Terrorism and U.S. Counter-Terrorism Programs in Africa: An Overview

Strategic Insights, Volume VI, Issue 1 (January 2007)

by Jessica R. Piombo

Terrorism in Africa: The Nature of the Threat

A casual reading of major newspapers would leave one with the impression that terrorists are running rampant across Africa. Terrorists are said to hide out in the multiple lawless and stateless areas that litter the continent; they supposedly gain recruits from among the starving and displaced masses who have been victimized by powerful warlords and governments that are fighting over the continent’s spoils. Militant Islamic recruiters are thought to prey on vulnerable communities, building militant organizations and recruiting the next generation of suicide bombers from the ranks of the poor Africans.

This is, to state it mildly, a vast oversimplification of both the nature of terrorist recruitment and the terrorist threat in Africa. First of all, organized terrorist groups no not rampantly proliferate across the continent. Prior to 2001, there were no designated “foreign terrorist organizations” in Sub-Saharan Africa. There have been a number of organizations that area governments label as “terrorists,” yet the United States has been hesitant to recognize the groups as such, for the understandable reason that in many cases, area governments are labeling opposition groups terrorists in order to gain support to combat their opponents.

Second, these sentiments are an overstatement of the influence of militant Islam across the continent, and a misunderstanding of the nature of “terrorism.” Terrorism in Africa is not confined to the realm of the radical Islamists, though those are the groups that receive the most attention. Of the three Sub-Saharan groups that have found their way onto the “other designated organizations” lists maintained by the State Department, only one (Al Ittihad Al Islamiyya, AIAI, of Somalia), was Islamist.[1] The other two included the former military of Rwanda (the ex-FAR) and a Christian terrorist group in Uganda, the Lords Resistance Army (LRA). al-Qaeda, obviously on the list of designated FTOs, operates in Africa, but is not from Africa.

Third, the common mantra that “failed states lead to terrorism” is, in fact, belied by geography: the designated terrorist organization that do exist and which have attacked Western targets tend to organize and operate in the countries with a modicum of law and order, such as South Africa and Kenya. Indigenous terrorist organizations (not designated by the United States) have originated and continue to operate in both unstable countries such as Somalia and Liberia, but the group are more prolific in states that have more advanced infrastructures, such as South Africa, Nigeria and Kenya. Without a reliable and secure commercial infrastructure, it becomes difficult to move commodities and illicit goods to fund terrorist activities. The largest al-Qaeda network in East Africa was uncovered in Kenya, one of the most politically stable countries in the region. In fact, to date this cell has been the only direct al-Qaeda group that has been turned up since the GWOT began in 2001. Terrorist groups tend to use the “failed” states like Somalia more as staging grounds and transit points, rather than places where the groups build long-term organizational and financial networks. Even in West Africa, while Hezbollah obtains diamonds from conflict zones and stateless areas, terrorists find it necessary to transport them via the Lebanese diaspora community that lives in the more politically stable countries.

Finally, when understanding the nature of the terrorist threat in Africa, it is important to note that there are distinct regional variations to the presence and extent of Islamist terrorist networks across Africa. The threat in Southern and Central Africa is almost non-existent, and for a clear reason: there are relatively few Muslims in Central and Southern Africa (see figure one). In these areas, Islamists are attempting to convert Christians to Islam, rather than proliferating radical Islamist networks.[2] Islam is much more prevalent in Northern, Eastern and Western Africa, and accordingly there are more Islamist groups, both radical and non-radical, in these areas than farther south. Therefore, when discussing the terrorist threat and U.S. counterterrorism programs in Africa, regional variations in the number of groups, intensity of their activities and the nature of the Islamist terrorist threat, are important.

Figure One: Islam in Africa

Source: United States Institute of Peace.

