Conference Report 2008 Monterey Proliferation Seminar 

Global Perspectives of the Proliferation Landscape: An Assessment of Tools and Policy Problems 

Sponsored by the Defense Threat Reduction Agency’s Advanced Systems and Concepts Office In cooperation with King’s College, University of London; Gulf Research Center; Fondation pour la Recherche Stratégique; University of Salzburg; School of Policy and International Affairs, University of Maine

10 – 12 June 2008, U.S. Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California

by James A. Russell and Trisha Bury

Introduction

On 10-12 June 2008, 100 government officials, civilian analysts, military officers, academics and security experts from a dozen countries gathered at the U.S. Naval Postgraduate School for the fifth annual Monterey Proliferation Seminar, addressing the topic “Global Perspectives of the Proliferation Landscape: An Assessment of Tools and Policy Problems.” The Defense Threat Reduction Agency’s Advanced Systems and Concepts Office (DTRA-ASCO) sponsored the event, which was hosted by the Naval Postgraduate School’s Center for Contemporary Conflict in cooperation with King’s College, University of London (UK); the Gulf Research Center (Dubai, UAE); Fondation pour la Recherche Stratégique (Paris, France); the University of Salzburg (Austria); and the School of Policy and International Affairs, University of Maine.

The Advanced Systems and Concepts Office supports DTRA, the Department of Defense and other U.S. agencies through projects that are designed to encourage alternative thinking, innovative strategies and cross-cutting approaches to WMD threats. As such, in this time of transition, DTRA-ASCO’s main objective for this event was to reflect upon changes in the security environment and examine the programs and policies that address them.

The conference themes were:

• Examining the proliferation field over the last decade. What went right or wrong? What are the main proliferation problems today?
• Assessing the prospects of a nuclear “cascade” as states seek to develop nuclear power infrastructure and achieve latent nuclear status. Should the expansion of global nuclear infrastructure prompt stronger IAEA restrictions?
• Reviewing attempts to establish a “defense in depth” against the proliferation of nuclear weapons and other WMD.
• Examining global problems in implementing enhanced control mechanisms and regimes. What is realistic for states, considering the levels of diplomacy, leadership and intelligence sharing necessitated by multilateral engagement?  

Keynote Address

The Honorable Patricia McNerney, Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary for International Security and Nonproliferation for the U.S. State Department, gave the keynote address, highlighting some of the most significant changes in the global proliferation environment and the responses of counterproliferation regimes. One of the Bush Administration’s top priorities is combating the WMD threat, and they are now working with Russia to manage the proliferation of dangerous materials worldwide. The landscape is changing on several fronts: as states like North Korea, Libya, Syria and Lebanon are building their capabilities, other states are ramping up their own programs just for defense or deterrence, which then increases the overall threat; meanwhile, the surge in non-state actors is bringing with it entirely new types of threats. These new proliferation threats beget new counterproliferation measures; among them, the National Security Strategy and the Strategy to Combat WMD aim to prevent rogue state acquisition, deter and defend against threats, and manage the consequences of proliferation. Multilateral initiatives such as the Global Threat Reduction Initiative remove materials that could have produced many improvised weapons by supporting peaceful nuclear energy programs and eliminating incentives that might spread dual-use technologies. Still other initiatives, specifically those brought about through the Security Council, preclude the funding of proliferation activities. One of the great successes of the Proliferation Security Initiative has been the transformation of the counterproliferation landscape through capacity-building, information-sharing and an increased deterrent impact. While the international community is becoming increasingly sophisticated in addressing proliferation threats, McNerney cautions that actors are becoming increasingly resilient to our counterproliferation measures, and we must continually adapt to stay on top of the threat.

V Siddhartha, Naeem Salik and Bruno Dupre at the Château Julien reception

Perspectives on the Defense in Depth: A Glass Half Empty or Half Full?  

Ambassador Robert Joseph of the National Institute for Public Policy gave the first talk, assessing current U.S. nonproliferation policy. The conceptual framework for the Bush Administration’s policies relies on prevention—strengthening the NPT, export controls and the cooperative threat reduction program; however, we need to draw on all available tools and amplify interagency responsibility. The framework for our nonproliferation strategy should consist of three elements: preventing all aspects of proliferation, preparing to deal with threats where prevention fails (i.e. ballistic missile defense), and mitigation of/response to proliferation consequences. In order to effectively address these three areas, certain “enabler” capabilities are required, including enhanced collection and analysis of intelligence, more research and development in key areas like nuclear detection, tailored strategies against each adversary and an active multilateral effort on non- and counterproliferation. The Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism represents a multilateral capacity-building measure that expands the reach of existing international law. Three principal challenges remain in the proliferation landscape:

• Rogue states. Libya stands out as a model for success, where all the military, diplomatic and economic tools were brought to bear. There was a series of tactical successes with Iran in the form of IAEA regulations, but the program marches on. The greatest prospects for diplomatic success with North Korea occurred after the November 2006 test, when all partners were fully engaged, but the opportunity has since disappeared.
• Nuclear terrorism. This is the preeminent threat facing the international community. There is a lot of work being put into detection and information sharing, but it is more important that we build on the foundation of existing global initiatives to strengthen our defense.
• Shaping the nuclear future. A pragmatic approach is needed; we must look at others’ perspectives and analyze their incentives for peaceful nuclear programs.  

