

explains the problems that confronted British policymakers and the exposition of the views of the personalities involved. Other issues that are raised by Mawby, such as the U.S. position in the Yemeni conflict and the reference to Cold War diplomacy, are important and contribute to the value of this study. However, the author's discussion of these important variables remains scanty and superficial. Moreover, the exclusive use of British sources somehow limits the value of the study, and it is difficult to gain an accurate insight into the attitudes and opinions of the indigenous actors.

Despite these shortcomings, the book is an important addition to the literature on the subject for the mere fact that it provides an analysis more complete than any other study dealing with this topic. The book includes notes and an extensive bibliography in the appropriate places. Students at all levels as well as the general public can benefit from it.

MICHAEL KNIGHTS, *Cradle of Conflict: Iraq and the Birth of the Modern U.S. Military* (Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 2005). Pp. 462. \$39.95 cloth.

REVIEWED BY JAMES A. RUSSELL, Department of National Security Affairs, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, Calif.; e-mail: jarussel@nps.edu
DOI: 10.1017/S0020743807070274

Being led down the hallways of one's previous life over several hundred pages is a slightly disconcerting experience. Working in the Department of Defense from 1988 to 2001, I was personally involved in U.S. defense policy in the Persian Gulf and from 1996 to 1999 served as country director for Iraq in the office of the Secretary of Defense.

Michael Knights meticulously reconstructs many of these labyrinthine hallways over this time period in *Cradle of Conflict: Iraq and the Birth of the Modern U.S. Military*, in which he takes the reader through the U.S. military's experience from just after the Gulf War all the way through the invasion of Iraq in 2003. Knights' work differs from many of the recent books published on the Iraq War in that he usefully and appropriately places the March 2003 invasion in the context of a frustrating period spanning over a decade when the nation's political and military leadership struggled to deal with the aftereffects of the Gulf War, which left Saddam in power.

As implied by the book's title, Knights seeks to build a case that the U.S. military's experience in Iraq provided an institutional bridge from the Cold War to the post Cold War era. Over the decade, Knights argues, the military confronted all the new and unseemly missions generally known as "military operations other than war" (MOOTW) and, in parallel, integrated many of the newer ways of fighting that flowed from the revolution in military affairs and effects-based operations. This experience, according to Knights, delivered the "modern" military into the new century.

Students and scholars interested in a carefully crafted blow-by-blow account of the Clinton administration's struggles to contain Saddam, the role of the U.S. military in containment, and the unsuccessful attempts to preserve the integrity of the doomed arms inspection process will find this book extremely rewarding. The author interviewed many civilian and military figures involved in these events. The actions in the no-fly zones, debates in the civilian leadership over when and how to use force, and the military's disdain for the seemingly never-ending and open-ended missions in the Gulf are chronicled in detail. The majority of the book successfully and comprehensively addresses these issues. The author is at his best when he retells in his succinct, crisp prose the 1990s story of containment in the Gulf—even if he at times lapses into jargon-laden military acronyms and terminology.

However, the book's more strategic conclusions are much of the work of the debate surrounding the difficult to conduct interwar period. In public debate over the Bush administration's containment policy, the debate over containment and prestige in "the Persian Gulf" was unchallenged. Part of the containment and prestige in "the Persian Gulf" was unchallenged.

Knights uncritically draws on primary sources for the Survey Group report, which is generally believed to be the work of former high-level officials who were out of touch. Does the report serve U.S. interests in preserving Iraq's territorial integrity in the Arabian Peninsula? These broad objectives are not clearly stated.

Thus, what are the lessons to be learned on the table in his political credibility as long as deterrence as long as national interest regimes such as Saddam's against U.S. globalizing power viewed as an isolating contagion" (p. 375). Lessons in the Gulf War depends to a large extent on the treatment of regimes like Saddam's. It glosses over the consequences of those cases warranting willful ignorance of officials.

The book also fails to mention that containment saw the military could just as easily have been used to open-ended missions. More institutionally opposed in the Gulf during the Clinton administration building and these missions after the war.

