Province: Kabul  
Governor: Hajji Din Mohammad  
NDS Chief: Nazar Shah

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Population Estimate: 3,445,000</th>
<th>Urban: 615,900</th>
<th>Rural: 2,829,100</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Area in Square Kilometers: 4,462</td>
<td>Capital: Kabul</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Names of Districts: Bagrami, Chahar Asiat, Dih Sabz, Guldara, Istalif, Kabul, Kalakan, Khaki Jabbar, Mir Bacha Kot, Musayi, Paghman, Qarabagh, Shaker Dara, Surobi</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| Composition of Population: Ethnic Groups: Tajik, Hazara, Pashtun, Kuchi, Qizilbash  
Religious Groups: Primarily Sunni; some Shia  
Total # Mosques: 3,025 |
| Ethnic Groups: Pashtun: Ghilzai, Shinwar, Wardak |
| Occupation of Population Major: Business, government service, agriculture, skilled professionals, day labor  
Minor: Animal husbandry |
| Crops/Farming/Livestock: Wheat, potato, vegetable, corn, fruit, Cow, sheep, goats, donkeys, horses, poultry |
| Literacy Rate Total: 57%¹ |
| Number of Educational Institutions: 696 |
| Colleges/Universities: 9 Universities; Kabul University, Teacher Training Colleges, Polytechnic Institutes, Institute of Health Science |
| Number of Security Incidents, Jan-Jun 2007: 24  
January: 7  
February: 1  
March: 3  
April: 1  
May: 8  
June: 4 |
| Poppy (Opium) Cultivation: 2006: 80 ha  
2007: 500 ha  
Percent Change: 525% |
| NGOs Active in Province: UNCHR, HAND, AMDA, WROR, ISRA, DACAR, NCA, SCA, UNICEF, NPO, CARE, MEDAir, INTERSOS  
Provincial Aid Projects:²  
Total Projects: 1,439  
Planned Cost: $61,407,272  
Total Spent: $39,911,215  
Primary Roads: Three main asphalt roads/highways connect the capital with the rest of the country; the Salang road links Kabul with the northern provinces; the Kabul-Kandahar Highway connects Kabul to the southern provinces. Many small roads in the capital are in poor condition.³  
Airport: Kabul airport is usable, security issues are limiting the willingness of airlines to operate in and out of the country.⁴ |
| Transportaion: |
| Electricity: Estimated Population w/access: 83% |
| Health Facilities: Hospitals: 28  
Clinics, etc.: 336 |
| Sources/ Availability of Drinking Water: River, canal system, karezes, wells  
Dependent on location and quality of water |
| Rivers: Kabul River |
| Significant Topographic Features: Kabul city is located in a valley which dominates the province. It is surrounded by the Logar and Paghman Ranges in the south-east, the Qorgh Range in the south-west, the Shirdarwaza Range in the north-east, the Charikar Range in the north, and the Tangi Gharrow Range in the west. Much of the land is very fertile rangeland and is largely rain-fed. Parts of the north-west portion of the province are used for vineyards, gardens and cultivated for crops. There are a number of reservoirs and lakes in the province; the most significant reservoirs are in Paghman and Khaki Jabbar district.⁵ |

¹ UNDP Afghanistan, Afghanistan Human Development Report 2007  
² ISAF and CJTF 82, Afghanistan Comprehensive Stability Project, June 2007.  
⁴ RRERS.  
⁵ AIMS, Afghanistan Paktika Province Land Cover Map, April 2002 and Nelles Verlag, Afghanistan, 2006 and RRERS.
Political Landscape: Central Government and Institutions

President Hamid Karzai:

Popalzai Pashtun. He was born in 1957 in Karz, Kandahar. His father was a Popalzai tribal elder who served as a Deputy Speaker of the Parliament in the 1960s. Karzai’s family was a staunch supporter of King Zahir Shah. In terms of education, after graduating from Habibia High School he earned a master of arts in International Relations and Political Science at Himachal University in Shimla, India. After graduation he returned to Afghanistan to join the mujahedin in the fight against the Soviets. He joined the National Liberation Front of Afghanistan led by Sebghatullah Mojaddedi, serving as a Director of Information and Deputy Director of its Political Office. In 1992, with the establishment of the Mujahedin Government, Karzai was appointed Deputy Foreign Minister. Karzai initially was a supporter of the Taliban but became disenchanted by their links to Pakistan. He joined his family in Quetta for a time, working to reinstate the King. His father was assassinated, presumably by the Taliban, in 1999. Following the terrorist attacks against the United States in September 2001, Karzai worked with the coalition to remove the Taliban from power. In December 2001 he was elected Chairman of the Interim Administration of Afghanistan by a governing committee in Bonn. He was elected President of the Transitional Government in June 2002 by an Emergency Loya Jirga. In October 2004 he was elected the first President of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan for a five-year term.

Ahmad Zia Massoud, First Vice President

Ahmad Zia Massoud was born in Ghazni on May 1, 1956. He completed his secondary studies at the Lycée Esteqlal. In 1976, he was admitted to the Kabul Polytechnic Institute, where he studied for three years. Following the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979, he traveled with his brother, Ahmad Shah Massoud, to the Panjshir Valley with the first group of Mujahedin. For the next three years, he fought alongside his brother in the Panjshir against the Soviet forces. For the next 12 years, he represented the Panjshir front and served as the Special Representative of Ahmad Shah Massoud in Pakistan. During this time, he worked closely with other Mujahedin commanders, international organizations, and countries that were supporting the Afghan resistance.

In the late 1990s, Ahmad Zia Massoud continued his political and diplomatic activities, working to raise the profile of Afghanistan on the international stage, and to call attention to the horrors of the Taliban. In December, 2002, he was appointed Ambassador of Afghanistan to the Russian Federation, a post he maintained until July, 2004, when he returned to Afghanistan at the request of President Karzai, and agreed to run in the elections for the position of Vice-President. He speaks Dari, Pashto, English and some Russian and French. He is married and has one son and three daughters. Ahmad Zia Massoud was sworn in as First Vice-President of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan on December 7, 2004.

Karim Khalili, Second Vice President

Karim Khalili was born in Wardak Province, and completed his secondary studies at a religious school. After the Communist Coup in 1978, Mr. Khalili joined the anti-government resistance. He left Kabul, and became active with a resistance group called Nasr, which aimed to free people from Communist, and later Soviet, rule. In 1981, Mr. Khalili became the Director of the Central Office of Nasr in Tehran, and was responsible for coordinating relations with a number of countries who were supporting Afghanistan’s struggles. Six years later, he became a member of the Islamic Coalition Council of Afghanistan, and later its Speaker. He worked hard to foster unity among the various Mujahedin groups, and traveled extensively within the region and elsewhere to advocate on behalf of the resistance movement.

---

6 Much of the biographical data comes from State Department PRT/Political Officer Reporting 2003-Present.
7 Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, Office of the President, A Brief Biography of President Hamid Karzai, at
   http://newsvote.bbc.co.uk/, accessed on 3 October 2007; and Global Security, Hamid Karzai, at
In 1989, when the National Unity Party (Hezb-e-Wahdat) was established, Mr. Khalili served as a member of the Central Council, and for a time, as the Resident Representative and Spokesperson of the Party in Pakistan. He also served as Minister of Finance during the Mujahedin Government. In 1994, after the death of Abdul Ali Mazari, Mr. Khalili was elected leader of the National Unity Party, and led his people in the struggle against the Taliban. He supported the Bonn Conference. With the beginning of the Interim Administration, Mr. Khalili halted the activities of the National Unity Party and dissolved its military branch. He served as Vice-President of the country under the Transitional Government. Karim Khalili was sworn in as Second Vice-President of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan on December 7, 2004.

Cabinet Members:
Senior Minister: Hedayat Amin Arsala

Hedayat Amin Arsala was born in 1942. He studied Economics and pursued a PhD in the United States. In 1969, he started his professional career at the World Bank Youth Professional Program and served at various positions with the World Bank. In 1987, he left the World Bank and joined the Afghan resistance against the Red Army and served as Senior Advisor and member of the Afghan Mujahedin Unity Council. He was also an active member of the resistance against the Red Army until 1989. From 1989 to 1992, he served as the Minister of Finance of the Transitional Government of Afghanistan. In 1993, he was appointed as the Foreign Minister of Afghanistan. In 1998, he was the member of Executive Council of Afghan Loya Jirga representing the former Afghan King His Majesty Zaher Shah. He also had a major role in convening the Bonn Conference in December 2001, which led to the establishment of the Afghan Interim Administration where he served as a Vice Chairman and the Finance Minister.

After the Emergency Loya Jirga in 2002, he served as the Vice President of the Transitional Islamic State of Afghanistan, as well as the Chairman of the Independent Civil Services Administrative Reform Commission. He also served as advisor to the Central Statistics Office of Afghanistan, the Afghan Economical Cooperation Committee, and as a member of the National Security Council of Afghanistan. He has represented Afghanistan on many official trips outside Afghanistan. Dr. Arsala is fluent in Pashto, Dari and English.

Minister of Foreign Affairs: Dr. Rangin Dadfar Spanta

Foreign Minister Dr. Rangin Dadfar Spanta was born in the Karokh district of Herat Province in 1954. A family of wealthy landowners, his father was elected to Afghanistan's National Assembly in the 1960s during the reign of King Mohammad Zaher Shah. Dr. Spanta studied at Kabul University, and left for Turkey to advance his studies in 1976. After the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, Dr. Spanta traveled to Iran, joining Afghanistan's resistance movement and becoming involved in the publication "Sada-ye Afghanistan" (Voice of Afghanistan). From Iran, he traveled to Pakistan, continuing his resistance activities there.

Dr. Spanta settled in West Germany in 1982. In 1991, he earned a doctorate from Aachen University, and was a professor there for the next 13 years. He was also director of the university's Third World Studies Institute. Aside from academics, Dr. Spanta also served as a spokesperson for the Alliance for Democracy in Afghanistan and was active in Germany's Green Party. In January 2005, Dr. Spanta returned to teach at Kabul University, and later became Senior Advisor on International Affairs to H.E. President Hamid Karzai. The President nominated him as Minister of Foreign Affairs, and Parliament approved on April 20, 2006. Dr. Spanta was sworn in by President Karzai on May 2, 2006.

**Minister of Defense: General Abdul Rahim Wardak**

General Abdul Rahim Wardak was born in Wardak Province in 1940. After graduating from Habibia High School, he joined the Cadet University. He completed further studies in the United States and Ali Naser Academy in Cairo, Egypt.

He has served as a Lecturer at the Cadet University and Assistant of Protocol of the Ministry of Defense. He served as the military assistant of Muhaz-e Milli, was the military assistant of the Tri- Lateral Unity, a member of Itihad-e Mujahedin, and commander of the Jihadi fronts of Muhaz-e Milli. After the fall of communist regime, he was a member of the Security Committee of Kabul City, Chief of the Army Staff, Director of the Military Officers Society, Director of the Education Commission, member of the National Army Commission, Deputy Defense Minister, Director of Disarmament Program and Director of Reform of the National Army. He has authored many works in Pashto, Dari and English.

**Minister of Interior: Zarar Ahmad Moqbel**

Biography currently unavailable.

**Minister of Finance: Dr. Anwar-ul Haq Ahadi**

Dr. Anwar-ul Haq Ahadi earned his Bachelor's and Master's degrees from the American University of Beirut in Lebanon in Economics and Political Sciences. He received a Master's degree in Fiscal Affairs and Management and a PhD in Political Science from Northwestern University. Dr. Ahadi was an Assistant Professor of Political Sciences at Carlton University in the United States. From 1985 to 1987, he served as the Banking Director of Continental Elona of Chicago. From 1987 to 2002, he served as a Professor of Political Science at Providence University in Rhode Island. From 2002 to 2004, he served as the Director of Da Afghanistan Bank (Central Bank of Afghanistan). Dr. Ahadi has written many publications in academic journals, books and popular dailies of the United States and speaks Pashto, Dari and English.

*Note: Ahadi is the President of the Afghan Social Democratic Party.*

**Minister of Economy: Dr. Mohammad Jalil Shams**

Biography temporarily not available.

**Minister of Justice: Sarwar Danesh**

Sarwar Danesh was born in a religious family in 1951 in Daikundi Province. He completed his primary education in Afghanistan and completed his higher education in Iraq, Syria and Iran. He has earned a Bachelors Degree in Law, a Certificate in journalism, a Bachelors Degree in Islamic Culture and Education, a Masters Degree in Islamic Fiqh and is working on a PhD (in progress) in the same field. He was a member and active participant in the Emergency Loya Jirga of 2002, a member of the Constitutional Drafting Commission through a decree by President Karzai, a participant in the Constitutional Loya Jirga. When Daikundi was announced as a province early this year, he was appointed as the first Governor.

**Minister of Culture and Youth Affairs: Abdul Karim Khoram**

Biography temporarily not available.

**Minister of Education: Mohammad Hanif Atmar**

Mohammad Hanif Atmar was born in 1968 in Laghman Province. He received a Bachelors Degree in Rural Development Studies in the United Kingdom and earned his Masters Degree in International Relations and Post-war Development from York University in the UK. He has also achieved a diploma in Information Technology and Computer in the UK. From 1992 to 1994, he served as an advisor for humanitarian programs in aid agencies both in Afghanistan and in Pakistan. From 1994 to 2000, he served as Program Manager for the Norwegian Committee for Afghanistan. From 2002 until 2002, he served as Deputy Director General of the International Rescue Committee. In 2002, he was appointed as Minister of Rural Rehabilitation and Development in the Transitional Government. Mr. Atmar has authored many books and articles on development and war in Afghanistan. He is fluent in Dari, Pashto, English and Urdu.

