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Democratic Nation Building in the Arc of Crisis: The Case of the Presidential Election in Afghanistan

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The United States will use this moment of opportunity to extend the benefits of freedom across the globe. We will actively work to bring the hope of democracy, development, free markets, and free trade to every corner of the world.¹

—President George W. Bush

Democracy [is] not viable in an environment of intense ethnic preferences . . . Countries with extreme ethnic complexity experience high levels of deadly political violence, which severely strains the fabric of their democratic orders.²

—Larry Diamond and Marc F. Plattner

The Bush administration is significantly lowering expectations of what can be achieved in Iraq, recognizing that the United States will have to settle for far less progress than originally envisioned during the transition due to end in four months, according to U.S. officials in Washington and Baghdad. The United States no longer expects to see a model new democracy, a self-supporting oil industry or a society where the majority of people are free from serious security or economic challenges, U.S. officials say. “What we expected to achieve was never realistic given the timetable or what unfolded on the ground,” said a senior official involved in policy since the 2003 invasion. “We are in a process of absorbing the factors of the situation we’re in and shedding the unreality that dominated at the beginning.”³

—The Washington Post

Introduction

On October 9, 2004, Afghanistan held a historic presidential election. Three and a half months later, on January 30, 2005, the people of Iraq participated in their first open election in 50 years. Both of these elections were of intense interest to the United States and the Bush administration because they
represented the initial recognition of a central aspect of the radical post-9/11 shift in U.S. foreign policy strategy and tactics—the aggressive pursuit of global democracy.

A year after the tragic events of 9/11, the Bush administration published the new U.S. national security strategy. This strategy was founded on three critical elements. First, in order to prevent terrorist and other possible threats to the U.S. homeland, the United States “will not hesitate to act alone, if necessary, to exercise our right of self-defense by acting preemptively.” Second, the United States will maintain instruments of power, including “unparalleled military strength and great economic and political influence” to make it impermeable to challenge by any foe. “[O]ur forces will be strong enough to dissuade potential adversaries from pursuing a military build-up in hopes of surpassing, or equaling, the power of the United States.” Lastly, the United States will promote democracy worldwide. “[W]e will make freedom and the development of democratic institutions key themes in our bilateral relations, seeking solidarity and cooperation from other democracies while we press governments that deny human rights to move toward a better future.”

The U.S. policy of reserving the right to wage preemptive war as well as other aspects of the new strategy met with resistance from many international quarters. When compared to previous U.S. foreign policy experience, the new strategy represents “an entire new set of ideas and principles” that challenges notions of multilateralism, self-determination, and sovereignty, as well as one of the founding principles of the UN: no preemptive war. Additionally, the United States and its policy appear unable to translate its position of global dominance into instruments that can effectively manage various troubling parts of the international system.

The purpose of this chapter is to focus on one aspect of the new national security policy—the promotion of democracy—relative to that policy’s initial test case in Afghanistan. Specifically, it examines a central component of the U.S. promotion of democracy in Afghanistan—the presidential electoral process as well as the meaning of its results to future democratic development. The analysis of this case raises important questions as to the problems facing the United States as it pursues the promotion of global democracy.

Politics in Afghanistan have traditionally been driven by local concerns. Ethnic and sectarian identities define boundaries for Afghan personal and group interactions and drive local concerns. Ethnicity and the issues that arise from ethnic fragmentation are key challenges facing any nation-state that is attempting to construct modern state institutions and norms. Those nation-states with more than one ethnic group that still rely on tribal structures find it more difficult to accomplish this task. This has been the case not only in Afghanistan but also in Africa, Asia, and parts of Eastern Europe. As long as groups within the state place more importance on their ethnic identities than on their national ones, there will continue to be conflicting loyalties that will greatly complicate national democratic development. As I argue later, Afghanistan is a prime example of the way in which ethnicity can directly
impact state formation and determine the success or failure of government. How the United States addresses such concerns within its framework of democratic promotion is critical. Critical theoretical issues concerning ethnicity and democratic development underlie the analysis.

**Ethnicity, Sectarianism, and Democratic State Formation: Some Theoretical Considerations**

[Afghanistan] consists of a mere collection of tribes, of unequal power and divergent habits, which are held together more or less closely, according to the personal character of the chief who rules them. The feeling of patriotism, as it is known in Europe, cannot exist among Afghans, for there is no common country.

—Sir Henry Rawlinson, nineteenth-century British diplomat/colonialist

According to Adrian Hastings, “nation, ethnicity, nationalism, and religion are four distinct and determinative elements within world history.” They are core concepts for every human and help guide individual and group motivations while determining how these entities will react to certain situations. All four are closely linked to each other, and as Hastings argues, it is difficult to separate one from the others. History would clearly suggest that a society’s culture and ethnicity could become dominant factors in the approach to state formation and ideas of governing. In tribal societies, ethnicity plays an even greater role in the everyday life of individuals and their interactions with others. Afghanistan is a seemingly prime example of a society with ethnic cleavages that represent significant obstacles to the creation of a democratically cohesive and legitimate government. According to Diamond and Plattner, “ethnicity is the most difficult type of socio-political cleavage for democracy to manage.” The underlying failure of many states plagued by ethnic fragmentation has been the uneven inclusion of minority groups in the rule of government and the government’s willingness to favor one ethnic group over another. These ethnically charged relationships can lead to conflict within societies and form an insurmountable barrier to democratic state formation.