In East and West Africa, Islam as a political ideology has capitalized on ethno-national struggles to create a potent force. Focusing on West Africa, the U.S. government is concerned with the activities of al-Qaeda, Hezbollah and a host of localized organizations, most notably the Salafist Group for Prayer and Combat (GSPC).[3] Tabliqhi Islamic sects, which themselves are nonviolent, recruit individuals in a missionary style that focuses on socially isolated young men. From these individuals, radical groups then recruit terrorists. For example, John Walker Lindh, the “American Taliban” arrested in 2001, had been a member of a Tabliqhi sect before becoming radicalized.

Radical groups have also been able to capitalize on local struggles for power and influence, as with the recruitment of militants from the Tuareg group in Mauritania and Mali. Nigeria has seen major increases in sectarian strife and militarized Islam in recent years, further contributing to rising concern in the Western and Sahelian regions.[4] Attacks against Western oil companies in the Niger Delta, however, come not from Islamist organizations, but from ethnic-nationalist movements seeking a more equitable share of oil revenues, to compensate for the environmental degradation wreaked by oil exploitation.

East Africa has attracted special interest from the United States and international community because of its early links to transnational Islamic terrorism. In 1998, United States Embassies in Dar es Salaam (Tanzania) and Nairobi (Kenya) were bombed, killing a handful of U.S. citizens and hundreds of Kenyans and Tanzanians. Sudan and Somalia have both served as training grounds and transit routes for al-Qaeda, and the agents who attacked the embassies in Kenya and Tanzania were closely linked to cells in Sudan and Somalia. As recent events in Somalia reveal, it is thought that at least two of these individuals are still hiding out in Somalia. In the wake of the embassy bombings, an organized al-Qaeda cell was uncovered in Nairobi, Kenya. In 2002, one of Kenya’s most popular tourist destinations, Mombasa, experienced two further terrorist strikes, this time in the form of coordinated and simultaneous attacks on an Israeli-owned hotel popular with Western tourists and an Israeli-chartered aircraft departing from the Mombasa airport.

Most importantly, East Africa has also been home to both al-Qaeda and Osama Bin Laden. al-Qaeda’s presence in the eastern region is both direct, with agents operating in several countries, as well as indirect, through the creation of satellite organizations and the recruitment of existing organizations to al-Qaeda’s cause. Sudan provided both training camps and a source of financial support for his organization during the early 1990s. In 1991 the leader of Sudan’s National Islamic Front (NIF) government, Hassan al Turabi, invited Osama bin Laden to live in Sudan. During this time, bin Laden established multiple businesses in Sudan, many of which he retains, and established al-Qaeda training camps in the more remote areas.[5] With the support of the NIF, bin Laden created the “Islamic Army Shura,” which he intended to function as a coordinating body for a consortium of terrorist groups allied to bin Laden.[6] Groups from Somalia and Eritrea were formally associated with Islamic Army Shura, and informal ties were established with groups in Uganda and several West African states. al-Qaeda has increased its direct presence in much of East Africa during recent years, extending from Sudan in the north to Tanzania, and perhaps even into Malawi in the south, which is why the region increasingly figures in U.S. counterterrorism efforts.[7]

Despite this permissive environment, the indigenous terrorist threat in much of Africa has not been considered a major threat in by the U.S. government, which focuses almost exclusively on the threat posed by transnational jihadi organizations originating outside Africa. Yet groups like al-Qaeda and Hezbollah operate alongside a pervasive network of local groups, some of which are affiliated with the transnational organizations, and many of which are not. In fact, the bulk of Islamist “terrorist” organizations in East Africa are those that originated in the area and operate with a regional agenda. Many of these groups existed before al-Qaeda attempted to organize them into a loose hierarchy, and so far these local groups have not become deeply entrenched in the al-Qaeda network. The most important obstacle to a closer alliance has been that local Islamist groups have a primary loyalty to their clans and ethnic tribes that has not always been compatible with al-Qaeda’s transnational agenda.[8] Transnational terrorist organizations like al-Qaeda and Hezbollah find it difficult to coordinate activities with local groups and have mostly given up attempting to organize them into larger associations and networks.[9] The transnational groups find the clan-based warfare and seeming anarchy of acephalous societies like Somalia difficult terrain in which to recruit and prosper.[10]