**Minister of Higher Education: Dr. Mohammad Azam Dadfar**

Dr. Mohammad Azam Dadfar was born in 1946 in Indkhoy. He graduated from Ghazi School in Kabul and earned his Medical Degree in 1973 from Kabul Medical Faculty. From 1973 to 1978, he served at Kabul University as a lecturer. In 1978, he was imprisoned in Pol-e Charkhi Prison by the Communist backed regime before he migrated to Pakistan in 1980 and became an executive member of the Doctors’ Union in Peshawar. In 1981, he went to Germany and worked as a doctor. In 1985, he returned back to Peshawar and worked at the Treatment and Research Center of Mental Disorders for Afghans in Peshawar. From 1996 to 1998, he pursued advanced courses for a certificate program in Petersburg, Germany. Dr. Dadfar speaks Pashto, Dari, Uzbek, German and English and also knows some Turkish.


**Minister of Commerce: Dr. Mohammad Amin Farhang**

Dr. Mir Mohammad Amin Farhang was born in an educated family in Kabul in 1940. He graduated from Esteqlal High School in 1959 and earned a Bachelors Degree in Economics from Kabul University. He earned a Masters Degree and a Doctorate Degree in Economic Development from KölN University in Germany. From 1974 to 1978, he was a professor in the Economics Faculty of Kabul University and the Director of the National Economy Institute. In 1978, he was imprisoned in Pol-e Charkhi Prison and in 1982 after his release went to Germany where he served as a professor at Ruhr University and the coordinator of Afghanistan’s Archive. After the fall of Taliban regime he was appointed as the Minister of Reconstruction. He has published many articles in the field of economics and politics in the Afghan and international publications. He has fluency in Dari, Pashto, French, German, and English.

*Note: Previously served as Minister of Economy*
Minister of Water and Energy: Alhaj Mohammad Toran Ismail Khan

Mohammad Ismail, son of Hajji Mohammad Aslam, was born in 1948 in Naser Abad village of Shindand District of Herat. In 1960, he was admitted to the 6th grade of Cadet School and earned his higher education from Cadet University in 1970. He joined Division Number 17 of the National Army in Herat and subsequently joined the jihad as his division revolted against the Soviets. In 1981, he served as the Amir of the southwestern parts of the country. In 1990, after the formation of interim government, he acquired the military rank of a General and was appointed as the Governor and Commander of the 4th Corps in Herat Province. In 1997, he was detained by the Taliban and spent three years in jail. After the fall of Taliban, he was appointed as the Governor of Herat and Commander of the 6th Corps. Arguably one of the most capable Northern Alliance commanders, Ismail still holds a significant level of influence in Herat and surrounding provinces. Mohammad Ismail Khan knows Dari, Pashto and English.

Minister of Transportation and Aviation: Eng. Nehmatullah Ehsan Jawid

Biography temporarily not available.

Minister of Women's Affairs: Mrs. Husn Bano Ghazanfar

Husn Banu Ghazanfar daughter of Abdul Ghafar was born in Balkh on February 1, 1957. She graduated from Sultan Razia High School in Mazar-e Sharif and obtained her BA and Master's degree on Literature and Sociology from Stawarpool Qafqaaz. Right after she obtained her Master's degree she joined the Literature Faculty of Kabul University. After two years of service as a lecturer, she went to Petersburg to pursue a PhD in Philology. After completion of her studies she returned to Afghanistan and was appointed the Head of the Literature Faculty. Eventually she was appointed as the Minister of Women's Affairs of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan. In addition to the above-mentioned posts, she has worked as a member of the High Council of the Ministry of Higher Education, member of Speranto International Association of Women, member of the International Association of Turk Zabanan and member of the Board of Directors of Hakim Naser Khesro Balkhi Association. She is fluent in Dari, Pashto, Uzbek and Russian and she knows a little Turkish and English. Her scientific articles and essays have been published in the national and international newspapers. She is a poet and writes excellent works of literature.

Ministry of Women's Affairs website: http://www.mowa.gov.af/

Minister of Hajj and Islamic Affairs: Nematullah Shahrani

Nematullah Shahrani was born in the Jerm district of Badakhshsan in a religious family. He completed his primary education in Badakhshan and graduated from Abu Hanifa School in 1960. He was admitted to Faculty of Islamic Studies of Kabul University in the same year. After earning his Bachelors degree in 1964, he joined the university as a member of teaching committee. In 1967, he went to Egypt and earned a Masters Degree from Al-Azhar University. In 1960, he again continued his services as a lecturer at Kabul University and was Chief Editor of Sharayat Magazine. In 1976, he went to the United States and studied law at George Washington University for a year and a half. He also went to the UK for a research trip and observed the courts, police stations, attorney's office, law institutes and centers. After the Soviet invasion, he was imprisoned for some time and went to Pakistan after he was released. He has worked in some popular magazines of the country (Payam-e-Haq, Alfalah, Qaza, Urfaan, Zhwandoon and Khwonkey) and dailies (Anees, Islaah, and Badakhshan) before he migrated to Pakistan. He has authored two volumes entitled, "Quran Shenasy" (knowing the holy Quran) and "Feqeh Islami Wa Qanoon e Gharb." (Islamic Fiqh and Western Law). The total number of articles he has written is 1500 and he was given the academic title of Professor for his hard work. After the emergency Loya Jirga, he was appointed as the Vice President of
Transitional Government. He was also the Director of the Constitutional Drafting Commission. Mr. Shahrani knows Pashto, Dari, Uzbek, Arabic and English, and has delivered speeches in English and Arabic in many conferences.

Ministry of Hajj and Islamic Affairs website: http://www.mop.gov.af/

Minister of Public Welfare: Sohrab Ali Safari

Sohrab Ali Safari was born on July 5th, 1945 in the Behsood District of Maidan in Wardak Province. He obtained his primary education in his district and secondary education in Kabul city at the Technology Institute of Afghanistan in 1957. From 1961 to 1965, he served on the Engineering Faculty of Kabul University. He earned a doctorate degree in Engineering from the Godseng Poly Technique in Poland. Sohrab Ali Safari is fluent in Dari, Pashto, English and Polish and knows a little German.

Minister of Public Health: Dr. Mohammad Amin Fatemi

Dr. Mohammad Amin Fatemi was born on 1952 in Nangarhar Province. He graduated from Habibia High School and earned his Doctorate in Medicine from Nangarhar Medical College in 1977. He has participated in advanced academic programs in Bonn, Germany and the High Institute of Public Management in Karachi. He has a certificate in health care and earned a Health Policy in Developing Countries certificate from Boston University the US in 1995. Dr. Fatemi has served as a doctor in Badakhshan, as a teacher in the Kabul Public Health Institute and a member of the Health Awareness Department. He was in charge of the education program of IRC, founder and Director of Mujahedin's Unity Programs, member of the advisory board of the Health Ministry in the interim government in the early 1990’s, and Deputy Minister and First Deputy of the Public Health Minister. He was the Public Health Minister from 1993 to 1995.

Dr. Fatemi has served as an advisor to the World Health Organization in Geneva, Switzerland for Mediterranean countries, as permanent advisor of the WHO for the Eastern Mediterranean countries, and from 1992 to 1994, a member of the Executive Board of WHO. From 1991 to 2001, he was a member of the Board of the Medical Services Development for Afghans, a member of the Board of the Ladies Hospital for Afghan Refugees, member of the "Order of Good Time" in Canada. He has participated in many academic conferences and is the author of Health Care, Right and Wrong Use of the Medicines, and First Aid.

Minister of Agriculture: Obaidullah Rameen

Obaidullah Rameen was born in 1952 in Baghlan Province. He was a student of Khost and Fereng High School for Primary and Secondary Education and graduated from Baghlan High School. He earned his Bachelors Degree from Kabul University in 1976 and studied for a year at the Agriculture Promotion Bank. He was an inspector at the Agricultural Bank from 1975 to 1977, a Director of the Banks' Cooperative from 1981 to 1983 and a Director in the Agriculture Promotion Bank from 2001 to 2004. He was also the Director of Center of Traders and Craft workers nongovernmental NGO and the acting Director of Agricultural Unity of Afghanistan.


Minister of Communications: Amir Zai Sangeen

Amir Zai Sangeen was born in the Urgoon District of Paktika Province. He completed his primary education in Urgoon and secondary education in Gardez and graduated from the Communication Training Center. In 1972, he earned a Bachelor's degree in Electronics and Communications from Southern London University of the UK. He started his professional career as a teacher in the Communication Training Center and from 1978 to 1980 and later
served as the director of that center. In 1980, he migrated to Sweden and actively participated in the development of the Swedish Committee for Afghanistan, which has had an outstanding role in promoting education, agriculture and health throughout the past 25 years in Afghanistan. Mr. Sangeen was employed in the communications sector in Sweden and served as a team member of the communication project of Shah Khalid in Saudi Arabia.

After 2001, Mr. Sangeen repatriated to Afghanistan. He has held training seminars for the engineers of the Ministry of Communication and Afghan Wireless Company. He was the leader of the Supervising Committee of the GSM license, and a Senior Advisor to the Minister of Communication from February 2003 till his appointment. Mr. Sangeen was appointed as the Director of Afghan TeleCom in July 2004 and had an effective role in formation of the company, approval of the statute, and follow up of the communications projects. He was also in charge of creating a structure for Afghan TeleCom and interconnection where he developed new procedures in this field.

Ministry of Communications website: http://www.moc.gov.af/

**Minister of Rural Rehabilitation and Development: Ehsan Zia**

Mohammed Ehsan Zia was born in Kabul and graduated from Mahmood Terzy High School. He received a Bachelor's Degree in Social Development from the University of Birmingham, U.K. in 1991, and an M.A. in Post-War Recovery Studies from York University, U.K. in 2000.

Having worked in management and advisory positions for humanitarian and post conflict programs in Afghanistan since 1988, Minister Zia has extensive professional experience in rural and community development. He has worked with international aid agencies and NGOs including the Norwegian Afghanistan Committee (NAC), German Afghan Foundation (GAF), Cooperation for Peace and Unity (CPAU), and Norwegian Church Aid (NCA). The Minister's areas of expertise include rural and community development policy formulation and program design; participatory development theory and practice; strategic planning for government institutions; community mobilization, participation, and prioritization; and conflict analysis and practical peace building. Minister Zia joined the Ministry of Rural Rehabilitation and Development (MRRD) as a Policy Advisor in July 2002. He was appointed Deputy Minister for Programs in January 2004, with responsibility for the overall management of six national priority programs with an annual budget totaling more than $300 million. He assumed his duties as Minister of Rural Rehabilitation and Development in May 2006. The Minister is fluent in Dari, Pashto, English, and Urdu.

Ministry of Rural Rehabilitation and Development website: http://www.mrrd.gov.af/

**Minister of Work, Social Affairs, Martyred, and Disabled: Noor Mohammad Qarqin**

Noor Mohammad Qarqin was born in 1953 in Tepa in the Qarqin District of Jowzjan Province. After completing primary school in Qarqin, he was admitted to Habibia High School in Kabul. He then was admitted to the Law Faculty of Kabul University in 1972, where he earned his Bachelor's Degree. In 1978, he began service in the Ministry of Education as a member of the Uzbek and Turkmen Department. He has also worked as the Director of Silo of Balkh and Director of Gas of Hairatan.

After the Soviet invasion, he migrated to Pakistan and took part in Jihad against the Soviet Union. He was a member of Loya Jirgas and National Councils during different periods. In 2001, he was appointed as Minister of Labor and Social Affairs. He resigned from his post in September of 2004 to serve as the Director of the electoral campaign of Hamid Karzai. He then served as Minister of Education before his most recent transition to his current position.

**Note: Previously served as Minister of Education.**
Minister of Border Affairs and Tribal Affairs: Abdul Karim Brahwi

Abdul Karim Brahwi was born in Pedehgee of Chahar Burjak District of Nimroz Province in 1955. He attended primary school in that district and graduated from Cadet School in 1973. He then attended Cadet College where he obtained his Bachelors degree in 1977 in the field of Weapons Technology. After graduation, he served in the 7th Corps of Reeshkhor. After the Soviet invasion, he left his service and joined the Jihad. He fought in the Jihad for 14 years and served as the commander of Mujahedins in Nimroz province. After the Islamic revolution, he was appointed as Governor of Nimroz province and the Commander of the 4th Brigade. During the reign of Taliban, he led the resistance front against the Taliban in that province. After the Taliban were defeated, he was again appointed as the Governor of Nimroz and Commander of 4th Brigade.

Minister of Urban Development: Mohammad Yousaf Pashtun

Mohammad Yousaf Pashtun was born in Kandahar on November 15, 1947. He completed his secondary studies at Ahmad Shah Baba High School, graduating in 1965. In 1966, he began his studies at the School of Engineering at Kabul University, by the next year, received a USAID/Kabul University scholarship to attend the American University of Beirut in Lebanon, where he later earned his Bachelors degree in Engineering and two Masters degrees, one in Architecture (1973) and the Other in Urban Design and Planning (1977). He has taught at Kabul University’s Department of Architecture, served for four years with a Mujahedin group (Jamiat-ul Ulema), and worked for almost a decade with NGO’s supporting Afghan refugees and Afghan development. He also served as a member of the Executive Committee of the Loya Jirga movement. In 2002, he was appointed Minister of Urban Development and Housing under the Transitional Government, and a year later, was appointed Governor of Kandahar Province. Mohammad Yousaf Pashtun was appointed Minister of Urban Development and Housing in December, 2004.