Similarly, religion and sectarianism are important factors that help define an individual’s identity and, in many cases, reflect directly on the individual’s ethnicity. Throughout history, religion has affected the creation of nation-states and, in some cases, has even been the basis for forming a common bond between different ethnic groups and forging unity when no other force was capable of the task. Moreover, religion has produced the predominant character of many states, such as Afghanistan. Today, the Middle East and Central Asia illustrate this phenomenon. Islam has become directly tied to both ethnicity and nationalism and has helped form the state structures in the region.

Ethnicity and religion are important elements in the formation of a litmus test to determine the probability of success for the creation of a stable and
successful government. A national identity is often difficult to construct among ethnically diverse nation-states. The national identity must supersede ethnic loyalties in order to avoid infighting between competing groups vying for political power. Today’s successful nation-states have populations that have placed national identity before ethnic identity, whereas most failed (or failing) states have remained ethnically defined, hindering the forging of unity and cohesiveness among the populace.

There is little doubt that a major challenge for democracy, as well as the Bush administration’s global pursuit of it, is ethnic conflict. Such ethnic conflict may exist for a variety of reasons. Diamond and Plattner posit that because ethnicity taps cultural and symbolic issues—basic notions of identity and the self, of individual and group worth and entitlement—the conflicts it generates are intrinsically less amenable to compromise than those revolving around material issues . . . they revolve around exclusive symbols and conceptions of legitimacy, they are characterized by competing demands that cannot easily be broken down into bargainable increments.

Hence, ethnicity is viewed as the individual’s and group’s identity and defines their view of entitlement. This has clearly been a significant historical dynamic in Afghanistan where the Pashtuns of the south have considered themselves as the only legitimate rulers of Afghanistan and have been the sole producers of kings and emirs that have ruled for the last 300 years.

The underlying factor for the creation of ethnic conflict in the majority of multiethnic societies has been the degree to which all parties are included in the ruling structure of the state. In severely divided societies, ethnic identity provides a clear line of demarcation as to who will and who will not be included; these lines seem to be unalterable. If Horowitz’s theory is correct, then exclusion produced by ethnic differences is the single most difficult barrier for multiethnic nation-states to overcome. “In deeply ethnically divided societies, in contrast to other lines of cleavages, such as class or occupation, the lines appear to be permanent and all-encompassing, predetermining who will be granted and denied access to power and resources.” Further complicating this situation are the historical memories of these groups, predominantly those of the excluded or minority groups, and the resulting deeply rooted animosity toward the ruling or historically dominant group within the nation-state.

Ethnicity and its possible conflicts become increasingly negative factors in the implementation and development of democratic structures and ideals within nation-states. As long as individuals value ethnicity more than nationalism and a struggle for power exists between separate groups, the chances for the creation of a democratic government and civil society are less likely. This is true not only in Africa, but also in the republics that were created after the fall of the Soviet Union and in the Balkans. Given the chance, it appears that most groups will choose to side with their own ethnic heritages and fight for
control of the political system. If so, then multiethnic societies that lack feelings of nationalism are not conducive to forming democratic governments.

Tilly argues, “the absence of extensive kinship or tribal organization favored the development of the nation-state in Western Europe.” Brinbaum and Badie suggest, “Third World states generally face societies that maintain the persistence of tribal or tribal structures, the crucial importance of kinship, and the limited individualization of property rights in land.” Intense ethnic identity is not conducive to the growth and development of democratic institutions that stress the importance of the whole populace over that of the individual or the group. “[T]he tribe or ethnic group gives primary importance to ties of kinship and patrilineal descent, whereas the state insists on the loyalty of all persons to central authority.”

According to Rubin in his analysis of Afghan fragmentation, “democracy, in the liberal tradition, consists of procedures for making the government accountable to society so that society can govern itself by means of the state.” He continues to say, “the inclusion of citizens in the polity’s institutions and opportunities to contest power define a democratic regime.” If the state shows preference to one group or another or includes only a certain group, that group gains a larger share of the distribution of important material and nonmaterial goods, including prestige. This increases the chance that “ethnic politics” will slow the development of democratic structures.

Another obstacle in developing and maintaining a multiethnic democratic state is the sheer difficulty for any regime in promoting an all-inclusive government and superimposing it on an ethnically divided society. Democracy, as a concept, stresses majority rule, which in multiethnic societies means there will always be groups that feel left out of the political arena. Successful democracies build into their systems procedures and mechanisms that allow minority groups to have a voice within government and thereby feel included in the overall governing process. The primary shortfall of many states facing ethnic conflict has been the ruling group’s failure to allow the sharing of power with others within the nation-state.

AFGHANISTAN: THE EPITOME OF AN ETHNICALLY FRAGMENTED SOCIETY

Afghanistan is a country with a diverse ethnic composition that complicates democratic as well as state formation. The present boundaries of Afghanistan were created to serve as a buffer between the British and Russian Empires as Afghanistan confronted modernity through its forced integration into an Euro-centric state. These “virtual” borders were not drawn along ethnic, linguistic, or religious lines, resulting in an externally imposed “state” composed of a complicated mix of people who were mostly living in small, kin-based communities outside of the limited urban areas. “The state was only able to impose its will upon the tribes and occupy its own territory thanks to the financial subsidies and weapons which were freely provided by the English between 1880 and 1919.” Consequently, the Afghan people were
embittered about modernity and all that it entailed. Complicating the situation was the adoption of this modernity process by many Afghan leaders in recent history. In the end, according to Olivier Roy, it was not modernization that failed the Afghans but the rulers’ notions of modernity. Simply put, he argues, “it is not modernization which brings problems, but modernity, the hypothesis which holds that modernity must necessarily involve a ‘cultural revolution,’ a transformation of the way of thinking and adoption of new social paradigms.”31

Along with modernity came new concepts to Afghanistan and its people, both on social levels as well as on governmental ones. Ideas such as women’s rights, separation of church and state, property rights, implementation of secular laws, and basic regulations, which historically were dealt with on the tribal level, were now being forced from the center outward. In the end, modernization was rejected by the traditionalist Afghans, mistaking it for modernity, a social concept. This wholesale rejection led to the weakening of many Afghan regimes, which were unable to propel the state from a draconian mindset to a more ideologically advanced social structure and organization.

