Conference Report:

Terrorism, Transnational Networks and WMD Proliferation: Indications and Warning in an Era of Globalization

Monterey, CA, July 25-27, 2006

Conference sponsored by Defense Threat Reduction Agency’s Advanced System Concepts Office (DTRA-ASCO) at the Naval Postgraduate School

Prepared by James A. Russell, Gwendolyn Sanders, and Colin Lober

For a printable version of this report, please click here.

From July 25-27, 2006 the Center for Contemporary Conflict at the Naval Postgraduate School hosted a conference addressing the topic “Terrorism, Transnational Networks and WMD Proliferation: Indications and Warning in an Era of Globalization.” The Defense Threat Reduction Agency’s Advanced Systems Concepts Office sponsored the event.

Over 130 government officials, military officers, civilian analysts, academics, and non-governmental experts participated in the proceedings, which featured two days in open session and a third day for government-only attendees. The conference represented the third in a series of annual events sponsored by DTRA-ASCO and organized by NPS that addressed different aspects of the security problems confronting states stemming from the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD).

The previous conferences in 2004 and 2005 focused on:

1. WMD proliferation in the Middle East; and
2. The links between globalization and emergent WMD supply proliferation networks in the aftermath the revelations surrounding the establishment of a global nuclear supply network by Pakistani scientist A.Q. Khan.

This year’s event sought to build on the work of the previous two conferences by focusing on the following themes:

1. The impact of globalization in shaping the security problems being faced by states flowing from the interaction between terrorism, transnational networks, and the diffusion of weapons technologies;
2. Structural changes in the international environment suggesting that transnational networks are making it easier for state- and non-state actors to acquire mass destructive technologies and weapons;
3. The relationship between and among transnational networks that are used for terrorism, money laundering, human trafficking, nuclear smuggling, and organized crime;
4. Evidence that that these networks are being used as tools for state- and non-state actors to engage in WMD proliferation; and
5. Implications of emerging transnational networks for a structured system of indications and warning that can alert policy makers to emerging proliferation challenges.

Organizing the United States Government to Combat WMD Proliferation

Consistent with guidance issued at the national level after the 9/11 attacks, various parts of the United States government have restructured themselves to better address the challenge of WMD proliferation. Cdr. Chris Bidwell of the Defense Threat Reduction Agency and the Strategic Command’s Center for Combating WMD (SCC-WMD) and Erin Harbaugh of the State Department’s Bureau of International Security and Nonproliferation began the conference by presenting their respective office’s current preparedness for addressing the threats associated with WMD proliferation.

Reflecting the complexity and intricacy of the WMD proliferation problem, Cdr. Bidwell noted that the Defense Department (DoD) now draws upon the expertise of numerous DoD Commands, and Departments as well as other U.S. government entities as part of an effort to develop an integrated response to the proliferation problem. The SCC-WMD is taking the lead for integrating and synchronizing DoD’s efforts to Combat WMD and covers the entire spectrum of threat response from non-proliferation to counter-proliferation and consequence management, as well as the use of force.

Ms. Harbaugh reviewed the State Department’s efforts to respond to emerging proliferation concerns, which include the establishment of the Bureau of International Security and Nonproliferation and the Office of WMD Terrorism. Created six months ago, this office coordinates U.S. foreign policy to address the nexus of proliferation and terrorism in attempt to orchestrate what Ms. Harbaugh described as a “layered defense in depth.” This approach, which assumes that no single layer, or capability, can provide a sufficient protection against a determined and adaptable terrorist adversary, is aimed at countering the WMD terrorism threat. By leveraging all instruments of national power: diplomatic, military, economic, and legal, and increasing partner country capacity, the State Department, in concert with other US Government agencies, is building a global, layered defense in depth to combat this critical problem.

Theoretical and Policy Framework

While there are many problems posed by the threat of WMD perhaps none are as daunting as creating a theoretical framework in which the threat assessment and response are not subject to a historical bias. NPS Professors James Russell and Jim Wirtz both provided theoretical frameworks surrounding WMD proliferation and indications and warning that placed these issues in broader context.

