The Project on Advanced Systems and Concepts for Countering WMD (PASCC) supports research activities that benefit the public through analysis and engagement to reduce and counter the threats posed by WMD/WME. PASCC seeks to cultivate interconnected, mutually supportive national and international strategic research-community partnerships across domains. A second goal is to bring scientific, technical, and social science faculty/experts together and to look well into the future and help understand and anticipate WMD/WME capabilities.

NEW! PASCC has released a broad area announcement (BAA) for FY14-FY15 project funding, which is posted on grants.gov. PASCC selects projects according to an annual review cycle. White papers are due by June 14, 2013.

For more information about PASCC, please see our brochure and our latest Annual Report. 

PASCC Research in Progress (RIP) sheets provide concise summaries of PASCC-sponsored projects. These "RIP sheets" describe the strategic relevance and proposed approach to each project, and are published when a project receives funding; they do not include project findings or conclusions.

All current and previous RIP sheets are now stored in Calhoun, which provides a searchable and browsable database of all PASCC projects. We especially encourage you to take a look at the new and ongoing projects PASCC will be funding in FY2013!

PASCC reports have a new home! The Homeland Security Digital Library (HSDL) provides a searchable repository of PASCC reports. 

Campus users: Access PASCC reports on the Homeland Security Digital Library (HSDL).  

Off-campus users: Access PASCC reports on the Homeland Security Digital Library (HSDL).

Most PASCC reports are publicly available, with a small collection of For Official Use Only (FOUO) reports that require user authentication and log-on to access.

A Go-to-Market Strategy: Promoting Private Sector Solutions to the Threat of Proliferation

Performers: Brian Finlay, Esha Mufti, and Nate Olson (The Stimson Center).

Abstract: The interconnectivity, complexity, and fluidity of global commerce suggest that the ability of governments to control the proliferation of dangerous technologies is diminishing — at the very moment proliferation and other transnational criminal challenges are increasing. These realities are driven by three contending presumptions: First, proliferation threats are evolving because of the globalized diffusion of WMD capacities which are themselves rooted in, and facilitated by, a growing network of private sector actors. Second, this new reality necessitates renewed attention on building innovative new partnerships with industry if our efforts to prevent proliferation are to be successful. And finally, while the means of WMD production was once the exclusive purview of governments, the privatization of those capacities have led to a growing convergence between the threat of WMD proliferation and a broad array of transnational threats.

This report argues that while government regulation will remain the central element in preventing WMD proliferation and combatting other forms of transnational criminal activity, these trends also open up new opportunities to modernize our preventive toolkit to more sustainably, effectively, and efficiently address a broad array of international trafficking and proliferation threats. Developing government and private sector partnerships is widely recognized to be a critical component for successful nonproliferation and counter-trafficking efforts; however, neither the government nor the expert community has systematically developed practical collaborations that go beyond threats of additional regulation. While not a panacea, self-regulation incented by the market is an under-leveraged tool in current prevention efforts.

The Israeli “Nuclear Alert” of 1973: Deterrence and Signaling in Crisis

Performers: Elbridge Colby, Avner Cohen, William McCants, Bradley Morris, William Rosenau, (CNA).

Abstract:The Strategic Studies Division of CNA, with support from PASCC, conducted an in-depth study of the rumored Israeli "nuclear alert" during the 1973 Yom Kippur War. Drawing on interviews with key participants and experts, both American and Israeli; open source documents; and U.S. Government documents pertaining to the Yom Kippur War, this study concludes that Israel likely did take some steps associated with the readying of its nuclear weapons in the very early stages of the Yom Kippur War, but that these steps were defensive or precautionary in nature and were not a signal. The authors also assess that it is likely that the United States observed this activity and that the report of the activity was disseminated to key decision-makers – but that the report did not have any significant impact on U.S. decision-making. Rather, U.S. (and likely all nations’) decision-makers were aware of the possibility of Israeli nuclear use as an implicit reality, but they judged that it was only plausible in extremis, and American leaders did not believe the situation, even in the dark hours of October 7, had reached those depths. This case illuminates several enduring aspects of the role of nuclear weapons in international politics and conflict, such as the perceptual significance of nuclear operations, bureaucratic and organizational factors in nuclear signaling, and the role of signaling during crises.

Please click here to read "The Israeli 'Nuclear Alert' of 1973: Deterrence and Signaling in Crisis."

Coercive Nuclear Campaigns in the 21st Century: Understanding Adversary Incentives and Options for Nuclear Escalation

PASCC Report: 2013 001. Performers: Kier A. Lieber (Georgetown University) and Daryl G. Press (Dartmouth College).