Minister of Anti-Narcotics: Habibullah Qaderi

Habibullah Qaderi was born in 1961 in Kandahar Province. He completed his secondary education at Ahmad Shah Baba High School in Kandahar before leaving for Pakistan three months after the war started in 1978. Minister Qaderi obtained a degree in mechanical engineering from Malaviye Regional Engineering College in Jaipure, India. He worked as a program logistics officer in the United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) and as a field officer in the Chaman, Lorlai, and Dalbandin refugee camps in Pakistan. During the Mujahedin interim government, he served as an English instructor under a program established by the University of Nebraska for Afghan refugees in Quetta, Pakistan. After the Bonn Agreement and establishment of the interim administration under H.E President Hamid Karzai in 2002, Minister Qaderi returned to Afghanistan and began working as a Senior Advisor to the Ministry of Refugees and Repatriation. He was an active member of Afghanistan's tripartite commission with the United Nations, Iran, Pakistan, Denmark, and the U.K. He was appointed Minister of Counter-Narcotics by the President in 2004.


Minister Qaderi resigned early in the summer of 2007 in anticipation of the UN annual report highlighting another year of increase narcotics trafficking and poppy production in Afghanistan. Minister Qaderi was subsequently replaced by his Deputy Minister, Colonel General Khodaidad, who continues to serve as Acting Minister of Counter Narcotics to date. Acting Minister Khodaidad’s biography follows:

Acting Minister of Counter-Narcotics, Colonel General Khodaidad (Former Deputy Minister of Counter Narcotics):

Colonel General Khodaidad son Mr. Ghulam Ali was born in 12th of February 1955 in the province of Uruzgan of Afghanistan. He completed His primary education in the year 1967 from
Shahristan Primary School and in the year 1972 he was graduated from Military high School Kabul and went to India for his higher studies. Colonel General Khodaidad is a graduate of National Defense Academy (NDA) India 1976 and also holds a degree from India Ministry Academy (IMA) India 1977. He is also a graduate of Fronza Military Academy Moscow in former Soviet Union Duties and Responsibilities.

Minister of Refugees: Mohammad Akbar

Biography temporarily not available.

Minister of Mines: Ibrahim Adel

Biography temporarily not available.

National Security Advisor: Dr. Zalmai Rasool

Dr. Zalmai Rasool was born in 1944 in Kabul. He received his primary and secondary education at Estiqlal High School and earned a Doctorate in Medicine from Paris, France. He worked in the Research Institute of Cardiac Diseases in Paris and was in charge of Haqiqat-e-Afghan Publication in Paris which focused on the Jihad in Afghanistan. He also worked as a doctor in the Military Hospital of Saudi Arabia, and as Chief of Staff of the former Afghan King His Majesty Zaher Shah in Rome. Dr. Rasool served as a Minister of Civil Aviation and Tourism during the Interim Government and as a National Security Advisor during the Transitional Islamic State of Afghanistan. Dr. Rasool is fluent in Pashto, Dari, English, French, Italian and Arabic. He has authored thirty medical books, booklets and other publications in Europe and the United States.

Judicial Branch—Supreme Court of Afghanistan:

The judicial branch consists of the Supreme Court (Steran Mahkama), High Courts, and Appeal Courts. The Supreme Court is composed of nine members who are appointed by the President for a period of ten years with the approval of the Wolesi Jirga. The appointment of the members for a second term is not permissible. The President appoints one of its members as the Head of the Supreme Court. The members of the Supreme Court cannot be dismissed from their service until the end of their term, except circumstances stated in Article 127 of Afghanistan's constitution.

The current Supreme Court Chief Justice is: Abdul Salam Azimi. He was sworn in on August 5, 2006. Before the Wolesi Jirga was established, Fazl Hadi Shinwari was the Chief Justice. He was rejected in 2006 after the Wolesi Jirga was established.

The current Supreme Court is made up of the following 9 justices:

Chief Justice Abdul Salam Azimi
Justice Mohammad Qasem Hashemzai
Justice Abdul Rashid Rashed
Justice Gholam Nabi Nawai
Justice Bahuddin Baha
Justice Zamen Ali Behsudi
Justice Mohammad Alim Nasimi
Justice Mohommad Omar Barakzai
Other Political Players:

**Governor Hajji Din Mohammad:**
Former Governor of Nangarhar, and current Governor of Kabul. An influential warlord from Nangarhar, he and his family are involved in Nangarhar politics, local poppy production, and have ties with Hezb-e Islami Khalis (HiK). Even after Din Mohammad’s transfer to the nation’s capital, he was able to maintain influence in Nangarhar primarily because of the reputation of his family (the Arsala family), strong Khugiyani Pashtun tribal connections, and because of the armed tribal militias controlled by his nephew, the Frontier Brigade Commander Hajji Zahir (who is allegedly involved in drug and timber smuggling). Hajji Din Mohammad has sufficient wealth to own several homes in Jalalabad, Kabul and around Nangarhar province. Two of his brothers are now deceased, including former US-ally Abdul Haq; both brothers were well known mujahedin commanders during the Soviet invasion. Din Mohammad was a former mujahedin fighter with HiK and became Governor of Nangarhar after the assassination of his brother Hajji Abdul Qadir.8 Governor Shirzai is renting Hajji Din Mohammad’s home in Jalalabad. He was appointed governor of Kabul in June of 2005. He is a former Minister of Education and Information, and he was the Minister of Intelligence Services during the Soviet jihad. Din Mohammad is approximately 61 years old and is a Khugiyani Pashtun.9 He studied at Kabul University for four years.

**Deputy Governor Sheikh Abdullah Mohsein:**
Ethnic Pashtun; approximately 48 years old. He was appointed deputy governor in May 2004. He has a BA in Religious Affairs from Hawzai Elmial Mashad in Iran.

**National Defense Service Chief, Nazar Shah:**
An ethnic Pashtun, Nazar Shah speaks Pashtun, Dari, and limited English. He was appointed to current post in August 2006 based in large part because of the success he enjoyed prosecuting insurgents in eastern Afghanistan. Nazar Shah previously served as NDS Chief in Kunar and he worked in the Soviet-backed KHAD. Nazar Shah’s support of the government Program-e Takhim-e Sohl helped to reconcile more than 20% of the total number of insurgents reconciled nationwide in 2005. He also worked to help bring down an IED cell responsible for carrying out repeated attacks against Coalition forces travelling from the Asadabad Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) compound. Nazar Shah was promoted to his current position in Kabul where he continues to work toward the stabilization of Afghanistan.

**Burhanuddin Rabbani:**
An ethnic Tajik, Rabbani was born in 1940 in Badakhshan province. He studied Islamic Law and Theology at Kabul University. After he graduated in 1963, he was hired on as a professor at Kabul University. In 1966 he went to Egypt and studied at the University of Al-Azhar in Cairo, Egypt where he earned a masters degree in Islamic Philosophy. A 15-member council of Jamiat-Islami appointed Rabbani leader of the party in 1972. The government attempted to arrest him in 1974, but he escaped. For a time Jamiat-e Islami was allied with Hezb-e Islami (with Gulbuddin Hekmatyar and Qazi Amin), but the two parties split in 1977.10 Based in Pakistan, he led his party in the

---


9According to a member of Hajji Din Mohammad's extended family, he is a member of the Arsala Khel family as descended from the Jabbarkhel fraction. That said, according to Mohammad Hayat Khan's Afghanistan and Its Inhabitants, Hajji Din Mohammad's Arsala Khel family is descended from the “Khugian Khel, Jabberkhel, Ahmadzai, Suleimankhel, Hezab/Izab Clan of the Ibrahim/Burhan Tribe of the Ghilzai Tribal Confederation.”

fight against the Soviet invasion. Following the eviction of Soviet forces and the fall of the Najibullah government, Rabbani became the President of the Islamic Council of Afghanistan, effectively leader of the country, until he was forced to leave Kabul by the Taliban in 1996. He established a government in exile in Faizabad and became the political head of the United Islamic Front for the Salvation of Afghanistan, perhaps better known as the Northern Alliance. The Northern Alliance was essentially a multi-ethnic umbrella organization which also crossed religious lines in an attempt to remove the Taliban from power. When the Taliban collapsed in 2001, Rabbani was still recognized as the official leader of Afghanistan by the United Nations. In December 2001 he formally transferred authority to Hamid Karzai. Currently he does not have an official government post, but he retains his position as head of Jamiat-e Islami.

**Wolesi Jirga:**

**Haji Mohammad Mohaqeq:**  
Hazara Shia. Current member of the Wolesi Jirga, elected from Kabul. Chair of the Education committee. He has a BA in Religious Studies. He is the leader of the Hezb-e Wahdat-e Islami Mardom-e Afghanistan, a breakaway from the original Hezb-e Wahdat. Mohaqeq was born in the Balkh province and claims to have a degree in religious studies. He was a commander during the fighting between mujahedin militias during the 1990s and was a deputy to Abdul Ali Mazari, the first leader of Hezb-e Wahdat. As a militia leader he contributed to the bloody fighting to keep the Taliban out of the Hazarajat. After the collapse of the Taliban regime, Mohaqeq became a deputy to Hamid Karzai and Planning Minister in the transitional government. He kept his ministerial post until March 2004. It is unclear whether he resigned the post or was sacked by Karzai. Mohaqeq alienated Khalili when he ran for president without the official endorsement of the Hezb-e Wahdat. This rift led to the formation of a new and separate Hezb-e Wahdat under the leadership of Wahdat. As a member of the Wolesi Jirga and party leader, Mohaqeq has increased his popularity among the Hazara by focusing on issues relevant to the Hazarajat and the Hazara population.

**Yunus Qanuni:**  
An ethnic Tajik from the Panjshir Valley, Qanuni served in the anti-Soviet jihad under the command of Ahmed Shah Massoud. When the mujahedin took control of Kabul in 1993, Qanuni was appointed joint defense minister under President Burhanuddin Rabbani. During the rise and rule of the Taliban, Qanuni represented the interests of the Northern Alliance abroad. In 2001, following the assassination of Massoud, Qanuni inherited the position of political head of the Jamiat-e Islami of the Northern Alliance. He was appointed interior minister when the Northern Alliance entered Kabul in November 2001 and served the senior Jamiat-e Islami leader representing Northern Alliance interests at the Bonn Conference in November 2001. Hamid Karzai, as interim president, reduced Qanuni’s political influence by moving him from the interior to the education ministry. With the broad support of Afghanistan’s Tajik population, Qanuni ran against Karzai in the 2004 election, placing a distant second. Qanuni’s presidential candidacy may have increased his influence among many Tajiks—gathering the support of Fahim Khan and Dr. Abdullah. However, his loss to Karzai has significantly diminished his influence in national politics. Following his loss in the presidential election, Qanuni formed a coalition of 11 different political parties.

---


parties (National Understanding Front/Jabha-ye-Tafahhum-e-Milli) to oppose Karzai and attempt to change the constitution in an attempt to weaken the presidency. Qanuni was elected speaker of Afghanistan’s Parliament after facing serious competition from abd al-Rabb Sayyaf and former president, Burhanuddin Rabbani. Rabbani eventually threw his support to Qanuni, giving him the victory over Sayyaf by a margin of 122 to 117. Following his election to be speaker, Qanuni resigned his position as head of the opposition parties. Qanuni also leads his own political party, Hezb-e Afghanistan-e Nawin (New Afghanistan Party). He is closely aligned with Mohammad Qasim Fahim and is a likely contender for the presidency in the next election.

Ramazan Bashur Dost:
Hazara Shia; politically independent. Disabled and Martyrs committee. He has a PhD from the University of Toulouse. He is a former Minister of Planning and was a refugee in France.

Hajji Mohammad Arif Zarif:
KIA on Nov. 6, 2007 from suicide bombing in Baghlan. Replacement pending new election. Ethnic Pashtun; possibly associated with Sayyaf. National Economy committee. He attended Kabul Military University and was a former army officer and businessman.

Ustad Adrur Rasoul Sayyaf:
Kharoti Ghilzai Pashtun; he is the leader of Itehad-e Islami. Chair of the International Relations committee. Sayyaf was educated in Islamic Studies at Kabul University and at al-Shar University in Cairo. While in Cairo he came in contact with the radical Islamic group the Muslim Brotherhood. He is a former professor on the Faculty of Islamic Law at Kabul University. He was implicated and subsequently arrested for plotting to overthrow the Daoud government. During the anti-Soviet jihad he came to lead one of the seven parties, Ittihad-e Islami, recognized and funded by the Pakistan ISI and the CIA. Sayyaf, due to his fluency in Arabic, became a primary conduit for Arab money and volunteer mujahedin in the fight against the Soviets. Many accused him of converting to Wahabism as he changed his name at the suggestion of his Arab donors and grew his beard longer than is normal. His ideas suggested he was “intent on shaping Afghan culture and religion along Arab lines.” It is suspected that Sayyaf maintained a close relationship with Osama bin Laden and participated in the creation of a number of training camps around Jalalabad which were later used by Al-Qaeda. With the rise of the Taliban, Sayyaf threw his support, despite his Pashtun ethnicity, to the Northern Alliance. Many of his commanders from Ittihad-e Islami abandoned him and joined the Taliban. As a result, he had little military influence in the operations of the Northern Alliance. Following the collapse of the Taliban regime, Sayyaf was elected as one of the delegates to the Constitutional Loya Jirga and ensured a significant influence of fundamental Islamic ideology was enshrined in the Constitution. He was elected to the Wolesi Jirga in 2006.

