Enhanced Defense Cooperation Between the United States and Pakistan

Strategic Insights, Volume VI, Issue 4 (June 2007)

by Zafar Nawaz Jaspal

Introduction

The current convergence of strategic perceptions of Pakistan and the United States resulted from the overwhelming security concerns—for the former, the continuing struggle with India, the counterterrorism campaign within the country and its desire to attain sufficient capability vis-à-vis its adversary. India provided significant incentives to continue and enhance its defense relationship with the United States. And for the U.S. Global War on Terrorism, Operation Enduring Freedom made Pakistan an important ally in the Middle East-Persian Gulf strategic consensus for rooting out al-Qaeda and its terrorists’ allies. With this perspective, the article attempts to examine the defense cooperation between the United States and Pakistan. Three central questions are; (1) what is the current defense cooperation between the United States and Pakistan; (2) what would be the factors of convergence and caveats in the cooperation; and (3) what are the ways of enhancing defense cooperation to make it long-term, stable, and mutually beneficial?

Conceptual Framework

Defense Cooperation is a multidimensional phenomenon involving complex sets of relationships, interests, and consequences. The primary objective of defense cooperation is to construct an advantageous strategic environment for the participants. The participating actors are either to secure and maximize desired gains or lessen their liabilities by sharing them with others. It constitutes a common strategic vision and results in mutual cooperation—arms transfers, joint military exercises, military education and training programs—for the sake of the shared objective of a peaceful, stable and advantageous strategic environment. Theoretically, defense cooperation is perceived as mutually beneficial to both parties. But practically, asymmetries in power and resources allow the superior state a degree of influence over the inferior. It creates dependencies, patron-client ties, and alliance relationships. It has a decisional influence, that is, the ability of one actor to influence, by bargaining, the foreign and domestic policy decisions of another. Although, the inferior considers defense cooperation in its strategic, political and economic interest, almost all of the countries, particularly small countries are well aware of the fact that participating in the alliances would automatically entail some cost.[1]

Strategic Convergence

Although the United States enjoys primacy in the international system owing to its immense military and economic prowess, it has a lot vested in maintaining good relations with Pakistan to promote its global and regional interests, especially in the realm of war on terrorism, nuclear nonproliferation, engaging moderate Muslim countries, and access to Central Asia.[2] Pakistan is a moderate Muslim country having constructive influence in the Persian Gulf and Middle East. The tragedy of 9/11 transformed the United States' security policies and changed its geopolitical calculations. The need of logistic facilities and intelligence about al-Qaeda has drastically enhanced Pakistan’s importance in the U.S. strategic calculations since 9/11. Pakistan’s geographical position on the Southern and Eastern borders of landlocked Afghanistan is the best location for supporting the U.S. and coalition air campaign against Taliban strongholds when operating from ships in the Arabian Sea or bases in the Persian Gulf.[3]

Pakistan gave a prompt and positive response when the United States requested for support in the GWOT.[4] The shift in Pakistan's policy and the situation in Afghanistan have been a destabilizing factor for Pakistan, yet there are basic factors of convergence for Islamabad and Washington. By offering political, logistical, and vital intelligence support, in addition to three crucial air bases to the Americans in their Operation Enduring Freedom, Pakistan, as in the 1980s, became an active ally in the war on terrorism.[5] Pakistan today has been deemed a “frontline ally” in the war on terrorism. Appreciating Pakistan’s key role as a frontline state in the war on terrorism, President Bush lifted all nuclear proliferation-related sanctions on Pakistan (and India) on September 22, 2001. The U.S. Congress passed, and the President signed into law, S. 1465 (P.L. 107-57) in October 2001. With this law, Congress exempted Pakistan from all sanctions related to democracy and debt-arrears for FY2002, and granted the President authority to waive such sanctions through FY2003. Presidential Determination 2003-16 exercised this authority for FY2003 on March 14, 2003.[6] More precisely, Washington cultivated Islamabad’s support through high level consultations, debt relief, aid commitments, and lifting of sanctions.

Pakistan's strategic outlook has been influenced by a geomilitary disequilibrium that is highly favorable to India. The massive build-up of India’s conventional and non-conventional military capabilities—advanced offensive aircraft, ballistic and cruise missiles, missile defense systems, nuclear submarines, an aircraft carrier, etc.—and Pakistan’s own less-developed indigenous armaments manufacturing capabilities enhance its dependence on the arms supplier nations. The asymmetry between India and Pakistan necessitates the latter to arm with the latest generation of weapons compensating for numerical inferiority for solidifying its defense against the former. Despite the continuity of composite dialogue and confidence-building measures to resolve outstanding issues and promote strategic stability and nuclear risk reduction, Islamabad continues to strive for a conventional balance at the lowest possible level of armaments since an imbalance could threaten stability, both conventional and non-conventional.[7]

Pakistan’s primary purpose in the U.S.–Pakistan defense cooperation is to strengthen the defense capabilities of Pakistan with two main objectives: to reduce the existing conventional weapons imbalance between India and Pakistan with the art of weaponry; and to remove a sense of insecurity and replace it with a sense of security by increasing the nuclear threshold on the subcontinent.[8] Precisely, after 9/11 Washington withdrew sanctions against Pakistan and agreed to provide various forms of military assistance, including sales, financing, equipment grants, and training to the latter.[9]