U.S. Counter-Terrorism Initiatives

While the terrorist threat may not be as extensive as the U.S. government and popular pundits claim, it is undeniable that there has been an increase in militant Islamism across the continent in recent years. Conflicts in Nigeria, the recent rise of the Islamic Courts Union (also known as the Council of Islamic Courts) in Somalia, and the vulnerabilities to recruitment created by pervasive conflict zones, attest to the increasing influence that Islamists have on the continent. The U.S. has made countering these networks one cornerstones of its foreign policy in Africa, as Letitia Lawson described in her contribution to this issue.

Counter-terrorism programs are complicated by historical and local conditions. Colonially-bestowed, artificial state borders divide ethnic groups, so that the people on either side of a border are often more loyal to their extended family networks than to their central governments. Trading and smuggling routes are centuries old, whether they involved the khat (qhat) trade in northern Sudan and Somalia or the spice trade along the coast from Zanzibar to Yemen. Porous borders and migrant groups make it extremely difficult to keep track of people and the flows of people and goods across borders, which can facilitate the transport of goods and commodities such as weapons and people (i.e., slaves) that can be traded for revenue. Along the coast of the Horn and down into east and central Africa, small trading boat (dhouw) traffic is virtually impossible to monitor, adding a maritime dimension to the difficulties in tracking terrorist activities and financial patterns. Conditions of poverty and scarcity make individuals vulnerable, and they will turn to any source of support, which provides opportunities for militant operatives to infiltrate charitable organizations and manipulate their programs. Finally, corrupt governments often survive through the same tactics and vulnerabilities that terrorist organizations manipulate, complicating U.S. efforts to “clean up” policing, enforce border security, and monitor financial transactions.

Accordingly, counterterrorism efforts operate at several levels: militarily, governmental, and societal. Programs take the form of direct security sector assistance, capacity building programs and economic assistance, and are overseen by the Department of Defense (DoD), Department of State (DoS, or State), Department of Treasury (Treasury) and the United States Agency for International Development (USAID). In this article, security sector assistance primarily refers to combined exercises and programs that train foreign militaries and security forces to operate more efficiently and professionally, though the Department of Defense also considers humanitarian and preventative measures as part of the war on terror.[11] Governance and capacity programs include both traditional democratization efforts, which help to inculcate norms of inclusion and participation, and governance assistance, which are programs that attempt to train governments, both national and local, in how to carry out their activities. State and USAID tend to oversee most of these efforts, either directly or through a range of subcontractors. Economic programs include traditional development assistance and the more recent wave of “post-conflict reconstruction and stabilization” programs that have become popular with the U.S. government, undertaken primarily by USAID. Because conditions of poverty make people vulnerable to recruitment, in a very broad sense, developmental programs also serve counterterrorism goals. Treasury’s activities focus mainly on countering terrorist finance, and are the most narrow of the programs.

Each of these initiatives targets a different aspect of the four “D’s” of fighting terrorism: defeat terrorists and their organizations; deny sponsorship, support and sanctuary to terrorists; diminish the underlying conditions that terrorist seek to exploit, and defend U.S. citizens and interests at home and abroad.[12] Another way to consider these programs is that they attempt to fight the supply of terrorists, the demand for terrorist networks, and the ability of terrorist to operate and maneuver. In the Department of Defense (DoD), these all a set of programs that are designed to combat the problem of “ungoverned spaces,” where “spaces” is not just a geographical expression, but also one of authority. An ungoverned space is a “physical or non-physical area where there is an absence of state capacity or political will to exercise control.”[13] Basically, the concept refers to areas where territories are physically uncontrolled or functional policy areas in which governments have ceded control, often allowing other organizations to take over the provision of services and functions that the government, in traditional terms, should be providing.