Professor Russell’s presentation titled “Globalization, the Nexus and WMD Proliferation,” placed the phenomenon of WMD proliferation within a theoretical framework suggested by the literature on globalization. As a response to increased trade, movements of people, and data/communication stemming from the digital revolution of the 1990s, a variety of transnational networks and actors are challenging the primacy of the nation state as principal arbiter of the international system. The state is now struggling to adapt its regulatory structures and its monitoring capabilities to keep up with burgeoning global stocks and flows. As an example, he pointed out that 20-foot container traffic is projected to grow from 80 million in 2002 to 180 million by 2015. Mr. Russell stated that tracking nefarious global stocks and flows associated with proliferation is becoming incrementally more difficult for developed states, which are also paradoxically being overwhelmed with data from a new generation of sensors entering service as a result of technological advances associated with information, surveillance and reconnaissance, or ISR, revolution. A related problem is a growing preponderance of “failed” states, which has seen the growth of what Professor Russell described as “non-normative rules based governance” both within states and in so-called ungoverned spaces. These geographic areas lying outside state control could play an increasing role in the development of WMD procurement and trafficking networks, according to Professor Russell. He also argued that while proliferation networks are constructed with geographic nodes in different locations around the world, those tracking proliferation need to follow the development of virtual networks that operate separately and distinctly from defined geographic areas. He argued that nefarious networks of all sorts are increasingly operating outside governments’ reach in what could be described as three dimensional “gray-areas” or “holes” that effectively represent a different form of instability in the international system. Professor Russell postulated that scholars tracking proliferation will need to study the interaction between virtual, three dimensional holes and geographic ungoverned spaces to determine whether new forms of instability will need to be measured and tracked.

Dr. Wirtz opened his presentation, “Indications and Warning in an Age of Uncertainty,” by emphasizing the difficulty of providing warning to policy makers in the absence of a defined conventional military threat. During the Cold War, the threat posed by the Soviet Union and its conventional military forces deployed in Eastern Europe was a known quantity. Today, targets exist in almost every inhabited space on earth, and the threats now can come from a wide variety of state- and non-state actors. Citing a cultural bias towards the rational actor paradigm, Dr. Wirtz stated that current U.S. government organizational structures are hampered in their ability to conceive of future WMD threats. He noted, however, that those seeking WMD must operate in society at large in order to procure almost all resources, such as people, money and weapons. In so doing, these groups operate on the margins of the societies they inhabit—creating the prospect of anomalies that can assist in the generation of I&W for policy-makers.

Comparative Approaches to Terrorism, Indications and Warning (I&W), and WMD Detection

In his presentation titled “The WMD Detection Problem: Past, Present, and Future,” Richard Russell of the National Defense University argued for increased efforts at gathering human intelligence (HUMINT) and de-emphasizing technical collection efforts. Refocusing these efforts, he argued, would enhance U.S. ability to track and detect WMD proliferation. He cited historical examples ranging from South Africa to India, which revealed U.S. weakness at gathering HUMINT and heavy reliance on signals intelligence (SIGINT), which left the U.S. susceptible to surprise. In the case of the current U.S.-Iran crisis, he argued that the U.S. should focus efforts on recovering as much HUMINT as possible in order to confront the proliferation issue.

[Add Wyn's summary here.]

Biological Weapons Proliferation

Professor Malcolm Dando of the University of Bradford in the United Kingdom, presented on the past, present and future threats of biological weapons. Dr. Dando argued that the threat from possible biological weapons (BW) use is evolving from a solely state-based paradigm to a context in which non-state actors demand attention. The existing protocols for containing BW exploitation and proliferation originally grew out of 20th century concerns over chemical weapons that had been first used in World War I. Unfortunately, Dr. Dando noted that the Geneva Protocol and the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention have proven inadequate in controlling the threat level. The response to these inadequacies came as the so-called “Australia Group” developed a list to codify CW agents. Eventually the list evolved from strictly CW to include BW, and the group’s export control mechanisms serve as a strong deterrent against states attempting to procure materials that would constitute or weaponize a BW or CW-based agent. Since the 9/11 attacks, Dr. Dando noted that sub-state units have been added to the list of possible actors seeking BW or CW. Dando argued that despite the new emphasis on non-state actors, states still needed to be carefully assessed and watched for potential BW proliferation.