The second speaker was Dr. Robert Gallucci of Georgetown University’s Edmund Walsh School of Foreign Service. He first spoke about traditional state proliferation problems, pointing to the uncertain future of North Korea despite previous negotiation successes; he also warned that using the word “unacceptable” against Iran is dangerous, especially when our words are not backed with action. The Bush Administration has been doing good things in terms of nuclear terrorism, but our focus should turn more toward fissile material control and intelligence sharing rather than trying to catch someone in the act of moving a nuclear weapon. Deterrence should be expanded to those states that have fissile nuclear capacity, including Russian and Pakistan. Recent U.S. policies have led to what Gallucci refers to as “gratuitous damage creation”:

• There is a role for nuclear energy given the problem of global climate change; it is the use of plutonium fuels that is a problem. The administration is not doing enough about this—we cannot set a precedent of using plutonium without expecting others to follow.
• The U.S.-India Nuclear Deal represents a trashing of an extremely important nuclear norm, as it was done outside the Permanent Five, sets the precedent way too wide for dealing with “responsible” nuclear creators and will not introduce new safeguards into India.
• Strategic weapons levels need to be lowered, and shutting down the CTBT argument only hurts us. The administration needs to de-emphasize preemption and preventive war, at least on the public front; we should not be taking up policies that we would find unacceptable in other members of the international community.

Discussion

One of the main points of discussion was the value of nonproliferation treaties. While we are likely to see a new treaty in the near future, it is important to consider that the informality of initiatives such as the PSI is a major factor in their success. The credibility of our nuclear deterrent is critical—it keeps Japan, for example, from developing its own program, keeping China happy and preventing a new chain of proliferation and insecurity—but there is a risk that some states may find the U.S. umbrella inadequate.

South Asia Panel

Dr. Rajiv Nayan of the Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses in Delhi discussed problems in executing nonproliferation from an Indian perspective. The first major problem is that so far, counterproliferation has taken a regional approach to a global issue—the globalization of proliferation networks, markets and materials has led them to elude the authorities at the regional level. Another is the prevalence of new threats, namely highly knowledgeable and sophisticated non-state actors ready to use any means at their disposal. Finally, there is an overemphasis on formalism; while legal, regulatory and enforcement mechanisms are essential, they are insufficient for dealing with clandestine networks that operate outside legal structures (even within countries with elaborate regulatory structures). There are also a number of critical unanswered questions regarding nonproliferation norms: Is nonproliferation a means or an end? Is nonproliferation more effective as a treaty or regime? Does Article 6, among others, demand full disarmament or just nuclear disarmament? When defining nuclear weapons states (NWS) and non-nuclear weapons states (NNWS), how should we approach countries with diverse backgrounds? How do we engage newcomers to the nonproliferation regime—as targets or partners? Nayan argues that any delay in answering these questions runs the risk of dampening the spirit of cooperation within the nonproliferation regime or having it lose credibility overall. The tasks ahead include:

• Development of a new, post-Cold War framework for nonproliferation
• Focused enforcement
• A criteria-based approach for NPT membership, creating an example for outliers to promote the adoption of desired behaviors
• Treatment of nonproliferation as a political tool
• Limited use of technical fixes, as well as sanctions that cause suffering among populations and create potential terrorist support bases

Brigadier General (Ret.) Naeem Salik of the Johns Hopkins School for Advanced International Studies talked about Pakistan’s approach to counterproliferation. He explained that Pakistan’s volatile neighborhood leads to constant misunderstanding and often unwarranted scrutiny and accusations about Pakistan’s nuclear program. Counterproliferation measures undertaken by Pakistan include:

• Restrictive: Establishment of National Command Authority (1999) to oversee national nuclear program, which has matured into a very professional, institutionalized organization; Defense in Depth from border to accounting to counterintelligence
• Regulatory Authority: Covers all aspects of the peaceful nuclear program; registered all facilities using any radiological materials (including hospitals), issues permits; ensures safety of power plants; developed national nuclear security plan
• Strategic: Overall implementation of export control regime
• National Command Authority: Legal rights to investigate offenses and enforce punishments
• International cooperation: 1. Nuclear Safety Convention; 2. Bilateral cooperation with the United States

Traditionally, Pakistan subscribed to nonproliferation, playing part in nonproliferation practices, but stayed out of the NPT because of India. Serious concerns for security and survival after the 1971 war led to a major change in Pakistan’s outlook on nonproliferation, and CTBT policy eventually fell victim to internal politics and changes in the international environment. Pakistan did, however come up with various nonproliferation schemes in South Asia, including bilateral nonproliferation agreements with India. They consider the United States-India deal to be a negative development, which is bound to impact Pakistan’s own FMCT policy. He concluded that NPT members need to overcome ethnocentric biases and try to engage outliers to the treaty.