Sayed Mustafa Kazimi:
KIA on Nov. 6, 2007 from suicide bombing in Baghlan. Replacement pending new election. Tajik Sayed; Shia. Associated with the National Power Party (Hezb-e Eqtedar-e Melli). National Economy committee. He was former Minister of Commerce and was with the Northern Alliance.

---

**Engineer Abbas Noyan:**
Hazara Shia; associated with Wahdat. Communications committee. He is a businessman who owns his own transport company.

**Mullah Taj Mohammad Mujahid:**
Tajik; Sunni. Associated politically with Sayyaf. Chair of the Counter-narcotics committee. He has a degree from the Islamic University in Pakistan. He is a former commander under Ahmed Shah Massoud.

**Hajji Sayed Jan:**
Ethnic Pashtun; associated with Pir Ishaq Gailani’s Mahaz-e Melli. Petitions committee.

**Malalai Shinwari:**
Female Shinwari Pashtun; politically independent. Secretary of the Justice committee. She has a BA in Journalism and is a former BBC correspondent. She is from Nangarhar.

**Doctor Kabir Ranjbar:**
Ethnic Pashtun; leader of the Afghan Democratic Party (Hezb-e Democrat-e Afghanistan). Chair of the Government Affairs committee. He has two PhDs—one from Kabul University and one from a university in Germany. He is a university professor and former communist.

**Hajji Mohammad Baqir Sheikzada:**
Hazara; may be associated with Wahdat. Petitions committee. He has a BA in Islamic Studies. He is a religious figure from Chindawal district.

**Doctor Niamatullah:**
Ethnic Pashtun; possibly associated with Hezb-e Islami. Health committee. He is a former official in the Ministry of Health and he runs a clinic in Sarobi.

**Mir Ahmad Joyenda:**
He is an Ismaili; politically independent. Government Affairs committee. He has a master’s degree. He is Director of Foundation for Culture and Civil Society and Deputy Director of AREU.

**Mohammad Ismael Safdari:**
Hazara; associated with Wahdat (Khalili). Refugees committee. He is a former provincial council chief and chief of mosques council in Bamyan. He was born in Wardak.

**Hajji Mohammad Dawood Kalakani:**
Sunni Tajik; associated with Sayyaf. International Relations committee. He was the political chief for 8th Corps. Injured on Nov. 6, 2007 from suicide bombing in Baghlan.
Anwar Khan Auriakhel:
Auriakhel Pashtun; associated with Sayaf. International Relations committee. He is a former commander from the Qarabagh district.

Haji Najibullah Kabuli:
Tajik. Counter-narcotics committee. He is a former HiG commander.

Mohammad Sangin Tawakalzai:
Ethnic Pashtun; possibly associated with Qanuni. Petitions committee.

Jamil Karzai:
Popolzai Pashtun; head of the National Youth Solidarity Party. Internal Security committee. He is a second cousin to President Hamid Karzai and is from Kandahar.

Al-Haj Baidar Zazai:
Zazai Pashtun; associated with Pir Ishaq Gailani’s Mahaz-e Melli. Chair of the Budget committee. He is a high school graduate and was born in Paktya. He is the former director of the Development Bank.

Alami Balkhi:
Hazara; associated with Qanuni’s political faction. Chair of the Justice committee. He may have a PhD. He is the deputy in the National Unity Front. He was born in Balkh and is a former official in the Ministry of Commerce. His father was a respected Muslim scholar.

Fatima Nazry:
Female Hazara; associated with Wahdat (Mohaqeq). National Economy committee. She is the former head of women’s affairs in Wardak and head of the election commission for women in Kabul.

Shukria Barakzai:
Female Barakzai Pashtun. Women’s committee. She is working on her BA at Kabul University. She is the editor in chief of the Women’s Mirror newspaper. Her family is from Kandahar and her husband is a businessman.

Mohammad Ibrahim Qasimi:
Hazara; associated with Wahdat (Akbari). Chair of the Petitions committee. He is a returned refugee from Canada.

Erfanullah Erfan:
Tajik. Counter-narcotics committee.

Sayed Dawood Hashemi:
Shinkai Zain Karukhel: Female Pashtun; associated with Pir Ishaq Gailani. She was the director of an education NGO. She is the daughter of a well-known moderate jihadist leader who was assassinated in Peshawar.

Shahia Atta: Female. Unclear whether she is Tajik or Pashtun; politically associated with President Karzai. High school graduate. She was President Karzai’s special representative in the border areas of Pakistan in 2002. She is a former medical worker.

Qudriy Ibrahim Yazdan Parast: Female Tajik; associated with Jamiat-e Islami (Rabbani). Secretary of the Women’s committee. She has a BA in Law and Political Science. She is a teacher at Kabul University and is on the Kabul Shura. During the Rabbani era she was a women’s leader.

Sabrina Saqeb: Female Tajik; associated with National Independence Party and possibly with Qanuni. Government Affairs committee. Saqeb was the youngest candidate for Parliament. She was born in Kabul but her family fled to Iran during the Soviet invasion. She studied English and computer science at a university in Tehran. In 2004, she and her family returned to Afghanistan. She worked as a director of health, education and handicrafts for the People in Need Foundation. She also served as an honorary secretary general for the National Basketball Federation and as a member of the national Olympic committee.21

Fauzia Nasryar Haidari: Female Tajik; politically independent, but may be associated with Qanuni. Secretary Communications committee. She has a BA. She is the widow of a former Minister of Haj.

Najiba Sharif: Female Pashtun; politically independent. Women’s committee. She has a BA. She is the former Deputy Minister of Women’s Affairs and former editor in chief of Roz magazine. She was a TV anchor and producer for 10 years and a teacher.

Meshrano Jirga:22
Bebe Hajji Nafisa Sultani: Female Pashtun; associated with People’s Rights. Chair of the Disabled and Martyrs committee. She has a BA and is disabled. She is the former head of a NGO dedicated to the needs of the disabled. She was a refugee in Pakistan from 1997-2002.

Mahbooba Hoqoqmali: Female Tajik; politically independent. Chair of the Legislation committee. She has a BA. In 2004 she was the Minister Advisor for Women’s Affairs. She is a lawyer and a university professor at Kabul University. She was a Loya Jirga delegate and was appointed by Karzai as his legal advisor.

Professor Hazrat Sibghatullah al-Mojaddedi: Pashtun. He is currently the Speaker of the Meshrano Jirga. He is the founder and leader of the Jabha-e Melli-ye Nijat-e Afghanistan (National Liberation Front of Afghanistan/Afghan National Liberation Front). After the defeat of the Communist government in 1992, the Grand Consultative

Council convened by the Afghan Mujahedin parties in Rawalpindi, Pakistan, elected Prof. Al-Mojaddedi as the President of the Islamic Interim Government of Afghanistan (famously known as the AIG) on 23rd February 1989. The election of Prof. Al-Mojaddedi by over 450 delegates representing a cross-section of the population was a testimony of his popularity and extensive support base in the Mujahid nation of Afghanistan. Mojaddedi served as the first president of the Islamic State of Afghanistan in the mujahedin government. He was the chairman of the Constitutional Loya Jirga in 2003 and he was appointed chairman of the Afghan National Commission for Peace Reconciliation Committee in Afghanistan by President Karzai in 2005. In 2005, in his role as chairman of the Commission he announced that “reconciliation process is open to all Afghans, including Mullah Omar…and Gulbuddin Hekmatyar.” This statement contradicted earlier statements by Karzai and Mojaddedi eventually retracted his statement. He was elected to the Meshrano Jirga in 2006.

**Engineer Mohammad Afzal Ahmadzai:**  
![Photo](image)  
Pashtun; associated with Hamnazar. Chair of the Rules committee. He has a BA and is a trained architect. Head of the Hamnazar political group.

**Nasrin Parsa:**  
![Photo](image)  
Female Hazara; associated with Payam-e Solh. Deputy of the Environment committee. She has a BA and is a former school principal. She taught clandestinely during the Taliban era.

**Provincial Council:**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Position</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Hajji Abdul Qadir Alami</td>
<td>Malim Ruqiya (female)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Huwaida Bawari</td>
<td>Al-Haj Zamen Ali Ahmadi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Engineer Ahmad Zia Sarwari</td>
<td>Nasir Ahmad Hamidi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Qurban Alli Fasihy</td>
<td>Taj Mohammad Wardak</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Amina Rasooli (female)</td>
<td>Hajji Wasirgul Anis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mawlawi Nader Shah</td>
<td>Hirma Alokozai (female)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Torpekai Zia (female)</td>
<td>Shair Aqa Farooqi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abdul Wahid</td>
<td>Zirgul Itifaq Sahak</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rahima Mushakhas (female)</td>
<td>Kamela Saifi (female)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malalai Hamid Pashtoon (female)</td>
<td>Doctor Gul Mohammad Baidar</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ashuqullah Yaqubi Doctor Mir Agha</td>
<td>Basir Ahmad Sediqi</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Constituion and Government Institutions

The Constitution of Afghanistan

The constitution of Afghanistan, created by a special Loya Jirga (13 December 2003 - 4 January 2004), was ratified by President Karzai on 24 January 2004. In essence, it ensures an Islamic republic, as stated in the benediction: “In the name of Allah, the Most Beneficent, the Most Merciful,” (which also happens to begin the preamble). The constitution contains 162 articles, covering matters of faith, government structure, and national composition.

The Writers

The Constitution was written by the 502 members of the Constitutional Loya Jirga (CLJ) formed on 14 December 2003. The CLJ was formed by a general election of a 19,000-strong electoral college. The CLJ was to replace the Emergency Loya Jirga, which was composed of Afghan notables, including a number of warlords and a disproportionate number of Panjshiri Tajiks. After the electoral college was put in power, 408 members were elected to the CLJ (344 men and 64 women), 50 appointed by Karzai (25 men and 25 women), followed by 24 refugee representatives, 9 nomadic representatives, 6 internally displaced persons representatives, and 3 non-Muslim (Hindu and Sikh) representatives. The inclusion of so many women ensured that women’s rights would feature prominently in the debate and in the constitution itself.24

The Special Position of the Loya Jirga

The Loya Jirga (“Grand Council”) holds a special place in Afghan history and governance. The first loya jirga was thought to be that which elected Ahmad Shah Abdali, later known as Ahmad Shah Durrani, as king of all Afghanistan in 1747. At present it may be convened for three reasons: “to decide on issues related to independence, national sovereignty, territorial integrity as well as supreme national interest,” in order to alter or amend the constitution, or to impeach the president (Article 111). In its constitutional mandate, a loya jirga “…is the highest manifestation of the will of the people of Afghanistan,” and is composed of the National Assembly, and presidents of all provincial and district assemblies (resulting, at present, in slightly less than 800 members). Members of the Supreme Court, ministers, and the attorney general may participate as non-voting members (Art. 110).

Division of Power

As a republic, Afghanistan has a standard three-tier government: executive, legislative, and judicial. It should be noted that except for especially heinous crimes (such as murder and crimes against humanity), current office holders in any of the three branches of government have immunity from prosecution.

The executive branch is led by the president, followed by the first vice president and then the second vice president. The president and vice presidents are elected for five year terms, and none may hold office for more than two terms (Art. 60 & 62). The President upon election must be at least 40 years old and a Muslim born in Afghanistan, free of conviction for genocide or crimes against humanity, and hold Afghan citizenship. The president, with the approval of the National Assembly, has the ability to appoint ministers (Art. 71). The president may be impeached by a Wolesi Jirga two-thirds majority, which then convenes a loya jirga, where again a two-thirds majority is required, and then conviction by a specially convened court of high government officials (Art. 69). The executive line of succession flows from the president to the first vice president to the second vice president to the president of the Meshrano Jirga to the president of the Wolesi Jirga to the foreign minister (Art. 68).

The legislative branch consists of the National Assembly, divided into two bodies: the Wolesi Jirga (House of the People or lower house) and the Meshrano Jirga (House of Elders or the upper house). The Wolesi Jirga is limited to 250 members, and two of the members from every province must be women (Art. 83). It can overpower an objection of the Meshrano Jirga by a two-thirds majority (Art. 100). The Meshrano Jirga contains at present 102 members, and is the less powerful of the two houses. It is one-third elected by district councils (for three-year terms), one-third elected by provincial councils (for four-year terms), and one-third appointed by the president (for five-year terms). Of those appointed by the president, 50% must be women, two must be nomadic, and two must be physically disabled (Art. 84). At present the head of the Wolesi Jirga is Muhammad Yunus Qanoni. The National Assembly has a website at www.nationalassembly.af.

