Conference Report

A Decade of Nuclear Learning: Ten Years After the South Asian Nuclear Tests

The Center for Contemporary Conflict, Naval Postgraduate School, with support from the National Nuclear Security Administration

Honolulu, HI, February 12-13, 2009

by Dr. Zachary S. Davis

Purpose

The Decade of Nuclear Learning project assesses the evolution of Pakistani and Indian nuclear policies over the ten-year period since both countries tested nuclear weapons in 1998. In February 2009 a small group of experts from India, Pakistan and the US convened to evaluate progress in four areas: nuclear decision-making; nuclear doctrine; command and control; nuclear deterrence. Presentations by leading experts provided the basis for rigorous discussion on the current state of nuclear stability in South Asia.

Key Findings

Nuclear learning has developed very differently in India and Pakistan. The divergent paths taken by India and Pakistan in the development of nuclear policies and forces have produced dissimilar concepts of nuclear deterrence. Since nuclear deterrence, to function effectively, relies on shared concepts of risk and reality, the absence of such a shared concept may undermine the robustness of deterrence. Our discussions revealed the following:

• Little common ground between Indian and Pakistani assessments of nuclear capabilities possessed by both sides
• No shared sense of the risks of escalation: India does not see its survival threatened, even by nuclear a exchange.
• No shared sense of consequences of a nuclear exchange.
• Political leaders in both countries are uninformed about critical nuclear issues.
• Both countries committed to continued development of strategic triad, but minimum deterrent goal remains undefined.
• Pakistan is far more advanced in preparations to conduct nuclear operations.
• India is lagging in all categories of nuclear development.
• Polemics and media hype undermine serious discussion.
• Bilateral communication is required to manage crises, and avoid accidental war

The Role of the United States

The participants identified problems and prospects facing the US role in South Asian nuclear stability. While rejecting US intervention, both India and Pakistan rely on the US to guide bilateral, regional, and global nuclear decisions.

• Both capitols expect US intervention to cool crises.
• US may not be able to act quickly enough to halt escalation.
• Expert-level engagement supports informed internal debates.
• Multilateral/global nuclear order is not a priority for either country.
• US support for bilateral talks on nuclear issues could lay foundation for more realistic assessments of risks, costs, and behavioral demands of deterrence.

A Decade of Nuclear Learning in South Asia

With support from the National Nuclear Security Administration, researchers from the Center for Contemporary Conflict at the Naval Postgraduate School convened an experts meeting to assess what has been learned by India and Pakistan since the nuclear tests of 1998. The meeting began with a discussion of what constitutes nuclear learning, then focused on four areas: nuclear decision-making, nuclear doctrine, command and control, and deterrence.

Dr. Zachary Davis and Mr. Toby Dalton Brig. Feroz Khan and Dr. Ashley Tellis

Nuclear Learning: What is it? Who learns? So what?

A Naval Postgraduate School professor provided a review of scholarly literature on organizational learning and its application to the nuclear field. His framework raised two critical issues. First, at what level does learning occur? For nuclear weapons, should we focus on individual leaders, government organizations or entire countries as the unit of learning?

Second, what constitutes learning? The speaker outlined two categories. Factual learning consists of the empirical facts associated with nuclear weapons – numbers, types and capabilities of various weapon systems. Inferential learning involves the lessons learned and applied to policy decisions. Illustrating the distinction, the professor noted, “The effects of a nuclear detonation are important for factual learning. What it means to employ nuclear weapons for political purposes is a matter of inferential learning.” In South Asia, there is no agreement on either. Indian and Pakistani officials and experts alike dispute the capabilities available to both sides. This includes overestimating and underestimating their own as well as their opponent’s capabilities. In general, Pakistan assumes that every Indian system functions as planned, while India tends to view Pakistan’s weapons, delivery systems, and operational plans as inferior. Regarding inferential learning, India and Pakistan appear to have learned and applied a number of “wrong lessons” from their experience possessing nuclear weapons. For example, lessons learned from crises such as Kargil, 2001 Lok Saba attack, Mumbai 2008, that brought India and Pakistan to the brink of war appear to have bolstered both side’s confidence in brinksmanship, and reduced concerns that low-level conventional conflict could jump across the nuclear firebreak. The lack of agreement in both categories of learning has serious implications for deterrence stability. The presenter addressed the difference between normative and value-neutral learning. He argued that, while learning is a normative concept most of the time, “any change in an actor’s belief system can be considered learning in a value-neutral way.” From this perspective, “wrong” learning would not be possible. The NPS professor then posited the existence of international learning as an additional dimension on which learning may be possible.