Power sharing also undermined many regimes throughout the last hundred years of Afghan history. Rulers turned to various sociopolitically influential groups (such as the ulema, the chiefs of the Pashtun confederation, or other prominent personalities) that were in favor of attaining more direct control and authority.32 This weakening of central power and its inability to co-opt the powerful and influential segments of society further decreased the chances of creating a lasting and fully independently operating state system. Afghans saw that they were better off supporting their local leaders and tribal elites, who provided them with security and economic relief, rather than supporting a central government that was dependent on the same leaders and elites to survive. In the end, this cycle undermined both the state and local leadership by creating a nonfunctioning government and establishing in the psyche of the Afghan the notion that no modern state system can successfully govern by bringing together both local and national level governing structures.

Currently, traditional legitimacy exists at tribal levels throughout Afghanistan. It is based on the sanctity of traditions and the legitimate rule of the tribal elders acting under those traditions.33 Traditional legitimacy is effective at the tribal level, but will not be effective for the government of a modern state. Much of Afghan society today, especially the rural areas of the country, continues to live within the governing structures of tribes and clans. Roy states, “the tribes see the state as existing on the periphery, responsible for administering land whose boundaries are constantly fluctuating on account of conquests carried out by the tribal confederations, in respect of which the state is no more than the means of continuity.”34 Rubin further develops this notion by suggesting, “the tribal model depicts tribes as largely self-governing groups of people united by a ‘group feeling’ based on a belief in common kinships[. . .] [W]hile the state claims authority over society within a territory, a tribes claims jurisdiction over a set of persons bound by kinship relations.”35 The tribes of Afghanistan see the central government as nothing
more than a foreign and unfamiliar power trying to force control in areas of society that traditionally are governed by tribal codes of conduct. Most tribes and villages have remained self-sufficient and autonomous, accepting central control only when in their material interest or when faced with overwhelming force.36

**Tribal Makeup of Afghanistan**

Today, Afghanistan is made up primarily of Pashtuns who would like to see a strong and Pashtun-run central state, Tajiks who focus on power sharing in the central state, and Uzbeks and Hazaras who desire recognition of their identities and mechanisms of local government.37 Although some of these groups are ethnically and linguistically distinct, they are not necessarily different in terms of culture.

Historically, the Pashtun tribes of the south, forming the largest demographic bloc within Afghanistan, have ruled and governed the country.38 Unlike other ethnic groups, the Pashtuns stress pronounced tribal structures and codes at state expense. The Pashtun dominance of government has created an atmosphere of tension between them and the remaining ethnic groups in Afghanistan—mainly Tajiks, Uzbeks, and Hazaras. These tensions have led to conflict, as well as repressive measures to quell the power struggle of these ethnic minority groups.

Minority ethnic groups have played specific roles within the society as a whole and within the government. But not until the Soviet Union’s invasion of Afghanistan did they truly gain power within the overall societal structure and establish themselves as a political and military force that the Pashtuns could no longer ignore. In the past, fighting for control of the state had occurred primarily between Pashtuns (i.e., Durranis versus Ghilzais). But as other ethnic groups rose in importance and made stabs at governing, a great struggle arose within Afghanistan that eventually led to outright civil war and the collapse of the Afghan government and state structure.

Since the beginning of modern Afghanistan, Afghan rulers have manipulated ethnic groups in their attempts to control the state. For example, “to weaken the Barakzais, Ahmed Shah, the ‘father’ of modern Afghanistan appointed a separate khan for the Achakzais, making the clan into a separate tribe, a status that they retain today.”39 Successful Afghan ruling authorities have been artful in underscoring and exploiting the differences of these groups, including encouraging conflict between them in order to maintain control. This manipulation is similar to that during the British history in Iraq. In order to control remote areas, the British identified points of contact among the tribesmen and farmers in rural areas and effectively created tribal leaders. The government co-opted the leaders for social status and other benefits of upper-class inclusion. This “divide and conquer” technique further fragmented the society and lessened the likelihood of collective action among the tribes in Afghanistan.

Past attempts at Afghan modern state formation that have directly challenged the local tribal and religious structures of society have resulted in
ethnic backlash and state failure. The underlying problem for Afghanistan’s
governments has been their inability to create a sense of genuine national
unity in times other than crisis. This lack of nationalism, compared to the
deeply rooted ethnic identity the majority of Afghans feel, reflects the reality
of how difficult it is for ethnically fragmented societies to coalesce into one
unified front.

Further complicating the dynamics of Afghan society are the relationships
between the tribes themselves and between the varying ethnic groups that
compose the nation-state. Simply put, the relationship among tribes are gener-
ally marked by “competition and outright animosity,” according to Christie.

The Bonn Agreement and Process

In December 2001 the precursor to Afghanistan’s first nationwide election
was held in Bonn, Germany, under the auspices of the UN Special
Representative for Afghanistan. The Bonn conference was organized soon
after it became clear that the United States and the Northern Alliance were
going to defeat the Taliban regime. The goal of this conference was to sys-
tematically map Afghanistan’s future.