In his presentation titled “Bioweapons, Proliferation, and the U.S. Anthrax Attack,” Dr. Leonard Cole presented his findings on the current biological warfare threat to the United States, using the 2001 anthrax attacks to illustrate his points. He noted that authorities did not begin examining the health crisis as an anthrax incident until three and a half weeks after the first outbreak. Cole argued that while blame should not be assigned to those in charge of the investigation, the incident should be used to provide important lessons for the problems facing nations responding to biological attacks. Using the postal system, the perpetrator spread the weaponized anthrax easily and penetrated quite deeply into U.S. government facilities, such as the U.S. Senate. When taken as a whole, the ability of the authorities to track down the perpetrator(s) was severely retarded by such factors as the elapsed time between the letter delivery and the outbreak as well as the dispersed locations of the attacks along the eastern seaboard from Florida to Connecticut, with heavy concentrations of the bacteria in the District of Columbia, New York City, and communities in southern New Jersey. Countering the threat of biological attacks remains a pre-eminent security challenge for all states, emphasized Dr. Cole.

Nuclear Smuggling Networks: Theoretical and Structural Issues

Dr. Richard Schuller, Principal, Tacoma Venture Group, suggested in his presentation titled “Modeling Nuclear Smuggling Networks: A Holistic Approach” that systems-level analysis provides a fruitful line of inquiry to a phenomenon dominated by innuendo and suspicions. The systems-level approach employed by Dr. Schuller identified eight steps that must occur for any non-state entity to acquire nuclear materials: (1) identify location of candidate materials; (2) removal of material from storage; (3) removal of material from facility; (4) arrange interim storage; (5) locate buyer; (6) arrange sale; (7) transport to buyer; (8) complete sale. While thefts of nuclear materials have occurred in the past, Dr. Schuller argued that these have been on the “supply-side” of the equation, i.e., material was taken from a nuclear facility by thieves who then searched for a buyer. Dr. Schuller contrasted this to a “demand-side” transaction, in which a group actively seeks out materials and methods by which that material could be stolen. While the prevalence of the supply-side incidents have increased, the utility of the stolen materials is low, which suggests that the activity is driven more by economics than by the desire for nuclear material. Dr. Schuller argued that the primary danger lies with the demand-side drive by any actor wishing to procure nuclear weapons. He noted that acquiring an existing device was on some ways preferable to developing an indigenous capability due to the huge “footprint” required for such a program. Dr. Schuller’s model identified five major steps necessary in the development of NW: (1) acquire needed weapons material; (2) establish needed infrastructure; (3) obtain knowledge base; (4) develop delivery system; (5) establish and maintain operational security.

While states are increasingly focused on the possibility of a relationship between criminal organizations, terrorist groups and WMD proliferation, the realities of these relationships reveals a complex situation, according Dr. Phil Williams, professor at the Graduate School of Public and International Affairs, University of Pittsburgh. In his presentation titled “Nuclear Smuggling Networks: Patterns and Typologies,” Dr. Williams explained that criminal organizations located in the areas of concern tend to be ethnically based, involve corrupt officials and operate like a business -- not the typical requirements of a terrorist organization. As such, terrorist organizations have come to adopt organized crime operating tactics creating hybrid organizations where the criminal aspect of the organization is designed to be a money generating venture to fund the terrorist activities. Dr. Williams argued that cooperation between criminal and terrorist organization tends to on the “supply-side” situation, as previously elaborated by Dr. Schuller. Dr. Williams stated that history has shown that the more terrorist groups act like a criminal organization, the greater the likelihood that the goals and focus of that organization will drift away from terrorism towards criminality. The bottom line for terrorist and criminal cooperation in the WMD arena comes down the two fundamental questions: (1) What criminal organization is willing to risk the consequences of aiding a terrorist organization in acquiring WMD? (2) Which criminal, terrorist or hybrid organization has the logistical capacity to smuggle WMD into a western nation for use against that nation? Dr. Williams concluded by emphasizing that while most criminal organizations are risk-averse, terrorist organizations must function in an inherently risky environment; together these contradictory facts give the authorities a possible window of opportunity for detection and deterrence.