The project leader used this analytic framework to identify specific leaders, institutions (such as India’s Bhabba Atomic Research Center or Pakistan’s Strategic Plans Division), and international organizations that should have experienced nuclear learning from the past ten years of experience in South Asia. The participants agreed that the analytic framework provided a useful starting point for evaluating nuclear learning in South Asia.

Nuclear Decision-making

A former U.S. Ambassador began the panel on nuclear decision-making with a critical review of US decision-making on South Asia, which he recalled might have had some role in shaping Indian and Pakistani views and policies. What might be done to correct “wrong lessons” learned by the US in the future?

A retired Pakistani Brigadier General then traced the history of Pakistan’s nuclear decision-making and suggested implications for current Pakistan nuclear policies. He asserted, “There’s only one thing in Pakistan on which everyone agrees, and that’s nuclear weapons.” Since 1998, the Pakistan Army’s strong influence on nuclear matters enabled a consistent focus on the operational requirements for nuclear weapons. Civilian leaders have ample nuclear expertise at their disposal to support decisions, although this has apparently not been fully utilized by the current political leaders. General Musharraf made nuclear issues a priority and developed the Strategic Plans Division (SPD) and other institutions such as the Nuclear Command Authority (NCA) and the National Engineering and Scientific Committee (NESCOM) to support operational, political and diplomatic decision-making. The establishment of these institutions represents significant nuclear learning, at least in terms of the logistical and operational aspects of nuclear weapons.

By contrast, India has been slow to establish and empower institutions to support nuclear decision-making. For historic and cultural reasons, nuclear decision-making remains in the hands of a very small, close-knit group of political leaders. Information about nuclear weapons is confined to the scientists directly involved in those programs. A Carnegie Endowment expert reported, “The fundamental decisions from the beginning of this [nuclear] program were never committed to paper.” There is no record. Significantly, the Indian military remains largely out of the loop. A leading Indian strategic thinker and retired Indian Brigadier General expressed admiration for the SPD and advocated development of a similar organization in India. He lamented the lack of expertise within and outside the Indian government, which cedes debate to those who do not possess real knowledge about nuclear issues. The Carnegie expert elaborated on the political dynamics of nuclear decision-making in India and suggested little change is likely in the decision-making process that is dominated by short-term political calculations. He also noted, “The Indians are deeply aware that they are operating in a constrained international environment.” On both domestic and international fronts, Indian leaders see little benefit to advancing nuclear issues.

Nuclear Doctrine

Nuclear doctrine in South Asia rarely reflects actual plans or capabilities, but has been dominated by political considerations. India’s publicly declared draft nuclear doctrine represents the combined political aspirations of multiple constituencies, but does not elaborate a military strategy linking nuclear weapons with the achievement of political objectives. Several participants indicated this is unlikely to change, and that India’s nuclear doctrine will continue to serve domestic political purposes. The exclusion of the Indian military from nuclear decision-making makes nuclear doctrine a mainly political exercise that does not reflect operational aspects of nuclear planning. Nevertheless, the current doctrine indicates very significant deployments ahead to achieve a nuclear triad of land, sea and air nuclear forces.