Tangible Outcomes

The convergence of interests provided the necessary impetus to the bilateral relationship. President Pervaiz Musharraf stated at the Pentagon on February 13, 2002, “Let me say that Pakistan and the United States have enjoyed very close military relations, military ties which go to the strategic level of cooperation in the past. And it is my pleasure to revive the same degree of relationship again with the United States.”[10] The 9/11 Commission recommended that the United States should make “the difficult long-term commitment to the future of Pakistan sustaining the current scale of aid to Pakistan.”[11] Condoleezza Rice, Secretary of State commented, “Pakistan has become a vital ally with the United States in the war on terror…. at one time in our history we did not maintain and continue deep relations with Pakistan after having shared strategic interests during the Cold War…the United States will be a friend for life.”[12]

At the political level, Pakistan and the United States established a strategic partnership during President Bush's visit in March 2006. The inaugural session of Strategic Dialogue was held in Washington on April 26–27, 2006. Under this partnership maintain regular and close coordination on bilateral, regional and international issues of mutual interests. Separate dialogues in the fields of education, energy, economy, terrorism and science and technology were initiated.[13] These mechanisms have strengthened the institutional basis of the Pakistan–U.S. relationship and helped deepen mutually beneficial cooperation in diverse fields. In late 2001, U.S. economic and military assistance to Pakistan amounted to $1,766 million by 2003. In June 2003, the United States finalized for Pakistan $3 billion multi-layer assistance package for a five-year period. The annual break-up of the package was $600 million, equally divided into Economic Support Fund and Military Assistance Components.[14] The U.S. Congress passed an act in December 2004 with provisions assuring continued assistance after the expiration of the five-year package in 2009.[15]

Revival of Defense Consultative Group

The Pakistan–U.S. Defense Consultative Group (DCG)—created to oversee a bilateral defense relationship that has existed in some form since the 1950s—met in Pakistan in late September 2002. This was the first such meeting since 1997.[16] The DCG serves as a primary forum for exchanging ideas and coordinating defense policy discussions with a view to deepen cooperation in diverse areas of the bilateral defense relationship. The 17th annual meeting of DCG was held in Washington D.C. on May 4-5, 2006. In the joint statement it was reiterated, “the U.S.–Pakistan defense relationship is essential to strengthening U.S. and Pakistani security, winning the Global War on Terrorism, and enhancing stability in South Asia.[17] The United States had agreed to enhance Pakistan’s conventional weapons capabilities at the 17th DCG meeting.[18]

Major Non-NATO Ally

In June 2004 the U.S. President officially notified the designation of Pakistan as a Major non-NATO Ally (MNNA). The MNNA is a designation given by the U.S. government to exceptionally close allies who have strong strategic working relationships with American forces but are not members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. This status facilitated the enhancement of defense cooperation between the two countries. Nations named as MNNA's are eligible for the following benefits:

• Entry into cooperative research and development projects with the Department of Defense (DoD) on a shared-cost basis;
• Participation in certain counterterrorism initiatives;
• Purchase of depleted uranium anti-tank rounds;
• Priority delivery of military surplus (ranging from rations to ships);
• Possession of War Reserve Stocks of DoD-owned equipment that are kept outside of American military bases;
• Loans of equipment and materials for cooperative research and development projects and evaluations;
• Permission to use American financing for the purchase or lease of certain defense equipment;
• Reciprocal training;
• Expedited export processing of space technology; and
• Permission for the country's corporations to bid on certain DoD contracts for the repair and maintenance of military equipment outside the United States.

Arms Sales

The major U.S.-made weapons systems Pakistan's armed forces use include F-16, P-3 Orion and C-130 Hercules aircraft, Harpoon and Stinger missiles, and 155mm howitzers. U.S. military equipment transfers to Pakistan ended in the 1990s due to the Pressler Amendment (invoked in 1990), and the Glenn Amendment in 1998 immediately placed Pakistan under economic sanctions.[19] The U.S.-imposed sanctions caused many of these systems to become inoperable, because they denied access not only to spares and support for existing systems, but also denied the availability of military specific equipments. Pakistan Air Force (PAF) was the major sufferer of the sanctions. After invoking the Pressler Amendment, the United States blocked the sale of 70 F-16s that Pakistan had ordered and paid for. With the end of U.S. sanctions, Islamabad presented Washington with demand for a variety of arms—missiles, artillery and rocket launching systems, unmanned aerial vehicles, and the release of previously purchased F-16 jets. The objective was to reduce the conventional weapons disparity between Pakistan and India as a means of halting a nuclear arms race in South Asia.