Nuclear Smuggling Networks Case Studies

Echoing the theme of terrorist and criminal organization overlap, Dr. Louise Shelley from American University summarized her research on nuclear smuggling networks operating from Russia through Georgia. Taking advantage of the internal conflict in North and South Ossetia and Abkhazia most traffickers use these conflict areas as the hub for transit of illicit contraband including nuclear materials. The Caucasus is merely a transit region before the materials move to Turkey and possibly beyond. Facilitating this trade is an international criminal network that facilitates the movement of a variety of illicit commodities. Terrorist and criminal organizations interact with other in Western European prisons establishing relationships between suppliers and purchasers. Within Georgia, criminals operated freely from prisons, using these facilities as de facto corporate headquarters prior to crackdowns in early 2006. The Georgian criminals, like the Sicilian mafia, maintain control over territory. Therefore, they direct transport of illicit commodities through their territory as result of their corruption of prison officials and other government officials. The monthly kitty of the serious criminals in prison was $1 million monthly. The long standing institution of professional criminals within Georgia and their ability to function internationally can result in the movement of such illicit contraband as nuclear materials largely unimpeded not necessarily with the explicit knowledge of the criminals.

In her presentation titled “Organized Crime, Terrorism and Nuclear Trafficking: DSTO Case Study 2001-2005,” Lyudmila Zaitseva of the University of Salzburg summarized her findings from 40 nuclear smuggling cases drawn from Stanford University’s Database on Nuclear Smuggling, Theft and Orphan Radiation Sources (DSTO). The DSTO contains over 1600 open-source entries spanning the years 1991-2005, revealing, among other things, that a total of 39 kg of highly enriched uranium or HEU, and plutonium have been seized by law-enforcement forces worldwide between 1992 and 2005. While this number cannot possibly represent the entire amount of HEU or plutonium “floating” on the market, the number does represent what is known in the open-source world, according to Ms Zaitseva. For her study, Ms. Zaitseva created a framework that looked for organizations that had the following attributes: experience in actual seizure of material; organizations of three or more people; a history of sustained illegal activity; and, were motivated primarily by profit. From the 40 selected cases, 31 fulfilled all of the criteria, yet only two had weapons-grade material and 60 percent were transnational in character. Ms. Zaitseva emphasized that her study showed that the linkages between nuclear smuggling and terrorist or criminal organizations remain weak. Also, in only 15 percent of these cases analyzed did nuclear smugglers also have an involvement in drug trafficking.

Ms. Sheena Chestnut, a graduate student at Oxford University, presented her research on North Korea's (DPRK) illicit smuggling activity.  In her presentation titled "North Korean Criminal Networks & Implications for Proliferation," Ms. Chestnut stated that DPRK criminal smuggling dates to 1976, when embassies were directed to "self-finance" their operations.   This directive meant that DPRK diplomats began to traffic in drugs, exotic animals, and counterfeit currency.  Chestnut noted that with the collapse of the DPRK economy in the mid-1990's, involvement in illicit trade expanded dramatically.  DPRK smuggling networks subsequently began working with criminal organizations to distribute drugs and "Supernotes," high-quality counterfeit U.S. dollars.  Most recently, the DPRK appears to have begun exporting counterfeit cigarettes and pharmaceuticals, which are distributed by front organizations far beyond the DPRK borders.  Chestnut stated that thus far, there is no evidence that criminal smuggling networks have been used to transfer WMD technologies and weapons.  She noted, however, that the DPRK possesses the capabilities to conduct nuclear and other WMD-related proliferation, adding that the DPRK has in the past shown a willingness to work with terrorist organizations and has also indicated that it would consider exporting nuclear material under certain conditions.