The issue of ungoverned spaces, poor governance capacity, authoritarian regimes and an inability to control territories beyond those in the capital cities is not new in Africa. The novel element is that it is the Department of Defense that is now taking up these issues, rather than them being relegated to issues of than issues of humanitarian assistance and under-funded programs farmed out by USAID. According to Deputy Assistant Secretary for Defense (DASD) for Africa Theresa Whelan, there has been a paradigm shift in how the DoD views threats and strategic interests. Emerging threats, issues of poor human security and poverty and the inability of most governments to control their territories (physically as well as in terms of governance) all contribute to an environment that is conducive to creating terrorist safe havens and recruiting bases. Therefore, the DoD has come to realize that it must take a more proactive approach, rather than just reacting to situations that have degenerated to near anarchy.[14]

The DoD has adopted the perspective, Whelan argues, that countering terrorism will never succeed unless it is part of a broader approach that focuses on the fundamental problems that prevent African governments from effectively controlling their territories, ruling capably and accountably, and in conditions of dire poverty. This paradigm shift also comes with the realization that the DoD is only one small part of a larger set of agencies that are necessary to conduct programs that will address these concerns, and that a multi-agency approach with cooperation between various U.S. and international agencies is the only way to address the issues.[15]

The following discussion focuses on U.S. foreign policy objectives in two of the fronts in the effort to counterterrorism: security assistance and capacity building, and counter-terrorist finance measures. Broadly construed, programs to promote economic development and governance assistance could also be considered counterterrorism measures to the extent that they alleviate conditions that lead people vulnerable to recruitment. Because the counterterrorism is not their primary focus, however, and because these types of programs are not explicitly security-focused, I am not including them in the article.

Security Sector Assistance Programs

Many of the United States' counterterrorism (CT) efforts are oriented towards military assistance and surveillance, and security building. On a continental scale, the main program is the Global Peace Operations Initiative (GPOI), whose African face is the African Contingency Operations Training and Assistance Program (ACOTA). GPOI aims to train 75,000 peacekeepers by 2010, a “majority” of whom are meant to be African.[16] In 2005, GPOI spent $35.6 million directly on Africa training and support to its Africa headquarters, out of a total budget of $96.7 million. Another $26 million went towards equipment, much of which found its way to Africa.

Table 1: GPOI FY2005 Spending as of August 2005.

Source: Serafino, 8.

ACOTA is run by the State Department, which in turn employs contractors to conduct the actual training. U.S. Military participation is in a supportive, rather than central role in ACOTA programs.[17] GPOI and ACOTA focus on creating regional peacekeeping forces, training battalions and companies from approximately thirteen African countries. While not strictly focused on combating terrorism, ACOTA warrants mention in this article because one of the main components in U.S. strategy is to lesson ungoverned spaces and reduce support for terrorist organizations in the first place. A lack of human security and conditions of poverty, both of which are caused by civil wars and insurgencies, are considered some of the primary reasons that people may turn towards radical organizations, and the lack of government control in these areas perpetuates the problem of vast ungoverned spaces. Therefore, the Department of Defense considers the ACOTA as a supportive program in the war on terror, even if it is not explicitly countering terrorism.

Turning to the explicit counterterrorism programs that focus on military assistance, there are the Trans-Sahara Counter-Terrorism Initiative (TSCTI), Joint Task force AZTEK SILENCE, and the East African Counter-Terrorism Initiative (EACTI). The Combined Joint Task Force, Horn of Africa (CJTF-HOA) falls within this category, though technically it combines security assistance with humanitarian programs that aimed to combat terrorism, reduce the conditions that lead to terrorism, and win hearts and minds in support of the War on Terror.