The judiciary is led by the supreme court, consisting of nine members. As in the U.S., the justices are nominated by the president and subject to approval by the Wolesi Jirga. Initially, the first three justices were appointed for a term of four years, the second three for terms of seven years, and the last three for terms of ten years. Subsequent justices will serve ten year terms, and no justice will serve more than one term (Art. 117). The court’s loyalties, in order, are to Islam, the constitution, and the other laws of Afghanistan (Art. 119). The court follows the Hanafi school of Sunni jurisprudence, except in cases involving Shiites (Art. 130). When Shiites are involved (although the degree of Shiite involvement necessary is not stated), Shia jurisprudence will be used (Art. 131). The Hanafi school is widely regarded to be one of the most moderate schools of thought.

The supreme court also has managerial duties. It may nominate, hire, fire, and transfer judges as it sees fit, with the approval of the president (Art. 132). The police and prosecutors remain under the executive branch of government (Art. 134).

---

25 This is not as ridiculous as it may sound; many educated and wealthy Afghans left the country long ago and had subsequently taken up citizenship in their respective adoptive countries. While at the assembly level positions one may carry the passport of another nation, the president may certainly not.
At the provincial level the constitution is careful to keep power devolved and democratic. Provincial councils, elected for four-year terms (Art. 138), are enshrined in the constitution, as are municipal councils (Art. 141), and district councils, which are elected for three-year terms (Art. 139). From among these councils, council presidents are elected. Strangely perhaps, the constitution makes little mention of the provincial governors President Karzai has been so adept at transferring, appointing, and firing in order to discourage the consolidation of regional powerbases.

Emergencies

In certain cases, the constitution provides for a state of emergency. This may be declared “…because of war, threat of war, serious rebellion, natural disasters or similar conditions, protection of independence and national life becom[in[g] impossible through the channels specified in this Constitution…” (Art. 143). After 60 days of emergency, or if the president should seek to transfer powers to the presidency, the president must seek the endorsement of the majority of the National Assembly (Art. 144). The constitution may not be amended during a period of emergency (Art. 146).

Notes

On faith-

Seemingly of the utmost importance, Afghanistan is a stated Islamic nation. The first three articles set out the supremacy of Islam in Afghanistan, and prohibit its contradiction. Article two does allow for followers of other faiths to practice their faiths, however. The first priority of the Supreme Court is to uphold Islam, the second to preserve the constitution (Art. 119). Similarly, the fundamental disqualification under the rights of association is a contravention of “the Holy religion of Islam” (Art. 35). The pre-eminence of Islam in Afghanistan and in the constitution cannot be subverted or altered (Art. 149).

On race and ethnicity-

The recognized ethnicities of Afghanistan are, in constitutional order (and in debatable order of size): “Pashtun, Tajik, Hazara, Uzbek, Turkman, Baluch, Pachaie, Nuristani, Aymaq, Arab, Qirghiz, Qizilbash, Gujar, Brahwui, and other tribes” (Art. 4). The official languages of the nation are Dari and Pashtu, although Uzbeki, Turkmani, Pachaie, Nuristani, Baluchi or Pamiri may be an official language in any province which features a majority population of any of these ethnicities (Art. 16). It should be noted that the national anthem as enshrined in the constitution is in the Pashtu language (Art. 20). Although not a major point, it has been reported that many minorities in Afghanistan are uneasy about the prominence of Pashtu.

On sex-

As previously stated, places are reserved for women in the National Assembly. Article twenty-two clearly states “any kind of discrimination and distinction between citizens of Afghanistan shall be forbidden. The citizens of Afghanistan, man and woman, have equal rights and duties before the law.”

On responsibilities of office-

Justices and judges, security and military personnel may not retain membership of political parties during their time in office (Art. 153). “The president, vice-president, ministers, supreme court justices, attorney general, heads of the Central Bank and National Directorate of Security, governors and mayors … shall not engage in profitable business with the state” (Art. 151). The president, vice president, justices and judges, ministers, and members of the National Assembly cannot hold other jobs during their terms of office (Art. 152). Furthermore, the finances of the president, vice presidents, ministers, members of the Supreme Court, and the attorney general are subject to publication both before and after their terms of office (Art. 154).

Elections-

An independent elections commission oversees elections in Afghanistan. The commission is appointed by the president and subject to endorsement by the Wolesi Jirga (Art. 156).

---

On the role of the king-

Although a moot point now, King Mohammad Zahir’s title “Father of the Nation,” as originally awarded by the ELJ, was enshrined in the constitution. The title died with the king on 23 July 2007 (Art. 158).

Perceptions of-

The constitution was not an easily crafted document. As the ELJ held the election for the electoral college, and the electoral college elected the CLJ, Afghans were learning the ropes of democracy, and many complained it was too soon to write a constitution. Indeed, many continue to see the constitution an idealistic document, unconcerned with the problems of warlordism and factionalism that have plagued Afghanistan since the fall of the Taliban.

Constitutions, however, are by their very nature documents of lofty ideals; in order to embody national aspirations a certain optimism must be injected into any such document. As a framework, the laws and lawmakers that follow are what will remove the impediments of the day. If they fail to do so, the failure rests with them. The Afghan constitution is a living document, and can be altered with a two-thirds majority of a loya jirga and the approval of the president (Art. 150).27

The Afghan National Police (ANP):

The process of reconstituting the national Afghan police force began with a conference in Berlin in February 2002. Donor nations settled on the need to create “a multiethnic, sustainable, and countrywide 62,000-member professional police service.”28 Germany, the lead nation in the training of Afghan National Police (ANP), had built a force of more than 61,000 police by 2007 with training based at the Kabul Police Academy. Between 2002 and 2005, U.S. involvement in the creation of the ANP was under the auspices of the State Department and included more than $4.1 billion in funding.29 Since 2005, however, the U.S. responsibility for the ANP has shifted to the Department of Defense and since 2007 Germany’s primary role is being taken over by the European Union Police Mission in Afghanistan (EUPOL). The 2005 handover of responsibility between the U.S. Departments of State and Defense resulted in an additional $2 billion of funding for equipment and increased pay for police. Currently, the U.S. military is involved in an extensive reform effort to retrain the ANP and increase its end size from 62,000 to 72,000 with $2.5 billion allocated for the effort.30

As the primary national law enforcement agency, the roles and responsibilities of the ANP are set forth in law. According to Article 5 of the Police Law, the roles of the ANP include:

- “Ensuring and maintaining public order and security;
- Ensuring and protecting the security the security and legal rights and freedoms of individuals and society;
- Preventing crime, discovering crimes and arresting suspects;
- Protecting public and private property;
- Fighting against the cultivation of poppies and marijuana, and the production and trafficking of illegal drugs;
- Fighting against organized crime and terrorism;
- Regulating road traffic;
- Responding to and assisting victims of natural disasters; and
- Safeguarding borders, preventing smuggling, and controlling check posts at borders and international airports.”31

---

29 Ibid., 8.
The Afghan National Police falls under the authority of the Ministry of the Interior (MoI) and extends down to the district level, with a chief of police assigned to “each of Afghanistan’s 34 provinces and approximately 400 districts.” Prior to 2006, the majority of provincial police chiefs reported directly to the MoI. In an effort to streamline the coordination of security and to diminish the influence of governors resistant to the authority of the central government, the ANP chain of command was changed. Five regional ANP commands, equivalent to the regional command structure of the Afghan National Army (ANA), were established in Kabul, Gardez, Kandahar, Herat, and Mazar-e Sharif. The chain of command now runs from “1) the Minister of Interior, to 2) the Deputy Minister for Security Affairs, to 3) Regional Commanders, to 4) provincial Police Chief, to 5) district Chiefs of Police” and governors are specifically excluded from the ANP command structure.

Currently the ANP is composed of five formal divisions and one that is temporary. First, the **Afghan Uniformed Police (AUP)** is the largest branch and is responsible for the day-to-day law enforcement throughout Afghanistan. Under the revised strength figures, the total number of AUP will increase from 31,000 to 45,000. Responsibility for border security to include the prevention the incursion of insurgents, drug trafficking and other forms of smuggling falls to the **Afghan Border Police (ABP)**. The ABP is currently divided into eight brigades, but it is currently being restructured into five zones that correspond to the ANA/ANP Regional Commands. The ABP man 13 border checkpoints and patrol the border. At only 65 percent of its original authorized personnel strength, the ABP is facing serious Manning problems especially due to the recent increase of total end strength from 12,000 to 18,000. Under the new figures, the ABP is only 44 percent manned. Created in 2006, the **Afghan National Civil Order Police (ANCOP)** is responsible for “maintain[ing] civil order in Afghanistan’s seven largest cities, to provide a robust and mobile police presence in remote high-threat areas, and to serve as a rapid-reaction force to support other police in an emergency.” The **Afghanistan Highway Police (AHP)** were responsible for maintaining order and security along the country’s primary highways. While the AHP officially were phased out and ordered to integrate into the AUP, due in part to their “corruption and ineffectiveness”, many refused to follow the redeployment orders. The future of the AHP remains uncertain. Counter-narcotics enforcement and investigation is the responsibility of the fifth formal branch or division of the ANP, the **Counter Narcotics Police of Afghanistan (CNPA)**.

In an attempt to deal with elevated security risks and increased insurgent and criminal activity, the **Afghanistan National Auxiliary Police (ANAP)** were formed. Officially, the ANAP are separate from the ANP and were designed as a “quick fix” solution. Recruitment for the ANA was aimed at existing militias in local areas with some degree of loyalty to the government in Kabul. Members of the ANAP receive condensed training, but wear the same uniform as the ANP (with their own designation patch), receive the same monthly salary of US470 and sign a contract for one year. Presently, the ANAP is viewed as a temporary force, but it is likely that the members will be integrated into the regular ANP after their initial contract year.

Despite achieving its original Manning goals of 62,000, the ANP is beset by serious problems and obstacles. First, the ANP has been described as ineffective, ill-trained and ill-equipped. This is due, most likely, to a number of factors. The commitment to the ANP from the international community has been insufficient to meet institution’s stated mission. Creating a national police force from the ground up in a country devastated by war with competing loyalties between warlords, militias, and the central government has proven challenging. Second, the ANP, which has been insufficiently trained and equipped as a police force, is often used by the central government and Coalition/ISAF forces as a fighting force, a role outside of its intended scope of law enforcement. The ineffectiveness, ill-training and misuse of the ANP is perhaps best evidenced by its casualty rate compared to that of the ANA. In

---

32 Wilder, 4.
33 Wilder, 5.
34 Wilder, 12.
35 Wilder, 13.
37 Wilder, 13.
2007, the ANP suffered approximately 1,390 total casualties (840 killed, 520, wounded and over 30 kidnapped) compared to 595 total casualties for the ANA (370 killed, 220 wounded and 5 kidnapped). During the first nine months of the year, the ANP has suffered 234 percent more casualties than the ANA. Third, the ANP is under-manned in critical areas, such as the ABP and over-manned with senior officers at the MoI. Fourth, the high-level of corruption and criminal activity within the ANP has contributed to its ineffectiveness in increasing the level of security. For instance, a recent survey “found only 1,200 officers at work in an area where Afghan commanders claimed 3,300 officers were serving.” It is common practice for police commanders to collect the salary for missing officers.

Recent and current attempts at reform are aimed at dealing with at least some of these problems. Under the guidance of the U.S. military, the ANP are being retrained. While this may not reduce their role in terms of war fighting, it might at least better prepare them for the reality on the ground. In an effort to deal with corruption and retaining trained members of the ANP, there are plans to increase pay and require that paychecks automatically be deposited into the members’ bank accounts. Finally, there is an ongoing effort to reduce the size of the senior officer corps in the MoI which will free up greater resources for increased manning where it is needed most.

**Afghan National Army (ANA):**

According to the new *Counterinsurgency Field Manual*, the role of the U.S. military is to assist the host nation. Specifically, it states:

> “The long-term goal is to leave a government able to stand by itself. In the end, the host nation has to win on its own. Achieving this requires development of viable local leaders and institutions...While it may be easier for U.S. military units to conduct operations themselves, it is better to work to strengthen local forces and institutions and then assist them. [Host nation] governments have the final responsibility to solve their own problems. Eventually all foreign armies are seen as interlopers or occupiers; the sooner the main effort can transition to [host nation] institutions, without unacceptable degradation, the better.”

Since 2001 efforts have been underway to put Afghanistan back on its feet by legitimizing the government. The resurgence of the Taliban has wrecked the development and rehabilitation of the country by making the effort too costly due to immense security risks. As a result, the development of effective security institutions available to the Afghan government is more important than ever. The Afghan National Army (ANA) is at the center of this effort, and despite great progress, significant challenges remain.

**Beginnings**

Creation of a new Afghan National Army was conceptualized at an international conference in Germany in December 2002. At the conference, sometimes referred to as Bonn II, the new interim government of Afghanistan and participating donor nations “agreed that the new Afghan army should be ethnically balanced, voluntary, and consist of no more than 70,000 individuals.” The United States agreed to assume lead nation status in the effort to reconstitute the ANA. Under the auspices of the Office of Military Cooperation—Afghanistan (OMC-A), the U.S. Department of Defense has responsibility to manage the planning and implementation process with assistance from the Department of State. Several other donor nations assumed responsibility for specific efforts and parts of the process.