Knights inexplicably omits military sourcing work over sizing of the military in the operational environment.

However, the book ultimately fails to deliver on the promise of placing this period in a more strategic context—a failure made all the more surprising because the author does so much of the work bringing the reader to the proverbial altar. The unfortunate fact is that the debate surrounding the political and military circumstances of the Iraq War has made it difficult to conduct a clearheaded discussion of successes and failures of U.S. policy in the interwar period. In the period preceding the U.S. invasion of Iraq, there was strikingly little public debate over the need to change course, and the sound bite narrative offered by the Bush administration describing the “failed” policies of the Clinton administration went largely unchallenged. Part of the storyline offered to justify “Operation Iraqi Freedom” was “failure” of the containment strategy, misuse of the U.S. military, and frittering away of U.S. power and prestige in “pinprick” strikes against Saddam.

Knights uncritically signs on to this analysis, perhaps reflecting the disdain of his military sources for the Clinton administration’s actions during this period. However, as the Iraq Survey Group report showed, containment actually proved to be more successful than was generally believed at the time. Moreover, in the aftermath of Operation Desert Fox, out-briefs by former high-level regime officials indicated that Saddam seemed increasingly isolated and out of touch. Does that mean containment succeeded? The answer is complicated. Containment served U.S. interests by constraining a potential weapons of mass destruction breakout, preserving Iraq’s territorial integrity as a bulwark against Iran, and mitigating the threat to the Arabian Peninsula. That the U.S. military did not like its “fuzzy” missions associated with these broad objectives is frankly beside the point.

Thus, what are the lessons of the 1990s? Knights places his political tendencies squarely on the table in his analysis of lessons from the U.S. military’s Iraq experience: “Lack of political credibility will remain a key weakness of the U.S. grand strategy and strategic deterrence as long as the U.S. views the world in terms of direct threats to narrowly defined national interest. An alternative way of viewing the world would be to look upon regimes such as Saddam Hussein’s Baathist government as intolerable beacons of resistance against U.S. global power. . . . In this unipolar age, when resistance to the hegemonic and globalizing power of the United States is likely to proliferate, resistance should not be viewed as an isolated phenomenon but should instead be diagnosed and treated as a global contagion” (p. 375). Once again, however, a case can be made that one of the decade’s lessons in the Gulf is that so-called “U.S. hegemonic power” is in fact limited and depends to a large extent on security partnerships backed by a validating political umbrella. Treating regimes like Saddam’s as a “contagion” makes for a nice sound bite but only glosses over the complexities confronting political and military decision makers in deciding on those cases warranting use of force. The disastrous occupation of Iraq reflects astonishingly willful ignorance of these complexities by senior Bush administration political and military officials.

The book also fails to deliver on another of its central arguments: that the decade of containment saw the U.S. military effectively transition into the so-called “modern era.” It could just as easily be argued that the opposite turned out to be the case. Despite being forced into open-ended MOOTW-type missions in Iraq and elsewhere, the U.S. military remained institutionally opposed to nation building and counterinsurgency. If anything, the experience in the Gulf during the 1990s only reinforced the military’s disinterest in messy missions of nation building and counterinsurgency, which is one reason for its lack of preparation for these missions after kicking Saddam out of Baghdad.

Knights inexplicably leaves unexplored two central issues that his otherwise meticulous military sourcing would suggest he was uniquely positioned to cover: the internal debates over sizing of the invasion force and the lack of preparation by the uniformed military for the operational environment after the invasion. Readers would be better directed to Michael

Gordon and Bernard Trainor's *Cobra II: The Inside Story of the Invasion and Occupation of Iraq* for coverage of these issues.

Despite these shortcomings, *Cradle of Conflict's* comprehensive treatment of the U.S. military's involvement in Iraq from 1991 to 2003 fills an existing gap in the literature. Students and professionals alike would be advised to include this book in their studies of the complex interaction among policy, military institutions, and regional threats, drawing their own conclusions from this meticulously constructed history.

