

Deterrence, Intelligence & Proliferation in an Age of Uncertainty



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Overview

- The Proliferation-Intelligence Nexus
- The Politics of Proliferation Intelligence
- Proliferation & Deterrence
- Conclusion



The Proliferation-Intelligence Nexus - State Actors

- Nature of the Issue
 - Outlined in Barton Whaley's Study of Nazi Rearmament
 - How does Proliferator minimize "Window of Vulnerability"
- "Pre-Discovery" Incentives
 - Maximum Secrecy To Protect R&D
 - Denial & Deception to minimize threat
- "Post-Discovery" Incentives
 - Denial & Deception to maximize threat
 - Generate Perception of fait accompli

Charles Lindbergh



1936 & 1937

“Germany now has the means of destroying London, Paris and Prague if she wishes to do so”

Iraq pre-Gulf War II -- Iran Today?

Will Non-State Actors Behave the Same Way?

- “Pre-Discovery” Incentives
 - Maximum Secrecy To Protect R&D
 - Denial & Deception to minimize threat
- “Post-Discovery” Incentives
 - Denial & Deception to minimize threat
 - Attracting attention risks countermeasures
 - Lack resources to generate false “threat”
 - Although how much threat is needed to generate response?

The Politics of Proliferation Intelligence



Proliferation Politics

Incentives vs. Disincentives

- Preventive War is a Hard Sell
 - D&D to cover operations is likely to succeed
 - Belief in Diplomacy, International Safeguards, Regimes, Collective actor mobilization, etc.
- Window of Vulnerability
 - Policymakers have to act before threat is fully materialized
 - Fear of Unnecessary War
 - Unwillingness to undermine Diplomacy, International Safeguards, Regimes, Collective actor mobilization, etc.
- Preventive War Paradox
 - Success = Action before threat materializes creates ex post political problems
- How are Politics different for Non-State Actors?

Proliferation & Deterrence



Proliferation & Deterrence

- Does Proliferation Strengthen or Undermine Deterrence?
 - Neo-Waltzian View -- satisfy legitimate security concerns - bolster deterrence
 - Betts -- no leader has ever welcomed Proliferation as a positive development
- Deterrence Failure & Strategic Surprise
 - What “Myths” and Schemes Stand Behind Acquisition -- Key Intelligence Question
 - Pakistan & Stability-Instability Paradox
- Non-State Actors
 - Deterrence might be possible (Kapur, Dunn)
 - Deterrence is impossible (Payne)

Conclusions

- Proliferators Incentives Drive Intelligence Problem
 - D&D Influences likelihood of Type I and Type II errors
- International and Domestic Political Issues Drive Response Problem
 - If Preventive War successful, ex ante evidence scant before and even *after* action is taken
- Impact on Deterrence Idiosyncratic
 - Analysts should Beware of “hare-brained” schemes involving new capabilities