide attacks and three IEDS between Jan. 1 and August 27, 2008.

KUNDUZ DISTRICT MAP