Discussion

A major discussion point for this session was the CTBT. While in India, there is a general understanding in the strategic community that they should not be the first to conduct a test, they feel that if there were a serious change in the international environment, they should review the moratorium on testing. Pakistan’s decision to stay out of the CTBT was influenced by the United States’ refusal to ratify, in addition to the belief that they would be pushed into the NPT if they signed on.

Non-State Actors panel: Friedrich Steinhäusler and Jez Littlewood

Countering the Threat of Non-State Actors

Dr. Jez Littlewood from the Canadian Centre of Intelligence and Security Studies discussed tools to prevent biological weapons use by non-state actors. (Link to presentation slides; link to conference paper.) To date, cases have been low-level, failures, or successes with very little impact, characterized by the following:

• State-level program: hard cases, like North Korea
• Latent interest; very few cases of terrorism involving bio weapons
• Failed acquisition
• Actual possession
• Unsuccessful use of bio weapon (Aum Shinrikyo)
• Successful use (salmonella in Oregon; anthrax letters in 2001)

The majority of terrorist groups have failed to master the science necessary for a biological weapons strike. Taking this into consideration, we must avoid hyperbole—just because a group can doesn’t mean it will, but just because it hasn’t doesn’t mean it won’t. An assessment of demand suggests that the norm against using biological weapons has strengthened in the recent past, but overall there is very little knowledge about motivations for using them. Capability is something beyond our control, as the globalization of technology and economic drivers creates potential capabilities throughout the world. We must keep in mind the fact that there are a wide range of possible targets and attack routes when it comes to non-state actors, and that the end goal may not just be lethal weapons, or in fact, those only lethal against humans. In terms of countermeasures, the 1925 Geneva Protocol was very important to norms; the Australia Group now represents the benchmark in standards; some states, like the UK, are realizing that the problem is no longer just external and are turning their focus inward; and ad-hoc multilateral arrangements tend to take on a life of their own. It is up to the international community to recognize knowledge gaps, especially the difficulty in determining attribution; think about differing approaches to accidents, natural outbreaks and intentional attacks; and most importantly, implement what’s already in place instead of calling for new measures.

Dr. Friedrich Steinhäusler from the University of Salzburg spoke about legal instruments to prevent nuclear WMD use by non-state actors. He first assessed UNSCR 1540, citing the inadequacy of physical protection measures defined within the resolution. The level of protection is instead determined by individual states, and national reports only come from member states with minimal guidance from the IAEA. Legal consequences for unsatisfactory or incomplete reports have not been reconciled. The IAEA Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (CPPNM) is similarly faulty in its subjectivity—actions taken to counter security threats are as divergent as each state’s view on threats—and no legally binding minimum standard for physical security is defined in the convention. Furthermore, many states in the developing world and CIS do not possess adequate financial resources to secure nuclear material and facilities. The IAEA Recommendations on Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and Nuclear Facilities (INFCIRC 225) is limited in that it only represents recommendations, and can only be supported by dedicated IAEA programs upon request. The Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism is hindered by the fact that two nuclear countries, India and North Korea, and several other countries with a level of nuclear infrastructure are not participating. The advisory body of partner nations (IAG), which is necessary for implementing the initiative, is informal and lacks the authority to enforce member states’ actions to combat nuclear terrorism as well as the ability to objectively assess any improvements resulting from the initiative. Finally, the Zangger Committee represents only an informal group of nuclear suppliers that are party to the NPT, and lacks the membership of important nuclear suppliers such as India, Pakistan, Israel and North Korea. He concluded with a brief analysis of the current proliferation situation: out of 1800 examined cases, only 27 involved weapons-grade materials, so either the system we have is working fairly well, or there is not much interest. There is a need for a realistic risk assessment, rather than one that is politically driven; we need to assess the real odds that a terrorist group will have the knowledge, technical capacity and opportunity for nuclear WMD. Current legal tools—multiple legally binding treaties, recommendations and voluntary agreements—appear to be adequate for now, as non-state actors have been unable to deploy nuclear WMD. Each of these legal tools, however, has inherent security weaknesses and is put at risk by a lack of international coordination, so our efforts should be focused on strengthening the tools we already have rather than formulating new ones.

European Perspectives panel: Bruno Tertrais, Camille Grand and Bruno Dupre

European Perspectives

Dr. Bruno Dupré of the European Commission’s Security Policy Unit spoke about the European Union’s perspective on proliferation and the defense in depth. Some of the new challenges include the underestimation of illicit trafficking and the increasing importance of nuclear energy in the face of climate change. To date, the EU has addressed these challenges through support for international treaties and organizations as well as diplomacy (i.e. sanctions). The missing part of the picture has been illicit trafficking, which is now being reconciled by an increased focus on UNSCR 1540. EU assistance is also being promoted through the CBRN safety and security culture in attempts to establish a complete threat reduction program and comprehensive capacity-building opportunities. The EU is expanding that security culture by improving regional training networks and creating regional centers of excellence in Africa, Asia and the Mediterranean. In terms of ad hoc initiatives, the EU is pursuing new financial approaches and the G8 Global Partnership to consolidate and reflect what the new region should be. Beyond the Global Initiative and PSI, it is also developing partnerships and networks with major third country partners like Russia and the United States, and with international and regional organizations. Assistance alone, however, cannot be the cure. There must be regional ownership, and intelligence and industrial outreach will be key. The limit of the exercise will be the willingness to cooperate.