Islamabad secured deals for the purchase of major U.S. weapons platforms, including 44 F-16s fighter planes, eight P-3C Orion marine surveillance aircraft with anti-submarine missiles, and Harpoon anti-ship and TOW-2A heavy anti-armor guided missiles.[20] The United States provided seven used C-130E transport aircraft (one being for spare parts) and, six Aerostats—sophisticated, balloon-mounted surveillance radars, Cobra and Huey helicopters to strengthen the border security arrangement on the western borders and along the Arabian Sea coastline.[21] The Pakistan Air Force (PAF) will also purchase TPS-77 Lockheed Martin from the United States as tactical support radars for PAF air defense network. TPS-77 is the latest configuration of world’s most successful 3-D radar.[22] Pakistan will also buy 700 air-to-air missiles made by U.S. defense group Raytheon for $284 million. The delivery of missiles will start in 2008.[23] In short, in the last five years (2002-2006) U.S. military sales to Pakistan amounted to $823 million.[24]

International Military Education and Training (IMET) Program

The military training programs bring officers to the United States, and sends Americans to Pakistan. The International Military Education and Training (IMET) program allows foreign military officials to train in the United States. It exposes mid-career Pakistani military officers to their American counterparts in the course of military education. Professional interchange between rising generations of Pakistani and U.S. military service personnel assists in developing mutual understanding and enhancing professional abilities and capabilities.

Pakistan–U.S. Joint Military Exercise

The basic objective of joint military exercises is to benefit from each other’s experience and expertise. After a hiatus of five years, in October 2002 Pakistan–U.S. joint military exercises have been revived.[25] Pakistan Air Force and Navy have also been conducting operational exercises with the U.S. Air Force and Navy, respectively, since 2001.

Prospects and Constraints

The Pakistan–U.S. relationship has been characterized by numerous “ups and downs.” Various stages—initial hesitation, alignment, detachment, tilt, disenchantment real alignment, sanctions and then suspected frontline state—have been the hallmarks of this nearly six decades of bilateralism. In this context, the defense cooperation between the United States and Pakistan would be transient or long lasting and would be governed by several factors. Quite clearly this defense cooperation cannot be one sided, that Islamabad responds positively while the Washington shows inaction in its prong or vise-versa. Washington and Islamabad, for example, have expressed policy preferences, prior to the revival of current defense cooperation, and also along with the delivery of arms. For the success of defense cooperation, both sides have to reappraise their policies.

Issues of Convergence

U.S. economic and, needless to say, military assistance will be extended when it is judged to enhance the politico-military interests.[26] In the post-9/11 environment, the primary objective of the United States in the region is to hunt down and eliminate the al-Qaeda and Taliban fugitives, particularly in the Afghanistan–Pakistan border areas. Pakistan has remained in the forefront for the accomplishment of this policy. It has been acting against al-Qaeda and its associates effectively.[27] Its security forces have been collaborating and coordinating to conduct operations jointly in the North Western and Balochistan provinces of Pakistan. More than eighty thousand Pakistani troops have been fighting the foreign terrorists in the South Waziristan Agency, where they had established sanctuaries. Precisely, the U.S.–Pakistan collaborative efforts led to the break up of the al-Qaeda network in border areas. Moreover, Pakistan is responsive to the UN Security Council resolutions under which comprehensive sanctions have been enforced against terrorists. For example, during the year 2005-2006, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs issued four SROs to give effect to the sanction measures imposed under Security Council resolutions against Osama bin Laden, Al-Qaeda, the Taliban and their associates.[28] Importantly, top U.S. government officials regularly praise Pakistan and its leadership for their “fine efforts” in joint counterterrorism operations. Pakistan's active and sincere role in the GWOT is an important step in the advancement of both countries’ shared strategic goals.

U.S. policy towards nuclear capabilities in South Asia shifted from a “rollback” presumption to two downstream concerns. One was “holding the line” against actual military deployment of nuclear weapons. The second was winning assurances from India and Pakistan that they would not engage in sensitive nuclear (or missile) exports to third countries.[29] Pakistan remains committed to adopting a minimal credible deterrence. It supports nuclear stabilization and restraint in the region and is opposed to any arms race. It proposed a strategic restraint regime to endure with interlocking elements of, one, conflict resolution; second, nuclear and missile restraint; and third, conventional balance.[30]

Pakistan is not party to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), but it subscribes to the objectives of the NPT. Pakistan is prepared on a voluntary and non-discriminatory basis to continue to act in consonance with the obligations, undertaken by nuclear weapon states, under Article I, II and III of the NPT. It supported the adoption of Security Council Resolution 1540, and efforts to break up of the A.Q. Khan network.[31] The government of Pakistan has adopted comprehensive laws (2004 Export Control Act) and regulations to prevent the export or proliferation of sensitive nuclear materials and technology. In October 2005, the government notified national Control Lists of Goods, Technologies, Materials and Equipment related to Nuclear and Biological Weapons and their delivery systems, which are subject to strict export control.[32] Importantly, the Indo–U.S. nuclear deal—a paradigm shift in U.S. antiproliferation policy—and the United States’ unwillingness to extend similar cooperation to Pakistan generate misperceptions about Islamabad’s nonproliferation commitments. Pakistan felt discriminated, yet it advocates a regional approach in the nuclear realm.

The ongoing composite dialogue between India and Pakistan manifests that despite irritants, enmity is giving a way to amity. Despite some distrustful events, both sides remained committed in establishing a durable peace between each other. Consequently, three rounds of Composite Dialogue have been completed.[33] The fourth round of Composite Dialogue will resume on March 13-14, 2007.[34] The improvement in the India and Pakistan bilateral relations has had a positive impact on U.S.–Pakistan relations. It would herald to Washington’s constructive role in the region. Indeed it is said that India and Pakistan are now “America’s two new best friends.”