Recent discussions of Cold Start doctrine raise questions about India’s intention to achieve quick battlefield victories and seize Pakistani territory without triggering a nuclear response. Pakistani experts and officials assure their Indian colleagues that such strikes would cross Pakistan’s nuclear redlines and would provoke a nuclear response. Indian’s however, are skeptical about Pakistan’s willingness to escalate, especially in light of India’s limited war aims. The true nature of India’s nuclear doctrine, if one exists, including its no-first-use policy and its adherence to a minimum nuclear deterrent, remains highly uncertain.

Pakistan’s nuclear doctrine remains intentionally opaque, although carefully augmented with the issuance of vague “redlines” that could trigger nuclear use if crossed. In essence, Pakistan will resort to nuclear weapons if its conventional forces are unable to defend against an Indian land attack. Pakistan retains its first use policy, despite the off-the-cuff remark by President Zardari that Pakistan would agree to a no-first-use doctrine. Another retired Pakistani Brigadier General asserted, “ Pakistan is mindful of India’s conventional advantage. Given this, it makes perfect sense for Pakistan to reject the no-first-use doctrine.” Pakistan also professes to adhere to a minimum deterrent policy, but in practice appears to be increasing its nuclear capabilities with no end in sight. Participants wondered what Pakistan would do with excess weapons once its deterrent needs are satisfied, and asked if Pakistan might consider extending nuclear security assurances to key allies such as Saudi Arabia. Pakistani experts downplayed this possibility, but other participants remained unpersuaded.

Nuclear doctrine in South Asia, perhaps like the declared doctrines of other nuclear states, remains an imprecise and unreliable indicator of intentions and capabilities. Several discussants wondered if further discussion of nuclear doctrines and their influence on stability could support the development of careful, sober and non-provocative doctrines aimed at avoiding misunderstandings and reinforcing deterrence. Others questioned whether pressure from Washington on Islamabad and New Delhi to clarify their nuclear doctrines may actually do more harm than good.

Brig. Salik, Mr. Clary, Dr. Joeck Brig. Gurmeet Kanwal

Command and Control

India’s command and control arrangements reflect the shortcomings of its nuclear development, planning, decision-making, and doctrine. Although there has been recent progress to operationalize nuclear capabilities, current command and control measures are embedded in a system of very complex political and bureaucratic structures. India’s Nuclear Command Authority (NCA) involves elaborate arrangements among many high-level political figures, raising questions about the efficacy of the system to produce timely decisions. Military officials have little or no independent authority to prepare or use nuclear forces. Technical experts answerable to political leaders must be deployed to execute critical functions, without which nuclear weapons and delivery systems would remain idle. In a crisis, technical command and control systems would be stymied by political and bureaucratic obstacles.

The former Indian Brigadier General, an advocate of developing robust and credible nuclear forces, outlined a unified, tri-service command structure in which the Strategic Forces Command would report to the Chief of Defense Staff, who would report directly to a group headed by the Prime Minister. The PM group would include the heads of the NSC, NCA, and the Defense Minister. Intelligence inputs would be reviewed at this level, and recommendations would be provided to the President. A streamlined decision-making process is essential to ensure the effectiveness of technical command and control systems. He indicated his admiration for Pakistan’s SPD and its support role to the National Command Authority.

By contrast, Pakistan’s command and control system was developed by the military and is highly reliable. The retired Pakistani Brigadier General described the process that started in earnest after the 1998 tests. The establishment of the SPD and the Army Strategic Forces Command prompted the development of a nuclear chain of command supported by technical communication systems. The military government of President Musharraf made nuclear command and control a priority, one that received ample authorities and resources. The nuclear program “had a direct chain of command after Musharraf took over, that facilitated the approval of projects and money.” Pakistan demonstrated considerable “learning” as it refined its command and control mechanisms from the Nuclear Command Authority (NCA) at the top to implementing technical and procedural steps to ensure safety, security and use control for deployed nuclear assets. Continuity has also worked well for SPD in terms of developing a cadre of experts. The retired Pakistani Brigadier Generals left little doubt that Pakistan’s command and control system would function as planned, even in a crisis. However, participants questioned how the NCA, which includes civilian as well as military leaders, would function under the new political leadership where legal authorities and political legitimacy are in flux. For better or worse, some of the efficiencies put in place under Musharraf appear to face new complications.