After nine grueling days of meetings and deal-making between various
Afghan factions, a UN-brokered agreement was signed establishing provi-
sional arrangements for Afghanistan pending the reestablishment of perma-
nent government institutions. It established an interim government for
Afghanistan until a nationwide election could be held. Pashtun tribal leader
Hamid Karzai was chosen to serve as head of an interim power-sharing coun-
cil, which took office in Kabul on December 22. Karzai was clearly the U.S.
favorite for this position. Especially after the Taliban’s assassination of Abdul
Haq in the fall of 2001, Karzai was the one Pashtun leader with whom the
United States felt comfortable. Washington lobbied vigorously in Bonn to
secure Karzai’s position as the leader of the interim government.

Although the Bonn Agreement—viewed by many as a “peace agreement”—
laid the groundwork for Afghanistan’s future political processes and institu-
tions of governance, it did not bring together the warring parties of al Qaeda,
the Taliban, and the Northern Alliance. Rather, Bonn coalesced Afghan
groups opposed to the Taliban and al Qaeda. Ironically, these factions were
also historically opposed to each other. Hence, although Bonn did represent
a new level of commitment and political will by both Afghans and major
powers and did establish the agenda and process for the establishment of per-
manent governance institutions, it did not attempt to resolve many root
problems, most notably Afghan ethnic fragmentation and distrust.

Moreover, as noted by some critics, Bonn codified de facto power rela-
tions, disregarding their legitimacy or illegitimacy. This was particularly
pronounced in the allocation of key ministries to the Tajiks and Northern
Alliance who, at the time of the Bonn conference, controlled Kabul in the
immediate aftermath of the Taliban’s demise. The Northern Alliance
received the three most powerful ministries within the interim government.
Younis Qanooni, leader of the Northern Alliance’s delegation, was made interior minister. The Alliance’s commander-in-chief, General Mohammad Fahim, became head of the Defense Ministry, and Dr. Abdullah Abdullah retained his position as foreign secretary. The 30-member cabinet included 11 Pashtuns, 8 Tajiks, 5 from the Shi’a Hazara population, and 3 Uzbeks. The remaining three were drawn from other minorities. Northern Alliance cabinet members appointed at Bonn were primarily ethnic Tajiks and former militia leaders from the Panjshir Valley, base of the famed Afghan resistant leader Ahmed Shah Massoud, who was assassinated on September 9, 2001. Since the defeat of the Taliban, these Panjshiris have dominated the Afghan security forces.

One could rightfully argue that neither the Bonn meeting nor the interim government it chose was very representative of the demographics and traditional power centers in Afghanistan. In particular, relatively few Pashtuns were given seats of power. Pashtuns assumed that this imbalance would be corrected. They expected Karzai to shift the balance of power back their way and give their former king a prominent national role. This did not happen.

Emergency Loya Jirga and the Resulting Transitional Government

A central component of the Bonn Agreement charted the course for the future democratic elections to be held in Afghanistan. Section I (4) stipulated that, in the meantime,

in Emergency Loya Jirga [national political assembly] shall be convened within six months of the establishment of the Interim Authority. The Emergency Loya Jirga shall decide on a Transitional Authority, including a broad-based transitional administration, to lead Afghanistan until such time as a fully representative government can be elected through free and fair elections to be held no later than two years from the date of the convening of the Emergency Loya Jirga.47

The Emergency Loya Jirga was also to elect a head of state for the transitional administration.

On June 24, 2004, the Afghan transitional government and administration of Hamid Karzai were installed during formal ceremonies in Kabul. Karzai had easily won the June 13 election at a national political assembly, or emergency Loya Jirga called for by the Bonn Agreement. The Loya Jirga, consisting of 1,500 representatives elected or appointed from 32 provinces, debated the political future of Afghanistan over a seven-day period. Two main issues concerning government composition faced the Emergency Loya Jirga: the role of former King Zahir Shah and his representatives, and the role of the Panjshiris who have controlled most of the Afghan security services in and near Kabul since the defeat of the Taliban. Both of these issues were resolved in rather interesting ways.
The former king’s support for the election of fellow Pashtun Karzai as the Afghan transitional head of state somewhat diffused ethnic issues. Subjects such as religion, the role of parliament, stability, and economic development dominated the jirga debates. But, this dissipation of ethnic suspicions and rivalry was short-lived, as Karzai would try to appease the various factions in the cabinet appointments he made.

The most problematic and sensitive appointments were in the area of security. Karzai renamed Mohammed Fahim, a leader of the Northern Alliance forces based in the Panjshir Valley, as defense minister. Karzai further strengthened Fahim’s position by appointing him as one of three vice presidents. This move was a clear indication of the Tajiks’ power—as well as the Northern Alliance—and signaled Karzai’s acceptance of the Panjshiris as necessary partners in his militarily weak government. Karzai recognized that he could not maintain stability during the fragile transition period without the help of powerful factional leaders such as Fahim. However, the relationship between Karzai and Fahim quickly became contentious and had the potential to bring down the Transitional Government.

For all practical purposes there was only one key change to the interim cabinet as a result of the loya jirga—the departure of Interior Minister Yunus Qanooni, a Tajik.