In East Africa, the EACTI and CJTF-HOA provide the base for U.S. counterterrorism programs. The key goals of U.S. CT policy in East Africa are containment in Somalia; counterterrorism and the promotion of peace and stability in Sudan, and security partnerships with Kenya and Ethiopia.[18] Increasing border security, better surveillance of coastal traffic, increased customs efficiency and seaport security could all work to reduce the ability of terrorist organizations to operate and move about the region, particularly in Sudan and Somalia. Established in June 2003 as a program of the Department of State, the $100 million East Africa Counterterrorism Initiative (EACTI) provides key states in the Horn of Africa with military training to strengthen coastal, border, customs, airport, and seaport security. In addition, the Initiative plans to train law enforcement officials in East Africa.”[19] Finally, the program includes assistance for regional efforts against terrorist financing and police training, as well as an education program to counter extremist influence.[20]

The Combined Joint Task Force – Horn of Africa (CJTF-HOA) that has been established in Camp Lemonier (formerly the headquarters of the French Foreign Legion) in Djibouti serves as the focal point for DoD efforts in the region. CJTF falls under the jurisdiction of the United States Central Command (USCENTCOM). On average, the staff of the CJTF numbers around 250, and the assigned troops between 1,200-1,800,[21] and the navy often conducts surveillance missions in the Red Sea.[22] The “combined” aspect of the CJTF is at the staff level only; there are no non-US troops assigned to the U.S. command. The CJTF-HOA’s publicly-stated mission to engage in “joint and combined training and operations in the CJOA-HOA and AOI to enable Regional Nations to defeat Al-Qaida and Associated Movements (AQAM) and to obtain coalition support in order to diminish underlying conditions that terrorists seek to exploit and to prevent the re-emergence of AQAM.”[23]

To effect this mission, the CJTF-HOA efforts conduct a series of short-term operations that are designed facilitate information operations, increase border security, provide counterterrorism training, increase coastal security, and foster intelligence sharing. In addition, the CJTF-HOA engages in civil-military operations and civil-affairs operations to support the primary activities. In these latter activities, the CJTF-HOA conducts goodwill exercises that include bringing U.S. military medical and veterinary professionals to various locations in the region to help local communities, and using the engineering capabilities of the Army engineers and Navy Seabees to dig wells and provide infrastructure to communities. Officially, the CJTF-HOA is not a direct action force and does not directly engage terrorists.

In West Africa, the main programs are the Pan-Sahel Initiative (PSI) and its successor, the Trans-Sahel Counter-Terrorism Initiative (TSCTI). The PSI operated between November 2002 and March 2004 with a budget of $7.75 million. It provided Chad, Niger, Mali, and Mauritania with assistance to training and equipment to improve their border security and deny the use of their sovereign territory to terrorists and criminals. PSI was primarily a military initiative run by European Command (EUCOM), and focused on capacity building in the security forces: increasing border control capabilities and in each country creating a rapid reaction force to pursue terrorists.

In 2004-2005, the PSI transitioned into the TSCTI, not only increasing funding and the scope of activities, but also making it an inter-agency endeavor. TSCTI, officially led by the State Department, incorporates the Departments of State, Treasury, Defense and USAID. DoD performs the security assistance functions through EUCOM, and the military portion of TSCTI is called Operation Enduring Freedom, Trans Sahara (OEF-TS). Funding for TSCTI was $16 million for 2005, with plans for $30 million in 2006, and $100 million a year for the remaining five years until 2011.[24] OEF-TS provides basic training to a rapid reaction company in each country, focusing on marksmanship, operational planning, communications, first aid, land navigation, communications, and patrolling. In contrast to ACOTA, which focuses on peacekeeping skills and non-lethal weapons training, TSCTI focuses on hunting down, capturing or otherwise eliminating terrorist groups. U.S. trainers have included both Special Forces and Marine Corps units.[25]

JTF Aztec Silence was established in December 2003, under the command of U.S. Sixth Fleet and operating in Northern Africa. Like the other programs in Africa, the focus is to fight transnational terrorism in ungoverned spaces and to build closer alliances between the United States and area governments. Aztec Silence focuses on information, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR), and uses Navy intelligence assets to provide collect and share information with partner countries and their militaries.[26]