The Honorable Camille Grand from the Directorate for Strategic Affairs, Disarmament and Security in the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs spoke about the priorities of the upcoming French EU presidency in terms of enhancing the fight against WMD proliferation. The Iranian nuclear crisis represents a wake-up call to many of the EU partners, who may be working more closely with the United States and other Permanent Five members. The other major development is the role of non-state actors and the subsequent implementation of UNSCR 1540. Some of the critical factors in EU workings are the principal of unanimity, which lengthens the amount of time it takes to come to conclusive decisions, and strong differences of opinion between countries like France, a nuclear energy proponent, and those who are against nuclear energy altogether. The strategy for managing the proliferation crisis will entail a continuation of the EU 3+3 talks and keeping Iran under pressure with sanctions. The French EU presidency will not engage in huge policy exercises, but rather focus on concrete implementation measures; these will include strengthening multilateral regimes through export controls and the next round of the NPT. Though ambitious, the stage is currently set for success, as international counterproliferation initiatives have matured. The EU plans for combating proliferation include:

• Threat analysis through intelligence sharing on current trends
• Developing tools on consular vigilance (i.e. adding a proliferation dimension to EU-wide visa policies)
• Working on proliferation financing
• Developing interception tools—there are already similar initiatives for the illicit trafficking of small arms and light weapons underway
• Trying to develop tighter legislation to punish proliferation activities

Discussion

The speakers touched on one important point about the difference between EU and NATO approach to WMD: NATO does not have an integrative policy, but merely a military response. The policies of the two organizations are not necessarily divergent, but they do start from two different points.

Middle East panel: Bruno Tertrais, Elahe Mohtasham and Mustafa Alani

Middle East Panel

Ms. Elahe Mohtasham of the Foreign Policy Center gave a talk on the degree of uncertainty in Iran’s nuclear fuel cycle program. Mohtasham was the first Western academic to have access to an Iranian nuclear facility and scientists. Outside estimates determined that Iran would not be able to complete 50,000 centrifuges at Natanz because of technological problems and breakdowns, so there is no point in giving them concessions. One of the major problems for intelligence is the difficulty in identifying and analyzing motives rather than technological capabilities, but there are still some great unknowns in terms of Iran’s technical advances. Mohtasham’s motives for this study were twofold: if we can gain more certainty on the status of the Iranian program, it might pave the way for the removal of favorable conditions; also, uncertainty is the key variable in any type of procurement. It is impossible to eliminate uncertainty in the Iranian nuclear question, and it is unlikely that any of the scientists even know 100 percent of what’s going on. Based on their past history, however, they shouldn’t have too much trouble—as of 2006, Iran had already run 3000 centrifuges, and has also been able to modify other designs. It was during this period that the international community missed key opportunities for engagement. Mohtasham recommended regional initiatives and national ownership of production facilities, which would discourage states to engage in a race to ramp up their nuclear fuel cycles.

Dr. Bruno Tertrais of the Fondation pour la Recherche Stratégique presented his methodology to predict the next nuclear Middle East country. The goal of his work was to come up with a net assessment of the alleged “cascading” effect, exploring both technical and political dimensions, using both qualitative and quantitative analysis. He found little evidence throughout the region of any significant developments in uranium enrichment programs, power reactors, research reactors or plutonium separation. Some states have not enforced a Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement (CSA), and the majority of states do not have the Additional Protocol (AP) in place. Tertrais analyzed three main areas:

• Security rationales. Turkey has a strong multilateral guarantee with NATO, but has increasing tensions with the United States and Europe. The GCC has no formal guarantee, and most others (i.e. Algeria, Libya, Egypt) have no security guarantee.
• Political rationales. In the Arab world, nuclear technology is viewed as a symbol of strength and independence, but a military program cannot be used to that end if it is conducted in secret. These technologies may be used to enhance internal legitimacy by second-generation leaders in Syria and Egypt and armed forces in Turkey and Algeria.
• Opportunity costs. The cost of open military-related activities is too high given sanctions and the interruption of civilian nuclear assistance. The lesson of the September 2007 Syrian strike is that the military option exists, possibly without punishment.

Tertrais’ net assessment of six case studies—Algeria, Egypt, Libya, Saudi Arabia, Syria and Turkey—included a hierarchy of risks by quantitative analysis of incentives and disincentives. Egypt was ranked the highest risk, and Turkey the lowest. He concluded that in current conditions, “hedging” will be the dominant behavior, characterized by keeping the option of enrichment or reprocessing, increasing training and expertise, and conducting experiments in secret. Factors that could change this calculus would include Iran withdrawing from the NPT; a major geopolitical event like an Israel-Syria peace deal; supply changes from China, Iran or Pakistan; and the evolution of U.S. policy such as a withdrawal of nuclear weapons from Turkey. Tertrais remains optimistic for now, but any event could set off major changes.