Caveats

While having waived the sanctions, Congressmen and opinion-makers in the United States continue to remonstrate on Pakistan’s nuclear weapons capability and its role in the war on terrorism. Importantly, once Pakistan agreed to assist the United States against Al-Qaeda and the Taliban, the latter should honor the role the former prepared to play, governed by its foreign policy objectives, resource endowments, and environmental limitations. Washington’s idealistic demands sometimes generates an impression that the U.S.–Pakistan bilateral relationship is fragile and the defense cooperation, once again, may be undermined by potentially disruptive developments in the areas of weapons proliferation, democracy-building, and the Indo–U.S. strategic partnership.

The protracted warfare in Afghanistan has had a frustrating impact on the United States and its coalition partners. It seems that the ISAF/NATO/U.S. forces have failed to destroy their adversary’s will and capacity to fight. The counterinsurgency campaign, instead of eliminating the "Taliban syndrome"—the movement to create an Islamic order in Afghanistan—has increased the latter's popular support.[35] Presently, it’s common to rebuke Pakistan for its military shortcomings. For example, Maj. Gen. Benjamin Freakley alleged that top Afghan insurgent Jalaluddin Haqqani was operating from inside Pakistan and sending men to fight in Afghanistan.[36] This attitude, of accusing Pakistan based on American misperceptions of Pakistan's sincerity in the war on terrorism, is likely to threaten Pakistan–U.S. defense cooperation.

Some in American decision-making circles have misplaced apprehension about the safety and security of Pakistan’s nuclear arsenals. The hypothetical scenario could be that if Pakistan does not modify its policies and fails to accomplish the demands of the United States, the United States would deny promised arms shipments and place restrictions on spare parts to force modification of Pakistan’s behavior. For example, the Implementation of 9/11 Commission Recommendations Act, 2007 recommend cutting off American military assistance to Pakistan if it fails to check the resurgence of the Taliban, etc.[37]

Theoretically, arms dependence can constitute one element of a country’s non-autonomy in its relationship with supplier nations. It arises from a situation where the defense program of one country is significantly determined by the policymakers of another country.[38] U.S.–Pakistan defense cooperation does not constitute a situation in which Pakistan’s defense program is significantly determined by the United States. Thus, embargoes could be effective if Islamabad is solely dependent on the United States or is in urgent need of a particular weapon that only the latter could provide.[39] While Pakistan needs sophisticated arms, the element of urgency is minimal. Precisely, it is not an overdependent recipient. Its nuclear weapons and missile capabilities establish a credible deterrence vis-à-vis its archrival. Secondly, employing such means as weapon diversification, especially through China, Pakistan has demonstrated a certain amount of resourcefulness in dealing with the United States. The arms that are easily replaceable at a tolerable cost could undermine the influence of the supplier. Therefore, for sustaining defense cooperation, the United States has to avoid excessive pressure on Pakistan. Otherwise Pakistan may approach other centers of power that supply arms to developing states. Approaching other suppliers may be favorable to Pakistan, but it would negatively effect the Pakistan–U.S. defense cooperation. Finally, Islamabad has the potential to defy Washington's demands and exhibit autonomy at the technical level of its strategy.[40] The major casualty of undesirable pressure would be defense cooperation, instead of behavioral change by Pakistan.

The United States has an interest in balancing any future Chinese expansion in Asia and the Indo–U.S. strategic partnership could play an important role in this respect. Previously, such an Indian role in the Indian Ocean was perceived by the Soviets to be against the United States and the West. But many American analysts viewed India as a potential counterweight to rising China. Pakistan perceives warmer U.S.–India ties with alarm.[41]

In July 2005, the U.S.–India relationship received a major boost with both the countries pledging to step up cooperation in non-military nuclear activities, civilian space programmes and high-technology trade and expanded dialogue on missile defence. The strategic partnership has radically altered Washington's and New Delhi’s attitudes over Kashmir. In fact, it is a double-edged blow to Pakistan; the United States is not willing to openly support Pakistan’s case on Kashmir; and New Delhi is using the partnership to strengthen its regional hegemony. It is not clear among non-Indian South Asians to what extent the United States is conscious of their fears of Indian hegemony. There is a growing concern over India’s unilateral policies in an Indo-centrist region where even Washington has been criticized for being supportive of India’s extraterritorial role. Realistically, every South Asian state except Pakistan has already been brought within the framework of a regional, Indian-dominated security system. The Indian leaders do not mask their desire that Pakistan also bow to the realities of power.[42] Conversely, Pakistan persists in a foreign policy that denies India’s claim to natural regional leadership. Ironically, whenever Pakistan raised its voice about India’s hegemony in Washington, it was construed as a typical cry of “India-haters” or as just a maneuver to manipulate the United States' South Asian policy.

India is a strong motivating factor in Islamabad’s willingness to renew the defense relationship with Washington. India’s earnest desire is to disrupt Pakistan–U.S. defense cooperation. It is ironic to note that India, a strategic partner of the United States, and already ahead of Pakistan in personnel, hardware, and sophisticated weapons for all three armed services, felt threatened by the Pakistan–U.S. defense cooperation. New Delhi’s growing influence in American policymaking circles could be perilous for the long-term Pakistan–U.S. defense cooperation.