In Southern and Central Africa, which rank lowest on the terrorism priorities to the U.S. government, the main program is the International Law Enforcement Agency (ILEA) located in Gaborone, Botswana, run by the Federal Bureau of Investigations (FBI). The ILEA trains local law enforcement officials in a variety of areas, among them intelligence and operation to track and apprehend terrorist groups and illicit activities. The focus of the ILEA is not explicitly counterterrorism, but general law enforcement capacity building. Again, as with the ACOTA program, to the extent that the issue of ungoverned spaces truly is a viable link to terrorist activity, the efforts of the ILEA to train area police forces and establish a more comprehensive rule of law in Africa contributes to the War on Terror. Through all of these efforts, the U.S. government aims to increase the capacity of African militaries and security forces and to support area governments, enabling them to better control their borders, conduct peace support operations and to directly track and fight terrorists both within their countries and the region.

Terrorist Finance Programs

Programs aimed directly at countering terrorist finance have almost no military components. These programs are primarily bilateral and include initiatives managed by the FBI and Treasury Department. The FBI’s Terrorist Finance Operations Section (FTOS) runs training sessions on combating terrorist finance in regions around the world, yet African participation is minimal and in 2003, Kenya was the only country to receive this training.[27] The ILEA discussed previously figures in the FBI’s arsenal to combat terrorist finance, though its full impact across Africa may be limited. Housed in Gaborone, Botswana, the African ILEA primarily serves countries in the Southern African region, which limits its impact in strengthening the capacity of East African law enforcement agencies. Kenya, Ethiopia, Djibouti and Uganda have been invited to send officials to Gaborone for training at the ILEA, and the first East Africans graduated a three-month course in June 2003.[28] This could indicate that in the future the ILEA will help to strengthen the capacity of the East African governments as well. Financial crimes are among the many courses taught at the ILEA (the others courses involve, among other subjects, counterterrorism in general, anti-corruption, border security, drug enforcement, firearms).

The Treasury Department, arguably the U.S. agency most directly applicable to the fight against terrorist financing, restricts its activities primarily to supporting and liasing with regional organizations that fight money laundering and terrorist finance. The Financial Action Task Force (FATF), a U.S. agency, helps to stand up regional bodies, called FATF-style regional bodies (FSRBs) around the world.[29] These regional organizations then attempt to influence the governments in their areas to pass and enforce legislation that strengthens the regulation of their financial sectors and criminalizes terrorist financing. The Department of Treasury’s involvement is limited to advice about creating anti-money laundering regimes, focusing on implementing a set of regulations established by the FATF that combat terrorist finance (called the FATF 40 plus the special eight recommendations). In Africa, Treasury officials work with the East and Southern African Anti-Money Laundering Group (ESAAMLG) and the Inter-Governmental Action Group Against Money Laundering (GIABA) of West Africa. These are the two FSRBs in Africa.

Many of the difficulties that African governments experience with fighting terrorism concern capacity limitations (law enforcement agencies that are weak and/or unable to actually track and obtain evidence on terrorist financiers and money launderers) and an inability (or unwillingness) to tighten security and enforce border controls. The countries that do have anti-money laundering legislation are slow to implement the regulations, however, and the entire effort against money laundering and other forms of TF involves more than just the creation of AML regimes. Enforcement is also key.

Strengthening law enforcement capacities could help area governments uncover and then successfully prosecute money-launderers and other terrorist financiers. For example, seminars organized by the Department of Justice’s Office of Overseas Prosecutorial Development Assistance and Training (OPDAT) provide training to help participating countries to develop action plans to strengthen counterterrorism efforts and draft counterterrorism legislation. Djibouti, Kenya and Tanzania have sent representatives to receive training in combating terrorist financing from OPDAT. Since capacity and enforcement abilities to combat TF in these countries is particularly low (see below), there should be indirect benefit to the efforts of these countries to combat TF.