Qanooni played a key role during the Bonn meeting in securing initial support for Karzai’s candidacy among leaders of a powerful, Tajik-led political and military coalition. The dismissal of Qanooni from the powerful interior ministry met with considerable controversy. When Karzai announced Qanooni’s replacement was Taj Mohammed Wardak, an elderly governor and ethnic Pushtun, Panjshiri soldiers and policemen in the ministry initially resisted with roadblocks and work stoppages. Karzai recognized the implications of alienating the Tajiks, as well as the considerable military strength of the Northern Alliance and especially the Panjshiris. He resolved the crisis by appointing Qanooni as adviser for internal security, a newly created post, and as minister of education.

Fahim, Qanooni, and Ahmad Wali Massoud were all vying for the leadership of the Panjshiris (Shura-i Nazar), and relations among them reportedly were not good. The demands by Pashtuns for Karzai to reduce these men’s power exacerbated relations, in particular between Fahim and Qanooni. Yet, the basic reality was that, were it not for the U.S. and coalition presence, the Panjshiris could replace Karzai anytime they wanted—and a lot of them were chafing under the constraints of the coalition.

Karzai’s choice of cabinet members also clearly represented a compromise between stability and change. Many Pashtuns expected that he would make major changes to the interim cabinet chosen during the Bonn meeting by removing factional leaders and appointing a balanced and professional cabinet more in line with the desires of the Pashtun community. Ultimately, this proved to be an impossible task. The leaders of the Northern Alliance were less than accommodating to change that would diffuse the considerable power they had received in Bonn. The cabinet reflected Karzai’s recognition
of the importance of striking a balance between the Pashtuns and Tajiks. Karzai was intimately aware of this after leading Afghanistan’s interim government for six months in an uneasy partnership with leaders from the Tajik-led Northern Alliance. He was faced with the extremely difficult task of assembling an administration that would satisfy all major ethnic groups while meeting the country’s desperate need for professional governance after years of ruinous conflict.

The cabinet’s composition also highlighted the Pashtuns’ continuing disorganization and lacked a level of leadership acceptable to broader groups. Considering that Kabul had traditionally been ruled by Pashtuns, the composition of the cabinet represented a significant shift in traditional power relationships. But then, alliances and ideologies are fluid, one reason why Afghanistan has had nothing resembling a stable central government for much of its existence. Nevertheless, the Tajik-dominated Northern Alliance recognized their ability to achieve practical superiority over the Pashtuns who, superior in numbers, had held them at bay for years. In the end it appeared that the Loya Jirga’s main achievement was to lend legitimacy to Hamid Karzai’s transitional government—an end-state seemingly consistent with the desires of the United States and other international actors.

Alienated Pashtuns?

The new power of the Tajiks did not sit well with the Pashtuns and alienated many in Karzai’s critical Pashtun power base. Whereas former king Zahir Shah was named by Karzai as “Father of the Nation,” many Pashtuns were dismayed and angered that none of his aides had been given senior posts. Other than Karzai, very few Pashtuns held positions of power in the Afghan cabinet. In July 2002, a Washington Post article titled “Pashtuns Losing Faith in Karzai, U.S.” suggested that the Pashtuns were “becoming rapidly disillusioned by a series of developments that have reinforced the power of rival ethnic Tajiks and militia leaders, left the former king politically sidelined and a Pashtun vice president assassinated, and subjected Pashtun villages to lethal U.S. air attacks.”

Pashtuns reportedly did not feel welcomed in Kabul where the officials they saw did not speak Pashtu. Padsha Khan Zadran, a powerful Pashtun leader/warlord in the important Khost Province, summed up the sentiments of many Pashtuns when he asked, “Why are they humiliating Pashtuns? We’re the majority. They placed Hamid Karzai at the top as a representative of Pashtuns. But in reality he’s no longer a Pashtun. He’s sold himself out. He’s a traitor. Pashtuns cannot sit around waiting. They will react and will claim their rights.”

Afghanistan’s Historic October 2004 Election: Precursor of Democratic Development?

According to the Bonn Agreement, Afghan national elections were to be held on June 24, 2004 (“no later than two years from the date of the
convening of the Emergency Loya Jirga”). These elections were to determine Afghanistan’s president, and National Assembly and Provincial Councils, all to be held concurrently. The presidential election was separated from the other two most certainly because multiple provincial contests would probably, “see an increase in factional violence as local power structures are challenged and, in some cases, long-term rivals put in direct competition.”

Electoral infrastructure delays, continuing instability, the claimed reemergence of the Taliban, and Kabul’s lack of control over the rural areas eventually led to the postponement of the simultaneous elections. However, the primary reason for the delay in elections was concern over overall security. In particular, antigovernment activity and cross-border attacks from Pakistan meant the situation was judged not sufficiently stable in June 2004 to allow for free and fair elections. Eventually, the presidential election was postponed until September 2004, and then once again rescheduled for October 2004. The National Assembly and Provincial Council elections—viewed as a much more complex undertaking than the presidential election—were also postponed.

In the spring and summer months preceding the presidential election, new violence was witnessed, especially toward election workers. A poll conducted for the Asia Foundation in July 2004 by Charney Research—a New York polling firm, which also conducted a voter education planning survey in Afghanistan—suggested that 81 percent of Afghans intended to vote. Afghans’ apparent eagerness to participate was confirmed by the rapid progress of voter registration since May, when it began in the rural areas (home to four-fifths of the population). In three months, registration soared from 1.5 million to 8 million of the estimated 9.5 million eligible voters. It continues at a pace of up to 125,000 per day, despite Taliban remnants opposed to the vote who threaten and even kill registrants.

Whereas Taliban threats drew the media’s attention, warlords and their armed militias posed greater threats to the elections and people.