Areas for Enhancement

The durability and enhancement of renewed defense cooperation is hinged on the reciprocity of benefits and sacrifices. It depends on shared interests and what advantage each partner gets from the continuity of cooperation. The U.S. military and economic assistance program, including the sale of F-16s, is certainly consistent with Washington’s wider efforts to construct a new global security regime. In so far as I can judge, the program meets Pakistan’s immediate security needs without upsetting the Indo–Pakistan strategic equilibrium. Obviously, it is not the solution for broad-based, long-term, sustainable and enhanced defense cooperation. For the hopes of enduring defense cooperation parallel to the Indo–U.S. strategic partnership, U.S.–Pakistan defense cooperation will have to be constantly nurtured with competing sets of priorities jostling for influence in both Washington and Islamabad. It’s imperative that the United States and Pakistan constitute an interdependent geopolitical and strategic whole, and that they develop a mechanism that generates interdependence and ensures the continuity of defense cooperation even in the aftermath of the elimination of the terrorist threat from Afghanistan. Without it, the full-fledged cooperation will remain chimerical. There are numerous areas for collaboration; a few of them are the following:

Air Force and Naval Equipment: Transfer at Bearable Cost

The cost of aircraft and U.S. sanctions in the 1990s made it difficult for Pakistan to maintain its operational capabilities. The Pakistan Air force has been denied state of the art aircraft acquisitions for two decades, and has been limited to refurbishing older high-performance aircraft (such as its Mirage 111 and V fighters), scrounging for spare parts for its limited F-16 inventory (still a first rate airplane, but 1970s technology).[43] Pakistan is in urgent need of modernized aircraft to maintain control over its own air space, in the event of major Indian conventional campaign against Pakistan, in which India’s air force doctrine calls for suppression of Pakistani air defenses and airfields. In addition to aircraft, Pakistan requires laser-guided bombing technology.[44]

The Indian Navy remains the most powerful in the Central and South Asian region. Indian Naval Doctrine 2000 stressed the need to have a fleet capable of operating in both the Eastern and Western Indian Ocean by having two operational aircraft carriers and highly capable submarines.[45] This ambitious Indian Naval buildup plan undermines Pakistan’s maritime security.[46] Pakistan’s vulnerability to India’s much larger naval force was demonstrated when the latter threatened to blockade commerce and the refined oil supply through Pakistan’s only international class shipping port at Karachi during the Kargil conflict of 1999, and in April-May 2002.[47] The majority of analysts believes that for the credibility of its sea denial strategy, Pakistan must start strengthening its Navy. Otherwise, it is likely to face block obsolescence in times to come. But staggering costs have prevented rapid progress for Pakistan Navy. Therefore, the ratio of Indian to Pakistani blue water vessels went from 2.4: 1 in 1980 up to 3.72: 1 in 2004.[48]

Though Pakistan became a coalition partner in 2004, its Navy has not been receiving state of the art weaponry from the United States. The Pakistan Navy’s request for ships to purchase or lease did not receive an affirmative response from the Americans. There is a need for the United States to assist Pakistan in improving its maritime capabilities. Notably, air force and naval equipment are very costly. Pakistan couldn’t bear the entire cost of these weapons. Therefore, the United States could assist Pakistan by decreasing the cost of weapons and increasing the military grants in the naval and air force sectors.

Military Technology: Cooperative Research and Development

The military technology areas of greatest concern to Pakistan with regard to military and nuclear stability on the subcontinent, besides nuclear and delivery systems, are space surveillance, submarine, and missile defense technologies. India, with the assistance of the United States, Israel and the Russian Federation, has been developing missile defense systems; added a modern submarine fleet in its Navy; advanced its capabilities qualitatively and quantitatively in the fields of airborne and space-based military reconnaissance and surveillance. It would be in the interest of both Pakistan's security and South Asian nuclear stability for the U.S. administration to encourage joint cooperative research and development projects between the U.S. Department of Defense and the Pakistani Ministry of Defense in defense technologies. Moreover, Islamabad aims to persuade Washington to include Pakistan in the Defense Trade Security Initiative (DTSI) process. This would facilitate Pakistan in purchasing U.S .munitions items without undue delay.

Dual-Use Components

Importantly, some years ago the United States relaxed regulations for the transfer of technology, components, and systems for the fabrication and launch of communication satellites. This is currently restricted to NATO and Major Non-NATO Allies.[49] Since 2004, Pakistan has been a non-NATO Allay, therefore, it is covered by U.S. communication satellites. Though space is not weaponized, it has already been militarized. Pakistan requires its own infrastructure of communication satellites and other surveillance equipment that can be used for both civilian and military purposes. Washington, therefore, should encourage American companies to transfer technology and invest in Pakistan’s communication satellite sector.

Another important area is microwave technology for indigenous advanced radars manufacturing. At the moment, there is no institution or component in Pakistan that could on its own pursue a venture in microwave technology. The United States could assist Pakistan in the research and development of sensors. The United States does adopt a flexible approach in the realm of hardware and software for the future improvement of systems. Joint-ventures could decrease the labor cost because in Pakistan, inexpensive labor is widely available. Secondly, it would increase interdependence in the sector of defense cooperation.