Discussion

One of the most significant findings from this panel concerned the process of hedging—the more you invest in hedging, the more you are proceeding beyond it. By investing significantly before having a real civilian program in place, you essentially have a full-blown military program. There is no evidence that the Iranian government has made definite decisions, but it is building a strong infrastructure to have the option of going nuclear. The more we push multinational fuel cycles, the more we make Iran come out with what it is doing. Though this may represent an economic answer to a political question, it gets us where we need to be.

Dr. James Acton of King’s College, University of London explored the links between verification and enforcement. The current nonproliferation policy foci regarding safeguards are detecting misbehavior and deterring misbehavior, the latter being the safer and more effective option. Intent is also an intuitive focus because of its political significance (i.e. enriching uranium for civilian use versus military use—one is perfectly acceptable, while the other represents an international violation). In the case of Iran, however, the focus on intentions rather than actions has hindered the ability of the Security Council to enhance sanctions and increase pressure. The IAEA Bulletin lists what Iran claims its intentions are, but does not assess these intentions—nor should it, given the ambiguous nature of intent and the intelligence conflicts it would entail. There are serious consequences for taking intentions into account when you do not have an organization that can assess it for all states. Deterrence, for example, is crucial to the functionality of international regimes; we must ensure that misbehavior will be acted upon, no matter what the likelihood of detection. The extent to which intent is taken into account harms the effect of deterrence, as debates about intent are essentially irresolvable between states that do not share detailed data on intelligence (as is the case with the United States and Russia with regards to Iran). Two more problems arise: violators can evade punishment by playing the intent card in the event that they are caught misbehaving and stirring up an irresolvable debate, and the more we focus on an intent that cannot be clearly determined, the more room we give Russia to work with Iran to the benefit of their bilateral relations and the detriment to the international community. Better verification will not help this situation—the earlier you find out about violations, the harder it is to determine intent. Rather, we must get better at handling the consequences of misbehavior, bringing politics up to speed with technology. The members of the Permanent Five can do the following:

• Stop using intent as an argument in order to downplay its role and stop giving states like Russia political space to oppose sanctions
• Apply consequences to allies regardless of intent to send a message of zero tolerance, as should have been the case with the United States when South Korea violated safeguards
• Consider generic resolutions that set consequences into effect regardless of intent

Dr. Wyn Bowen from King’s College spoke about plausible deniability, face saving and nonproliferation breakthroughs. Plausible deniability is defined as a situation in which individuals or governments can credibly claim not to have taken a particular decision, to be involved in a specific activity or to have ceased involvement, although in reality they have direct responsibility. A successful course of action leaves little room for plausible deniability; coercion, too offers little cover, as there is an observable chain of events and it is difficult for a target to claim that they were coerced into action. In terms of nonproliferation, plausible deniability is linked to saving face. In the case of Libya, the three negotiating parties maintained plausible deniability prior to December 2003. In an attempt to save face, the Foreign Minister made the announcement, which distanced Qadhafi from the decision. The Bush Administration erred in publicly linking the “demonstration effect” of the Iraq War, overstating the war’s impact and unnecessarily war-hawking to neighboring states. In Iran, saving face is even more important than in Libya because of the pluralistic nature of the Iranian political system. The “Axis of Evil” speech resulted in a loss of face for Khatami, contributing the to reassertion of influence from hardliners. In addition to maintaining and building pressure, we should play on the Iranian “face maintenance” to prevent a breakout, making it difficult for them to establish a military nuclear capacity. The loss of face for not remaining in the NPT would be too damaging for Iranian factions, both internally and internationally; this could go hand-in-hand with an offer for unconditional talks. It should be noted, though, that seeking positive movement on the part of Iran may require some loss of face for Western states in negotiations and concessions.

Discussion

One of the primary discussion points was the extent to which face is tied to Ahmadinejad. It is certain that the next president will have to distance himself from the nuclear question, as it may be a more international issue than it is for Ahmadinejad now. Having Bush lose face might have been an incentive for negotiations; if the next U.S. president is willing to negotiate from the get-go there will be no face loss for Ahmadinejad. In dealing with Iran now, a carrot and stick approach my be the most effective in getting a real solution which still allows them to save face, but some hard lining may also be necessary to send the right message to others.

New Tools and Old Problems

Dr. V. Siddhartha of the UN 1540 Committee gave his personal assessments on the implementation of UNSCR 1540. As of May 2008, the first national reports on implementation have come in from 153 member states and the European Union, along with additional information from 103 states. The extent of implementation is determined through measures taken by states reflected in their individual matrices of over 300 data fields covering 1540 requirements, national framework and enforcement. Ratification is a matter for member states, as 1540 does not describe the specific details of compliance. The overall completion rate for all states stands around 30 percent. UNSCR 1810 intends to “Encourage the pursuit of the ongoing dialogue between the 1540 Committee and States on their further actions to implement fully resolution 1540 (2004) and on technical assistance needed and offered.” This resolution promotes horizontal communication to group states with other like-minded and similarly capable states. It also “Encourages all States to prepare on a voluntary basis summary action plans with the assistance of the 1540 Committee as appropriate, mapping out their priorities and plans for implementing the key provisions of resolution 1540 (2004), and submit those plans to the Committee.” There is a requirement for three Security Council committees to enhance cooperation: the committees for 1540, 1267 (Al-Qaeda/Taliban, 1999) and 1373 (Counter-Terrorism, 2001). 1540 and 1373 seek to enhance compliance by capacity-building; a cooperative approach is necessary to get all 191 states involved. If the authority of the Security Council is overused, the propensity of states over time will be to do the bare minimum, and implementation must be viewed more as a long-term exercise. The question remains whether compliance is a matter of will or capacity.