According to a survey of Afghan voters conducted by the relief organization CARE, 87% said that the government should do more to reduce the powers of Afghan commanders, and 64 percent said the most important way to improve security was to disarm the militias. Only 17 percent said that Afghans would face pressure on how to vote, but of those, more than 85 percent said the pressure would come from commanders. Interestingly, only 0.84 percent said that Islamic clerics would influence their vote.

Threats to voters by regional power brokers were commonplace. For example, in September 2004 in southeastern Khost province, elders of the Terezai tribe announced on Khost radio that all tribe members must vote for Hamid Karzai. Tribal families who voted against Mr. Karzai would have their houses burned down. As suggested earlier, tribal elders, as well as the
collective identity of the Afghan tribes, often determine the positions of individuals.

Deference to tribe is a common attitude all across southern Afghanistan, where the largest ethnic group, the Pashtuns, live. Individuals such as Sayid Amir, an astrologer waiting for loaves of bread at a bakery in Qalat, know that the new Afghan Constitution allows them full personal rights. But he still says he must defer to his tribal elders with his vote. “It depends on our tribal leaders,” he says. “Yes, I know it is my right to choose whom I want. But in my region, the tribal leaders will all get together and choose whom they will vote for, and then everyone will vote for that person.”

Such a context with its accompanying behavior and attitudes is inconsistent with Western concepts of democracy.

Eventually 9 million of the eligible 9.8 million eligible voters registered. In fact, “in the provinces of Khost, Nooristan, Paktia, and Paktika, voter-registration rates exceeded eligible voters by 140 percent. In 13 of the 34 Afghan provinces voter registration exceeded the number of eligible voters.” Voter registration fraud and voting irregularities were cited by many observers. It is also worth noting that the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) refused to send election monitors to Afghanistan because they believed that “the present conditions in Afghanistan [were] significantly below the minimum regarded by OSCE . . . as necessary for credible election observation.”

Although the training and recruitment of election staff was slower than originally anticipated, eventually, there were 4,807 polling centers manned by a staff of approximately 120,000. Finally, on October 9, 2004, the presidential election took place in an atmosphere of great anticipation. Eighteen eligible candidates were listed on the Afghan presidential ballot. Around eight million voters, some waiting in lines for hours, voted. Hamid Karzai garnered 55.4 percent of the vote and his main opponents Yunus Qanooni, Haji Mohammed, and Abdul Rashid Dostum received 16.3, 11.7, and 10 percent, respectively. There were, however, complaints about voter intimidation—especially in the Pashtun south and east—voting procedures, multiple voting, and other counting irregularities in some areas. Also, 15 of the candidates initially called for the election to be suspended because of alleged fraud and “intimidation by Mr. Karzai’s supporters, and [a] charge that the faulty ink pens have made it possible for Afghans to vote multiple times.” Most of these candidates eventually backed away from their complaints after a series of meetings with U.S. Ambassador Zalmay Khalilzad. Eventually, an Impartial Panel of Election Experts concluded that the outcome had not been affected by these problems.

Even with these controversies, the Afghan election was viewed by most as a historic watershed event and a resounding success. High voter turnout, low levels of violence, and the participation of women even in conservative Pashtun southern areas pointed to many positives. The simple fact that the
election was held was important considering that Afghanistan ranks at the bottom of nearly all development indices, has no extended tradition of universal franchise, and has experienced almost a quarter century of continual conflict in its immediate past.

But, there is an important question concerning the election. What do the election results mean for the development of democracy in Afghanistan? Evidently, the answer to this question is not clear.

Figure 6.1 presents two maps that seem germane to the answer. The upper map in figure 6.1 represents a geographical breakdown of ethno-linguistic groups in Afghanistan. As suggested by this map, the Pashtuns primarily occupy the mountain belt that extends along much of the border with Pakistan and the Registan Desert southwest of Kandahar. The Tajiks primarily live in the eastern range of the Hindu Kush Mountains in the extreme northeast of the country. The Shi’a Hazaras occupy the central Hindu Kush range in the center of Afghanistan. Finally, the Uzbeks occupy the area east of Badghis—both the desert of Faryab and its plain that extends northward into central Asia (in the north and center of the country). When one compares this upper map in figure 6.1 with the lower map representing the provinces carried by each of the presidential candidates, an extremely interesting pattern emerges. Considering that each of the four leading Afghan presidential candidates belonged to a different ethno-linguistic group—Karzai (Pashtun), Qanooni (Tajik), Mohaqiq (Hazara), and Dostum (Uzbek)—the maps track ethnic representation quite nicely. Unlike a two-colored American electorate map, Afghanistan’s has four hues. Intuitively, it appears that the results of the Afghan presidential election merely reify traditional ethnic splits in the country.

In order to more explicitly explore the notion that the results of the presidential election primarily reflect long-standing ethnic divisions, provincial election data for each of the four leading candidates was gathered. Data was also collected for each of the 34 Afghan provinces relative to their ethnic breakdown or composition. Correlation analysis was then performed on these data representing provincial voting results and provincial ethnic composition. The correlation results of this analysis are presented in table 6.1.

The results are telling. The analysis clearly supports the notion that the results of the Afghan presidential election represent and reflect historical ethnic patterns that have long driven conflict dynamics in the county. No candidate received significant support outside of his particular ethno-linguistic group.