At Bonn II the participants agreed upon an initial force structure and primary roles for the ANA. Table 1 indicates the planned structure of the army based on the original number of 70,000. The overarching mission of the ANA is to:

- Provide security for the central government and protect the political process as defined by the Constitution;

---


40 Rhode.


43 Ibid., 6.
- Replace every other militia and organized military force in the country;
- Fight insurgents and terrorists; and
- Work closely with coalition and other international forces.\textsuperscript{44}

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 1 Planned ANA Force Structure\textsuperscript{45}</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ground combat troops: Kabul and Major Cities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Support Staff: Recruiting, Education and Training, Acquisition and Logistics, and Communications and Intelligence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ministry of Defense and General Staff Personnel</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Air Staff for Secure Transport of President of Afghanistan</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Organization, Leadership and Training

Afghanistan’s Army is divided into five Regional Commands (Corps) and is overseen by the Ministry of Defense and General Staff which are located in Kabul. Appointed by President Hamid Karzai, General Abdurrahim Wardak is the current Defense Minister. The Regional Commands are located in Kabul (201\textsuperscript{st} Corps), Gardez (203\textsuperscript{rd} Corps), Kandahar (205\textsuperscript{th} Corps), Heart (207\textsuperscript{th} Corps), and Mazar-e Sharif (209\textsuperscript{th} Corps). The senior leadership of the ANA is detailed in Charts 1 and 2.

Chart 1 Defense Minister and General Staff\textsuperscript{46}

As an “infantry-centric force”, each ANA corps is supposed to have three brigades which in turn are to consist of three light infantry *kandaks* (Dari for ‘battalions’), one combat support (CS) *kandak* and one combat service support (CSS) *kandak*.\textsuperscript{47} Shortcomings in manpower and resources, however, have limited the actual combat power of the five army corps thus far. As of June 2007, only the 201\textsuperscript{st} and 205\textsuperscript{th} corps were fully staffed. The 203\textsuperscript{rd} is assigned two brigades and the other two only have one brigade each. The manning levels of the various corps are indicative of security risk in each region.\textsuperscript{48} In terms of actual

\textsuperscript{44} Ibid., 6.
\textsuperscript{46} The Official Website of the Afghan National Army.
\textsuperscript{48} Ibid., 3-4.
manpower, a fully manned kandak contains 600 troops, meaning that a fully manned corps should have approximately 5,400 combat troops and 3,600 combat support and combat service troops.49

Chart 2 Corps Commanders50

As recruitment for the ANA began in 2002, the various coalition partners and donor nations assumed specific training responsibilities. Enlisted training, basic and advanced, is overseen primarily by the United States (which also runs the Drill Instructor School). In conjunction with normal basic training, the United Kingdom administers initial and advance training for the ANA’s non-commissioned officers (NCOs).51 Within the ANA, all military training and education falls under the Afghan National Training Command (ANATC HQ). The bulk of enlisted training takes place at the Kabul Military Training Center (KMTC). Basic training for all new recruits begins with a standard seven week course after which those with potential for leadership are culled from the training kandak and sent to the NCO course. The next six week phase of basic training is conducted separately after which the new soldiers are reunited with the fresh NCOs. The Canadians conduct a validation process of the newly trained forces under the auspices of their Afghan National Training Center Detachment. Known as Collective Lanes (CTX), the two-week program subjects and evaluates ANA units on how they handle a number of likely tactical situations they may face in the field.52

Initial officer training is conducted through two programs. The National Military Academy of Afghanistan (NMAA) is a four year university-type course modeled on the program at the United States Military Academy in West Point, New York. Due to the rapid growth projections for ANA, the NMAA alone is unable to produce a sufficient number of new officers to lead the troops. As a result a twenty-three week Officer Candidate School (OCS) is run by the British military. The OCS program trains new university graduates to become officers at a much quicker pace than the NMAA. The program

50 The Official Website of the Afghan National Army.
51 The Official Website of the Afghan National Army.
52 Chan, 8 and The Official Website of the Afghan National Army.
curriculum is based on that of the British Military Academy at Sandhurst. France provides continuing education and training for officers at various levels of command. Additionally, ANA cadets and officers receive training from and in other countries. For example, some Afghan aviators are trained on Mi-17 helicopters in Texas and a number of cadets are attending military academies in the United States. The Indian military also had plans to send a training team into Afghanistan to conduct training on a wide range of topics.

Continual training and mentoring of the ANA is carried out by U.S. and ISAF troops primarily through the Operational Mentor and Liaison Team (OMLT) Program. Each OMLT is assigned 12-19 personnel with various areas of specialization and are deployed for at least six months. They are assigned at the kandak, brigade, garrison and Corps HQ levels. According to NATO the principal roles of the OMLTs are to “provide training and mentoring to support ANA units’ operational deployments” and to “provide a liaison capability between ANA and ISAF forces.” Several ISAF nations either field their own OMLTs or provide manning for multi-national OMLTs. Currently there are 26 OMLTs assigned to just over 40,000 troops. Some estimates suggest that at least 100 OMLTs will be needed to meet the needs of the ANA once it reaches the end strength of 70,000.

Problems and Challenges

Despite enormous strides in just five years, the ANA faces a number of serious problems and challenges which must be addressed in order to insure it becomes a sustainable and efficient institution. A resurgent Taliban only compounds these problems. In May 2006, retired General Barry R. McCaffrey spent time looking at the security situation in Afghanistan and submitted a report to the faculty at the United States Military Academy. In his report he wrote the following:

“The Afghan Army is miserably under-resourced. This is now a major morale factor for their soldiers…Afghan field commanders told me that they try to seize weapons from the Taliban who they believe are much better armed…These ANA units do not have mortars, few machine guns, no MK19 grenade machine guns, and no artillery. They have almost no helicopter or fixed wing transport or attack aviation now or planned. They have no armor or blast glasses. They have no Kevlar helmets…This situation cries out for remedy. A well equipped, disciplined, multi-ethnic, literate, and trained Afghan National Army is our ticket to be fully out of the country in the year 2020.”

The current status and the future of the ANA are impacted by the previous three decades of war and anarchy. The destruction of the previous national army during the Soviet invasion left an institutional vacuum that was filled by competing warlords and militias and created a number of significant challenges to the recreation of a new national army essentially from scratch.

In the face of open conflict with foreign forces and amongst the Afghan people, the population divided into groups based on locality, ethnicity, religion and politics. Militias, under the leadership of local warlords, were often the only source of security and order. Throughout the anti-Soviet jihad and the rise and fall of the Taliban, the various militias displayed a willingness to work together only temporarily, often splitting apart and fighting one another once their common goal has been attained. Despite defeating the Taliban in 2001 and the creation of a new state and new constitution, former warlords continue to vie for loyalty and power, often operating in contradiction to the wishes of the central government. At the same time, competing loyalties between local militias and the national army necessarily call into question the quality and trustworthiness of troops with previous militia affiliations.

---

53 Chan, 8-9.
54 The Official Website of the Afghan National Army.
55 Chan, 9-10 and Interviews with the Office of International Program, United States Air Force Academy.
Additionally, there is the possibility that local militias are recruiting the most qualified recruits by offering them greater benefits and the ability to operate closer to home. Militias and warlords are a security threat which often demands the attention and resources of the fledgling ANA. Instead of being able to focus its energy on openly anti-government insurgent groups such as the Taliban, Hezb-e Islami, and others, they are forced to deal with the actions of warlords and militias in various geographic locations. The resurgence of the Taliban has prompted former militia leaders to begin illegally hoarding weapons in anticipation of state failure.59

The new Afghan National Army, devoid of an existing institutional history, is dependant upon donor nations to provide adequate funding and manpower. These donor nations are not providing the ANA with what it needs; as General McCaffrey pointed out, this has resulted in a military without the necessary equipment to perform their mission. It remains to be seen whether the commitment and contributions of the donors will be sufficient or long enough in duration to have a lasting effect. Additionally, the growth rate of the ANA has been slower than planned, thereby reducing its readiness to assume a greater role in providing security for Afghanistan.60

The ANA also faces challenges in terms of human resources, training, discipline and professional relations, which are compounded by the absence of any meaningful institutional history. Recruitment of well qualified volunteers has proven difficult “as the ANA mainly attract[s] volunteers from the lowest strata of society.”61 This has caused problems in terms of education and literacy and even physical fitness. Illiteracy among the ANA rose from 60 percent in the 2002 to around 80 percent by December 2005. It is estimated that as of February 2006 approximately “50 percent of the officers of the Army Corps Kandahar” were illiterate.62 This has an obvious negative impact on the ability of the ANA to operate jointly with US and ISAF forces and at the same time hinders the training process. Physical fitness is also a serious problem “with substantial numbers of recruits failing to pass the medical test and others dropping out of the training course because it proved physically too hard for them.”63

Training new recruits, NCOs and officers has proven challenging. The donor nations have worked to build a cadre of Afghan soldiers capable of conducting and overseeing the training process. Starting the process from the ground up, however, is requiring a significant lead time. Illiteracy and language barriers further complicate the training process. Communication problems exist not only between foreign trainers and Afghans, but also between the Afghans themselves, many of whom speak Dari or Pashto but not always both. Additionally, teaching NCOs and officers to work together effectively is difficult. Army leadership at the junior and mid-levels often is unwilling to hand responsibility over to the NCOs.64 Training periods have been shortened periodically in an attempt to increase the number of deployable troops as manpower targets proved unrealistic.65 The result, however, may only prove to be a greater number of untrained and ineffective troops. The need for improved training, and perhaps longer training, are manifested in a lack of discipline which contributes to a number of other issues facing the ANA—desertions, absences without leave, and corruption.

Desertions in the first two years of the ANA were around 20 to 22 percent and have since dropped, yet remain a persistent drain on force strength. For example, in 2005 around 300 men simply walked away from the 205th Corps in Kandahar, or one-twelfth of the entire force. This is extremely troubling considering that Kandahar is a hot bed of insurgent (Taliban) activity.66 The frequency of unexcused absences (AWOL), where the soldiers eventually return, perhaps have an even greater negative impact on force strength. Some estimates suggest that “at any given time, between a quarter and a third of the strength of the average battalion would be AWOL and sometimes even more.”67 A recent Congressional Research Service Report suggests that ANA units may only be 50 percent manned at any

60 For example, the original target of 12,000 trained troops by April 2003 had to be revised downward to 9,000 (Antonio Giustozzi, “Auxiliary Force or National Army? Afghanistan’s ‘ANA’ and the Counter-Insurgency Effort, 2002-2006,” Small Wars and Insurgencies, Vol. 18, No. 1 (March 2007): 48-49).
61 Ibid., 58.
62 Ibid., 58.
63 Ibid., 57.
64 Chan, 10.
65 Giustozzi, 48.
67 Giustozzi, 53.
given time. The AWOL rate multiplies during Ramadan and winter, as troops prefer to be home. It is also common for ANA soldiers to be AWOL for extended periods of time as they return home to remit funds to family, as the necessary financial institutions do not yet exist in Afghanistan.

Evidence and statements by ANA soldiers suggest that the primary reasons behind desertions and AWOL include low pay, lack of equipment, low morale, an unwillingness to serve far from home, and refusal to fight alongside foreigners against fellow Afghans. The monthly salary of trained recruits, until recently, has been $70 which pales in light of offers of triple that by the Taliban for switching sides. As force strength is reduced due to desertions and AWOL troops, it is compounded further by low retention rates as enlistments are expiring. Just over 35 percent of Afghanistan’s trained troops are electing to reenlist, well below the ANA’s goal of 50 percent retention. Corruption, rampant throughout the entire ANA rank structure, also diminishes the effectiveness of the army. Officer commissions are often for sale and equipment is sold regularly to local militias and insurgents. There is also evidence that some ANA units are involved directly in the narcotics trade.

Recent Efforts at Reform

As security remains elusive across much of Afghanistan’s South and East, efforts are under way to improve the ability of the ANA to do its part. According to the official website of the Afghan National Army there are currently 46,000 personnel in the army with 3,000 new recruits entering each month. The push to achieve the end strength of 70,000 by 2009 continues. Recently Afghanistan’s Defense Minister, General Abdurrahim Wardak, has suggested that a force of 70,000 may not be sufficient to provide security and indicated that the number may need to be revised upward to 150,000. Such a scenario, however, seems unlikely due the inability of the Afghan government to meet the sustainment costs of a projected force of 70,000. There are now some suggestions to lower the ANA’s end strength to 50,000.

Attempts to increase the combat effectiveness and morale of the ANA are underway despite the current challenges. In February 2007 the United States committed to assist the “ANA add a commando battalion and combat support units.” Additionally, the U.S. began transferring over 800 armored vehicles early in 2007 with more equipment promised. Air assets, especially helicopters, are in very short supply for both the ANA and the NATO/ISAF forces. In terms of pay, the Afghan Defense Ministry announced that “the government had enhanced the salaries of ANA soldiers from 80 to 100 dollars per month [and] soldiers who wanted to renew their contract would get another raise of US$35 in their monthly salaries.” The United States has increased funding for the ANA from $1.9 billion in 2007 to $2.7 billion in 2008. Training of the ANA remains a priority as OMLTs from NATO and ISAF militaries continue to provide assistance and mentoring. As the ANA expands, however, there will need to be a significant increase in the number of OMLTs deployed to Afghanistan. As recently as October 2007 the French and German governments agreed to send more training teams to work with the ANA.

Future

The future of the ANA remains uncertain. No one is under the illusion that the ANA is ready to provide security for the whole of Afghanistan. The major players, however, do recognize the challenges.