Dr. Lewis Dunn from SAIC explored the role of Cooperative Security Activities (CSA) in meeting today’s proliferation challenges. One must think of CSA as a process, a principle and a set of tools. The process is bringing to bear a comprehensive set of cooperative actions, both bilateral and multilateral. The principle is building on areas of cooperation. The set of tools consists of a “basket” of six tools: negotiated agreements; unilateral actions; information, data and dialogue; visits, personnel and exchanges; joint studies, experiments and initiatives; and joint programs and centers. There should be a mix of potential means to work on a given strategic challenge and to shape the global strategic future, though some strategic relationships will not be ripe for some time. Dunn explained how one could apply the CSA concept to today’s proliferation challenges, regardless of whether it’s a question of a new tool and old problems or an old tool and new problems or both:

• Strengthening Permanent Five cooperation. The time is ripe to regularize and extend today’s more ad hoc, event-driven strategic challenges. P5 dialogue should be regularized, and joint studies may help build habits of cooperation.
• Containing CBRN terrorism. Cooperative activities and initiatives are already in place, including PSI and the Global Initiative. We can preserve and reinforce current cooperation and pursue multilateral actions for accelerated implementation of 1540.
• Preventing runaway proliferation. CSAs can support efforts to roll back North Korea and block Iran; they can also help strengthen the legitimacy of nonproliferation norms and institutions. The top priority here should be to deal with the problem countries. We can extend the process of U.S.-Russia nuclear rollback to buttress the longer-term legitimacy of norms and institutions, and provide a longer-term nuclear vision by engaging fully on nuclear abolition through joint studies, experiments and P5 activities.
• Managing proliferation risk of widespread use of nuclear energy. Here, CSAs can contribute across the toolkit. Reciprocal unilateral actions can buy time, joint programs and commitments can manage the fuel cycle and provide security assurances. In the meantime, dialogue must continue.
• Avoiding nuclear weapons use. Our strategy should be to buttress existing dialogue and release information and data within political and legal constraints, and to pursue joint studies with wider P5 participation and terms of reference.

Discussion

One concern brought up during the discussion session was a shift of jurisdiction for 1540. The more you overload the Security Council, the more you diminish its power to implement and back each resolution with sanctions. Another was the next U.S. president’s priorities given feasibility and payoff, which include transforming the U.S.-Russia strategic relationship to be non-competitive, continuing to work on problem countries through nuclear abolition, and working P5 cooperation to hold leaders accountable and accelerate 1540 implementation.

Old Tools and New Problems

Professor James Russell of the Naval Postgraduate School spoke about arms markets and illicit procurement networks. The objectives of this research are to gain a better understanding of the dynamics in today’s nuclear market, identify conditions under which actors jump the reservation, determine if empirical case studies suggest theory that points us to I&W indicators alerting us to black market development and illicit nuclear transactions, and suggest ways to deter or interdict illicit market activities. Today’s global nuclear infrastructure consists of 435 nuclear power reactors in 30 countries, 284 research reactors in 56 countries, and 220 reactors powering ships and submarines. Exponential growth in this area is forecasted, resulting in more uranium mining, more conversion and enrichment plants, and more training of scientists, engineers and technicians. Using Pakistan, Iraq, Iran and North Korea as case studies, the following commonalities become apparent:

• Illicit procurement networks start out supporting state efforts
• Use of allies/nationals abroad; social networks matter
• Use of front companies, or seeking struggling companies
• Personalities matter in terms of technical expertise and management
• Use of logistics in-place: networks are able to use these to transport easily
• Taking advantage of loose state control
• Access to expertise, internally and externally

Common indicators include:

• Procurement of dual-use items
• Known entities or affiliations with suspected proliferants
• Relevant companies in trouble, possibly looking for new clients
• Possible firings or loss of employment at relevant companies

In meeting the proliferation challenges ahead, we must focus on the supply side, reviewing relevant industries that have the capability to produce and ship. We must also go after the network essentials such as engineering and technical knowledge, logistics and finance.