Conclusion

Beyond explicit measures to provide assistance to Africa’s security architecture and to fight terrorist finance, there are a variety of “security cooperation” tools that in one form or another contribute to the War on Terror in Africa. These include the traditional forms of security assistance (international military education and training), humanitarian assistance, combined training and exercises (such as FLINTLOCK), direct operational activities (peacekeeping, humanitarian relief ops, counter-narcotics, etc), combined education, mil-to-mil contact, and other DoD activities such as demobilization, civil affairs and environmental security.[30] This article attempted to lay out the basic arguments for why the United States is increasingly concerned with terrorism in Africa, the true nature of the terrorist and Islamist threat, and to provide a basic outline of the major counterterrorism programs currently run by the U.S. government. A truly comprehensive approach to combating terrorism on the continent would involve a much broader range of programs, focusing on alleviating the conditions that leave Africans vulnerable to recruitment in the first place. The U.S. acknowledges this, and has stepped up its HIV/Aids programs and development assistance (through the Millennium Challenge Account). Whether or not the programs will have tangible results still remains to be seen. The interesting fact is that whatever way you cut it, the level of attention and support that African countries are receiving as a result of their role in the post 9-11 strategic environment is unprecedented in U.S. foreign policy.

The views and ideas expressed in this paper are the author’s own; they do not reflect the position or policy of the United States government. I would like to thank the Homeland Security Center at the Naval Postgraduate School for support to conduct the interviews associated with this project.

 References

1. Patterns of Global Terrorism, Department of State Publication 10535, released April 2004. Of the Department of State’s “designated foreign terrorist organizations” (FTOs), none were created in sub-Sarahan Africa, and there are only two groups: the Armed Islamic Group (GIA) and the Salafist Group for Call and Conflict (GSPC) on the designated FTO list that developed in northern Africa. Both of those are from Algeria

2. The exception to this is the organizations Qibla and PAGAD (People Against Gangsterism and Drugs), which operate in Cape Town, South Africa. Their influence is limited to small areas of South Africa where there are large pockets of Muslims, and both organizations tend to advance local agendas rather than transnational Islamist ideologies.

3. For an analysis of the GSPC, see the November 2006 issue of Strategic Insights, which focused on the Algerian group.

4. For a discussion of extremism in West Africa and the Sahel, see the excellent report by the International Crisis Group, “Islamist Terrorism in the Sahel: Fact or Fiction,” Africa Report number 92 (March 31, 2005). For a more general overview of political Islam in Africa, see David Dickson, “Political Islam in Sub-Saharan Africa: The Need for a New Research and Diplomatic Agenda,” USIP Special Report, no. 140 (May 2005).

5. For more information see Anne M. Lesch, “Osama bin Laden's 'Business' in Sudan,” Current History, 101 (2002), 203-209 and Gunaratna, Inside al-Qaeda, Op. Cit.

6. The 9/11 Commission Report, 58.

7. See, for example: E. Blanche, “Africa - Is al-Qaeda a Target in East Africa?” Jane’s Terrorism and Security Monitor, July 1, 2003.

8. International Crisis Group (ICG), “Somalia: Countering Terrorism in a Failed State,” Africa Report No 45 (Nairobi/Brussels, May 2002) and ICG, “Counter-terrorism in Somalia: Losing Hearts and Minds?” Africa Report No 95 (Nairobi/Brussels, July 2005). See also Rohan Gunaratna, Inside al-Qaeda: Global Network of Terror (New York: Berkeley Books, 2002).

9. Gunaratna, Ibid.

10. ICG, “Counter-terrorism in Somalia,” Op. Cit.

11. See, for example, 12 of the Quadrennial Defense Review Report, issued by the Secretary of Defense, February 6, 2006.

12. The “four d’s” were first outlined in the 2003 National Strategy for Combating Terrorism, and repeated in new the National Strategy updated and issued in March 2006. These form the basis of all U.S. counterterrorism activities and programs. (For more information, see the news release issued by the White House on February 14, 2003.

13. Comments of DASD for Africa Theresa Whelan had been available publicly at www.jhuapl.edu/POW/rethinking/SeminarArchive/121905_WhelanNotes.pdf but are not currently available online. The author has also twice heard Whelan discuss these issues, at the National Defense University in November 2005 and at the Marine Corps University in January 2006.

