Democracy without Development? Unbalanced Transformations in Eastern and Southern Africa

Strategic Insights, Volume IV, Issue 12 (December 2005)

by Siegmar Schmidt

Introduction

This report provides an overview on the state, trajectory and management of the transformation processes in 15 countries in East and South Africa: Ethiopia, Angola, Botswana, Eritrea, Kenya, Madagascar, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, Zambia, Zimbabwe, Somalia, South Africa, Tanzania and Uganda. It is based on the results of the Bertelsmann Transformation Index (BTI) and the underlying country assessments which analyze each individual country in detail. As the following overview shows, the countries in Eastern and Southern Africa are showing heterogeneous developments with respect to transformation to market economy and democracy. In Southern Africa the differences between the countries under review are larger than in Eastern Africa.

Development of Democracy

In Southern Africa the three states of Botswana, Mauritius and South Africa have made progress with respect to democratic principles during the period under review. Those democracies show only deficits of democratization or democratic consolidation in a limited number of criteria used in the BTI 2006 to measure transformation towards liberal democracy. Noteworthy, the two nations with the smallest populations—Mauritius with 1.2 million people and Botswana with 1.7 million citizens—are among the most advanced democracies in the whole BTI 2006 country sample. Still, none of the three democracies can be regarded as consolidated. Among other reasons, major social disparities, foremost in South Africa and Botswana, are the most important obstacle to democratic consolidation.

The largest group of countries in Southern Africa, however, is formed by democracies with more or less pronounced defects among which are Madagascar, Malawi, Uganda, Zambia, Mozambique and Namibia. The level of democratization in East Africa is overall significantly lower than in Southern Africa: in this region, only Tanzania and Kenya can be classified as defective democracies. The high hopes from abroad and the countries themselves that were put on the new Kenyan government under Mwai Kibaki after he had won the presidential election against Arap Moi—an African “big men”, who has ruled for decades in an authoritarian way—did not materialize. Zimbabwe, Ethiopia, Eritrea and Angola have to be classified as authoritarian regimes. The situation is different from country to country: in Zimbabwe there are still some remnants of democratic rule. However, President Mugabe has accomplished to further strengthen his position by using repression against an opposition that is too weak to force the regime into major political concessions. In Ethiopia there have been minor steps of political liberalization; but it remains unclear to which extent the opposition will be able to recover from its defeated in the parliamentary elections in May 2005.

Democratic development in Eritrea took a turn to the worse in recent years and has to be classified as a hard dictatorship. Angola is undertaking first steps to liberalization after the end of a decades-long civil war but still has to be rated authoritarian at present as the government is not seriously introducing political reforms. One of the reasons is the attempt to control the oil resources of the country. The country seems to be an example for the “curse of resources” in Africa. A clear tendency towards more democracy is not detectable at present, the situation being too fragile. Somalia is still a deviant case in the region as the country lacks a central government since 1991 and state collapse is now permanent. The following table summarized the findings of the BTI 2006 concerning the state of democracy in East and South Africa:

Table 1: Political Regimes Eastern and Southern Africa (Early 2005)

* State monopoly of force not guaranteed because of insurgent movement in certain areas. ** No central monopoly of force.

The states under review show—apart from Somalia—only minor problems with stateness. Civil rights in general are handled liberally. Deficits exist in Zimbabwe because of the discrimination of the white minority and increasing, potentially threatening, polarization between the ethnic groups of the Shona and Ndebele due to the discrimination of the latter group. Another exception is Eritrea, where some religious groups are deprived of their civil rights.

The state monopoly of the use of force in all states is in the hands of the government. Only in Northern Uganda the brutal Lord’s Resistance Army constitutes a serious threat to the security in that part of the country. Small rebel groups in Ethiopia are posing no substantive threat to the government. Still, the weakness of the state is on the one hand enabling stateless and lawless areas due to overboarding criminality (in South African metropoles, Nairobi and at the Kenyan borders). On the other hand the state is almost absent due to the lack of administrative resources and effectiveness (for example, in some regions of Madagascar). The positive development in the region of Puntland, which is separated from Somalia, is continuing. The secession of this region and its ambitions for national sovereignty are still not acknowledged internationally. Furthermore, there is a clear separation of religion and state in all area countries with the exception of Somalia, where Islam has become a stronger force as is shown by the encroachment of Sharia.