Mr. Bruno Gruselle of the Fondation pour la Recherche Stratégique talked about supply and demand in WMD proliferation networks. Proliferation networks can be defined as functional organizations to buy and sell systems, components and technologies. They are comprised of a multiplicity of public and private actors, including financial establishments, industrial suppliers, government officials, brokers, front companies and so on. They represent a complex system involving both willing and unwilling people and companies scattered around the globe, dealing with a relatively limited amount of money compared to other types of illicit markets. The coexistence of supply and demand make WMD acquisition and sale a market in economic terms. In financial terms, the variety of people and companies to be paid and the sheer number of transactions allows a great deal of network activity to occur below the radar, but legal transactions create documents attached to contracts, and even cash eventually has to find its way back into the banking system. Previous experience tracking terrorist funding will prove useful in detecting WMD financing. In order to neutralize WMD networks, priority must be given to a global action to take down key functions rather than interdicting a given operation. The three pillars of neutralizing networks are intelligence (mapping networks, detecting operations), repression (taking down key players) and interdiction. Some methods that should be put to use in the future include enhancing the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) mandate to include WMD proliferation trafficking; enhancing bilateral pressure on countries known to serve as platforms for production, transshipping and the establishment of front companies; reducing the dissemination of key proliferation technologies; and strengthening brokering regulations and export controls.

Discussion

The utility of case studies was explored, as they capture the broad dynamism of today’s processes, but also yield fairly specific results about proliferation patterns, and thus studying these cases is our best shot at interdicting the next threat.

Concluding roundtable: James Russell with co-sponsors Wyn Bowen, Bahman Baktiari and Mustafa Alani

Concluding Roundtable

Professor James Russell, Dr. Michael Wheeler, Dr. Friedrich Steinhäusler, Dr. Bruno Tertrais, Dr. Wyn Bowen, Dr. Mustafa Alani and Dr. Bahman Baktiari concluded the conference with a roundtable discussion. The main themes addressed in the concluding roundtable were:

• Measuring success. It is unclear whether terminating or eliminating nuclear programs is ever permanent, as is currently the question in North Korea. Rolling back programs, as with India and Pakistan, is unpopular but necessary to prevent a major cascade of proliferation.
• Iran. We need to reconceptualize the way we look at the Iranian government, taking into account the fact that it operates like a horizontal “factionocracy” and is extremely resilient. It is important to identify regional, national and internal factors that influence Iranian actions because it is often difficult to discern whether what they think, say or do is most valid (and their thoughts, words and actions often have little in common).
• The threat from non -state actors. The risk of non-state actor (i.e., terrorist) capacity to obtain and use WMD has been greatly exaggerated. Since 9/11, there have been failed WMD attempts and successful attacks using conventional explosives, but nothing close to the scale of the 9/11 attacks. While the intention is unquestionably there, the ability does not follow close behind and is unlikely to develop in the near future. The question is whether we just focus on keeping the materials out of their hands, or accept that they might acquire them and prepare for the consequences. While perhaps we should not focus so much on intentions, we should continue to study the dynamics between intentions and capabilities to stay a step ahead of would-be proliferants.
• Legal frameworks. The system is in a far better position to prevent a terrorist attack than it was before 9/11. All the necessary legal measures, treaties and recommendation are already in place; we should now use this window of opportunity to show that we’re serious about counterproliferation by addressing the known shortcomings in our legal framework, fully implementing the resolutions we already have and granting the necessary jurisdiction to effectively enforce these mechanisms.

Agenda  2008 Monterey Proliferation Seminar Global Perspectives of the Proliferation Landscape: An Assessment of Tools and Policy Problems

Sponsored by the Defense Threat Reduction Agency’s Advanced Systems and Concepts Office

In cooperation with King’s College, University of London; Gulf Research Center, Dubai; Fondation pour la Recherche Stratégique, Paris; University of Salzburg; School of Policy and International Affairs, University of Maine.

10 – 12 June 2008, U.S. Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California

Monday, 9 June

1700 – 1830 Conference Registration: Hilton Garden Inn Monterey, 1000 Aguajito Road, Monterey, CA 93940; (831) 373-6141

Tuesday, 10  June

0700 – 0755 Conference participants can walk or drive 3 blocks from the Hilton to the Sloat Street entrance of the NPS campus. Attendees will be on the gate access list for the duration of the conference. The Mechanical Engineering Auditorium (site of conference activities on 10-12 June) is inside the gate to the left. Continental breakfast will be provided at the conference site.

0800 – 0845 Introductions and Orientation

Dr. Michael O. Wheeler, Director, Advanced Systems and Concepts Office, Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA-ASCO); ProfessorJames Russell, Naval Postgraduate School.

0845 – 0930 Keynote Address

Honorable Patricia McNerney, Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary for International Security and Nonproliferation, U.S. Department of State.

0930 – 1045 Perspectives on the Defense in Depth: A Glass Half Empty or Half Full?

Panel Chair: Dr. Michael Wheeler, DTRA-ASCO.

Speaker 1: Honorable Robert Joseph, Senior Scholar, National Institute for Public Policy, Fairfax, VA.

Speaker 2: Dr. Robert Gallucci, Dean, Edmund Walsh School of Foreign Service, Georgetown University, Washington, DC.

1045 – 1100 Break

1100 – 1230  European Perspectives

Panel Chair: Dr. Bruno Tertrais, Fondation pour la Recherche Stratégique, Paris.

Topic 1: “The European Union’s Perspectives on Proliferation and Executing the ‘Defense in Depth’,” Dr. Bruno Dupré, Security Policy Unit, European Commission, Brussels.