ROBERT OLSON, *Turkey–Iran Relations, 1979–2004: Revolution, Ideology, War, Coups and Geopolitics* (Costa Mesa, Calif.: Mazda Publishers, 2004). Pp. 316. \$35.00 paper.

REVIEWED BY GOKHAN CETINSAYA, Department of Humanities and Social Sciences, Istanbul Technical University, Istanbul, Turkey; e-mail: cetinsayag@itu.edu.tr

DOI: 10.1017.S0020743807070286

Robert Olson is a well-known expert on Ottoman Turkish–Iranian relations and the history of Kurdish nationalism and politics. The book under review is in various ways a continuation of his earlier works, *The Kurdish Question and Turkish–Iranian Relations: From World War I to 1998* (1998) and *Turkey's Relations with Iran, Syria, Israel, and Russia, 1991–2000* (2001), and numerous articles. As in his previous works, Olson examines Turkish–Iranian relations through the lens of the “Kurdish question.” The book is composed of recent articles by Olson published in various journals and various chapters of his earlier books.

The book consists of eight chapters. The first chapter examines relations between Turkey and Iran from the Iranian Revolution to the toppling of the Welfare Party in Turkey in 1997. The second chapter is devoted to the six crises between Ankara and Tehran that occurred from 1997 to September 2000. The third chapter focuses on major developments in Turkish–Iranian relations (restoration of diplomatic relations, the Taliban and Ocalan affairs, issues concerning northern Iraq) from 1997 to 2000 that relate to the six crises discussed in the previous chapter. Chapters 4 and 5 examine the geopolitics of the Caspian Sea, Azerbaijan nationalism, and the Kurds and northern Iraq in Turkish–Iranian relations throughout 2000–2002. The sixth chapter discusses Iraqi issues and their implications for the two governments before the U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003. Chapters 7 and 8 are devoted to Turkey–U.S. and Iran–U.S. relations during the first months of 2003, as well as the results of the U.S. invasion of Iraq and its implications for Turkey and Iran.

The book aims to survey a quarter century of relations between Turkey and Iran. It does not attempt to cover all aspects of Turkish–Iranian relations. Instead, it focuses on the influence of the “Kurdish question” on both countries and in northern Iraq, on issues of Azerbaijani nationalism, on Islamist politics, and on the Caspian Sea.

Olson accepts Steven R. David's “omnibalancing” theory in international relations as the best tool to understand the foreign policies pursued by Turkey and Iran. Omnibalancing theory stresses the external–internal threat of the transnational Kurdish (and Azeri) question(s), in addition to the powerful challenges from the Kurds in Iraq to the two neighbors. Olson also employs a method from R. Hinnebusch and A. Ehteshami's book, *Syria and Iran: Middle Powers in a Penetrated Regional System* (1997), invoking characteristics of midlevel powers to explain Turkey's and Iran's foreign policies.

The book offers three main theses. First, both in Turkey and Iran, the ideologies that fueled their respective politics for the past twenty-five years were constantly challenged throughout this time. At the end of this period, Ankara seems to have proven to be ideologically stronger

and more flexible than Turkey and Iran, that by mid-2003, in the Middle East, the invasion of Iraq, to be an obstacle to change” in Iran.

The book has 2004, only forty generally uses new sources, including flowering Turkish cites *Hürriyet*. All to use only this ne foreign policy and has employed Tur Therefore, the boo a study of their m Turkish names, th

Despite these sh only book on this

JACQUES WAARDE de Gruyter,

REVIEWED BY WIL town, Mass.; e-ma DOI: 10.1017.S0020

A major portion of torical encounters monolithic assumpt of work. Its annou taken place betwee worlds of other cu as broad as possibl modern period, incl In all this Waarde contemporary deve is so rich in Musli two chapters he pr Christianity, and Isl Christian phenome

The book consis previously, and thre a level of repetitio for example the ch (p. 121–22 and 205