Terrorism, Proliferation and Non-State Actors

Dr. James Smith, Director of the Institute for National Security Studies at the Air Force Academy, presented the preliminary results of findings in a research project titled “Al Qaeda, WMD Proliferation and Strategic Culture.” Dr. Smith summarized the approach of his research in which the potential use of WMD by Al Qaeda is placed within a broader framework of the organization’s strategic culture. Dr. Smith stated that WMD use by Al Qaeda in pursuit of mass casualties forms only one element in a broader ideology and narrative that postulates an embrace of targeting combatants and non-combatants alike as part of a broadly-focused defensive jihad against the West and apostate regimes in the Middle East. Al Qaeda exists in a framework of total war in which the means must be justified by the ends. While there is no traditional basis for using WMD in radical Islamist thought, Dr. Smith emphasized that the West needed to play close attention to the search for justification of mass casualty attacks that seeks to legitimize the use of WMD.

In reviewing his case study of the London January 2003 ricin cell, Dr. Glen Segell of the Institute of Security Policy, London, England, emphasized that at the time the United Kingdom’s legal system only allowed for prosecution of committed acts based on the criminal justice system and did not provide adequate authorities to address demonstrated intent to commit acts of terror. His presentation titled “The London Ricin Cell: Implications for the Future,” summarized the facts of the ricin cell case for WMD proliferation and addressed the broader implications of the case for counter-proliferation and counter-terrorism in the United Kingdom. He noted that the case had to be placed in context of the leading to Operation Iraqi Freedom with its emphasis on a casus belli of WMD . On January 5, 2003, police arrested seven men in a north London suburb, seizing Castor oil beans, equipment for crushing the beans, and a ricin recipe. Such evidence clearly pointed to intended use as biological agent for assassination, disruption and mass panic, according to Segell, even if the original motive was not that. However, three years later, all but one arrested member are free, with the lone holdout held on totally unrelated charges. Police investigation revealed that the cell was potentially targeting high-ranking British officials who supported Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF). In this the local moved to the global and was addressed in speeches in Washington, the United Nations and by Generals in the Coalition forces. Dr. Segell emphasized that the disturbing parts of the evidence presented at the arrestees court case pointed to links between the London ricin cell and Islamic extremist groups in Algeria, Georgia, Iraq, and Pakistan. In doing so the cell in some respects represented an extension of a phenomenon he described as the grey area phenomena associating terrorism, criminals and warlordism. The ricin cell represented part of a disturbing trend in which regional warlords and global criminal networks could coalesce with terrorists to be empowered with unconventional weapons for multiple purposes.

Andrea Plebani, Research Fellow at Landau Network-Centro Volta (LNCV), Como, Italy, presented the findings contained in his paper titled “Attractiveness of WMD for Radical Islamist Movements.” Mr. Plebani examined two main issues related to the threat represented by the acquisition of WMD by Islamist radical organizations: the ideological-theological dimension and the spatial one. Concerning the first issue, Mr. Plebani examined the different positions expressed by the most prominent clerics towards WMD within the Islamic community and, in particular, he analysed the fatwa issued by Sheikh Nasir bin Hamid al-Fahd, which legitimates the use of WMD.

Mr. Plebani underlined the central role this fatwa could play in the current scenario and argued that the focus should be placed on the rest of the Islamic clerical world, stressing the importance of creating an ummah-wide dialogue to de-emphasize the attractiveness of WMD to Islamist organizations.

Concerning the “spatial dimension” of the above delineated threat, Mr. Plebani stated that one of the main obstacles encountered so far by these movements has been the lack of a site at which to set up production of the weapons as well as access to the necessary know-how, materials, and tools required to achieve their aim. In this regard, Weak-Failed states represent the next frontier of the war against the acquisition of WMD by Islamist radical organizations and should be placed in the centre of the strategy aimed to avoid such a scenario.

Terror Financing Networks: Lessons for WMD Proliferation?