In Somalia, Eritrea and Angola there have been no elections at all. In Zimbabwe and Ethiopia the elections have been clearly manipulated by repression and discrimination of the opposition. The Angolan government has delayed the planned 2005 elections to 2006. In other countries, the election process is not without problems, too. Apparently, there have been election irregulations in Malawi; in Zambia, Uganda, Tanzania and Mozambique, the election process has been correct but the opposition has been discriminated during the campaign period. For example in Tanzania the ruling party “Chama Cha Mapinduzi” did suppress supporters of the opposition. Uganda is a special case. There are still only individual candidatures allowed. This proceeding is approved by a referendum. Parties are not authorized to participate in the elections. The most free and fair elections are found in Mauritius, South Africa and, with minor restrictions because of the role of the media, in Botswana, Namibia, Kenya (elections in December 2002), Madagascar (technical deficits) and Mozambique (irregularities).

Military and other security forces in Angola and—to a lesser extent—in Uganda are potential veto players that could develop into a threat for the civilian governments if their interests are affected by the democratization process. Freedom of organization and freedom of speech are guaranteed in the democratic states and are rudimentary realized in the authoritarian states. Only in Eritrea these civil rights are totally suppressed. The separation of powers is guaranteed by the constitution in all states and is formally respected. In reality, though, there is a clear preponderance of the executives which holds especially true for the presidential systems but also for the parliamentary systems of South Africa and Botswana. Parliaments in most states are not able to fulfill their oversight function. They are especially weak in authoritarian systems and in Angola. A remarkable exception was the refusal of the parliament in Malawi to grant former president Muluzi a third term by changing the constitution is remarkable.

The working of the judiciary is often restrained due to organizational deficits as well as corruption. Equality before the law thus is limited. Judicial reforms in Kenya were attempted by the new government (dismissal of corrupt judges, among other measures); however, in the short-run these steps have further weakened the efficiency of the judiciary; more fundamental changes will take time. The independence of Supreme or Constitutional Courts is threatened in those cases where the government—usually the president—appoints the judges. The least disastrous are the judicial systems in Mauritius, South Africa, Botswana and Namibia.

Democratic institutions in Botswana, South Africa, Mauritius and partly Namibia are robust. In democracies with smaller defects such as Kenya, Malawi, Tanzania, Zambia, Uganda and Mozambique institutions are stable but often are not able not use their prerogatives or perform the functions ascribed to them in the constitution and suffer from dramatic administrative shortcomings. Friction losses are due to frequently changing parliamentary majorities (Malawi, Madagascar). Official statements seem to indicate that in most defect democracies and even in many authoritarian states nearly all political actors support democratic institutions. Reality shows, though, that this is oftentimes only lip service. Many actors (in Angola, partly Uganda) devalue these institutions by informal practices or just ignore them.

With the exception of Eritrea and Somalia, all states in the region have a multi-party system. Those multi-party systems cover a broad spectre of different types of party system: predominant party systems (Rimanelli 2000) are in existence in Tanzania, Botswana, Namibia and South Africa. In addition, Mozambique is developing in the direction of a dominant party system after repeated election victories of the ruling Frelimo even if the country (as well as Angola) has a structural tendency towards a two-party system with parties along ethnic-regional cleavages.

Only in Botswana this trend can be traced back to institutional factors such as the plurality vote and to the fragmented opposition as in South Africa and Namibia. The electoral successes of the dominant parties in these two countries—more than two thirds of votes in the latest elections—are caused by the myth of the former freedom movements on the one hand, but also by historical reasons (e.g. Apartheid) and ethnic fragmentation (Namibia). In Tanzania, the dominance of Chama Cha Mapinduzi (Revolutionary Party) must be explained by the discrimination of the opposition. In Mozambique, Angola and Zimbabwe, there is a trend towards a to two-party systems, in Uganda and Malawi a tendency to a three party systems.

Overall, the political parties are among the most important deficits of democratic consolidation in the region. Parties are moderately polarized along a political ideological spectrum; most of the parties have only shallow roots within their society. Often, they define themselves along ethnic and regional cleavages or represent electoral clubs of influential (and wealthy) personalities (so called „big men“, as in Eritrea and Zimbabwe). An extreme case is the broad ruling coalition in Kenya, which is internally fractionized nearly up to political paralysis. The institutional weakness of the political parties and instability of the party systems is related to the neopatrimonial principle and the resulting logic as well as to the high level of underdevelopment.[1] Another substantial problem in many states is the weakness of opposition parties[2] which is caused by several factors, for example, the lack of political programs, discriminations and repressions, and strategic advantages of the ruling parties.