14. Ibid.

15. Ibid.

16. Nina M. Serafino, “The Global Peace Operations Initiative: Background and Issues for Congress,” CRS Report for Congress, no. RL32773, updated February 2006.

17. Richard Roan and John Sevold, West Africa Regional Manager of ACOTA and Eastern and Southern Africa Regional Manager of ACOTA (respectively), remarks delivered to the “21st Century Marines in Africa Conference: West and Central Regions,” United States Marine Corps University, Quantico, VA, January 18-19, 2006.

18. J. Stephen Morrison, “Somalia and Sudan’s Race to the Fore in Africa,” The Washington Quarterly 25, no.2 (Spring 2002), 191-205.

19. Ted Dagne, “Africa and the War on Terrorism: Update,” CRS Report for Congress, catalog no. EBTER213, September 24, 2004; William P. Pope, “Eliminating Terrorist Sanctuaries: The Role of Security Assistance,” Testimony before the House International Relations Committee, Subcommittee on International Terrorism and Nonproliferation, Washington, DC, March 10, 2005. Also author’s conversations with MGen Samuel Helland (October 2005, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA) and RADM Richard Hunt (October 2005, at the Mayport Naval Station, Mayport Florida ). RADM Hunt is the current commanding officer of the CJTF-HOA

20. Ambassador Cofer Black, Coordinator for the Office of Counter Terrorism (Department of State), “The Prevention and Combating of Terrorism in Africa,” remarks at the Second Intergovernmental High-Level Meeting on the Prevention and Combating of Terrorism In Africa Algiers, Algeria, 20 October 2004.

21. Dagne, Op. Cit.; CJTF-HOA falls under CENTCOM’s jurisdiction.

22. See Al J. Venter, “Red Sea Anti-Terror Force,” Jane’s Terrorism and Security Monitor, March 1, 2003.

23. Author’s discussion with RADM Hunt; presentation at the Naval Postgraduate School by former CJTF Commander Major General Samuel Helland, USMC in October 2005. This particular version of the mission statement comes from Colonel Dwight Trafton, USMC, Chief of Staff, CJTF-HOA, remarks delivered to the “21st Century Marines in Africa Conference: West and Central Regions,” United States Marine Corps University, Quantico, VA, January 18-19, 2006

24. Headquarters United States European Command Press Release, “Flintlock Exercise Trains Africans to Handle Defense”, June 20, 2005. The sharp funding increase in out-years leads to some skepticism as to whether or not that amount of funding will actually materialize.

25. For accounts of the training programs, see 1st Lt. Phillip Ulmer, “Special Forces Support Pan Sahel Initiative in Africa,” Armed Forces Information Service, March 8, 2004; CPL Lameen Witter, “U.S. Marines Start Training in Niger, ” Marine Forces Europe Public Affairs Release, August 10, 2004.

26. “JTF Aztek Silence,” Global Security.org.

27. “U.S. Bilateral Assistance Efforts,” INCSR 2003 Report, March 1, 2004.

28. Information on the International Law Enforcement Academy (ILEA) in Gaborone, Botswana was obtained from the State Department website at: http://www.state.gov/p/inl/ilea/c11283.htm.

29. Author’s interview with Indira Krum (Africa officer in the task force on terrorist financing of the Terrorism and Financial Intelligence Unit) and Vincent Drayer (advisor to TF and Financial Intelligence), Department of Treasury, Washington, DC, September 23, 2004. FATF stands for the Financial Action Task Force, an international body that sets policies and standards for anti-Money-Laundering and Counter-Terrorist Finance measures.

30. DASD-Africa Theresa Whelan includes this range of tools in her presentations on how the DoD combats ungoverned spaces in Africa. See, for just one example, Whelan’s presentation to the National Defense University in November 2005 at: www.ndu.edu/inss/Symposia/Africa2005/whelan_ppt.pdf.