Dr. Harold Trinkunas, of the Naval Postgraduate School, spoke about patterns of terrorist financing and the possible overlap with proliferation networks. In his presentation titled “Follow the Money: Patterns in Terrorist Financing,” Trinkunas argued that while many of the same methodologies and institutions are used in both terrorist financing and proliferation networks, there is not an easy one-to-one comparison. He noted that a major problem plaguing financial institutions and governments as they attempt to find terrorist financing in the international financial system is the sheer volume of transactions occurring, creating a significant signal to noise problem. Since the number of transactions is fewer, take place among fewer nodes, and often involve the movement of physical assets, this problem may not be as acute for agencies targeting WMD proliferation networks. However, two areas where there are lessons learned from counter-terrorism financing (CTF) for preventing WMD proliferation are intelligence and enforcement. International CTF efforts have shifted their emphasis from freezing terrorist assets, the strategy pursued immediately after the 9/11 attacks, to using intelligence about financial transactions to build a better picture of the overall terrorist network. A similar approach may be fruitful in countering WMD proliferation. Another of the key problems in countering terrorism financing is that while most countries have enacted legislation criminalizing such activities, their enforcement mechanisms remain weak. This is due both to a lack of state capacity and shortages of resources and to the efforts of domestic veto coalitions to limit state surveillance of financial transaction. International CTF efforts have not done enough to overcome these obstacles, but counter WMD proliferation efforts should learn from this and place greater emphasis on designing policies to promote enforcement capacity, provide resources and secure political buy-in from partner states.

“More due diligence is needed to stop the financing of terrorists,” proclaimed Jack Blum, Esq., during his presentation titled “Lessons from the Past: Money Laundering and the New Security Environment.” Internationally, banks are allowed to transfer money amongst each other without fulfilling the same requirements that regular citizens must for a simple wire transfer. The “who, what, where, why, when, and how” of individual wire transfers requiring a recipient and donor information simply doesn’t apply to the international banking system, noted Blum. Moreover, the technology exists to track any kind of international financial transaction, as all of the international wire transfers pass through London, New York or Frankfurt, yet the application of the technology is lacking. The patterns used by nefarious groups to transfer money are not yet known, let alone tracked by any major financial institution. Blum emphasized that greater interagency support is needed to overcome this knowledge gap and to discover the “person behind the fake name.”

Indications &Warning WMD Proliferation Case Studies

Mr. Tom Johnson, of the Naval Postgraduate School, presented research conducted by himself and Professor James Russell on open source data collection on South Asia proliferators. He asserted that that up to 90 percent of the necessary data to detect proliferation exists in the open-source arena, with the other 10 percent existing in the classified realm. Professor Johnson argued that while open-source information presents its own set of collection and analysis problems, the benefits of relying on open-source data are compelling. He explained that the primary difficulties faced by researchers using open sources are in wading through the sea of data and identifying relevant information. In this sea of confusion, terrorist groups seeking to proliferate are able to operate and thrive, sometimes in plain sight. The research project administered by Professors Russell and Johnson primarily focused on the supply-side of proliferators in South Asia ("Open Source Exploitation and Open Source Exploitation and WMD Proliferation Networks: An WMD Proliferation Networks: An Untapped Resource Untapped Resource.") Professor Johnson concluded by presenting the preliminary findings on the project examining proliferators in South Asia, focusing on individuals, companies and transnational terrorist groups that, according to open sources, may be involved in proliferation activities.

In a case study of 171 incidents from 2001-2006, Dr. Sonia Ben Ouagrham and Mr. Dennis Gormley, both of the Monterey Institute for International Studies, investigated smuggling networks in Central Asia and the Caucasus. In their presentation titled “Trafficking in WMD Materials in Central Asia and the Caucasus: I&W Implications,” Dr. Ben Ouagrham presented a picture of amateurish smuggling networks in Central Asia and the Caucasus where the vast majority of thefts involved radioactive material stolen for the value of metal casing rather than for the radioactive sources themselves. These thefts were often perpetrated by the “supply-side” rather than terrorist demand. The results of their study revealed only two instances of BW and CW trafficking, the first in Ukraine, the second in Georgia. Dr. Ben Ouagrham noted, however, the increasing signs that the drug trade and illicit trafficking networks are coalescing. From this, Dr. Ben Ouagrham concluded that there were no established connections between suppliers, potential brokers, and an established terrorist client network. Mr. Gormley expounded on the two types of knowledge approaches involved in the case study, explicit and tacit. Explicit knowledge follows along the lines of traditional education and knowledge transfer occurring in many universities, research labs, workshops, etc., both domestically and transitionally. Tacit knowledge, however, is much harder to detect as it is inductive and passed through experience without a paper trail. Most disturbing, post-Soviet fragmentation has led to lax security, virtually no accounting, and severely underpaid scientists. Specifically, the Soviet Anti-Plague System had developed over 80 facilities in Central Asia and the Caucasus designed to control deadly endemic diseases, which also contributed to the offensive and defensive aspects of the Soviet BW program, and today the facilities are in poor condition with little by means of security and no accounting system of pathogens. Mr. Gormley stated that West must continue working with the post-Soviet countries to monitor and control facility structure and activities, staffing patterns, physical security and biosafety at many unsecured facilities in Central Asia.