The low level of economic development and the decades-long repression and cooptation by authoritarian systems have hindered the development of well-organized interest groups. With the exception of South Africa which has powerful trade unions and trade associations, interest groups are weak and exist mostly in urban areas. Within the most countries there are large numbers of autonomous social organizations, organized solely on the local or regional level. They have important functions for the population often they are heavily dependent on external or public support and are not politically influential.

Opinion surveys on social support for democratic principles are not available for countries under authoritarian government and post conflict states. Survey data from Botswana, Kenya, Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, South Africa, Tanzania, Uganda and Zambia suggest a high—sometimes very high (Kenya, Botswana, Mauritius)—level of support from sides of the populations for democratic principles and ideas. At the same time, however, the idea of single party systems in Namibia, Mozambique, Tanzania and South Africa is supported by substantial minorities.

Economic Development

Most nations in South and East Africa belong to the poorest and least developed countries in the world.

Table 2: Development indicators for Eastern and Southern Africa

* N.A. = not available. **on average 1999-2003. ***Total debt in % of NNP, see: http://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/www/de/laenderinfos/index_html. Sources: see country reports; UNDP, Human Development Report 2004.

Click here to view a larger version of Table 2: Development indicators for Eastern and Southern Africa.

Whereas macro economic stabilization programs have proceeded and the growth rates have been positive, there have been only marginal improvements of the quality of life for the majorities of the populations. Many people are still living in poverty; even basic public services are insufficient. Due to the increasing death toll caused by HIV/Aids life expectancy is declining dramatically in many states such as Zimbabwe, Namibia and South Africa. This is reflected in declining HDI-levels. Whereas Southern Africa is the region with the highest rates of infection—in Zimbabwe the percentage of infected persons is estimated at 35% of the aged 15 to 49—the levels for East Africa are lower. However, the number of infections in the East African countries is most certainly not accurately counted and the trend indicators also point to rising infection levels.

In general, the status of transformation towards market economy is highly diverse in the region. Whereas there are working market economies in Mauritius, Botswana, and South Africa and to a lesser extent in Uganda, Zambia, Namibia and Kenya, far-reaching state interventions (Madagascar, Angola, Ethiopia and especially Eritrea) and the informal sector are subverting the foundations of the market economy in other countries. The informal sector plays an important role in all states, although there are differences between the first named group and the following countries. According to the Index of Economic Freedom published by the American Heritage Foundation, the role of the informal sector in Botswana, Mauritius and Namibia as well as South Africa is decidedly smaller than in the other African countries. The index places the African countries—also with the exception of Botswana, South Africa, Namibia, Mauritius and even Uganda, which are estimated to be “mostly free”—in the lower strata of the rating scale as “mostly unfree.” The first mentioned countries are all to be rated economically successful. This is indicating a connection between the level of liberalization of the economy and economic success. Still other factors, as for example terms of trade, do play an important role.

With the exception of South Africa—even providing capital market access for Botswana, Namibia and other neighbor states—capital markets are underdeveloped. With the exception of Zimbabwe, inflation rates are moderate. The exchange rates in general have been adapted to the economic situation, followed regularly by devaluations. Successful stabilization policy has been conducted especially in Mauritius, Botswana, South Africa and Uganda, followed by Namibia and Ethiopia. The successes of monetary and fiscal policies in many countries can be explained with the potent control by the International Monetary Fund. This means, that these countries are semi-sovereign in the field of macroeconomic policies.

Property rights are guaranteed by the constitution in most countries. Most often, however, these rights are only partly realized due to administrative shortcomings, manipulated deeds of ownership and political corruption (Malawi). There are relative few problems in Zambia. The question of private property of agricultural land poses juristically and emotional problems. Land regulation is often complicated by traditional communal ownership as in Uganda, communal owners being able to block the disposal. In Ethiopia and Eritrea (since 1996) private ownership is not possible, only long term lease agreements can be made. Dispossession of the white population from farm land in Zimbabwe has catastrophic consequences for the economic situation in that country. Still, there are debates about dispossession in Namibia and South Africa (to lesser extent in Kenya). Up to now, the return of land in both countries has proceeded by observing the principles of rule of law and as far as possible with the consent of the dispossessed and compensations. Privatization only in few countries (especially in Uganda) did have the effect of private enterprises now forming the backbone of the economy. There has been progress in Madagascar, Namibia and—to a lesser extent—in Ethiopia. Political opposition from sides of the employees (South Africa) as well as from elites that are worried about their possibilities of patronage (Malawi) are slowing the process of privatization or even brings it to a total standstill.