Abstract: This report examines why and how regional powers armed with nuclear weapons may employ these weapons coercively against the United States or U.S. allies during a conventional war. Lieber and Press argue that intra-war deterrence – preventing nuclear-armed adversaries from escalating during a conventional conflict – is the most important deterrence challenge facing the U.S. in the 21st century. Facing conventionally superior foes, regional nuclear-armed states will worry deeply about the consequences of defeat, which are extraordinarily costly for leaders, and will therefore have substantial incentives to employ nuclear force coercively to stalemate the conflict before they suffer a battlefield defeat. The authors argue the need to incorporate escalation prevention into the goal set for U.S. planners and to assess the impact of changes to the U.S. nuclear arsenal on the ability to deter intra-war escalation.

The Sixth U.S.-Japan Strategic Dialogue

Performers: Brad Glosserman and David Santoro, (Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS)).

Abstract:The Pacific Forum CSIS, with support from the Defense Threat Reduction Agency, held the Sixth US-Japan Strategic Dialogue in Maui, Hawaii on Feb. 7-8, 2013. Twenty-five experts and officials and nine Pacific Forum CSIS Young Leaders from the two countries, all attending in their private capacities, examined the impact of the 2012 elections in both countries on their relationships and the alliance, compared assessments of China and North Korea, and focused on ways to strengthen extended deterrence.

Please click here to read "Toward the Next “Strengthening” Agenda: The US-Japan Alliance in Search of a Vision."

The Fifth U.S.-Republic of Korea Strategic Dialogue

Performers: Brad Glosserman and David Santoro, (Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS)).

Abstract: The Pacific Forum CSIS, with support from the Defense Threat Reduction Agency, held the Fifth US-ROK Strategic Dialogue on Maui, Hawaii on Feb. 4-5, 2013. Twenty-five experts and officials and nine Pacific Forum Young Leaders attended, all in their private capacities. They examined the impact of the 2012 elections in both countries on their relationships and the alliance, compared assessments of China and North Korea, and focused on ways to strengthen extended deterrence. While the dialogue enjoyed its usual candor, ROK participants in some cases seemed hesitant to get too far out in front of their new incoming government.

Please click here to read "Testing Resolve: The US-ROK Alliance at a Crossroads."

Impact of Scientific Developments on the Chemical Weapons Convention

Performers: Katie Smallwood, Ralf Trapp, Robert Mathews, Beat Schmidt, and Leiv K. Sydnes.

Abstract:In 2012, PASCC joined several other organizations in supporting IUPAC's third international workshop to review advances in science and technology with regard to their impact on the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC). For each previous workshop, the program committee prepared a report with findings and recommendations to the States Parties of the CWC and the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW). Review Conferences of the CWC are convened every five years in recognition of the evolutionary nature of the agreement. There exists an ability to adjust and modify the Convention in response to advances and changes, and the objective of the Review Conferences is to review the operation of the CWC, to assess the progress made with its implementation, and to provide strategic guidance for the coming years.

Please click here to read the complete report, which will help provide a baseline for the next CWC Review Conference.

Submarine and Autonomous Vessel Proliferation:Implications for Future Strategic Stability at Sea

PASCC Report: 2012 021. Performers: James Clay Moltz (Naval Postgraduate School).

Abstract: Conventional wisdom from the late Cold War onward suggests that the U.S. submarine force is virtually invulnerable to attack, particularly since the demise of the Soviet Union. U.S. nuclear force planning and a range of other Navy long-range procurement plans assume the safety of future SSBN and SSN operations and the relative absence of threats. This scoping study tests and challenges these assumptions by examining international trends in the proliferation of submarines and autonomous vessel technology. It begins by observing that undersea strategic stability during the Cold War relied on specific factors that may not be present in the future. The study then surveys the range of new countries and capabilities emerging in the 21st century undersea environment. It concludes by suggesting that undersea warfare is going to pose serious new challenges to the U.S. Navy, possibly putting its sea-based leg of the triad at risk as the number of operational boats declines, while also observing that overseas SSN operations will be complicated by changing conditions and ASW developments. Finally, Moltz offers several possible remedies: 1) revision of currently laissez-faire U.S. policies in the area of submarine export controls; 2) revised procurement and basing policies in regard to U.S. SSBNs to reduce emerging vulnerabilities; and 3) reconsideration of diesel/AIP boats as a supplement to U.S. SSN forces for enhanced ASW and for conducting certain domestic and overseas missions.

U.S.-U.K.-France Trilateral Dialogues on Nuclear Issues

Abstract:In 2012, PASCC funded the European Trilateral Dialogues with a grant to the Center for Strategic and International Studies. These dialogues promote insights and policy recommendations in the United States, United Kingdom, and France on nuclear issues ranging from defining the role of nuclear weapons, promoting non-proliferation efforts, advancing NATO's nuclear policy, and enhancing material security. Please click here to read the latest consensus statement from the trilateral working group.

U.S.-Turkey Strategic Dialogue (November 2012)

PASCC Report: 2012 019. Performers: Victoria Clement and Ryan Gingeras (Naval Postgraduate School).