As can be seen in table 6.1, each ethnic group voted for the explicit candidate from their own group, with correlations ($r$) of ethnic parochial voting ranging from between .84 and .91. These results are statistically significant with a $p < .0001$ meaning that these results could not have occurred randomly. Whereas such an analysis does not imply causation, it does suggest clearly that traditional ethnicity remains at the forefront of Afghan politics, at least as represented by recent presidential voting patterns.

An examination of table 6.1 also indicates other notions of the vital importance of ethnicity in Afghan politics and governance. It is interesting to note
Figure 6.1 Afghan ethno-linguistic groups and Afghan October 2005 Presidential Election results.
not only the high positive correlations between the different ethno-linguistic groups with their respective ethnic candidate (represented by the correlation results in the table’s diagonal), but also the negative correlations that show the candidates for whom the various ethnic groups were not likely to vote. The Pashtuns have significant negative correlations ($r = -0.44$ to $-0.54$) relative to their probability of supporting a candidate from a different ethnic group. The chance of a Pashtun voting for any of the other candidates was indeed very slight and reflected their solidarity in voting patterns. Likewise, the Tajiks had a very slim chance of voting for a Pashtun ($r = -0.54$ with a $p < .001$). These results suggest that the two most influential Afghan ethno-linguistic groups—traditional rivals—will not only vote for their own candidate, but also against the other. This is not an encouraging finding for the success of a strong presidential system based on the primacy of one ethnic group in deference to others. In fact, it has been argued that a strong presidential system can actually be a recipe for disaster in countries such as Afghanistan where political elites are deeply divided, for it effectively permits only one winner, while potentially generating many disgruntled losers.68

The Afghan governmental system mapped by the Bonn Agreement could fail miserably if Karzai were to take advantage of the opportunity of his powerful office to advance the causes of his own ethnic group, the Pashtuns. This would be disastrous for Afghanistan. Not only would it likely reinforce factionalism and deepen the rifts between ethnic groups, but also eventually result in civil war or secession.

This analysis suggests that Afghanistan faces an extremely difficult challenge: how to unify its fragmented society and foster the development of a national identity while each ethnic group continues to attempt to gain a foothold in government, sometimes at the expense of other groups. This ethnic approach, rather than a regional or national one, will continue to fragment society until one dominant ethnic group controls all of the governmental power or ethnic politics will make way for increased internal conflict.

As the analysis above bears out, the presidential election appears to have been more procedural than substantive. With Afghan ethnic groups voting...
mostly along ethnic lines rather than crossing over to candidates from other ethnicities, the election made little headway toward uniting the divided country behind a single candidate. Although Karzai was elected with a majority of the overall vote, he was not elected with a majority of the vote within any ethnic group outside his own, the dominant Pashtun. Hamid Karzai’s claim that he is a truly national candidate that has support across ethnic lines is not borne out. Less populous, but no less important, ethnic groups such as the Uzbeks, Tajiks, Hazaras, and Turkmen did not “forget” their own interests and vote for Karzai in an attempt to unite the country.

Although the American administration assumes the election of an Afghan president is the first step on a path toward democracy, ethnic divisions, unless properly addressed, threaten to derail any long-term hope of a democratic Afghanistan. Unwilling to vote outside ethnic boundaries and come together in compromise, Afghan citizens have begun a voting trend that does not portend well for any future parliamentary government.

The burden falls on the political elites to reach compromise independently or face continued intractability on all ethnically divisive issues, which in Afghanistan translates as almost all daily business. Rather than letting the situation deteriorate, the elected leaders must reach compromises that are mutually and constitutionally guaranteed, so those minority groups feel vested in the various government institutions. On issues that include rather than exclude them, Afghan minorities will demand compromise. Additionally, changes should come from the bottom up. Inherent here is the belief that government is most effective when it is open to its citizenry. If the citizenry views the government as ineffective, they will have no incentive to participate and will come to view the government negatively.

All is not bleak, however. Afghanistan does have two major factors in its favor for democratic development. First, it is a multiethnic society composed of a handful of groups rather than two opposing forces. With four major ethnic groups, the Afghan polity has many sources from which to form coalitions to bridge the ethnic divide. Second, the timing of the government-building process allows each group to enshrine collective rights that will protect political interests and share economic ones.

**Conclusion**

While the United States pushes Afghanistan toward a democratic government, not just in name, but also in practice, the Bush administration would be well advised to look closely at the complexity involved in building a lasting democracy in ethnically divided Afghanistan. In a society fragmented by ethnic groupings where concerns over rights of the group dominate the rights of the individual, a Western-style liberal democracy, designed to promote and protect individual rights, is viewed as doing little to address the needs of the groups. Indeed, as Horowitz points out, young democracies often fall victim to the problems of their past as they appropriate colonial institutions or Western constitutional provisions, neither of which takes into account the
reality facing the new nation. In Afghanistan’s case, addressing the ethnic divisions that permeate the country is paramount if democracy is to take hold. Rather than endorse a procedural democracy that only highlights the completion of events, such as elections, the Bush administration must force the Afghan government to address the issues that divide the citizenry with earnest concern and grave attention.

Over the past 100 years, national politics have not been of much concern to the ordinary Afghan who made decreasing the state’s influence at local levels his number one priority. This constant deflection of central authority in the everyday lives of Afghans allowed traditional governing structures to remain largely intact and slowed their evolution to more modern structures. As the central government fought to gain access to these local structures, it was met with increased resistance and eventual revolt. The cycle repeated itself through many different Afghan regimes using varying models of government.