Rudimentary social institutions do not exist or are not functioning sufficiently due to administrative shortcomings. Even if the situation is better in Namibia, South Africa, Botswana and Mauritius, large parts of the populations there live in poverty. High infection rates with HIV threaten to lead to a collapse of the health systems. Most governments—with the exception of Uganda—have started the fight against this disease too late (Botswana) or only ineffectually (South Africa).

Equality of opportunities is not realized as the “Gender-related Development Index” is showing clearly. The percentage of women in parliaments is respectable in some cases. But in daily life, women are often discriminated, for example in the education system but as well in career. In many cases the reference is made to tradition.

The capacities of the national economies are highly different. Botswana and Mauritius have to be mentioned as positive examples. Macroeconomic data are satisfying in the regional comparative perspective. Growth rates for Uganda and Mozambique have been impressing for years, but budgetary deficits and high dependencies from abroad are indicating that this development is not self-sufficient. Many countries do show successes in growth rates but on a low level (Tanzania, Zambia, and Ethiopia). This is truer for Madagascar and Angola, where high investment and growth rates can be explained by former crises and in the case of Angola by the boom in the oil market. Still budget deficits and indebtedness in many cases are comparatively high.

The Republic of South Africa, which is presenting the economic heavy weight of Southern Africa, could only partly fulfill its role as the lead economy in this part of the continent. Reasons were the low growth rates, as these have only recently passed three percent due to massive social problems within the country. The ongoing economic slowdown in Zimbabwe is stalling regional cooperation and has led to a loss of external assistance and investment. This resulted in a low volume of foreign investments. The rates of unemployment, which are only in some cases available due to statistic shortcomings, in general should be comparable to those of South Africa with 40 percent.

Protection of resources in most states in an issue of minor importance. Only in some regions of Kenya, Namibia, South Africa, Botswana, where the stock of games and natural resources are important for tourism, the ecological aspect is attributed a high priority. Deforestation and, also as an effect of this, the erosion of land is proceeding (Kenya). The ecological conscience among others is more highly developed in Mauritius and South Africa, even if concrete measures are realized only inconsistently. Normally, especially in poor countries, ecological aspects are subordinated to economic ones.

The evaluations of the quality of the education system and the efforts in the fields of research and development are in general very low. In Somalia, Angola, Ethiopia, Zambia, Tanzania, Eritrea and to more and more extent in Malawi the situations at schools and universities is calamitous: inadequate equipment with teaching material, improper rooms, overloaded classes and lacking discipline and motivation of the teaching staff are usual. Only in the three democracies of Mauritius, Botswana and South Africa are evaluated as belonging to the middle strata. The desolate situation of the education system, the tertiary education institutions included, is endangering the future of many countries. The situation is even worsened by the high numbers of HIV-infections among teachers and students (South Africa, Zimbabwe, and Namibia).

Transformation Management

In comparison with West- and Central Africa the level of difficulty of the transformations in Eastern and Southern Africa is lower, but still severe in international comparations. The high level of difficulty of Somalia, Angola, Ethiopia and Eritrea is primarily resulting from structural problems, e.g. the overall low level of development. Countries such as Mozambique and Uganda still suffer from the effects of decade long civil wars, but the situation could be further stabilized in the period under review. In Somalia fighting between different warlord-factions continues, but on a lower level then before. Civil society is in place in all states, although the strength and organizational density varies from country to country. Civil society is relatively weak in authoritarian states in general but also in Malawi and Tanzania. In contrast, in South Africa and Kenya civil society is strong and even in a position to challenge the government.

Steering Capability

With respect to pursuing reform goals and the capability to implement them, it is useful to distinguish between three groups of states. First the governments of Zimbabwe and Eritrea form a group of totally reform-averse countries concerning the goals of social market economy and democracy.[3] They act as veto actors for every substantial reform. Second, a large group of states define goals in the sense of the Bertelsmann Index but pursue these goals only incomplete or half-heartened (Tanzania, Malawi). Other governments only announce reforms or lack the necessary technical or human resources for implementing them (in part Uganda). Many country reports stress that governments tend to be more pro-reform in the economic than in the political sphere. Examples are Malawi, Tanzania, and Uganda. One main reason might be that donors and the Bretton Woods Institutes put the governments under reform pressure which they cannot escape due to dependence on external resources.