Nuclear Deterrence

The group reviewed classic deterrence literature on the psychological relationship that develops around a shared understanding of reality. Learning depends on shared lessons about deterrence – how it functions and what actions support or undermine stability. The group noted the lack of a shared concept of deterrence between India and Pakistan. Differing attitudes towards factors such as geography, threat perception, nuclear capabilities, and conventional military power were cited as factors that produce such contrary views of deterrence. The China factor looms large in India’s calculations, greatly complicating the quest for stability.

A Naval War College professor noted the absence of shared lessons regarding Indian or Pakistani development of nuclear delivery systems. He commented, “Lessons are only ‘learned’ if you change your behavior. So here we have lessons identified rather than lessons learned.” Decisions about missiles, aircraft, and sea-based platforms appear to have been made without regard to previous experience of their likely effects on deterrence. Other factors, largely domestic in nature, appear to have driven the selection of delivery systems. The result is asymmetric force structures that do not necessarily reinforce stable deterrence and communications that are highly dependent on media speculation. Current crisis management and risk reduction efforts are clearly inadequate. Participants noted the risks associated with nuclear-capable systems such as SRBMs and aircraft being utilized in conventional war plans. The project lead noted his article in Arms Control Today outlining these potential dangers and citing possible arms control measures to manage such risks.

The only example of commonly held beliefs is that deterrence is robust and unlikely to fail. Rather than providing learning opportunities about crisis avoidance and crisis management, recent crises such as Kargil in 1999, the Lok Saba attack in 2001, and Mumbai in 2008 appear to have increased confidence in the ability to conduct conventional war under the nuclear shadow. Finally, the group noted the role of experts and the media who complicate the already inadequate communication between New Delhi and Islamabad on nuclear issues.

The Next Ten Years

The group noted the following trends that are likely to unfold over the next ten years.

• Nuclear capabilities will grow and will soon exceed the requirements for nuclear deterrence, despite advocacy of minimum nuclear deterrence.
• Requirements for safety, security, and use-control for nuclear weapons and materials will increase, as will the risks of accidents.
• Nuclear deterrence will continue to be tightly coupled to conventional war scenarios. The risks of escalation will remain significant.
• India will focus on nuclear deterrence with China, justifying larger nuclear forces to compete with Beijing. Expansion of Indian forces will drive continued growth of Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal.
• Sea-based nuclear-armed systems of Pakistan, India, and other nations are likely to interact, creating a possible trigger for nuclear confrontation.
• Nuclear doctrines will not provide clarity or enhance stability.
• Political leaders in India and Pakistan will continue to view nuclear issues through the lens of domestic politics, thus making decisions and statements that may further complicate the bilateral nuclear relationship.
• India and Pakistan will not enthusiastically support CTBT, FMCT, NPT Review, or other multilateral regimes.
• Both sides will continue to rely on the US for crisis management.

U.S. Options

The group identified several areas where the US may be able to help promote regional nuclear stability.

• Both capitols expect US intervention to cool crises. This is a curse and a blessing, but opens the door for discussion about crisis management tools such as enhanced hotlines, back-channel diplomacy, and arms control.
• Current export control and nuclear security training should be expanded.
• Expert-level engagement supports informed internal debates. Track II can pay dividends, as well as expert discussions and young leader training.
• While New Delhi and Islamabad remain wary of multilateral/global nuclear diplomacy, both would appreciate consultation and inclusion in US efforts to strengthen the nonproliferation regime. In exchange, India and Pakistan would refrain from counterproductive actions, such as supporting NAM positions or unhelpful resolutions on the Middle East.
• The US can discuss regional security with both India and Pakistan, making clear expectations for nuclear stability and nuclear alliances.
• US support for India-Pakistan bilateral talks on nuclear issues could lay the foundation for more realistic assessments of risks, costs, and behavioral demands of deterrence.
• US could support studies of bilateral risk reduction, verification, and arms control applications relevant to South Asia.