Military-to-Military Relations

Military training and education programs were expanded after 9/11. Washington should not limit these programs to military subjects, but expand them to include fellowships for Pakistani officers to join American universities and research centers as was done during President Zia’s years. This expansion would deepen existing bilateral cooperation, and provide new opportunities to gain greater interoperability.

Securing Nuclear Assets

Though U.S.–Pakistani cooperation in the nuclear field was a legally complicated area, but after the Indo–U.S. nuclear deal the situation is has changed. The United States has to break the mold by finding a nuclear modus vivendi with Pakistan. The United States should see the pragmatic virtue in Pakistan’s emphasis on nuclear safety and compliance with important NPT safeguard clauses. Washington is in a position to assist Islamabad in improving its capabilities in the sphere of nuclear risk reduction. It could provide technical know-how, which would allow Pakistan to develop its own national technical means, which become crucial for nuclear risk reduction.

Visit of Congress Members

The U.S. Congress has a significant role in evaluating and finalizing U.S. economic and military assistance packages. Hence, the approval of Congress is essential for defense cooperation between the United States and Pakistan. The preceding discussion suggests that many Congress members have misplaced apprehensions about Pakistan. Therefore, it is imperative to rectify these misperceptions adequately. For this reason, members of Congress, especially the members of defense and foreign relations committees, should visit or be invited to Pakistan to elucidate the real situation. Regular visits by members of Congress would be a constructive arrangement for the enhancement of defense cooperation between the United States and Pakistan.

Conclusion

The current defense cooperation between the United States and Pakistan is an interesting case in the sense that both the sole superpower and a medium power have entered into cooperation to serve their own respective objectives at the global and local levels simultaneously, and as a consequence, the emergence of a conflict of perspectives would seem inevitable. Secondly, in this defense cooperation the United States is a supplier and Pakistan is a recipient in the realm of arms collaboration. Though this interaction pattern often benefits the strategic and political interests of the former, the latter remains engaged in the process to maximize its autonomy in its own geo-strategic environment through sophisticated arms transfers. In an ideal bilateral defense cooperation, conflicts of interest between the actors on a specific area or policy realm are resolved by mutual consensus. In the context of U.S.–Pakistan defense cooperation, the real progress depends on whether or not conflicts of interest on a specific issue or policy realm are resolved in harmony with the preferences of the former without jeopardizing the strategic interests of the latter; which unfortunately has been partially ignored, if not completely neglected.

 About the Author

Mr. Zafar Jaspal is an Assistant Professor in the department of International Relations at Quaid-e-Azam University in Islamabad, Pakistan. He has a been a researcher in various Islamabad think-tanks and is widely recognized for his contributions and publications on strategic affairs and defense policies.

 References

1. Pervaiz Iqbal Cheema, Pakistan Defense Policy: 1947-58 (London: Macmillan, 1990), 145-61. See T. V. Paul, “Influence Through Arms Transfer: Lessons from the U.S.–Pakistani Relationship,” Asian Survey 32, no. 12 (December 1992), 1078-92.

2. President Pervez Musharraf’s vision of Pakistan—one which rests on modern liberal values; what he calls “enlightened moderation”—is compatible with the U.S. objectives. Also see Christopher Layne, “The Unipolar Illusion Revisited,” International Security 31, no. 2 (Fall 2006), 10-6.

3. India offered logistical support to the United States for air operations against Afghanistan. But aircraft launched against Afghanistan from Indian bases would still have to overfly Pakistan. Pakistan placed a small airport in Sindh and two small airports in Balochistan at the disposal of the United States for logistical and communication support to their counterterrorism operations in Afghanistan. The airbase near Jacobabad has been vital to U.S. Operation Enduring Freedom, and the airport of Dalbandin, near the Afghan border, is a key forward operational base.

4. Abdul Sattar, Pakistan’s Foreign Policy 1947-2005: A Concise History (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2007), 244-5.

5. Iftikhar H. Malik, “Pakistan in 2001: The Afghanistan Crisis and the Rediscovery of the Frontline State,” Asian Survey 42, no. 1, January-February, 2002, 204.

6. K. Alan Kronstadt, “Pakistan–U.S. Anti-Terrorism Cooperation,” Report for Congress, Order Code RL 31624 (March 28, 2003), 2.

7. In April 2004, well after the Composite Dialogue started, the Indian limited war discourse was revived and expanded in expert and media discussions of so-called ‘Cold Start’ military operations. This Cold Start idea was that well-coordinated Indian conventional military units—air, armored, infantry and special forces—could mount high speed assaults on predetermined military targets inside Pakistan, going over and around rather than engaging the main, blocking ground forces and defensive fortification, and then bargain, or retire back to base without triggering a nuclear reprisal. Rodney W. Jones, Conventional Military Imbalance and Strategic Stability in South Asia, Research Report 1, South Asia Strategic Stability Unit, March 2005, 6.

8. The overt nuclearization of India and Pakistan has not, so far, deterred either side from risk-taking with sub-conventional war, threats of conventional war, and military brinkmanship.

9. In forging its international coalition against terrorism, the United States has modified its military assistance program in three significant ways. First it has changed its legal regime to facilitate arms transfers to foreign nations. Second it has granted military assistance to several states directly involved in the war in Afghanistan. Finally it has increased and expedited counterterrorism assistance and general military aid to other countries around the world. Whether these developments represent a long-term policy shift or a response to a specific crisis remains to be seen.