Topic 2: “Enhancing the Fight against WMD Proliferation: Priorities of the Upcoming French EU Presidency (2nd semester 2008),” Honorable Camille Grand,  Deputy Director for Disarmament and Multilateral Affairs, Directorate for Strategic Affairs, Disarmament and Security, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Paris.

1230 – 1315  Lunch, La Novia Room, Herrmann Hall, NPS

1315 – 1430 Countering the Threat of Non-State Actors

Panel Chair: Dr. Friedrich Steinhäusler, Director, Government Radiological Measurements Laboratory; Full Professor of Physics and Biophysics, University of Salzburg.

Topic 1: “Tools to Prevent BW Use by Non-State Actors,” Dr. Jez Littlewood, Director, Canadian Centre of Intelligence and Security Studies; Assistant Professor, The Norman Paterson School of International Affairs (NPSIA), Carleton University, Ottawa. (Link to presentation slides; link to conference paper.)

Topic 2: “Legal Instruments to Prevent Nuclear WMD Use by Non-State Actors,” Dr. Friedrich Steinhäusler, University of Salzburg.

1430 – 1445 Break

1445 – 1545 South Asia Panel

Panel Chair: Professor Feroz Khan, Naval Postgraduate School.

Topic 1: “Problems in Executing Non- Proliferation: An Indian Perspective,” Dr. Rajiv Nayan, The Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses, Delhi.

Topic 2: “Pakistan’s Approach to Countering Proliferation,” BG (Ret.) Naeem Salik, Visiting Scholar, Johns Hopkins School for Advanced International Studies, Washington, DC.

1550 Buses depart from NPS, stops at Hilton

1620 Buses depart Hilton for Château Julien

1630 Reception hosted by the School of Policy and International Affairs, University of Maine; Chateau Julien, 8940 Carmel Valley Rd., Carmel, CA (831-624-2400)

1800 Buses return to Hilton

Wednesday, 11 June

0730 – 0800 Walk to ME from Hilton; continental breakfast

0800 – 0930 Middle East Panel

Panel Chair: Dr. Mustafa Alani, Gulf Research Center, Dubai.

Topic 1: “After Iran: A Methodology to Predict the Next Nuclear Middle East Country,” Dr. Bruno Tertrais, Fondation pour la Recherche Stratégique, Paris.

Topic 2: “The Degree of Uncertainty in Iran's Nuclear Fuel Cycle Programme,” Ms. Elahe Mohtasham, Foreign Policy Center, London.

0930 – 0945 Break

0945 – 1115 The Future of Nonproliferation and International Regimes

Panel Chair: Dr. Susan Martin, King’s College, University of London.

Topic 1: “Actions, Intentions and Standards of Evidence: Exploring the links between verification and enforcement,” Dr. James Acton, King’s College, University of London.

Topic 2: “Plausible Deniability, Face Saving and Non-Proliferation Breakthroughs,” Dr. Wyn Bowen, King’s College, University of London.

1115 – 1230 New Tools and Old Problems

Panel Chair: Dr. Kerry Kartchner, U.S. Department of State.

Topic 1: “Implementation of UNSCR 1540,” Dr. V. Siddhartha, UN 1540 Committee.

Topic 2: “Meeting Today’s Proliferation Challenges: The Role of Cooperative Security Activities,” Dr. Lewis Dunn, Senior Vice President, SAIC.

1230 – 1330 Lunch, La Novia Room, Herrmann Hall

1330 – 1445  Old Tools and New Problems

Panel Chair: Dr. Scott Sagan, Director, Center for International Security and Cooperation, Stanford University, Palo Alto, CA.

Topic 1: “A Theory of Future Proliferation Networks,” Professor James Russell, Naval Postgraduate School.

Topic 2: “Supply and Demand: The Economy of WMD Proliferation Networks,” Mr. Bruno Gruselle, Fondation pour la Recherche Stratégique, Paris.

1445 – 1500 Break

1500 – 1600 Concluding Roundtable

• Professor James Russell, Naval Postgraduate School
• Dr. Michael Wheeler, DTRA-ASCO
• Dr. Friedrich Steinhäusler, University of Salzburg
• Dr. Bruno Tertrais,  Fondation pour la Recherche Stratégique
• Dr. Wyn Bowen, King’s College
• Dr. Mustafa Alani, Gulf Research Center
• Dr. Bahman Baktiari, Cohen Center, School of Policy and International Affairs, University of Maine

1630 Conclusion of open session

1830 Buses transport conference participants from Hilton to Carmel Beach

1845 – 2130 Beach party!—Carmel Beach at 13 th Ave (dinner provided); bring fleeces

*Note: The suggested dress for all conference events is “California casual”—no suits, no ties. Sweatshirts/fleeces/sweaters are recommended for Wednesday’s beach party.

Conference POCs:

Professor James Russell

• O: 831-656-2109
• C: 831-915-0629
• jarussel@nps.edu

Ms. Trisha Bury

• O: 831-656-7527
• C: 360-460-3635
• tlbury@nps.edu
• Fax: 831-656-2949