---

69 Chan, 14.
70 Katzman, 31.
71 Chan, 14 and Giustozzi, 52.
72 Giustozzi suggests that the Taliban offered “ANA soldiers three times their pay to switch sides.” See Giustozzi, 52.
73 Chan, 6.
74 Giustozzi, 54-55.
75 The Official Website of the Afghan National Army.
76 Katzman, 30.
77 Ibid., 30.
79 Chan, 14-15.
80 Katzman, 53-54.
they face in recreating a national army. Efforts, while perhaps insufficient presently, are underway to address the problems. Today the ANA has some presence in most of Afghanistan’s 34 provinces. The key to the ANA’s future is time; time to train, equip and gain expertise. Without the help of ISAF and NATO the ANA will not have sufficient time to build the institutional strength needed to stand on its own. The donor nations must continue to provide the necessary forces to provide security in the interim along with the funding and expertise to create an ANA that is more than an auxiliary force to NATO and ISAF.

Primary Political Parties:

Hezb-e Islami Khalis (HiK):
Originally a mujahedin group which split with Hekmatyar’s Hezb-e Islami under the leadership of Yunus Khalis. HiK was dominant in Nangarhar. Khalis died in 2005 or 2006, resulting in an internal power struggle for control of the party between Khalis’ son Anwarul Haq Mujahid and Hajji Din Mohammad. It appears that Mohammad was successful in consolidating his control over much of the party. Recent and active political players in Nangarhar have connections to HiK. Led by Hajji Din Mohammad, current governor of Kabul.

Ittihad-e Islami (Sayyaf):
This fundamental party is under the guidance of one Abdul Rasool Sayyaf, and has been since the anti-Soviet campaign. Despite ideological and cultural similarities with the Taliban, Sayyaf did not join them (for personal reasons) and went with the Northern Alliance. He follows strict Wahhabi interpretations of Islam, and is not known for tolerance. In the past this party has been known for its foreign supporters and followers; the former often Arab, the latter from places as diverse as the Southern Philippines, Chechnya, and Bosnia. In February 1993 government forces and members of the Ittihad-e Islami massacred over 700 Hazara in the Afshar district of West Kabul.

Hezb-e Afghanistan Naween (New Afghanistán Party/Qanuni):
Led by Mohammad Yunus Qanuni. Part of a political alliance called Jabahai Tafahim Millie or National Understanding Front. Qanuni was the primary contender against Karzai for the presidency. He is a Tajik who has been a mujahedin, spokesman for Ahmed Shah Massoud, and Minister of Interior and Education. He was elected to parliament in 2005 and was chosen to lead the Wolesi Jirga. Support for him and his party may be a political counter-weight to Karzai.

Hezb-e Wahdat-e Eslami-ye Afghanistan (Islamic Unity Party of Afghanistan):
Began as a Shia umbrella party led by Abdul Ali Mazari. Abdul Ali Mazari died under mysterious circumstances while in the custody of the Taliban. During the Soviet invasion the party received support from Iran. The party “remains the primary political force among the Hazara.” During the period of Taliban rule, the party held on to the Hazarajat against the attempted blockade by the Taliban. It is currently led by Mohammad Karim Khalili, who is currently the Second Vice President to Hamid Karzai. For a time Hajji Mohammad Mohaqeq was the military leader of the party under the political leadership of Khalili. Mohaqeq and Khalili had a falling out, however, over Mohaqeq’s decision to run for president without the official approval of the party. Subsequently, Mohaqeq split away and formed his own party, Hezb-e Wahdat-e Eslami-ye Mardom-e Afghanistan. The original Wahdat party has begun to lose influence and support among the Hazara, in part because of the pull of Mohaqeq’s new party and likely because Khalili’s position as Second Vice President distracts from his efforts to look after the needs of the Hazara.

Hezb-e Wahdat-e Eslami-ye Mardom-e Afghanistan (Islamic Unity Party of the People of Afghanistan):

---

82 Katzman, 30.
83 Giustozzi, 61-63.
The party is led by Hajji Mohammad Mohaqeq, a member of the Wolesi Jirga, and split from Khalili’s Hezb-e Wahdat. The party seems to be in ascendancy compared to Khalili’s party. Exact political differences between the two parties are difficult to surmise, but it appears that it is more a matter of leadership than of significant differences in political platforms. Mohaqeq seems more focused on issues affecting the Hazara and the Hazarajat than his rival Khalili.87

**Mahaz-e Melli (Pir Gailani):**
Primarily (but not exclusively) a Pashtun party, followers of the Sufi holy man Pir Ishaq Gailani. It has a reputation for moderate thought and the traditional mystical and introspective religious currents that characterize Sufism.

**Jamiat-e Islami (Islamic Society of Afghanistan):**
Led by Burhanuddin Rabbani. It is predominately a Tajik political party which was active in the anti-Soviet jihad and a major political player in the Northern Alliance. Today Rabbani supports Karzai. Yunus Qanuni’s Hezb-e Afghanistan Naween broke away from Jamiat-e Islami.

**Hamnazar**
One of the most important parties of the Meshrano Jirga, Hamnazar (Alliance), It mainly consists of pro-Karzai MPs, who are Western sympathizers. The group numbers some thirty parliamentarians and is led by Amin Zai. A doctor by profession, he is closely allied with Karzai who strongly supported him for this position.88

**Hezb-e Islami Gulbuddin (HiG):**
Mujahideen party active since the Soviet invasion; led by Gulbuddin Hekmatyar. HiG was famous for its shifting loyalties, and was the favorite party of Pakistan’s ISI until the rise of the Taliban. Former members continue to wield considerable influence in the province. Actively opposed to US-led and Afghan national forces. Hekmatyar is a Kharoti Ghilzai and, therefore, less influential than the much more respected and powerful Khugianis, such as Haji Din Mohammad and Anwarul Haq Mohammad.89

**Harakat-e Islami (NUF):**
A Shia party originally led by Muhammad Asif Muhsini, the Harakat-e Islami fought the Soviets with support from Tehran. Known for having many Hazara as well as non-Hazara members, this Shiite party refused to join the Hazara coalition Hizb-i Wahdat in the ensuing civil war. Since 2005 they have been led by Hojjatolislam Seyyed Muhammad Ali Jawed, a minister in Karzai’s first cabinet.

**Taliban:**
The Taliban have often been labeled as the Afghan Government and America’s greatest enemy in Afghanistan. This is only partially true; the Taliban are not as united as some might think, and in the end their divisions may prove their downfall more than any kinetic operation or government negotiations. Either way, after six years, it is clear that kinetic operations alone will not defeat them. As opposed to their rapid ascension to power in the mid-1990s, the Taliban at this point is committed to a “protracted war.”90

The Taliban ideology is a schizophrenic distortion of *Pashtunwali* (“the Way of the Pashtun,” the Pashtun moral code) and fundamentalist Islam. Often times, the Taliban itself confuses the two, and this confusion is part of the larger divide in the Taliban: is it a jihadist organization, or a Pashtun one?

Born supposedly in 1994, during a particularly tumultuous time in Afghan history, the Taliban went on to control Kabul in 1996 and had five years in which they ruled Afghanistan tyrannically with a crude mixture of theocratic intolerance, ethnocentrism, and anarchic brutality. Women were cruelly treated in a legal system that disqualified their testimony and made rape, unless witnessed by four

---


89 Chris Mason, *Tora Bora Nizami Mahaz*.

corroborating males, the same as adultery and therefore punishable by death. Ethnic and Islamic minorities were cleansed, and development was all but ceased as the youth were turned out of secular education to memorize the Qur’an and females forced out of public life altogether.

The Taliban mythology cites their creation as a reaction to the injustices that were perpetrated during the mujahedin era of Afghan politics. In 1992 the Najibullah socialist regime was finished, and Afghanistan was divided between rival warring factions. In the Southern Pashtun homelands these divisions were most critical, with a plethora of armed bands competing for territory. At one point, it was rumored that there were twenty-odd checkpoints between Kandahar and the Pakistani border at Spin Boldak, a distance of less than 100 kilometers. At one checkpoint two girls were taken from their vehicle and assaulted. A local village mullah was called upon to rescue the girls, and together with thirty compatriots, he did. This brought him and his band to the notice of the transport cartel in Quetta, who had been severely hindered by the anarchic state across the border. The mullah was Mullah Omar, and the transport cartel began to fund his militia in order to drive away the others. Within three months it had rolled on to capture twelve Southern provinces with little or no resistance. At some point it is assumed Pakistani Inter-Service Intelligence (ISI) came to notice the village mullah and his rag-tag bunch of Islamic student/fighters (Taliban) and began to lend support. The Taliban rose to power as a popular movement, at least in the Pashtun homelands. They brought stability, law and order, albeit at a cost. Still, crime by individuals plummeted and male civilians could venture out of their homes in relative freedom, provided they were bearded and attended regular prayers.

Little is known about Mullah Omar. He is one-eyed, as a result of fighting during the anti-Soviet campaign. Only one photo of him is known to exist, and even during the five years he ruled the nation as amir, he is known to have only made two trips to Kabul, preferring instead to rule from Kandahar. He is from the Hotaki clan of the Ghilzai supertribe, the largest Pashtun confederation. Traditionally, the Ghilzai have been denied leadership positions in Afghanistan by the less-numerous Duranni Pashtuns (all the kings of Afghanistan since 1747 and President Hamid Karzai are Durrani Pashtun). After fighting the Soviets he returned to his native district near Kandahar and ran a madrassah (religious school). In 1996, five months before capturing Kabul, he not only touched but wore the supposed cloak of Mohammad (PBUH) in Kandahar. This invested him with a divine legitimacy in the eyes of many rural, uneducated Pashtuns. To further cement his status, he called a gathering of ulema (Muslim scholars and community figures) to crown him Amir al-Momineen (“Leader of the Faithful”). Since 2001 he has been in hiding.

The Taliban are driven by two competing interests: the desire to re-conquer Afghanistan and the desire to reestablish a caliphate. The first is Pashtun-centric, the second more al Qaeda inspired. The danger of each wing to the Taliban is that the Pashtun-centrists may be amenable to cooption in a new Afghanistan, and that the jihadists with a more global view may be marginalized into criminals and simple terrorists.

Because of these two divergent goals, the means are often similarly disparate. This is precisely what causes the friction in Taliban tactics: is it a terrorist organization, or an insurgent force. Ideally, it is thought, the Taliban would like to perform as an insurgent force, but it lacks the popular support and resources to make that possible. After 2001, a massive reorganization was called for within the Taliban leadership; it had been knocked out of government, was on the run, and not even the local population in the southeast, from whence the Taliban sprung, would support them. A combination of war-weariness, combined with altogether too recent memories of Taliban brutality prevent the Taliban from achieving any real legitimacy as popular “movement.” One of the hardships of insurgencies is that insurgents are generally free to make promises that cannot be kept, whereas governments must be seen as good to their word. The Taliban, because it actually has been in power, does not enjoy this advantage as much as other insurgent groups might.

Since 2001, the Taliban has relied a great deal on terrorist tactics. This is ironic, as it was precisely as a result of such tactics used by the Taliban’s guest, al Qaeda, that their time in power was ended. Unfortunately, this has encouraged greater cooperation between the Taliban and al Qaeda, and a sharing of tactics. The first recognized suicide bombing in Afghanistan took place on September 9, 2001.

wherein disguised al Qaeda operatives killed Ahmad Shah Masood, the “Lion of Panjshir” and leader of the Northern Alliance. This can be viewed as an ipso facto gift from al Qaeda to the Taliban. From then until the Taliban rebound in 2004-2005, suicide attacks remained few in number and primarily perpetrated by foreign elements (i.e. Pakistani Punjabis).\(^94\) In recent times, however, the number of suicide attacks has increased exponentially, and their lethality has as well.

The Taliban was forced into a corner after 2001, and could only exist as a terrorist organization. Hence the large army groups they had previously besieged the Northern Alliance with rapidly deteriorated to squad sized units. By 2005, however, they were again fielding company-sized units, and by 2006 battalions. After 2004 they also began to over-run districts regularly. The districts were never held for very long, but long enough to kill suspected coalition sympathizers and impress a soon-wavering local population.\(^95\) From a terrorist force on the run to destabilizing presence to a rebel army seems to be their strategic vision. This follows Che Guevera’s observation that ‘insurgents themselves can create the conditions necessary for government overthrow.’\(^96\)

What the Taliban wants is a return to its pre-9/11 status (Stage 2). After 9/11 it elected to use terror tactics (Stage 4), as they were the only means available for the Taliban to destabilize the countryside and create the anarchic conditions which led to the first Taliban rule. Since increased operations in 2004, and the stabilization of rear areas in Pakistan, the Taliban has moved increasingly into Stage 3, wherein terror hit-and-run and suicide tactics are still employed, but the movement begins to identify itself with its Pashtun base and cultivate support there. In Pakistan, raging against a military dictatorship allied with the West and led by a non-Pashtun has earned the Taliban, al Qaeda, and other assorted militants more credit than in Afghanistan, where there is a democracy led by a Pashtun. Throughout a successful insurgency it is necessary to delegitimize the government.\(^97\) The Taliban strategy in Afghanistan, therefore, has been to separate the government from the people, to destroy or prevent development works, and create a scenario in which the only government presence most Pashtuns are likely to see is an armed one.