10. “Rumsfeld and Musharraf Brief Reporters,” CNN.com, February 13, 2002.

11. The 9/11 Commission Report, July 22, 2004, 369.

12. Abdul Sattar, Ibid., 352-3.

13. President George W. Bush paid a visit to Pakistan on March 3-4, 2006. In the Joint Statement issued on March 4, the two Presidents affirmed the Pakistan–U.S. Strategic Partnership. Riaz Ahmed Syed, ed., Foreign Office Year Book 2005-2006, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Government of Pakistan, 78-9. See also “Foreign Minister's Remarks at the Joint Press Stake-out with Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, 27 June 2006, Islamabad, ”P.R. No.227/2006," Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Pakistan, 27 June 2006.

14. President Pervez Musharraf visited the United States from June 21-29, 2003. On June 24, 2003 President Bush at Camp David received President Musharraf. Pakistan Foreign Relations 2003-04, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Government of Pakistan, 62. More importantly, the United States is Pakistan’s largest foreign investor. The U.S. share in the total FDI in Pakistan between 1990-2004 is 37.8% and amounts to $2.94 billion.

15. Abdul Sattar, Ibid., 251.

16. “Joint Statement: Pakistan–U.S. Defense Consultative Group,” Rawalpindi, Pakistan, September 25-27, 2002.

17. “Joint Statement: Pakistan–U.S. Defense Consultative Group,” May 1-5, 2006.

18. “U.S. To Enhance Pakistan's Conventional Weapon Capabilities: DCG Meeting,” PakistanDefense.com, May 2006.

19. Enacted in 1985, the Pressler Amendment stipulated that most military and economic assistance to Pakistan could only be authorized after an annual certification by the U.S. President that Pakistan did not possess a nuclear device. Certification was not offered in 1990. The Glenn Amendment to the Arms Export Control Act of 1994 requires the U.S. President to terminate sales of any military items and terminate other military assistance to Pakistan. It also revoked licenses for commercial sale of any item on the U.S. munitions list. Daniel Morrow and Michael Carriere, “The Economic Impacts of the 1998 Sanctions on India and Pakistan,” The Nonproliferation Review (Fall 1999): 3-4.

20. “Pakistan to Get 44 F-16s: PAF Changes The Number Of F-16s Wanted,” PakistanDefense.com, May 2006. In December 2005 two used F-16 aircraft were provided to Pakistan under the Excess Defense Articles in view of its status as Major Non-NATO Ally. The Bush Administration formally notified the Congress about the F-16 sale to Pakistan in June 2006. The new F-16s would be configured with high-tech Avionics especially the airborne intercept radar (AI) and beyond visual range (BVR) air-to-air missiles would also be incorporated. All the 44 planes will be delivered to Pakistan within 30 months. Riaz Ahmed Syed, ed., Foreign Office Year Book 2005-2006, 80. See also “Pakistan Details F-16 “Shopping List,” Military Technology (August 2006): 79-80.

21. K. Alan Kronstadt, “Pakistan–U.S. Anti-Terrorism Cooperation,” 15. See also Abdul Sattar, Foreign Office Year Book 2005-2006, 247.

22. It is L-band, solid state, and pencil beam, phased array tactical radar. It provides continuous, high quality, 3-D, excellent detection on fighter size aircraft up to 260 NM with an altitude of 1,000,000 feet.

23. They are divided into two categories: 500 advanced medium-range air-to-air missiles (AAMRAAM); and 200 short-range AIM-9M Sidewinder missiles. “Pakistan buys 700 air-to-air missiles from U.S. company,” The News International, January 17, 2007.

24. The 300 million dollars was proposed for 2006. Which was added in the total amount given above. See K. Allan Kronstadt, “Pakistan–U.S. Relations,” Issue Brief for the Congress, no. IB94041, Congress Research Service, Washington, March 2005.

25. “Pakistan–U.S. joint military exercise begins,” Asia Political News, 21 October 2002. Shakil Shaikh, “Afghan unit to take part in Pak–U.S. war game,” The News International, April 20, 2006. “Afghanistan invited for military exercises,” The Nation, April 20, 2006.

26. Robert G. Wirsing and James M. Roherty, “The United States and Pakistan,” International Affairs 58, no. 4 (Autumn 1982): 390.

27. Touqir Hussain, U.S.–Pakistan Engagement: The War on Terrorism and Beyond, Special Report 145 (Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace, August 2005) 5-6. Donald A. Camp, Department of State Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary for Asian Affairs, The statement presented to the U.S. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, March 2, 2005, in The DISAM Journal (Spring 2005): 55.

28. These SROs enabled State Bank of Pakistan and other concerned Departments/Ministries to take further action against entities included in the Consolidated List of 1267 Committee. Riaz Ahmed Syed, ed., Foreign Office Year Book 2005-2006, 117.

29. Rodney W. Jones, “U.S. Core Interests & Policies and Their Impact on the Security and Economic Development of the Regional Countries,” in Major Powers and South Asia (Islamabad: Institute of Regional Studies, 2004), 13.