In his case study of South Africa titled “South Africa and WMD Supply Networks: Indications and Warnings Implications,” Dr. Steven Burgess of the Air War College introduced the question, “Will there be any more surprises?” Pointing to the case of South Africa, Dr. Burgess stated that the U.S. believed South Africa to be a benign partner not a country that had constituted a BW system. This predisposition blinded the U.S. to South Africa’s weak system of internal security and program oversight. Although South Africa began a defensive BW program, it evolved into an offensive program that became driven by scientists operating outside government control. While running South Africa’s BW program, Dr. Daan Goosen began contacting people, including criminals, seeking personal financial gain in exchange for a collection of pathogens and gradually involved himself in a variety of nefarious activities. Burgess recounted that closing down the South Africa’s BW program proved difficult, and strains of various BW were found in Dr. Goosen’s garage and those of other officials involved in the program. Burgess also reviewed the involvement of South African entities in the A.Q. Kahn nuclear networks, which he argued once again highlighted the difficulties associated with keeping track of under-employed former government scientists that had significant knowledge to offer The biggest takeaway from the South African experience is the need for greater oversight considering that people involved in both the Khobar Towers bombings and the London bombings were traced back to South Africa, and the lack of basic security that existed throughout the period of BW program constitution.

Proliferation Networks and the Next Generation of WMD

Dr. Margaret Kosal from the Defense Threat Reduction Agency briefed the conference on the possibility for next generation proliferation in WMD in her presentation titled “Is Small Scary? The Rapidly Narrowing Line Between Science Fiction and Threat Anticipation in Nanotechnology,” Dr. Kosal noted that the scientific pursuit of the minutely small – nanotechnology—is thriving in academia and in the private sector.  Whereas academia, the intelligence community, federal agencies, and regulatory policy are currently grappling with the security issues surrounding cutting-edge research and publication in the realm of biotechnology, there has not been commensurate attention to the potential proliferation challenges of nanotechnology.  Dr. Kosal’s presentation explored proliferation scenarios for a range of chemical and biological threats, from circumventing vaccines to environmentally robust vesicants and the long-term potential of molecular assemblers (along with physical limitations due to the Second Law of Thermodynamics and the effect of small Reynolds's number on viscous movement).  The international nature and prominent commercial sector activity in nanotechnology research and development, a situation that renders previous models inadequate, were also considered.  Recognizing and initiating efforts to address the potential for malfeasant use by a state or knowledge transfer by a deranged, lone scientist should be initiated now.  Alternatively, we may find ourselves ten years down the road facing a nanotechnology A.Q. Khan- kind of figure. 

Lessons from Pakistan

In their presentation titled “The Next Proliferant: Lessons from Pakistan and the AQ Khan Network,” Dr. Peter R. Lavoy, Director, Center for Contemporary Conflict, and Brigadier General (Retired) Feroz Khan stressed five major points: (1) a motivated state will develop nuclear weapons if it believes in their feasibility and utility; (2) under international pressure, programmatic success requires secrecy and compartmentalization; (3) those involved in program administration adopt an end-justifies-the-means mentality; (4) procurement networks will fill today’s nuclear supply needs. Dr. Lavoy stressed the importance of how these truths came to the fore in Pakistan. Where the international relations theory of realism only explains proliferation in the context of states’ search for a balance of power, Dr. Lavoy’s “myth-making” paradigm emphasizes the impact of ideas, people, and institutions on decisions by states to proliferate. Dr. Lavoy emphasized that in Pakistan, the nuclear myth was an “unverifiable claim about the relationship between a nation’s nuclear weapons program and its national security, power, and welfare.” This myth was, in turn, propagated by nuclear mythmakers in the Pakistani system. He concluded by stating that the recent the U.S.-India Global partnership has served to reinforce Pakistani fears of an imminent Indian attack, in turn reinforcing the entire myth-making paradigm that has proven so important in the development of Pakistan’s nuclear program.