One of the successes the Taliban has had in this respect is with opium. Afghanistan is awash in opium, providing 93% of the world’s total opiate product.\(^98\) Up to half of Afghanistan’s Gross Domestic Product is as a direct result of this pernicious trade,\(^99\) although only a third of that, one billion U.S. dollars,


is for cultivation. That leaves two billion U.S. dollars for transport, refinement, and smuggling, something the Taliban has been more than willing to take part in.\textsuperscript{100} In Afghanistan, thirteen percent of the population is directly involved in the opium trade, and many more dependent on its ancillary benefits.\textsuperscript{101} By offering to protect the crop, and hiring local men to do so at pay rates much higher than the Afghan National Army, the Taliban has ensured that in many areas government inspectors, eradication forces, and coalition forces are unwelcome. By creating an environment that gives many rural people a stake in a lack of governmental presence, the Taliban has ensured anti-government sentiment in many places. Additionally, the revenues raised, although difficult to estimate, must give the Taliban much need influence and arms.

A second strong point of the Taliban of late has not been in Afghanistan at all, but in Pakistan. The Taliban has long enjoyed local sympathies in Pakistan. In a concerted effort to ensure a safe-haven in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) similar to what many mujahedin enjoyed during the anti-Soviet campaign, they have beaten the Pakistani military to a standstill and forced the government out of many of the tribal areas, most noticeably Waziristan.\textsuperscript{102} Until the Taliban is denied these areas of sanctuary, they cannot be defeated.

The Taliban is not as united as its leaders would like. Beginning with the inclusion of suicide tactics, previously unknown in Afghanistan, and most recently with President Karzai’s offer of peace talks, the Taliban has been divided for some time.\textsuperscript{103} Mullah Dadullah, the Taliban’s former military chief killed in May 2007, was a major proponent of terrorist tactics, and to have neutralized such a high-level target it is thought coalition forces must have had inside information on his whereabouts, indicating fissures in Taliban leadership. Karzai’s 2007 attempt at negotiations with the Taliban also induced disagreement in Taliban ranks. Eventually the Taliban set forth absurd preconditions for talks, but the delay in their reply and the dissent within the leadership was evident.\textsuperscript{104}

Much has also been made of the tiers of Taliban membership; the first tier consisting of the leadership and hardened warriors, many of whom came of age fighting the Soviets. The foreign fighters of al Qaeda would also fit in this tier; far from home and dedicated to jihad, they are often well-trained and well-disciplined.

The second tier consists of the trigger-pullers, the young men hired to guard poppy fields during the growing season, and the farmer browbeat into laying an IED. They are often uneducated locals, or mis-educated boys from sympathetic madrassahs across the border in Pakistan. While not overly competent fighters, their numbers and dedication makes them worrisome.

Finally, a third tier might be added: locals, mainly Pashtuns, who are personally invested in the fight. These are the fighters who have no ostensible ideological qualms with the government, nor affinities for the Taliban, but benefit from a lack of government control in their area, such as opium growers. Some nomadic groups, such as the Kuchi, are hesitant to have their grazing lands restricted are may see themselves as better off without a strong central government. Others may fight because their kin were injured at the hands of coalition or government forces, for \textit{badal} (“revenge”) under the \textit{pashtunwali} system or other personal reasons. The Taliban if possible would like to foster more of these animosities towards coalition and government troops in the tribal areas, but so far it has met with mixed success, and in some places direct opposition by locals.

\begin{itemize}
\end{itemize}
The Taliban is dug in for a long war. An oft quoted expression of theirs is “the Americans may have the watches, but we have the time.” Hoping that political will in the NATO alliance will dry up, the Taliban seems to think that as long as they don’t lose, as long as they keep up pressure on coalition and government forces, and keep security and development from Southern Afghanistan, victory is theirs. Such a victory would be disastrous for Afghanistan and the wider world. Religious and ethnic sectarianism, gynophobia, and cultures of death anywhere threaten everywhere.

Public Attitudes toward Political/Religious Leaders:
According to survey data, shuras and elders are considered the most respected leaders by 87% of the provincial population; mullahs and mullahs by 6%.106

Human Terrain:

Pashtuns:
Pashtuns are located throughout the districts of Kabul province. The largest single ethnicity of Afghanistan, the Pashtun, and in particular the largest tribe of said, the Ghilzai, formed the backbone of the Taliban movement. Traditionally beholden to the moral code of Pashtunwali (“the way of the Pashtun”), they can easily be deeply offended by breaches of the code and carry the grudge for generations. The Pashtuns are fiercely independent and often view themselves, as the largest ethnicity in the country, as the rightful leaders of Afghanistan. That being said, they suffered much during the Soviet invasion, and must be included in any effort to secure and develop the country.

Ghilzai:
The largest single tribe of the Pashtun ethnicity, the Ghalji or Ghilzai, and in particular the Hotaki clan, formed the backbone of the Taliban movement. Long resentful of the power the Duranni tribe (of which Karzai and Zahir Shah are members), the Ghilzai are fiercely independent and often view themselves, as the largest grouping of Pashtuns in the country, as the rightful leaders of Afghanistan. That being said, they suffered much during the Soviet invasion, and must be included in any effort to secure and develop Ghazni Province.

Wardak Pashtun:
Some leaders of the Wardak Pashtun were notorious for their opposition to the British in 1879-1880. The Wardak tribe is subdivided in the Mayar, Mirkehl (which may be the same as the Amir Khel), and the Nuri.107 There is some disagreement whether the Wardaks are Karlanri or Ghilzai Pashtun. Most evidence suggests they are Karlanri. Currently several Wardak Pashtuns hold important posts in the central government, including the Ministry of Defense (General Abdur Rahim Wardak), the Ministry of Information, Culture and Youth (Abdul Karim Khoram), and the Ministry of Parliamentary Affairs. It is also important to note that “several Islamic radicals emerged from Wardak who helped to promote and implement Taliban’s conservative interpretation of Islam.”108

Khogiyani:
Feud with Shinwari and Ghilzai. History of opposing the British. They are classified as Karlanri and Hill Tribe Pashtuns.

Shinwari:
Feud with Khogiyani. History of opposing the British and the central government in Kabul. A major thorn in the side of Amir Abdur Rahman Khan during the 1880s. They are classified as Eastern, Sarbani Pashtuns.

107 Adamec, Vol. 6, 802-803.
**Safi (Safay):**
Kunar Safis are the largest and most powerful of the province’s Pashtun tribes and live primarily in the Pech Valley region. The Safis historically have been one of the most dissident tribes in Afghanistan, with a major uprising against the central government in 1945-1946. The tribe is divided into three clans, the Gorbuz, the Massoud and the Wadir. The three clans were divided politically during the communist era. In large part the Wadir Safis were aligned with the communists and served in the government. Many Safis mujahedin leaders came from the Gorbuz clan. The Massoud clan, however, was split between both sides.\(^{109}\)

**Tajik:**
Tajiks are located throughout most of the Kabul province. Tajiks are the second largest ethnic group in Afghanistan, after the Pashtuns and comprise between 25-30% of the population. The Tajiks in Afghanistan tend to live in settled communities as opposed to a nomadic lifestyle. Pashtuns refer to them as Farsiwan, or speakers of Farsi, the lingua franca of Afghanistan (50% of Afghanistan speaks Farsi, as opposed to only 35% for Pashtu). Between the Tajiks and Pashtuns there has been significant animosity in recent years. Forming the backbone of the Northern Alliance, they also have a base in the nation of Tajikistan. They held out fiercely against the Taliban. Most Tajik are Sunni Muslims, but a few are Shi’a. Tajiks made up the majority of the Northern Alliance, both in terms of membership and leadership. Tribal ties have largely broken down among the Tajiks; therefore, social organization is defined primarily by geography. Despite their lack of cohesiveness the Tajiks are often brought together due to the perceived common threat posed by the Pashtuns.\(^{110}\)

**Hazara:**
Hazara are located in pockets throughout Kabul province.\(^{111}\) The Hazara, a distinct ethnic and religious group within the population of Afghanistan, have often been the target of discriminatory and violent repression. Most likely descended from the Mongols of Genghis Khan, (there is also a strong argument that they are of Eastern Turkic origin), the Hazara are noticeably different in physical appearance when compared to the Pashtun majority. In terms of religion, the vast majority of the Hazara are of the Shia Muslim faith, again in contrast to the Pashtuns who are Sunni Muslim. Due to these differences, “the Hazara have experienced discrimination at the hands of the Pashtun-dominated government throughout the history of modern Afghanistan.”\(^{112}\) As the traditional underclass of Afghan society, Hazara were exploited and made to work as servants and laborers. As a result there tends to be an anti-government and anti-Pashtun bias among the Hazara. In present day Afghanistan, the Hazara are divided geographically into two main groups: the Hazarajat Hazara and those who live outside the Hazarajat. The Hazarajat is located in the Hindu Kush Mountains in central Afghanistan and is “centered on Bamyan province and include[s] areas of Ghowr, Uruzgan [now Day Kundi], Wardak, and Ghazni province.”\(^{113}\) The Hazara living outside of the Hazarajat live in and around Kabul, Herat, Mazar-e-Sharif and Samangan province. Due to atrocities committed against them by the Taliban, the Hazara by and large are opposed to the Taliban. In August 1998, the Taliban massacred approximately 4,000 Hazara in Mazar-e-Sharif; this massacre was followed by another the next month when the Taliban killed another 500 Hazara in Bamyan. The Hezb-e Wahdat (Islamic Unity Party of Afghanistan) is an umbrella political organization which commands the support of large numbers of Hazara. The Hazara are also often at odds with the Kuchi population within the Hazarajat.

**Kabuli:**
The term kabuli refers to the heterogeneous urban population of the city of Kabul. In general the term is ethnic-neutral, due the multi-ethnic nature of the capital and the result of generations of intermarriages.

---

\(^{109}\) US Department of State Asadabad Provincial Reconstruction Team Political Officer Reporting, 2005.


According to Peter R. Blood, “A typical Kabuli speaks Dari in addition to his mother tongue and, whether male or female, is urbane, favors European fashions, is secularly educated, and most probably works as a bureaucrat, shopkeeper/owner or in the service sector. Many who have had professional education or experience abroad…are Western-oriented in outlook and enjoy cosmopolitan lifestyles.” Many Kabulis left the capital during the past three decades of war.114

**Kuchi:**
In Kabul province, the Kuchi are located primarily in the north-west. Involved in a constant and centuries old range war with the Hazara, the Kuchi are Pashtun nomads. Drawn primarily from the Ghilzai tribe, the Kuchis have moved across Afghanistan and Pakistan for generations, and only since Pakistani independence were banned from Pakistani territory. Dispersed and well-traveled, they often receive news from distant relations in far-away provinces relatively quickly. The self-declared “leader” of the Kuchis is one Hashmat Ghani Ahmadzai. Partially settled by the king and the following socialist governments, they were strong supporters of the Taliban, both ideologically and pragmatically, as they came into possession of many Hazara lands thanks to the repression of the Shiite Hazara by the Taliban. There are estimated to be around three million Kuchi in Afghanistan, with at least 60% remaining fully nomadic.115

**Qizilbash:**
The Qizilbash in Kabul province are located in the capital and the surrounding districts. The Qizilbash are an Imami Shia group thought to be descended from Persian “mercenaries and administrators left behind by the Safavid Emperor Nadir Shah Afshar to govern the Afghan provinces.”116 After the demise of the Safavid Empire in Afghanistan, the Qizilbash, due to their higher levels of education and experience as administrators, remained influential in the Afghan court and government bureaucracies. Their Shia faith combined with their disproportionate political influence often resulted in resentment by large portions of the Sunni majority within Afghanistan.117 Also, they were used by the shahs as personal bodyguards and assigned to put down uprisings among the populace, which further alienated them from the Pashtun majority. Due to the persecution, religious and political, the Qizilbash frequently resorted to the use of *taqiyya*, the practice of precautionary dissimulation or the adoption of a dual religious identity. In order to play a role in government and society, the Qizilbash, like other Imami Shia, publicly portrayed themselves as Sunnis or Pashtuns while they privately maintained their Shia faith.118 In present day Afghanistan, the Qizilbash continue to practice *taqiyya* making it difficult to gain accurate census data. It appears that they largely reside in urban centers and “tend to be predominantly urban professionals—doctors, teachers, engineers, and lawyers.”119

**Tatar:**
Located in the north-west portion of Kabul province. The first Central Asian Muslims to come under the Russian yoke, Tatars still retain their own republic within the Russian Federation. During the colonial era they were often used as spies and guides for Russian and later Soviet efforts, and heavily involved in commercial trading. In Afghanistan, many of the Tatars settled after either trying to escape the Russians, or as traders.

**Hindus and Sikhs:**
A small number of Hindus are located in the districts surrounding the capital. Long parts of the commercial life of Afghanistan, Hindus and Sikhs have lived in the country for centuries as traders and

---


119 World Culture Encyclopedia.
money-lenders. During the time of the Taliban they were harassed and forced to wear identifying badges, and as a result many left the country. Since the beginning of OEF, however, many have returned to Afghanistan and their previous vocations.

**Security Landscape:**

**General Level of Security:**
The threat level in Kabul is significant. Despite receiving large amounts of funding for aid and infrastructure projects, insurgency groups (Taliban, HiG, and Al Qaida) remain active. The capital, as a target, provides an opportunity for the insurgents to discredit the government. BBC Monitoring reported 24 security related incidents during the first six months of 2007, five of which was a suicide attack.

**Public attitudes toward security:**
93% of those surveyed consider the security situation good, 3% consider it fair, and 4% consider it bad.\(^{120}\)

**Public attitudes toward FF:**
No survey data available.

---

\(^{120}\) Altaï Consulting, 9 March 2007.