30. Shaukat Aziz, Prime Minister of Pakistan, “Pakistan–U.S. Relations: Building a Strategic Partnership in the 21st Century,” Council on Foreign Relations, New York, January 18, 2006.

31. President Bush strongly supported the UNSCR 1540 in 2004. In his speech to the UN on September 23, 2004, President Bush called for a Security Council resolution requiring member states to take all necessary steps to deny terrorists groups and other non-state actors from acquiring weapons of mass destruction and related components. Jofi Joseph, “The Exercise of National Sovereignty: The Bush Administration’s Approach to Combating Weapons of Mass Destruction Proliferation,” Nonproliferation Review 12, no. 2 (July 2005): 381-2. Christina Rocca, Department of State Assistant Secretary for South Asia, “United States Policy Toward South Asia,” The Statement before the House International Relations Subcommittee for Asia and the Pacific, on June 14, 2005, in The DISAM Journal, (Summer 2005): 77.

32. The Control Lists encompass the lists and scope of export controls maintained by the Nuclear Suppliers Group, the Austrailian Group which relates to biological agents and toxins, and the Missile Technology Control Regime. The classification system is based on the European Unions’s integrated list which constitutes the lates international standars in this regard. Riaz Ahmed Syed, ed., Foreign Office Year Book 2005-2006, 111-2

33. The events, which generates misperceptions are Baluchistan crisis, issue of cross-border terrorism, serial blasts in Delhi in October, 2005 and terrorist attack on scientists in Bangalore in December, 2005, the deadly bombing in Mumbai on July 11, 2006.

34. Mariana Baabar, “Pakistan, India take peace to new level,” The News International, Islamabad/Rawalpindi Edition, January 14, 2006.

35. There are number of studies which deals with the emergence of Taliban syndrome and the contribution of the United States and Pakistan in nurturing this phenomenon during the Soviet-Afghan war. For understanding the Taliban syndrome see M. Ehsan Ahrari, “China, Pakistan, and the Taliban Syndrome,” Asian Survey 40, no. 4 (July-August 2000): 658-71.

36. “Top Afghan insurgent operating from Pakistan, says U.S general,” The News International, Islamabad/ Rawalpindi Edition, 14 January 2006. On November 23, 2006 the Canadian Foreign Affairs Minister Peter MacKay told the Canadian parliament’s defense committee that Pakistan was not doing enough to fight terrorism. He demanded, that Pakistan must seek out and arrest senior Taliban officials, improve border security, sign and ratify United Nations conventions on terrorism, bring in stronger money-laundering laws and prevent the exploitation by insurgents of refugee camps in Afghanistan.

37. The bill (H.R.-1) was passed by the House of Representative. Anwar Iqbal, “New U.S. legislation may review nuclear proliferation row,” Dawn, January 26, 2007. “The root cause of terrorism,” The News International, January 27, 2007.

38. T.V. Paul, "Influence through arms transfers: lessons from the US–Pakistani relationship," Asian Survey XXXII, no. 12 (1992): 1080.

39. Ibid., 1088. President Zia termed the U.S. decision to cut off aid as a “blessing in disguise”—that is, a means to achieve greater self-sufficiency.

40. Pakistan developed its nuclear weapons despite the U.S. punitive sanctions.

41. Indo–U.S. Strategic Partnership’s repercussions for Pakistan see Dr. Zafar Iqbal Cheema, “Progression of India–U.S. Relationship and its Implications for Pakistan,” National Development and Security XIV, no. 1 (Autumn 2005): 30-50.

42. The South Asian region is dominated by India in territorial, military, economic, and numerous other ways. The very size and resourcefulness of India compared to its six neighbors have been intimidating, giving it a potential geopolitical leverage. See Iftikhar H. Malik, “The Pakistan–U.S. Security Relationship: Testing Bilateralism,” Asian Survey 30, no. 3 (March 1990): 287.

43. Rodney W. Jones, Conventional Military Imbalances and Strategic Stability in South Asia, 29.

44. India has a Western-origin, laser-guided bombing technology for over a decade.

45. The Military Balance 2002-2003, International Institute of Strategic Studies (London: Oxford University Press, October 2002), 125.

46. For imbalance between India and Pakistan Navies see “South Asia’s nuclear navies: Sea-based contention,” IISS Strategic Comments 9, no. 9 (November 2003).

47. In 2000, Pakistan completed construction of the first phase of an alternate naval base (Jinnah Naval Base) at Ormara, 240 kilometers northwest of Karachi. It was reported that it is capable of berthing 8 ships and 4 submarines. Pakistan is also building deep-water port at Gwader—to be capable of handling cargo ships up to 100,000 tonnage and oil tankers up to 200,000-tonnage capacity—with the assistance of China on the Makran coast close to the border with Iran. In fact, during April-May 2002, the Indian Navy was reportedly ready to impose a naval blockade against Karachi, having transferred five principal surface combatants from the Eastern to the Western Indian Ocean for this purpose. The Military Balance 2002-2003, 126.

48. Rodney W. Jones, Conventional Military Imbalances and Strategic Stability in South Asia, 40.

49. G Balachandran, “Indo–U.S. Relations and Reality,” Strategic Analysis 29, no. 2: (April-June 2005): 214.