Clear priorities for reforms have been established by Mauritius, South Africa and Botswana. All states are democracies. Economic reforms were continued successfully also by the Uganda government headed by President Museveni. For most of the states a gap between reform announcements and implementation capabilities has to taken into account. The high scores for Madagascar can be explained by its ambitious reform program. But it is too early to judge whether the ambitious goals can be really achieved. The relatively low scores for the Kenyan government reflect the disappointing reform policy of the government.

Effective Use of Resources

The criteria ‘effective use of resources’ also includes the two indicators political coordination and fight against corruption. In general, the scores for the countries under review are low or only reach middle positions. Only Botswana’s scores high for all three indicators of this criterion. Mauritius still faces a problem with corruption. It is remarkable that Botswana is in the “Corruption Perception Index” by the NGO Transparency International again ranking 31st, ahead all EU-members joining the Union in 2004. Even South Africa and Mauritius rank high ahead of Poland and Croatia, a new candidate country. Madagascar, Mozambique, Tanzania, Eritrea, and Uganda are positioned much lower. At the end of the ranking, under the most corrupt countries, Ethiopia, Zimbabwe and Kenya and Angola are to be found. Still, the record with respect of fighting corruption is poor in many countries.

Against the background of the country’s considerable resources, South Africa could have done more, especially the fight against political corruption lacked credibility. The effective use of resources is hampered in many states not only by sometimes endemic corruption, but also because of administrative bottlenecks. Many governments still ignore budget and spending ceilings and the government’s expenses are often intransparent. In particular, during elections extensive spending is used as an instrument in gaining political support form specific groups. A coherent policy without frictions between line ministries and agencies is still an exception.

Consensus-building

The criteria consensus-building consists of six different indicators. The main idea is to analyze whether governments seek and use consensus in their society to pursue reform goals. Consensus is regarded both as an aim and a tool to implement and legitimize reforms. Special interest in the country reports is devoted to the role civil society plays as a cooperation partner of the respective governments and the support of government for the formation of social capital. Authoritarian regimes—unsurprisingly—are neither supporting civil society nor do they foster the creation of social capital. On the other side, unsurprisingly again, democratic governed countries such as Botswana, South Africa, Mauritius, and Madagascar are characterized by a high degree of consensus between elites and the majority of the citizens. These countries also try to enable civil society for reforms. The overall development of social capital remains weak.

In many countries—except South Africa and Mauritius—governments do not try actively to mitigate political cleavages. Only the Mugabe government in Zimbabwe systematically fuelled domestic conflict. The reluctance of governments to escalate latent ethnic or social conflict or to play the ethnic card might be one reason why Southern Africa is more peaceful than other regions. In most countries the reconciliation between victims and perpetrators of past injuries has not begun for political and sometimes cultural reasons. In few countries such as Botswana this question is not relevant since there had not been any injuries by the government in the past. Ethiopia has started cautiously to deal with past injuries. Far ahead is South Africa not only because of its famous Truth- and Reconciliation Commission but also because of its policy for land restitution by a legal process.

International Cooperation

The willingness to cooperate with neighboring states, within the framework of regional organization and with donor states and international agencies is high as the score of 7.5 reveals. Non-cooperative with respect to market economy reforms and democracy are Zimbabwe and Eritrea. As mentioned before, the willingness to cooperate reflects in many cases the dependency on foreign resources. Some governments only pay lip service to reforms to receive further assistance. In general, just as mentioned, assistance for economic reform is more welcome than support for political reforms.

Above all, South Africa, Madagascar, Mauritius and Mozambique support the African Union (AU) and regional organizations. South Africa is playing a special role, for the country plays an active role in conflict-diplomacy (e.g. in Burundi) and has deployed “peacekeeping” troops to the Congo. In partnership with Nigeria it is one of the most important driving forces behind both NEPAD (New Partnership for African Development) and the AU.