Adding to Dr. Lavoy and Brig. Gen. Khan’s thesis, Bruno Tertrais offered a presentation of the A.Q. Khan network from a European perspective. In his presentation titled “Pakistani Nuclear Imports and Exports: A European Perspective," Tertrais summarized the “import strategy” utilized by Pakistani officials to build their indigenous nuclear program, noting that U.S. suppliers played an important role in the program. Pakistan’s procurement networks made extensive use of front companies and took advantage of lax intra-European trade policies. He also argued that Pakistan’s subsequent export activities operated by A.Q. Khan in some respects simply used the model nuclear materials imports and applied it to its export activities that resulted in sales to Libya and Iran. Tertrais emphasized that Pakistan’s successful import and export programs should serve as a warning to both the European and American governments of the ability of procurement networks to mount effective deception efforts and to operate in the seams of inadequate export control systems.

Combating Emergent WMD Networks: Challenges for Export Controls

Dr. Michael Beck, Executive Director of the Center for International Trade and Security at the University of Georgia, presented on the elements necessary for export controls. An effective export control regime must have three main pieces: 1) licensing authorities; 2) enforcement mechanisms, and; 3) government outreach to industry. Dr. Beck noted that while some countries have made progress in developing export controls, many countries lack even the legal basis to control WMD-related trade. Among states that have passed export control laws, enforcement mechanisms are especially weak, including in places where they are most needed. Central Asia serves as a prime example of a location whose history with WMD materials development combined with porous borders and weak rule of law can create the right mix for a terrorist seeking to procure WMD-related items. While UN Security Council Resolution 1540 has made progress in requiring states to create export control systems, the ability of all parties to carry out such a mandate is extremely weak. Dr. Beck emphasized that the weakness of these export control systems places pressure on the West to assist fledgling nations attempting and desiring to fulfill their obligations in meeting the requirements of UNSCR 1540.

Conference Findings

The conference served as a useful vehicle in bringing together a multi-functional, interdisciplinary group from inside and outside government to consider future proliferation challenges. A number of interesting findings emerged from the two days of presentation that are relevant for academics, policy-makers and intelligence community professionals studying the issue of WMD proliferation and seeking to configure national instruments of power as policy tools to deal with the threat.

1. The gravest WMD proliferation threat today comes from states that satisfy four conditions: (a) loose internal oversight and controls over an existing program as was the case in Pakistan; (b) possess significant latent capability in the form of human knowledge and expertise and an industrial infrastructure as is the case in Russia, FSU, and South Africa; (c) weak internal physical controls over materials that could be used for WMD-related weapons (Russia and FSU); (d) encourage illicit activities by various state organizations, i.e., DPRK .
2. There is little indication of in the open sources that indicate widespread cooperation between terrorist groups and state-based WMD proliferation activities and networks. Moreover, there is little evidence that nuclear smuggling networks operating in Central Asia and the former Soviet republics are servicing a “demand” side market from terrorist organizations.
3. Processes associated with globalization, such as the diffusion of weapons technology and continued growth in non-state actors of various types, will inevitably spread dangerous WMD-type capabilities throughout the international system.
4. The prospects of continued state failure and the consequent establishment of non-norms based governance in these areas will create additional proliferation challenges for developed states.
5. Export controls as currently structured are a useful first line of defense to contain proliferation, but weak enforcement mechanisms around the world will continue to create seams or gaps that can be exploited by state- and non-state actors engaged in illegal proliferation activities.
6. Current systems used by the intelligence community for indications and warning are ill-suited to predict emergent proliferation challenges emanating from states and non-state actors.