The challenge facing the current Afghan government is the task of uniting the Afghan people while not repeating the mistakes of the past. The concept of national identity needs to be bolstered, but not at the expense of marginalizing ethnic traditions and norms that are deeply valued by the Afghan people. As long as people are divided by ethnicity or religion, there will be injustice, corruption, and discontent. The goal in every budding democracy should be to create a strong sense of national identity above all else. Governments must foster the common identity and remove all ethnic and religious aspects of government. In Afghanistan, Shi’a, Sunni, Pashtun, Tajik, Uzbek, and Hazara leaders must fully cooperate in a quest for unity. It is only then that all citizens will achieve a common sense of national belonging and democracy will be able to thrive. In the end, this tightrope act will determine whether or not Afghanistan succeeds in forming a modern nation-state with democratic institutions and a large civil society.

Notes

5. For an excellent analysis of this strategy, the Bush administration’s foreign policy and “neo-conservatism,” see James Mann, Rise of the Vulcans: The History of Bush’s War Cabinet (New York: Viking, 2004).
6. Ibid., 330.

10. Ibid.


12. “Legitimacy” can be defined as the belief of the citizens that the authority of the government is just and credible. Legitimacy rests on a belief in the legality of rules and the authority of those who hold offices created under those rules. Citizens are obedient to the authority of legally established rules and offices, not to particular individuals.


18. Since the modern formation of the country of Afghanistan, only two non-Pashtuns have ever reigned in Kabul. Habibullah Ghazi, a Tajik, briefly held power in 1929 until he was overthrown and Pashtuns returned to power. Burhanuddin Rabbani Tajik, leader of the Jamiat-i-Islami, was an ineffectual Mujahideen president of Afghanistan from June 1992 until the Taliban took Kabul in September of 1996. Rabbani then led the Northern Alliance.


21. Ibid., xviii.


23. Ibid., 9.

24. Ibid., 10.

25. Ibid., 4.

26. Ibid.


28. Ibid., 42.


38. The Pushtuns, representing 42% of the population, make up the largest ethnic group in Afghanistan. Ethnic Tajiks represent 27% of the population. The Hazaras represent another 9%. Other groups—such as the Aimaks, Turkmen, Baluch, Uzbek, and others—comprise the rest. The country is almost totally Muslim, with the Sunni Muslims representing 80% of the population and Shi'i Muslims representing 19%. See “Afghanistan,” *The World Factbook 2004* (Washington: Central Intelligence Agency, 2004).


42. Key factions at Bonn were the Northern Alliance (primarily Tajik), the Rome Group (representing the former king, Mohammed Zahir Shah), the Cyprus Group (allegedly Iranian-backed), and the Peshawar Group (primarily Pashtun).

43. Interview of senior U.S. government official.

44. Barnett Rubin, “Afghanistan and Threats to Human Security,” an essay adapted from a speech delivered in Tokyo on December 15, 2001, at the International Symposium on Human Security: “Human Security and Terrorism—Diversifying Threats under Globalization”—from Afghanistan to the Future of the World, www.cfr.org./public/resource.cgi?pers!1841, accessed February 2, 2005. Although not explicitly stating so in the Bonn Agreement, Lakhdar Brahimi, the special representative of the UN secretary general suggested that the role of the Emergency Loya Jirga after six months was to remedy some of the defects in the interim government originally chosen at Bonn. One such defect was that the original interim government did not closely reflect the demographics of the country.

45. See Thomas H. Johnson, “The Loya Jirga, Ethnic Rivalries and Future Afghan Stability,” *Strategic Insights*, vol. 1, no. 6 (Monterey, CA: Center for Contemporary Conflict, Naval Postgraduate School, August 2002). Much of the following discussion is pulled from this article.

46. It is interesting to note that even the Rome group of Zahir Shah, the former king, had very heavy non-Pashtun representation, including the group’s leader in Bonn.


48. Fahim, a Tajik from the Panjshir Valley, replaced Massoud as the military leader of the Northern Alliance after the legendary Afghan leader was assassinated. He played a key role in the ground war against the Taliban. The United States, however, had reportedly reevaluated its relationship with the Northern Alliance and its view of Fahim. One Western official with extensive experience in Afghanistan stated, “The U.S. government is making a terrible mistake in supporting Fahim . . . The U.S. has the resources to understand this is not a reliable partner and that he could easily be replaced . . . Fahim’s tendencies are those of a street thug.” Susan B. Glasser and Pamela Constable, “Tension Rises between Two Key Afghans: Defense Chief Is Seen as Threat to Karzai and Nation’s Stability,” *The Washington Post*, August 5, 2002, A12. Fahim has an interesting past. Fahim reportedly replaced Najibullah as the head of KhAD (the Soviet’s puppet PDPA’s brutal secret police and intelligence agency during the Soviet occupation). He is close to the Russians (he was the clear Russian favorite to lead the Northern Alliance after the death of Massoud) and is extremely disliked by many Pashtuns, Hazaras, and Uzbeks.

50. Ibid.


52. Ibid.

53. At the time, Zadran was reported to control the three southeastern provinces of Khost, Paktia, and Paktika—traditional Pashtun strongholds. Zadran had been part of a continuing conflict, in part, concerning the governorships of these three provinces. See “Warlord Pushes for Control of a Corner of Afghanistan,” *New York Times*, August 6, 2002.


55. See Section (1) 4 of *Agreement on Provisional Arrangements in Afghanistan Pending the Re-Establishment of Permanent Government Institutions*.


60. Ibid.

61. Ibid.

62. Ibid.

63. Ibid.


65. Ibid.


71. Ibid., 115–116.


73. Ibid., 10.


75. Ibid., 168.