Abstract: From October 31 to November 2, 2012, experts gathered in Istanbul for a PASCC-sponsored Track II dialogue on weapons of mass destruction and regional security. Major themes included American and Turkish perspectives on security and cooperation, extended deterrence, Iran and the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), and the NPT and U.S.-Turkish relations. Participants found consensus on the need to maintain NATO's nuclear deterrent, though there was some disagreement on the meaning and implementation of the NPT. Most American and Turkish participants agreed that the proliferation of illicit nuclear programs in the greater Middle East is not inevitable should Iran develop a nuclear weapon, and that counter-proliferation efforts in Turkey are crucial to upholding the NPT. A number of Turkish and American participants advocated the use of strategic dialogues as a means of furthering discussing issues beset by mistrust, particularly when Turkish sovereignty, American national interests, and intelligence sharing are seen to be at stake. Participants generally agreed that much work remains in developing and expanding Turkey’s capacity to confront challenges related to nuclear proliferation.

U.S.-Brazil Workshop on Global and Regional Security (August 2012)

PASCC Report: 2012 018. Performers: Harold Trinkunas and Thomas Bruneau (Naval Postgraduate School).

Abstract: A workshop on global and regional security was held in Brasilia on 13 and 14 August, 2012, supported by PASCC. Among other topics, participants discussed Brazil's regional role, the limits to the Non-Proliferation Treaty, the changing international system and possible security threats, Brazil's nuclear submarine program, and the role of Brazil's domestic politics in the creation of its defense policy. Brazilian participants also offered some criticisms of the U.S.'s perceived trustworthiness in promoting nuclear disarmament. Nevertheless, Brazilian and U.S. participants agreed on the need to foster an emerging community of interest on security issues that involved both countries. The Brazilians also pointed to areas for further concrete exchanges, particularly on nuclear safety and disaster response.

Multilateral Cooperation on Nonproliferation

PASCC Report: 2012 017. Performers: Jeffrey W. Knopf (Monterey Institute of International Studies).

Abstract:Global efforts to prevent the spread of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) have given rise to international regimes that cover nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons, respectively, each with a core treaty. Over time, a number of other initiatives have sprung up alongside these treaties.  Yet, while  a tremendous amount of cooperative activity takes place beyond the core nonproliferation treaties, there is very little research dedicated to a comparative analysis of these efforts. This project  addresses this gap in our knowledge by providing the first systematic comparative analysis of cooperative nonproliferation activities beyond the core treaties. It has two goals: to identify sources of cooperative nonproliferation activities and to assess the effectiveness of such endeavors. Although it is often  not feasible  to estimate an overall success level, for many of the initiatives studied it is possible to point to clear examples of successful implementation of program objectives. On balance, cooperative nonproliferation  activities make a positive contribution to nonproliferation and problems would likely be worse without them. Several policy recommendations follow in this report; in particular, there is a need to improve coherence and integration among the multiple cooperative endeavors. 

NATO's Deterrence and Defense Posture: After the Chicago Summit (June 2012)

PASCC Report: 2012 016. Performers: David S. Yost (Naval Postgraduate School).

Abstract: On 25-27 June 2012 the NATO Defense College, the NATO Nuclear Policy Directorate, and the U.S. Naval Postgraduate School Center on Contemporary Conflict convened a workshop at the NATO Defense College in Rome concerning the future of NATO’s deterrence and defense posture in light of the decisions taken at the Alliance’s summit meeting in Chicago in May 2012.   Much of the discussion focused on the Deterrence and Defense Posture Review (DDPR) approved by the Allies at the Chicago Summit. Many workshop participants said that NATO’s nuclear-sharing arrangements remain important for deterrence and assurance within the Alliance, and that the life extension program for the B-61 gravity bomb and the modernization of dual-capable aircraft remain central issues for the future of NATO’s nuclear deterrence posture. Several participants said that the DDPR’s focus on nuclear, conventional, and missile defense capabilities was “too narrow” and that future assessments of the Alliance’s capability requirements must take the cyber and space dimensions into account. Participants also noted the continuing tension between NATO’s reliance on nuclear deterrence and its long-term commitment to nuclear disarmament.

Resource Conflicts: Emerging Struggles over Strategic Commodities in Latin America: Phase II

PASCC Report: 2012 015. Performers: Maiah Jaskoski (Naval Postgraduate School).

Abstract: The efficiency and success of U.S. security initiatives in Latin America  requires a thorough understanding of resource conflict and the state’s role in managing it. International investments in mining and hydrocarbons in the Central Andes could potentially affect U.S. economic influence in those countries and have real implications for U.S. security presence relative to other world powers. This report examines how the regulations that structure the process of local community consultation affect the mining sector in Peru and the hydrocarbon extraction sector in Bolivia. By identifying  commonalities in resource conflicts and analyzing how subnational institutions can predict the condition under which conflict arises, this research serves as a first stage in predicting, preempting, and resolving conflict more effectively. The findings in this report should matter to those concerned with the mechanisms by which new projects are reviewed and approved, including the degree to which a project’s environmental and social impacts are anticipated and evaluated