In striking contrast to their rhetorical support concerning human rights and democracy, all countries stay in a passive position towards the Mugabe government in Zimbabwe. In a longer perspective this may lead to a loss of credibility and this is one of the reasons for South Africa and other countries did not reach the highest scores as a reliable partner in cooperation. It is plausible, though not provable in empirical means, that the situation in Zimbabwe and the passiveness of African States are reasons for the low inclination of foreign countries to invest money in southern Africa. Only Mauritius and South Africa are able to show substantial investments.

South Africa again is a special case, for many South African large scale enterprises perform as aggressive investors in many countries and take control of local markets in increasing extent. Yet, South African investments were not unanimous welcomed for historical and political reasons. In East Africa no flare up of frontier war between Ethiopia and Eritrea could be noticed, but in general the situation is fragile, for the Ethiopian government refuses to accept an arbitral award of a commission to settle territorial claims. At the end of 2004 and after long negotiations Kenya, Uganda and Tanzania ratified a protocol to implement the customs union of reanimated East African Community (EAC).

The position of Uganda concerning foreign affairs is contradictory: On the one hand, Uganda is a reliable partner and prepared for cooperation. As a result of considerable pressure from abroad, the government announced to rethink the ban of party candidatures. On the other hand, Uganda is deeply involved in the Congo conflict by supporting rebel organizations, thus—at least indirectly—responsible for massive violation of human rights.

Summary and Perspectives

Though there have been extremely difficult general conditions, most countries were able to maintain their status of democratic development. Significant improvements have not been reached, except for Madagascar. In Angola (starting from extremely low level), Ethiopia and Kenya minor improvements could be realized. Distinct setbacks could be seen in Zimbabwe and Eritrea and—with to a much lesser extent—also in Malawi. In the period from 2001 to 2005 no clear trend towards positive or negative development is to be identified.

Results of the Bertelsmann Transformation Index 2006 for East and South Africa

Concerning market economy, the development was more convenient in the terms of the investigation. Progress was made above all in Uganda, Tanzania, Mozambique and Madagascar. In contrast to this, the descent of Zimbabwe continued. Eritrea for political and economic reasons developed with growing intensity towards a potential trouble spot. In Malawi economic crisis was caused by political crisis. Also in Mauritius, one of the continents great hopes, economic step backs could be seen, though the potential of economic and—on a lower position—social development is yet high.

To give recommendation for foreign support is difficult, because of the different situations in the countries under review. In only very few cases clear starting points for external assistance can be defined. One of these cases is Angola where the support for civil society is highly important. Support of democratization should mainly focus on supporting a level playing with fair political competition. Electoral observation is still of major importance.

There is no alternative to political conditionality (e.g. aid sanctions) in cases of massive human rights violations or disregard for democratic principles. Without external pressure reform processes would not be introduced and continued. Conditionality is ineffective in those cases in which countries refuse any reforms even if this would mean a deep crisis. In Zimbabwe the main interest for donors must be to guarantee the survival of the opposition. In Southern Africa the donor countries have been reluctant to put pressure on the neighboring states and the Southern African Development Community (SADC) to change their passivity towards Zimbabwe.[4]. The outcome of the country reports within the framework of the African Peer Review Process should be regarded as an indicator for willingness to reform. Countries which are serious with economic reforms should receive support for good governance reforms and more assistance, perhaps even with budget financing. In many countries it is also necessary to strengthen the implementation capacities of governmental and non-state actors. More attention must also be paid to the improvement of social conditions, since unless the majority does not benefit from reforms in economic or social terms the support for reforms will be limited.

 About the Author

Siegmar Schmidt is Professor for Political Science, Institute for Political Science at the Social Science Department, University of Koblenz-Landau.

 References

1. Gero Erdmann, "Neopatrimoniale Herrschaft-oder: Warum es in Afrika so viele Hybridregime gibt,“ in Petra Bendel, Aurel Croissant, and Friedbert W. Rüb (eds.), Zwischen Demokratie und Diktatur. Zur Konzeption und Empirie demokratischer Grauzonen (Opladen: Leske+Budrich, 2003), 323-342.

2. Adebayo O. Olukoshi (ed.), The Politics of Opposition in Contemporary Africa (Uppsala: Nordkiska Afrikainstitutet, 1998).

3. Somalia will be excluded from the following analyses since the country does not have any central government. The very basic precondition for any reform-oriented policy is therefore missing, but see the country report for progress in Puntland.

4. Roland Zimmermann, Demokratie und das südliche Afrika. Antagonismus oder Annäherung? (Wiesbaden: VS Verlag, 2004), 96-102.